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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an investigation into the accounting practices by which British and 
American expatriates make sense of Western involvement in the Middle East. Based 
on the analysis of an audio-taped archive of some sixty hours of face-to-face interview 
material recorded in Kuwait during a ten-month period in the year immediately 
following the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, this project explores the interactional 
work by which speakers situate their conversational contributions in dialogic 
anticipation of a range of competing but mutually co-implicative demands for 
accountability which they take their talk and their participation in the circumstances 
of that talk to entail. Specifically, speakers are seen to manage the productive tension 
between the competing demands for accountability to conflicting assumptions about 
the nature of prejudice on the one hand, and the awareness of and/or sensitivity to 
cultural difference on the other, in and while attending to the situated concerns for 
their warrant in making the claims that they do and the degree to which they are 
implicated in those claims in and through the activity of their production. In this way, 
conflicting assumptions are show to be constitutive of the social practices whereby 
speakers account for Western involvement abroad. 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
I: Others 
II: Full Circle 
Introduction I 
Overview of the Thesis 3 
Approaching the Other: A Theory of Methods 7 
The Familiar Other: The Paradox of Alterity 12 
Managing the Crisis in Anthropology 14 
Dialogue and the Rhetorico-Responsive Model of Interaction 21 
Dialogism and Social Constructionism 21 
Dialogue and the Negotiation of Meaning 23 
Contributions to Social Constructionism 34 
Points of Comparison: Differences in Contributions to Social 
Constructionism 37 
Analytic Materials 44 
Conclusion 50 
2. Work on Work on (Work on) the Other: Literature Review - Writing 
an Argumentative Foil 62 
Methodological versus Theoretical Appeals to Transcendence 65 
Reflexive Implications in Social Constructionism 80 
Conclusion 91 
3. Incumbency and Entitlement: Category Membership and Identity as 
Participant Concerns 98 
Speaker Incumbency and Identity as Participant Concerns 99 
Accounting for Social Mobility 101 
Anticipating Criticism: Reductionism and the Description of Culture 113 
Conclusion 127 
4. Reflexivity, Racism and the Voice of the Other 132 
The Spectre of Racism 134 
Attending to Arab Identity: Race, Nation and the Voice of the Other 151 
Recruitment and Corroboration: Colluding with the Voice of the Other 161 
Conclusion 169 
5.20/20 Hindsight: Narrative as a Device in the Management of 
Competing Demands for Accountability 174 
The Analysis of Narrative 174 
The Narrative Time Machine: Temporal Disjunction as a Resource 176 
Narrative and the Rhetoric of Experiential Authority 186 
Constructive Analysis: Theorising One's Presence 192 
Conclusion 198 
6. Respecting the Wishes of Others: Providing for the Relevance of 
Cultural Sensitivity in Arguing for the Legitimacy of Western 
Involvement Abroad 202 
Having a Clue: Making Sense of Military Conflict in the Persian Gulf 204 
Working Against Time: Difference and the Perils of Acculturation 209 
The Palestinian Diaspora and the Legitimacy of Policy 218 
Discussion: Repertoires (Reflexively) Revisited (R[R]R) 226 
Conclusion 229 
7. A-Conclusion 233 
Mundane Navel Gazing 235 
The Post-Colonial Middle Kingdom 237 
Appendix: Transcription Conventions 242 
References 245 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I: Others 
If I had it to do all over again, I would make the same decisions and for all the same 
reasons. Along the way, though, I have had some very pleasant surprises. It is the 
business of these remarks to acknowledge these by directing my thanks to a number 
of different people. 
To Toine van Teeffelen, who without fail always had a suggestion of 
something fascinating to read. 
To all the members of Loughborough University's Discourse and Rhetoric 
Group (DARG) who I've had the tremendously good fortune to encounter (either 
directly or in the legacy that they have left to those of us who joined the group after 
their having moved on) for providing a most stimulating environment for the 
exchange of ideas. 
To my thesis supervisor, Jonathan Potter, whose work gave me the impetus 
to relocate to Loughborough and whose scholarship justifiably continues to be 
celebrated as exemplary. To Mikhail Billig, my Director of Research. To Derek 
Edwards, a rare teacher who can sustain my attention for phenomenal amounts of 
time with his eloquence both in print and in the lecture theatre. To Malcolm 
Ashmore, Katie MacMillan and Sumiko Mushakoji: `way out' there on the bleeding, 
cutting edge of the social sciences. To Matt Kops, for quite a number of different 
reasons which are distinct from but not independent of his being a good drinking- 
buddy. To Stephanie Taylor, for demonstrating that it can be done. To Susan Speer, 
a waking giant. To Mary Horton-Salway who engaged me for all the right reasons, 
responding as I would have wished without ever neglecting to bid me on to something 
more. 
To Jim White, Warden of William Morris Hall, who in providing me with a 
position as a subwarden there created a far more pleasant space of retreat from 
scholarship than I could have ever hoped for, and in so doing made it possible for me 
to accomplish my academic goals. 
I know what I mean. They know what I mean. I know what I mean because 
they know what I mean. 
I should also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Overseas 
Research Students (ORS) Award Scheme for partial funding of this project as well as 
to acknowledge a generous grant from the Timothy John Godfrey Memorial Fund. 
II: Full Circle 
I have read treatises whose first order of business was to acknowledge, with thanks 
and praise, indebtedness to none other than the Deity. I would like to think that since 
first having encountered such statements, my theology has matured to the point that 
I can regard acknowledging those around me as a not altogether different act. 
11 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has as its topic an issue that has engaged the Western project of inquiry 
for at least the last three-hundred and fifty years: that of alterity - the question of 
the Other. In particular, this work is concerned with the way that alterity features as 
a topic in accounts by Western expatriates of their experience of living and working 
in the Arab Middle East. Based on an extensive body of face-to-face interview 
material collected from among the community of British and American residents of 
the Persian/Arabian Gulf area, the thesis explores how it is that when accounting for 
their presence in the region, speakers attend to matters of racism, cultural difference, 
racial and ethnic prejudice, and the legitimacy of non-indigenous contact with and 
interaction among those whom they regard as the Arab cultural Other. 
The main concern here is not, however, one of working to identify these 
issues as aspects of the talk: to find instances of, say, prejudice or differences in 
cultural outlook in and among those expatriate participants who have taken part in this 
study. Instead, the concern is with precisely how just such matters feature as concerns 
for and among those participants themselves, and with the sort of significance this has 
in constituting the activity in which those participants are engaged when making sense 
of their own presence in the region where they reside. In other words, the concern 
is with how speakers bring off their activity of accounting for their involvement in 
the Middle East as something in relation to which just such considerations are 
essentially relevant. In particular, how do speakers make sense of their own identity 
in terms of contrast with some Other, and what is the relation of the assumptions to 
which they are mutually oriented in their talk when doing so? How do such 
assumptions constitute the activity of mutual orientation by which speakers make 
sense of their involvement in the region? Further, what are the reflexive implications 
of that involvement for the activities in which such accounting gets done? That is, in 
what sense is the activity by which speakers account for their experience of residing 
in the Middle East itself constitutive of that activity? 
One principal claim in this thesis is that to the extent that speakers reflexively 
attend to the implications of their talk about residing in the Middle East, then 
accounting for that experience constitutes that experience. In other words, their talk 
is an instance of that about which it is an account (at least implicitly). This thesis, 
among other things, explores that relationship. The investigative (i. e., interview 
related) activity produces that which is sets out to explore (viz., the experience of 
Western expatriates in the Middle East) and in so doing, it constitutes its own object 
of analysis. The question of why and/or how participants account for their presence 
in the Middle East is thus co-terminous with an account of their participation in the 
then current setting - the interview - where that very question is itself at issue. In 
reflexively accounting for their account - that is, in attending to the implications that 
the production of their own interview talk potentially raises for its reception - 
speakers also and thereby simultaneously attend to the matter of making sense of their 
presence in the region. It is in this regard that the subtitle of this thesis ('Talking the 
Experience of Western Expatriates in the Middle East') is relevant. While the claim 
here is not that the talk under consideration is constitutive of all of the participants' 
experience in the region (even while that experience is the topic of their talk), that 
talk certainly constitutes that experience of which this thesis is an examination. Thus, 
this thesis takes sense-making as its topic, in the sense that it is a concern for both 
participants and a means by which participants pursue their concern. 
In addition, the thesis also examines the way that speakers attend to a range 
of competing demands for accountability in their talk, exploring how it is that 
managing the conflict between such demands constitutes the activity in which the 
notions of Westerner and (Arab) non-Westerner are rendered meaningful. Such 
demands include one's accountability to be neither prejudiced nor unaware of cultural 
difference. It is in this sense that speakers occupy a discursive space between two 
competing assumptions that inform their talk - as alluded to in the thesis title ('In 
the Gulf the Between Prejudice and Culture'). Part of our concern in this thesis will 
be to explore how speaker efforts to manage the tension between these competing 
demands for accountability are themselves constitutive of the rhetorical work by 
which accounting for the Western presence abroad is accomplished. That is, without 
this tension, there is no talk about Western involvement to be had as such. The 
conflict is constitutive of the sense-making activity wherein accounts of Western 
involvement derive their significance. 
As we shall see, the relation this has to the matter of alterity is at least two- 
fold. Firstly, alterity features in the talk we will consider as an assumption the 
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availability of which speakers provide for throughout their talk. The relevance of 
alterity is provided for in talk about cultural difference, and it informs the discussion 
of the Arab Other throughout. Second, and at the same time, the matter of alterity is 
also taken up as a theoretical concern in and through the very activity by which 
speakers discuss the Arab Other. In other words, the concern with alterity-the 
theoretical concern with the Other - features as both topic and resource for speakers 
in their activity of bringing the very assumption of alterity to bear in accounting for 
their own presence in the Middle East. It is this overall task of this thesis to explore 
this relationship between participants' concern for alterity in these different but related 
ways. 
Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is concerned, then, with how accountability for sensitivity to and 
awareness of cultural difference is related to accountability for prejudice; and with 
how the two are mutually co-implicative in the talk under consideration here. The 
analytic task will be to explore how speakers work to manage the two sets of 
conflicting demands in such a way as to sustain dialogue. In so doing, they display 
their orientation to the situation as one for which such concerns are constitutively 
relevant. 
Chapter 1 ('Approaching the Other: A Theory of Methods') establishes the 
groundwork for a dialogic approach to interaction, basing this on the work of the 
Russian social philosopher and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. A dialogic approach 
is concerned with issues of alterity in making sense of interaction. This concern with 
alterity is related in the chapter with the issue of the Other, and the comparison is 
made with this issue as both a theoretical concern characteristic of the Enlightenment 
project of inquiry and a concern among participants in the talk. The interesting 
relation here is that of how what is taken up as a theoretical concern is also, in the 
talk we consider, reflexively deployed as a means in attending to the demands for 
accountability that those concerns are taken to imply. 
Chapter 2 ('Work On Work On [Work On] the Other: Literature Review - 
Writing an Argumentative Foil') is concerned with previous work in which these 
issues are taken up. Conceived as an exploratory exercise in the reflexive implications 
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of observations regarding a discursive approach toward the production of textual 
representation and the objectification accomplished thereby, this chapter is something 
of a review of the literature which has such issues as its concern. Thus, what 
distinguishes the work of this chapter from an otherwise ordinary literature review 
is that it seeks to examine the reflexive implications of analysing analytic practices. 
Specifically, this chapter looks at instances where the analytic scholarship which takes 
the analytic/scholastic projects whereby culture and racial prejudice are objectified 
works to exempt itself from accountability for the self-same sort of deconstructive 
scrutiny which it objectifies in the work it examines; and further with how this is an 
inevitable feature of any analytic project. In this way, Chapter 2 works to display the 
very point it seeks to make about analytic work in its own take on the analytic work 
which takes analytic practices as its object. In objectifying such scholarship, it works 
to display how objectification works. 
The analysis of corpus material begins in Chapter 3 with a consideration of 
issues surrounding identity ('Incumbency and Entitlement: Category Membership and 
Identity as Participant Concerns'). This chapter addresses the rhetorical work that 
speakers pursue in offering critical remarks on the motivation of expatriate residents 
for their presence in the region. It is concerned with the way that speakers manage 
issues of identity, attending to the potential for their participation in the interview 
situation and the adequacy of their contribution to that interaction (as expatriate 
interviewees) to be construed as implying a range of negatively accountable 
inferences. As such, it is an explanation of how speakers manage the competing 
demands of their participation in the interview setting as between providing their 
contributions with experiential authority while managing the extent to which their own 
expatriate identity implicates them in the negative inferences which they work to 
make available in the very activity of making such identity relevant to the talk. As we 
shall see, it is in displaying an awareness of those very demands for accountability 
to assumptions concerning the awareness and tolerance of cultural difference whereby 
speakers are able to manage the extent by which they themselves are implicated in 
those demands. 
Chapter 4 ('Reflexivity, Racism and the Voice of the Other') is concerned 
with the details of talk about the nature of prejudice and social discrimination and 
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with how these relate to implicitly available demands for awareness of cultural 
difference. Here, again, speakers work to manage a range of conflicting demands for 
accountability. Of particular interest is the situated nature of what is said to constitute 
racism - as between attending to physical phenotype, national origin or some other 
feature. It becomes clear that in orienting to matters of racial discrimination as 
relevant to the circumstances of the talk, that speakers must employ the very sorts of 
definitional criteria whose use they work to make accountable in pursuing the situated 
activity of attending to the management of that accountability's extent. At the same 
time, however, speakers also display the reflexive awareness of this in and through 
their talk. 
Chapter 5 ('20/20 Hindsight: Narrative as a Device in the Management of 
Competing Demands for Accountability') is specifically concerned with the role of 
narrative in managing conflicting demands for accountability. Specifically, we explore 
the details of how speakers create a distinction between themselves as the character 
of a narrative account and as the teller of that account in the then present context of 
that account's telling. In creating this sort of a disjunction, speakers are able to 
manage the competing demands for accountability with which they are confronted in 
their talk. In addition, we also examine how theorising one's own experience 
similarly has the effect of creating a disjunction between the speaker as the object of 
his or her own analytic scrutiny and as the individual who works to conduct that 
activity itself. This splitting of the speaker is productive as a device for managing the 
tension between competing demands for accountability. 
Chapter 6 ('Respecting the Wishes of Others: Providing for the Relevance of 
Cultural Sensitivity in Arguing for the Legitimacy of Western Involvement Abroad') 
takes up the theme of cultural sensitivity as a participant concern by examining the 
argumentative uses for which the implicit demands for accountability are employed 
in legitimating Western involvement abroad - in particular with reference to the 
Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-91 and Western-based corporate concerns. Here we 
shall see how speakers argue that Western actions in these matters is itself expressive 
of cultural sensitivity and also how they attend to the potential for their argumentative 
efforts to be construed as motivated - that is, how they deal with issues of stake and 
interest in the formulation of their argumentative accounts. In this way, implicit 
5 
criticism of Western involvement is itself accounted for as an instance of insensitivity 
to cultural difference. 
In Chapter 7 ('A-Conclusion'), we return to the issues of analysis and examine 
the theoretical implications of how the reflexive inferences of an issue are themselves 
deployed in taking up an argumentative stance. 
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Chapter 1 
APPROACHING THE OTHER 
A Theory of Methods 
[Q]ualitative research ... 
discovers what has always been known: We are our own 
subjects. How our subjectivity becomes entangled in the lives of others is and has 
always been our topic. (Denzin, 1997: 27) 
This thesis project is conceived as a contribution to research in social constructionism, 
and this chapter is concerned with explicating some of the methodological 
considerations that are at issue in a project of this sort. In particular, its purpose is 
to describe the theoretical assumptions that inform the investigation which comprises 
the substantive analyses in Chapters 3-6 to follow. Providing such a description might 
at first appear as if it should be relatively straightforward, but one of the most 
difficult aspects of writing about analytic methods from a social constructionist 
approach is that it is the very distinction between theoretical and methodological 
concerns which is problematic for social constructionism in the first place (Gergen, 
1992). The very question of what method itself involves is at issue in the sort of 
analytic undertaking that a thesis such as this one sets out to accomplish. Any 
treatment of methods, therefore, must begin with this observation from the very 
outset. 
Any discussion of social constructionism, however, might also usefully begin 
by contextualising some of these problematics within the tradition of inquiry informed 
by the assumptions of a Cartesian dualism. Central here is the approach intrinsic to 
a representational model of mind (and, relatedly, of language) which regards reality 
as having an autonomous existence independent of the descriptive practices whereby 
it is portrayed - an approach which Rorty (1980) refers to as the mirror model of 
mind. ' Determining the degree of accuracy with which various representations of 
reality reflect that to which they refer has been one of the chief analytic goals within 
the Cartesian tradition of inquiry. Representations, because they are theoretically 
distinguished from their referent, thus become an object of scrutiny insofar as their 
accuracy (or lack thereof) is taken to result in distortion of some sort. Inherent in 
such efforts is the privileging of an implicitly available set of comparative criteria 
which are themselves paradoxically regarded as transcendent of or unaffected by the 
same sorts of contingencies to which they are applied as a corrective. In other words, 
the contingency of perspective is an assumption that this sort of inquiry takes as both 
its starting point and as its defining problematic. That is, situatedness of perspective 
is of concern both as an assumption that informs the inquiry and as a problematic to 
be resolved. Thus, one's point-of-view - the position from which they see things and 
from which that perspective is defined - has implied for Cartesian inquiry the 
possibility that there might be a place from which the situated contingency of 
perspective can be transcended (Lynch, 1994). Involved in such inquiry, then, is the 
circuitous effort to transcend the limitations in perspective which the situated 
contingency of a given description is taken to imply. It is this particular objective that 
has characterised the Enlightenment project from its inception, and indeed is 
constitutive of same (Berman, 1982; McGowan, 1991; Smart, 1992,1993). 2 
This sort of analytic approach is thus interesting for how the assumption 
concerning a representation and its object(s) are situationally deployed to inform one 
another. Specifically, it must be assumed that there is either an unchanging, given 
nature to one's perspective (making it possible to investigate alterations in reality), 
or else that the reality of which one's perspective is said to be a representation is 
itself assumed to be unproblematically given and unchanging (in order that the 
interrogate of alterations in perspective might be pursued). In this way, assumptions 
about the nature of reality and representation co-implicate one another. Relating this 
to some of the definitive problematics in psychological theory, Edwards (1997: 10, 
emphasis in original) remarks: 
Cognition and reality are like two sides of a coin. If we want to know about 
cognition, we need to take account of the world, hold reality constant, or vary it 
systematically, so that we can discern the workings of mind. If we want to know 
about reality, it is cognition and other human foibles that have to be held constant or 
under control. We have to assure ourselves that we are not deluded, mistaken, or 
misinformed, seeing what we expect or want to see, and this may require systematic 
methods for countering the vagaries of mind. (... ) The interesting thing, of course, 
is what happens when we consider any such purchase on non-psychological reality 
to be itself a product of human perceptions, artefacts [sic], practices, and accounts. 
It is this mind-versus-reality dualism that a social constructionist approach 
works to interrogate. This is accomplished in investigations of how the distinction 
between the description and the object is itself one that is employed in order to attend 
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to socially significant, interactional business in the contexts of its use. For example, 
in social constructionist work on the discursive practices through which the mental 
(that is, mental phenomena) is objectified in psychological theory, the distinction 
between mental representation and mind-independent reality is approached as one 
whose relevance is provided for in various discursive practices as a way of 
legitimating, among other things, a range of interventionary therapeutic practices 
(Danziger, 1990; Rose, 1990,1996). Mental representations of reality are regarded 
(in the social constructionist work) as set against what representation-independent 
reality is taken to be (in the work which such social constructionist analyses take as 
their object - that is, the first-order level of work which is said to objectify the 
mental) in order to argue that that work (the first-order work) is itself employed to 
legitimate interventionary practices. The reading of how the dichotomy is produced 
is itself deployed to undermine the legitimacy of the claims entailed therein. 
Similarly, social constructionist approaches to the question of cultural difference 
regard the matter of culture itself as one whose relevance is made available in the 
context of discursive work to legitimate, say, Western projects of colonial and neo- 
colonial expansion (Barker, et al., 1994; Bloom, 1994; Childs and Williams, 1997; 
MacKenzie, 1995). 
What these different examples of social constructionist work have in common 
is an approach that interrogates the dualistic assumptions of a representational model 
by exploring how those assumptions are made relevant in the specific contexts of their 
use. While there is continuing debate surrounding the scope of analytic purview that 
a social constructionist position should or ought to include, (related, specifically, to 
the question of whether the ironising, deconstructive reading of a given text 
reflexively encompasses itself within the theoretical scope of what is regarded as 
constitutive in its objectifying practice [Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985; Woolgar, 1988: 
73-78; Potter, 1988; Edwards et at., 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 19921), there is a 
shared concern with objectification as an interactionally achieved practice. As we will 
see, this concern is of direct relevance to the issues raised by participants in the 
conversations that comprise the analytic materials of this thesis, and features as 
germane to the work of this thesis in producing that concern in its analysis. 
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One particularly good example of analytic research where such claims are 
considered is that of the sociology of scientific knowledge (ssK). Nigel Gilbert and 
Michael Mulkay (1984), for example, have explored the way in which assumptions 
about the constancy either of viewpoint or of reality are selectively invoked in 
scientists' accounts of their professional activities. Specifically, Gilbert and Mulkay 
describe how scientists work either to bolster or else to undermine their own or their 
professional rivals' particular versions of reality by selectively referring either to the 
mind-independent `out-there-ness' of a version's referent (the empiricist repertoire), 
or else to the perspectival contingency of a version as the mere product of mind (the 
contingent repertoire) depending upon the implications that either of these imply for 
the legitimacy of theoretical models at issue in those accounts. As with Edwards' 
observations on the nature of cognition and reality in the passage quoted above, so 
too in the accounts that Gilbert and Mulkay examine, the assumption of mind- 
constancy necessarily informs a theoretical interrogation into reality while the 
assumption of the static and unchanging nature of reality informs interrogation into 
theoretically formulated perspective itself. This means that the assumption concerning 
reality (as distinct from mind) is mutually co-constitutive or co-implicative of the 
assumption concerning mind from which it is taken to be distinct. That is, talk about 
perspective paradoxically entails making assumptions concerning mind-independent 
reality and vice-versa. ' Remarking upon this, Edwards (1997: 58-59, emphasis in 
original) notes: 
What emerges from Gilbert and Mulkay's research of scientists' accounts] is that the 
empiricist repertoire alone is inadequate for science in practice. Like cognition and 
reality, scientific truth and error are mutually implicative, and one of the things that 
has to be done in practice is resolving disagreements or contrary claims. Since proper 
adherence to the idealized formal canons of method should not, according to the 
empiricist repertoire itself, produce errors, then some other, contingent form of 
accounting is required, particularly for persistent errors and entire research 
programmes. Error accounts are essential to the credibility of factual accounts, and 
include various kinds of stubbornness, interests, rivalries, and misguided allegiances. 
The interesting outcome of Gilbert and Mulkay's research into the accounting 
practices that they consider is the ease with which participant scientists deploy the 
range of otherwise seemingly conflicting or mutually exclusive ways of talking about 
their professional activities and those of their colleagues. In terms of how this relates 
to the concerns of this thesis, the point is that the accounts of scientific activity that 
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Gilbert and Mulkay examine are expressive of concerns that characterise a project of 
deconstructive irony more generally. It is this paradoxical feature of how mutually 
conflicting assumptions inform talk about the practice of scientific inquiry that is 
addressed in discussions of the `foundational crises' that are said to plague work 
throughout the social sciences. This issue has been a matter of concern since the 
earlier part of this century with work in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(Mannheim, 1949; Dant, 1991; Ashmore, 1989); and more recently has been attended 
to in the disciplinary debates in the domains of social psychology (Elms, 1975; 
Parker, 1989), social and political philosophy (Bhaskar, 1989,1993; Norris, 1997; 
see also related discussion in Parker, 1992: Ch. 2) and in the debate surrounding 
realism and anti-realism (Norris, 1990; Potter, 1992a; Potter et at., 1990). 
The principal reason that the issue of contingency in scientific (or other) 
knowledge has proven problematic has to do with the way in which claims about 
situated contingency are themselves made available as a rationale in seeking to 
transcend the limitations of perspective which they are taken to imply in the first 
place. That is, the situated and (by implication) necessarily contingent nature of a 
given perspective on reality is seen as legitimating efforts to transcend or escape the 
limitations that it entails. The assumption involved is that reality might somehow be 
accessed in a straightforward or unmediated fashion if only the contingencies of given 
representations can be understood and thereby set aside. A paradoxical feature of such 
efforts is that they exempt themselves from the scope of this interrogation. That is, 
the very scrutinising activity whereby this setting-aside is itself accomplished is 
excluded from consideration as an instance of representational practice. ' The 
constitutive paradox of such a tradition is that it seeks to explore the limitations of 
perspective as a means of achieving a transcendence to which such limitations will not 
be effected -a sort of perspectiveless perspective, as it were or, as Derrida (1976) 
might put it, a view from nowhere. 
It is for this reason that Greer (1997: 84) distinguishes two different strands 
of ironisation in work to examine representation: one which he glosses as an anti- 
realist, anti-foundationalist social constructionism (referring to the work of Gergen 
[19851, Shotter and Sampson 11983,19871); and a second that he calls social 
constructivism - an approach which, while concerning itself with a number of 
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different social factors in accounting for the development of particular kinds of 
knowledge, nevertheless allows for the sense of a discourse-independent reality to 
inform its readings (Greer refers here specifically to the work of Rom Harre, James 
Averill and Donald Polkinghorne). s Whether defined as a feature of the individual 
(as with the case of mind) or of some collective (as with the case in working to 
delineate some set of socio-cultural norms and values); social constructionism, 
broadly speaking, examines the discursive means by which perspective is 
distinguished from that about which it is taken to be a representation. ' The distinction 
that Greer makes and its relevance to particular analyses raises some rather interesting 
issues concerning the reflexive implications for an analysis of claims to 
transcendence. 
The Familiar Other: The Paradox of Alterity 
The paradox involved in analytic efforts to legitimate knowledge claims is perhaps 
nowhere more evident than in the discipline of cultural anthropology. In particular, 
the disciplinary concern of anthropology with the matter of alterity - with the 
culturally organised perspective of some Other(s) - is one in which its own 
theoretical assumptions are brought to bear in the accounts of cultural systems 
(ethnographic descriptions) that are its product and are expressive of the effort to 
transcend the perspectival limitations of situated contingency. In other words, 
anthropology's activity of revealing the limitations in culturally defined outlook is, 
by definition, itself constitutive of an effort to transcend just such situatedly 
contingent limitations. This is so even where this is acknowledged to be the case in 
the theoretical writings within the discipline concerning just how such descriptions are 
formulated. By cataloguing and exhaustively describing the various contingencies 
which are said to define the human outlook, the paradoxical goal implied in such 
efforts is that of transcending the situated concerns that comprise the human 
perspective. The paradox involved is that where all representations of reality are taken 
to be contingent on the (culturally defined) circumstances of their production, so too 
are the representations of such representational activity. Thus, anthropology shares 
in the constitutive paradox of the Cartesian enterprise generally in that the limitation 
in perspectives that it formulates is itself implicitly determined relative to a set of 
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comparative criteria made inferentially available in an ethnographic description which 
is itself suspended from reflexive scrutiny. 
At the most fundamental level, the problematic is evident in the delineation 
of the analytic object - (the hu)man - as distinct from the activity of inquiry 
whereby that object is made available. In particular, this relates to how the production 
of ethnography as the discipline's central practical accomplishment is organised 
around a range of different and competing demands for accountability (Sharrock and 
Anderson, 1981). In the first place, ethnographic description addresses itself to the 
elucidation of unfamiliar or exotic systems of cultural organisation. That is, it 
concerns itself with alternative ways of conducting social interaction and of exploring 
how modes of interactional relations among co-members of a given populace are 
definitive of its social organisation. Thus, the task of ethnography is essentially one 
of translation since it is the job of an ethnographic description to translate the 
otherwise unfamiliar patterns of social organisation into a form that is comprehensible 
from within an alternative set of patterns (norms, values, etc. ) which is fundamentally 
different from it. The paradox this involves is that if the task of an ethnographic 
account is to make the unfamiliar accessible, it is also at the same time to preserve 
the exoticism of the Other as a way of obviating the task of translation between 
different culturally defined perspectives in the first place. Yet, to the extent that the 
unfamiliar is made accessible, it is thereby rendered non-exotic and no longer altern. 
It is the paradoxical tension between these two competing assumptions and the 
management of that tension which is constitutive of the practice of anthropology as 
a discursive undertaking. ' 
In terms of how this relates to this thesis, this project explores the way in 
which similar sorts of concerns with alterity inform the talk of British and American 
expatriate residents of the Middle East in conversations where they account for their 
presence abroad. Specifically, the concerns taken up in anthropological discourse are 
also at issue in the talk we shall consider where speakers attend to matters of cultural 
awareness and prejudice. Just as with ethnographic description, these two concerns 
are related in a particularly interesting way because attending to the issue of cultural 
difference raises a number of implications concerning bias and distortion on the part 
of the Other whose cultural expectations define them as Other. At the same time, this 
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raises similar implications with regard to the observer's description of that bias 
relative to his or her own view of the Other. In other words, assumptions about the 
contingency of perspective that are made available in talk about culture themselves 
raise reflexive implications for the speakers who provide for their relevance in their 
talk. This project explores how an assumption of reality-constancy is made available 
in talk where speakers attend to demands for an awareness of cultural difference 
(since invoking the values and outlook of a culture as such is accomplished relative 
to some criteria of comparison); while the assumption of mind-constancy is made 
available in talk where speakers work reflexively to foreclose a construal of such talk 
as itself prejudicially motivated. Exploring the details of what is this involves is the 
principal task of the analytic chapters which follow (Chapters 3-6, below). 
Managing the Crisis in Anthropology 
259. "But how can human understanding outstrip reality and itself think the 
unverifiable? "-Why should we not say the unverifiable? For we ourselves made it 
unverifiable. 
A false appearance is produced? And how can it so much look like that? For 
don't you want to say that this like that is not a description at all? Well, then it isn't 
a false appearance either, but rather one that robs us of our orientation. So that we 
clutch our brows and ask: How can that be? 
260. It is only apparently possible "to transcend any possible experience", even these 
words only seem to make sense, because they are arranged on the analogy of 
significant expressions. 
261. The "philosophy of as if" itself rests wholly on this shifting between simile and 
reality. 
(Wittgenstein, 1967: 48e, emphasis in original) 
It is the paradoxical nature of transcendence and contingency which is the subject of 
continued debate within anthropological theory itself - specifically with regard to 
debate concerning the adequacy of ethnography. Discussion on this matter involves 
responses ranging anywhere from the mere acknowledgement of the paradoxical 
nature of the competing assumptions (transcendence or contingency) to attempts at 
privileging one or another of the two assumptions at the expense of its alternative. In 
either case, however, the issue of conflict between contingency and transcendence is 
approached as a problematic that requires resolution. That is, the concern seems to 
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be that of resolving the paradox in order to make anthropological inquiry itself 
accountable to the very assumptions regarding contingency which it works to make 
available. What makes all of this so significant is that anyone should approach the 
paradox as something that requires resolution in the first place. That is, the paradox 
is seen as problematic only where there is an implicit claim that one's own knowledge 
claims themselves are not contingent on the circumstances of their production (even 
where those claims are that someone else's knowledge is so contingent). Were this 
not the case, and were the contingent nature of one's own claims (about the 
contingency of knowledge in general) itself employed as a display of the assertion 
which it itself entails, then there would be no need to attempt a resolution - that is, 
no problematic to attend to. The debate surrounding this issue, then, is one in which 
the contestants attempt to appropriate the rhetorical impact that an appeal to 
transcendent, value-neutrality provides even in making the claim that no such quality 
exists. 
Reworking Realism 
One particularly interesting example of how this appropriation occurs is that of 
Martyn Hammersley's What's Wrong with Ethnography? (1992). Hammersley takes 
up the sort of paradox entailed by a representational model of language in his 
discussion of what he glosses as realist and anti-realist readings of the ethnographic 
enterprise. For Hammersley, the resolution of the paradox between the necessity of 
contingency of perspective and the prospect of situational transcendence that an 
acknowledgement of that contingency suggests for him lies in what he refers to as a 
reworked realism. Though the details of his argument are rather involved, in the final 
analysis he argues that ethnographers should use a modified Popperian theory of 
falsification in order to manage the theoretical conflict between contingency and 
transcendence (Popper, 1959). 8 Such a position - in which the relative degree of 
validity of a particular model is determined by its purported resistance to 
falsification - attends to the accountability of contingency by asserting the 
independence and autonomy of a representation's object over and against that 
representation's situated character. It is as if merely acknowledging in principle that 
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one's own viewpoint has limitations were tantamount in practice to transcending the 
confines which those limitations impose. 
In addition, another way that Hammersley responds to what he sees as the 
problematics entailed by observations concerning the contingency of one's viewpoint 
is to argue that they are self-refuting. ' The upshot of this is to acknowledge the 
reflexive implications of perspectival contingency as a means to reassert a theoretical 
distinction between representation and object. Thus, while Hammersley concedes that 
it is not possible to attain a viewpoint or representation which is not itself contingent 
on the conditions of its production, he nevertheless argues that the relative likelihood 
that a representation is falsifiable can be established (if not in actual practice, then at 
least in principle). 
The very activity of interrogating the possibility of there existing some non- 
contingent, perspective-independent reality becomes, for Hammersley, the means 
whereby such a reality is asserted. 10 This means that his interrogation of the 
assumptions at issue proceeds upon and is informed by those very assumptions 
themselves. Hammersley thus works to reassert a realist ontology rather than to 
respecify its terms. In this respect, Hammersley shares a great deal with much of the 
scholarship that he sets out to review because even while often noting that the 
competing demands for accountability implicate one another so that the assumptions 
entailed by one necessarily conflict with the assumptions entailed by its opposite (that 
is, contingency rules out transcendence and transcendence runs counter to 
contingency), such critiques take up the resolution of the conflict between these 
demands for accountability as their own business. An alternative, of course, would 
have been to approach the conflict and its management as a practical task whose 
accomplishment is (at least, in part) the business-at-hand of anthropology. From such 
an approach, transcendence and contingency could be regarded as co-implicating one 
another so that the attempt to achieve transcendence necessarily violates demand for 
the recognition of contingency. At the same time, the recognition of contingency 
implies the possibility of transcendence (as the site from which, paradoxically, 
contingency can be recognised as such). It is the management of this paradox that is 
an essentially constitutive feature of an anthropological undertaking itself. 
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Yet Hammersley's review and much of the related scholarship to which it is 
a contribution do not do this. Instead, there is a drift whereby talk about the conflict 
between competing assumptions mixes with attending to the demands for 
accountability that they entail. Further, this involves some rather elegant rhetorical 
work in that the argument cycles-back and recognition of the conflict itself becomes 
a resource in the management of the paradox that it involves. For example, consider 
the way that in his critique of a realist position, Hammersley occasions the remarks 
whereby he works to reintroduce the very assumptions by which that position is itself 
informed (1992: 49-50, emphasis added): 
In what direction does a solution to the ambivalence towards realism that is built into 
ethnography] lie, then? The first step, I think, is to recognise that the realism often 
built into ethnographic methodology is of a relatively naive or crude kind. 
Effectively, it assumes not only that the phenomena we study are independent of us, 
but that we can have direct contact with them, contact which provides knowledge 
whose validity is certain. [... ] Such a view is clearly indefensible. It assumes that 
there is some foundation of direct knowledge to which we can get access. [... ] 
The next step in the argument is to recognise that relativism is not the only 
alternative to naive realism. There is a great danger of backing ourselves into a 
corner by deploying a dichotomy which obscures the wide range of epistemological 
positions available. We can maintain belief in the existence of phenomena 
independent of our claims about them, and in their knowability, without assuming 
that we can have unmediated contact with them and therefore that we can know with 
certainty that our knowledge of them is valid or invalid. The most promising strategy 
for resolving the problem, in my view, then, is to adopt a more subtle form or 
realism. 
Here, the development of Hammersley's argument is related to the issue of 
knowledge validity and the demand that an ethnography be held accountable to the 
assumption that the reality of which it is a purported description is independently 
verifiable. In arguing as he does here that there exists no reality which is description- 
independent, Hammersley implicitly introduces the very distinction which is at issue 
in the first place - viz., the distinction between knowledge and the reality about 
which that knowledge is said to be a representation, between epistemology and 
ontology. In other words, in recognising a conflict between the assumption that the 
object of one's analytic gaze both results from and is independent of the activity 
whereby it is contemplated, Hammersley works to gain some purchase on that conflict 
and thereby to resolve the paradox it entails by means of the very activity of calling 
attention to it. Again, recognition of the conflict is itself employed as a resource in 
managing the paradox involved so that that which is denied is asserted in the very 
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denial itself. The maintaining of belief, for example, is here taken to be somehow 
distinct from the asserting of claims about the objects of that belief; the knowability 
of some phenomenon is taken to be different from contact (mediated or otherwise) 
with that phenomenon; and the issue of validity is regarded as somehow entailed by 
certainty (even where that claim is argued against). 
Thus, relativism is deployed as a means of mediating in and where the 
potential for conflict arises as between the analytic meta-perspective and the 
perspectival limitations which it takes as its own object of scrutiny. Here Hammersley 
works to foreclose the potential for realism to be undermined through the implications 
of relativist arguments by attending to the implications of an anti-realist position 
without, however, dealing with the theoretical inferences that are entailed thereby. " 
In short, the discussion of the debate surrounding the adequacy of ethnography takes 
the very sorts of concerns it addresses - that is, the management of conflict - as a 
means of engaging in the very sort of activity that it sets out to examine. ' 
The Experience of Standing Outside Time 
A similar response to the supposed problematics that are taken to undermine the 
credibility of ethnography (on the assumption of a realist ontology, that is) is that of 
Johannes Fabian. In particular, his discussion of ethnographic chronology resembles 
Hammersley's critique in that it works to gain critical purchase from the 
acknowledgement of contingency as a means to resolve the paradox that it involves 
(Fabian, 1983). At issue here is something he refers to as co-evalness (or 
allochronism) involving, specifically the way that anthropological writing situates 
what it takes to be different cultural systems along a teleological scale such that any 
given socio-cultural system is construed as either more or less developed relative to 
some other culture on that same scale. For example, culture A (say, that of the 
Gahuku people of Papua New Guinea) is taken to be less `culturally advanced' than 
culture B (say, a society from among the Western post-industrialised countries like 
those of Europe or North America). Crucial to Fabian's discussion here is the relation 
between geo-physical space and temporality because what situating different cultures 
within such an evaluative scale entails is conceiving of them as located in different 
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times even when and where they are contemporaneous. Travel between different geo- 
physical spaces thus denotes travel through time. 
In developing this point, Fabian's assertion is that to pursue the fieldwork 
requisite for the production of an ethnographic account is itself to depend upon this 
set of assumptions about time and space, 13 and that this way of conceptualising the 
spacio-temporal necessarily entails a fundamental contradiction in the practical 
accomplishment of anthropology as an academic discipline which arises from the 
conflict entailed between the tasks of the anthropologist-as-participant in a foreign 
culture and the anthropologist-as-ethnographer of that culture (Fabian 1983: xi, 
emphasis in original): 
I will be searching ... 
for an "error, " an intellectual misconception, a defect of 
reason which, even if it does not offer the explanation, may free our self-questioning 
from the double bind of fate and evil. That error causes our societies to maintain 
their anthropological knowledge in bad faith. We constantly need to cover up for a 
fundamental contradiction: On the one hand we dogmatically insist that anthropology 
rests on ethnographic research involving personal, prolonged interaction with the 
Other. But then we pronounce upon the knowledge gained from such research a 
discourse which construes the Other in terms of distance, spatial and temporal. 
Specifically, epistemological warrant is accorded to the ethnography in proportion to 
the success of its author-as-participant among those peoples to whose different geo- 
physical and temporal space he or she has gained access and acquired firsthand 
experience. At the same time, that warrant is undermined to the extent that it is held 
accountable to the assumptions regarding contingency of perspective. Just as for 
Hammersley, so too for Fabian the constitutive contradiction by which the 
ethnographic enterprise is realised itself constitutes a problematic that requires 
resolution rather than a phenomenon of interest in its own right. 
On (Not) Being There 
Perhaps the most celebrated response to the paradox involved in the anthropological 
project which is similar to the sort of take that Fabian develops is that of Clifford 
Geertz (1988). Geertz explores the constitutive paradox of anthropological writing as 
a problematic by addressing how the production of ethnographic description as a 
professional practice is one whose success is crucially dependent upon the use of 
certain rhetorical devices whereby its authors imbue their accounts (and, by 
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implication, the theoretical constructs which they employ those descriptions to 
substantiate) with experiential authority in virtue of their own personal involvement 
among the peoples who are the object of those accounts. 14 Again, as with the work 
of Hammersley and of Fabian, what is particularly interesting about this is how the 
conflict in demands for accountability that are constitutive of the ethnographic project 
is itself taken up as a matter to be resolved. In Geertz's case, the objective appears 
to be one of making anthropology accountable to the assumptions of contingency by 
conceding the impossibility of transcendence. What is interesting about this is that 
such a concession is itself deployed as an implicit response to the demand for 
anthropological theory not to be circumscribed by the contingencies of its production. 
The concession is given for a response. This, however, is done from within 
anthropology -- as a way of attending to those very concerns which are its topic. That 
is, it is an attempt to legitimate anthropology, making it accountable to the 
assumptions concerning contingency that anthropology itself works to make available 
by simply acknowledging them. " 
In sum, we have briefly considered three different takes on the mutually co- 
implicative assumptions whose management and attending to is (at least partially) 
constitutive of anthropology as a disciplinary practice. What is significant here in 
terms of how these issues arise in the talk among Western expatriates we shall 
consider in the analytic chapters to follow is that the conversational participants attend 
to the same demands for accountability as a practical concern to be dealt with in their 
own talk. Both in professional contributions to the theoretical debate and the talk 
among expatriate speakers we shall have occasion to examine, the effort is to mediate 
the paradox rather than taking the activity of mediation as an interesting phenomenon 
to be considered in its own right. 16 In this way, these participants work to do 
anthropology, even while theorising what is involved in that activity. This thesis seeks 
to explore how that work of mediation is accomplished in accounts where cultural 
difference is attended to as a relevant concern as well as how the reflexive 
implications entailed in paradoxical nature of that conflict are handled in such talk. 
Thus, this thesis is concerned to respecify the issues that the debate surrounding the 
adequacy of ethnographic description throws up as its own analytic concern. 
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Dialogue and the Rhetorico-Responsive Model of Interaction 
The purpose in addressing the sorts of concerns and debates within anthropology 
taken up in the previous section is least twofold: (1) to demonstrate the complexity 
with which a discussion of the reflexive implications of the debate have in and for its 
very own conduct; and, perhaps more importantly, (2) to situate this debate within 
the broader context of the Cartesian enterprise. These two concerns are, as the 
anthropological theorisation we have considered here demonstrates, ultimately related 
to one another. In terms of how they relate to the analytic concerns of this thesis, 
however, their relevance has to do in particular with the way that British and 
American expatriates, in working to account for their own presence in the Middle 
East, orient to the sorts of competing assumptions (and their associated demands for 
accountability) that are of concern in the theoretical debate surrounding the 
ethnographic enterprise. In this sense, their talk is very much an expression of 
Cartesian problematics - that is, as mentioned, a sort of mundane anthropology. 
More specifically, though, we shall also see that pursuing the issues that are at stake 
in the debate surrounding the adequacy of ethnographic description is accomplished 
when and where speakers attend to the potential for their own contributions to be 
construed either as prejudicial on the one hand, or else as unaware of and/or 
insensitive to differences in culturally determined outlook on the other. We shall 
return to consider these matters in considerably greater detail both in discussion below 
and in the chapters that comprise the substantive analysis of this thesis to follow; but 
before doing so, we need first to elaborate a bit more upon the matter of alterity and 
dualism with which we began this chapter. Only then will we be in a better position 
to consider the details of how these concerns are attended to in talk among expatriate 
speakers. 
Dialogism and Social Constructionism 
One of the major issues of concern with regard to the talk we examine in this thesis 
is alterity - the question of the Other. As we have touched upon, alterity is an issue 
for anthropology because it is the Other and the perspective of the Other which is that 
discipline's object of analysis. Further, we have already suggested here that the 
21 
reflexive implications of situated contingency made relevant in discussions where the 
outlook of the Other is a topic itself holds significant ramifications for anthropology 
and for that discipline as a discursive undertaking which is itself accountable to 
particular assumptions constitutive of the Enlightenment project of inquiry. Now, an 
alternative approach to the question of alterity is to respecify the assumptions that 
inform one's inquiry such that the Other is regarded as an accomplishment of situated 
discursive interaction. Specifically, this means regarding alterity as something that is 
intrinsic to the production of any discourse, as inherent in the production of any sort 
of utterance; since as an utterance, a discursive product is addressed to a set of 
assumptions which it thereby construes of an Other. It is to situate a perspective 
relative to some alternative which that perspective is directed to as contrastive. From 
such an approach, alterity is conceived of as inherent to the very activity of 
addressing the Other. The perspective of the Other is not regarded as autonomous, 
and independently inherent in some Other, but rather is regarded as arising in the 
activity whereby that Other is addressed and thereby construed as Other. 
This position on what is involved in alterity is essentially the upshot of work 
in a dialogistic, rhetorico-responsive take on talk. A particular utterance is seen as 
oriented to the perspective of the Other, and it is in this orientation that alterity is 
constituted in and by the talk of participants to an episode of conversational 
interaction. It is the interactional response to that activity (a mutual orientation) by 
which this alterity-producing orientation is carried forward, extended in and through 
dialogic encounter itself. This is a different theoretical take on alterity than that 
developed within a Cartesian dualism because it does not begin with the assumption 
that there exist monadic, essentially individual points to and from which something 
is addressed; but rather that alterity is relationally constituted. In this way, the Self 
is regarded as constituted in some Other - that is, in the activity of orienting to a 
different perspective - and it is in that activity that difference in perspective as such 
is constituted. 17 
For our purposes here, of particular relevance to an approach of this sort is 
an emphasis upon and theoretical concern with the way that accounts of the world (or 
reality) are related to the interactional /social activity in which they come to be 
articulated. In particular, the emphasis here is on the interactional nature of those 
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accounts' production such that they are reflexively oriented to the sorts of responses 
with which they might be met in dialogue. In other words, accounts of the world are 
produced, among other things, for how it (that account) might be received by some 
interactional Other(s) in dialogue. Thus, an account is situated within a rhetorical 
field of alternatives to which it might possibly be taken to contrast as a routine feature 
of talk's production which Shotter (1993b) refers to as the rhetorico-responsive nature 
of interaction. " More specifically in terms of the detailed manner whereby an 
account is actually related, this means that talk is shaped in anticipatory foreclosure 
of a range of possible receptions with which it might be met - that talk is reflexively 
oriented toward pre-empting a particular reading /reception by which its significance 
might be construed. It is in and through the work of such anticipatory foreclosure that 
contrastive rhetorical positions are themselves interpellated. It is this particular feature 
of a dialogic contribution that is referred to in the work of the Russian literary 
theorist and social philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin with the term addressivity. '9 It is in 
such anticipatory work that the contrastive positions are inferentially made available 
in the talk. This work is, however, more complicated than this relatively simple 
description might imply because the very anticipatory work whereby a response is 
foreclosed itself becomes a factor in the shaping of the exchange between participants 
in the course of that encounter's ongoing development. Furthermore, it is in and 
through this activity of anticipatory work that interlocutors come to negotiate the 
meaning of their contribution in the process of establishing a distinction between their 
relative positions (Edmondson, 1981: Ch. 3). 20 
Dialogue and the Negotiation of Meaning 
One way that we can illustrate what a dialogic approach involves is to consider some 
specific examples of conversational interaction. Here again, Bakhtin's work is of 
particular relevance. In terms of what is involved in the interactional work of 
anticipating the sort of response with which one's contribution might be met in 
dialogue, Bakhtin discusses this under the rubric of voice. What is important to see 
here is how a contribution's (potential) reception is integral to its formulation. 
Consider, for example, the approach that Bakhtin develops in his analytic discussion 
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of the following excerpt from Dostoyevsky's novel Poor Folk (1960; quoted in 
Bakhtin, 1984: 207): 
A day or two ago, in private conversation, Yevstafy Ivanovich said that the most 
important virtue in a citizen was to earn money. He said in jest (I know it was in 
jest) that morality consists in not being a burden to anyone. Well, I'm not a burden 
to anyone. My crust of bread is my own; it is true it is a plain crust of bread, at 
times a dry one; but there it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and 
irreproachable use. Why, what can one do? I know very well, of course, that I don't 
do much by copying; but all the same I am proud of working and earning bread in 
the sweat of my brow. Why, what if I am a copying clerk, after all? 
In examining this particular passage, Bakhtin works to show the way that the remarks 
of the character Makar Devushkin are oriented to the potentially responsive 
contributions of an (otherwise) absent interlocutor. His point is that Makar 
Devushkin's remarks are shaped by those anticipated responses and that those very 
responses are accessible in the remarks by which they are oriented to as potentially 
available. In other words, these remarks have in them a sort of shadow or trace of 
the contrastive perspective to which they are directed, made available through what 
Bakhtin refers to as their accentual and syntactic structuring. In order to show this 
more clearly, Bakhtin (ibid.: 210) modifies this same passage, adding an explicit 
version of those alternative responses so that the text resembles a conversation 
between Makar Devushkin and an interlocutor giving voice to the statements to which 
his remarks are responsively oriented: 
THE OTHER: One must know how to earn a lot of money. One shouldn't be a 
burden to anyone. But you are a burden to others. 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: I'm not a burden to anyone. I've got my own piece of bread. 
THE OTHER: But what a piece of bread it is! Today it's there, and tomorrow it's gone. And 
it's probably a dry one, at that? 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: It is true it is a plain crust of bread, at times a dry one, but there 
it is, earned by my toil and put to lawful and irreproachable use. 
THE OTHER: But what kind of toil! All you do is copy. You're not capable of anything else. 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: Well, what can one do! I know very well, of course, that I don't do 
much by copying, but all the same I am proud of it. 
THE OTHER: Oh, there's something to he proud of, all right! Copying! It's disgraceful! 
MAKAR DEVUSHKIN: Well, in fact really, so what if I am just a copying clerk! ... 
[etc. ] 
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The point for Bakhtin in all of this is not to make the claim that an utterance 
determines its response; but that an utterance in nevertheless responsively oriented to 
the potential uptake with which it might be met in subsequent dialogue. ' In other 
words, Bakhtin is not claiming that these remarks here are the actual responses of an 
interlocutor; but rather that these are the sorts of potential rejoinders to which Makar 
Devushkin's remarks are oriented, and that the responsive orientation to just such 
rejoinders is made available in and with these very remarks themselves as an intrinsic 
feature of their design. In this sense, then, even though an utterance originates from 
an individual speaker, it nevertheless has the responsive reaction within it, so to 
speak, displayed in the concerns to which it gives expression. This is what Bakhtin 
means when he says that a single utterance is dialogic (ibid.: 209, emphasis in 
original) : 
[L]et us imagine two rejoinders of the most intense dialogue-a discourse and a 
counter-discourse-which, instead of following one another and being uttered by two 
different mouths, are superimposed one on the other and merge into a single 
utterance issuing from a single mouth. These two rejoinders move in opposite 
directions and clash with one another; therefore their overlapping and merging into 
a single utterance results in a most intense mutual interruption. This collision of two 
rejoinders-each integral in itself and single-accented-is now transformed, in the 
new utterance resulting from their fusion, into the most acute interruption of voices, 
contradictory in every detail, in every atom of the utterance. The dialogic collision 
has gone within, into the subtlest structural elements of speech ... . 
Again, the fact that a single utterance is the expression of what Bakhtin describes here 
as a sort of vocal fusion which contains an anticipated response within it is not to say 
that an utterance determines or indeed ever can determine the actual response with 
which it is met in conversational interaction. This is so because the anticipatory work 
of an utterance is itself something to which a response can always be made. Thus, 
whatever effort there may be to foreclose a particular construal of one's contribution 
is itself an effort which falls outside the scope of those projective attempts at 
anticipatory control or foreclosure. 22 
Bakhtin thus distinguishes between different senses of the term dialogic: (1) 
the dialogue which is internal to an utterance (in the sense described in the 
immediately preceding quotation), and (2) the interactional exchange that actually 
takes place between conversational participants and which involves the response of 
an interlocutor that itself escapes such anticipatory attempts at foreclosure as carried 
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out in dialogue of the first sort. In other words, Bakhtin distinguishes between the 
dialogic, interactional alternative anticipated in the responsively oriented design of an 
utterance, and the actual response with which that utterance (as so designed) is met 
in an exchange between individual speakers. Further, it is in the forum of this second 
sense of dialogue where the negotiation of meaning takes place as between 
interlocutors. Intrinsic to such negotiation however is the utterance internal, vocal 
fusion of the first sort of dialogue and the uptake with which it is met in actual 
conversational interaction. 
Dialogic Exchange and the Negotiation of Meaning 
In order to understand exactly what is involved with this second kind of dialogue and 
in particular how it relates to the situated negotiation of meaning, consider the 
following extract of conversational material taken from an extended interview 
involving a junior-level member of the u. s. diplomatic corps assigned to the 
American Embassy in Kuwait (speaker DB). This particular exchange was recorded 
in February of 1992, shortly following the events of the then recent Persian Gulf 
War. In the conversation recorded here, the speakers are attending to the business of 
introducing a range of issues having to do with the conducting of the Gulf War and 
of the United States' involvement in the hostilities related thereto. 23 
(1.0) Interview, 44 - junior-level u. s. diplomat 
1 KM: 
2 
3 DB: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Yeah. Well you must have been following the war pretty closely 
then, right? You [said] uh- 
[Mm. ] 
DB: Yeah. [Uh-] but uh- pretty much everybody was (Hx)@ @ back 
KM: [Yeah. ] 
DB: home, 
KM: Yeah, but I mean you- you would have uh- I mean but- but in the 
diplomatic corps, you're [saying] everyone was following it. Is 
DB: [Mm mm. ] 
KM: [[that it? ]] 
DB: [[Oh yeah. ]] Yeah. 
14 KM: 
15 
16 DB: 
Yeah, so um- I mean, I have some questions here ((REFERS TO 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE)) about the war I'm interested in] as well 
[Okay. ] 
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17 KM: xx, uh- well the first question on my list is always "Why did- why 
18 did the United States pursue the Gulf War". I mean as opposed to 
19 pursuing sanctions or uh- [pursuing] it- another option, why did 
20 DB: [Right. ] 
21 KM: they- why did the us government choose the course of action that it 
22 DID. Um- 
23 
... 24 DB: Just, you know, as my personal opinion? Or uh- 
25 
26 KM: Whatever you want to- I- whatever you feel inclined to GIVE 
27 [me] actually, but uh- because I don't know how uh- how much at 
28 DB: [Yeah. ] 
29 KM: liberty you are to- to tell me [[xxxx, ]] 
30 DB: [[Yeah. I can't talk-fl um- 
Involved in an exchange even as brief as this one is a great deal of rather subtle 
interactional work. Of particular concern to us here, though, is the way that the 
speakers in this exchange work interactively to negotiate the significance of their 
contributions to the encounter by managing the potential reception of those 
contributions in virtue of the projective (or anticipatory foreclosure) work on the part 
of their respective interlocutor. In examining this exchange, one inclination is simply 
to consider the talk as incidental to the actual business of discussing the reasons for 
u. s. involvement in the Gulf War. All this preliminary work might thus be regarded 
as somehow incidental to the real business-at-hand of the talk -a sort of verbal 
meandering around, perhaps clumsily conducted in order to establish exactly what it 
is that the interviewer has in mind in pursuing the talk. As we shall see directly, 
though, it is precisely in these preliminary remarks where a great deal of the 
negotiation of meaning takes place. Specifically, it is in this activity that speakers 
work to establish the significance of their (forthcoming) remarks as adequate to the 
occasion to which those remarks are a contribution. That is, speakers work here to 
negotiate the adequacy of their forthcoming contributions as appropriate to the 
occasion of which they are constitutive. Essential to this work is the very dialogic 
aspect of the contributions that each of the speakers makes in his respective turn-at- 
talk. More specifically, it is the first kind of dialogue to which we referred above - 
the dialogue internal to a particular utterance - that provides a resource with which 
interlocutors work to negotiate the significance of their talk in the course of pursuing 
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the second kind of dialogue - the actual, turn-by-turn exchange between individual 
speakers. 
The best way to begin discussing the details of what these different kinds of 
dialogue involves is first to consider the interactional work in terms of how the 
speakers make one anothers' situated activities accountable within the context of an 
interview situation (Clayman, 1992; Hutchby, 1996). Interview situations are 
remarkable as occasions of talk because, among other things, they often involve 
features in which the participants orient to the interaction as the generating of talk-to- 
be-overheard. This is evidenced by the particular way in which questions are 
broached and answers are likewise offered up for consideration. For example, in an 
interview situation, a speaker might raise a question which, in other circumstances, 
might itself possibly be called into account as one for which he or she (the 
interviewer) might reasonably be expected already to know the answer. In the 
interview situation, however, the status of the question is different than it might be 
in other circumstances in that the question-and-answer format is the very means 
whereby the speakers ongoingly accomplish their talk as an interview throughout the 
course of its conduct. 24 
In other words, it is precisely because the interviewer is working projectively 
to anticipate what the answer to his or her question might entail that the asking-of- 
questions and the related giving-of-answers is taken by the concerned parties as 
contributing to the talk as the accomplishment of an interview. Thus, the status of the 
question is such that it contributes toward that end in a manner which is constitutive 
of the particular occasion of talk in which it occurs. For example, by letting a 
question pass, as it were, and not making accountable the interviewer's broaching of 
that question; the interviewee thereby assents to the content of that question as 
constitutive of the talk's topic while at the same time construing what it is that he or 
she takes that content to be (as displayed in his or her response thereto). In contrast, 
by failing to answer an interviewer's question - that is, by interrogating the 
relevance of a question to the talk-at-hand or in some other way making that question 
accountable - the interviewee has at his or her disposal the means with which to 
reject the question's content for the sake of its relevance in constituting the talk's 
topic. The making accountable of an interviewer's question, therefore, constitutes an 
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interviewee's contribution to managing the talk's content in the circumstances of its 
generation. " Now, in terms of what this has to do with the different kinds of 
dialogue that we have considered and their relation to the negotiation of meaning, 
these question-and-answer contributions might be considered for how they are both 
dialogically related to one another, as well as for what sorts of internal dialogue 
might be involved. 
We can begin here by first considering the turn-at-talk wherein the interviewer 
quotes from the written schedule of questions to which he refers ('Yeah, so um- I 
mean, I have some questions here about the war I'm interested in as well xx, uh- 
well the first question on my list is always "Why did- why did the United States 
pursue the Gulf War". I mean as opposed to pursuing sanctions or uh- pursuing it- 
another option, why did they- why did the us government choose the course of action 
that it DID. Um-', lines 14-22). In terms of the internal dialogue involved, the 
shadows or traces of contrasting positions are made available where this turn is 
shaped in anticipation of a range of possible responses which it works to foreclose. 
For example, in referring to the interview schedule as such, the interviewer's 
remarks are oriented toward the potential that his contribution might itself be made 
accountable as contentiously raising a range of implications concerning his 
interlocutor's intentions and motivation for contributing to u. s. foreign policy 
objectives. That is, the question could be construed as implying that u. s. policy with 
regard to the Gulf War is unjustifiable or illegitimate and that speaker DB, in his 
capacity as a diplomatic staff member, is accountably complicitous in contributing to 
the pursuit of those objectives. The potential dialogic response to which his turn-at- 
talk is directed might thus be something along the lines of an inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the query as raising exactly such inferences. This could 
conceivably take the form of a response on the part of speaker DB such as: `Do you 
always ask such personally implicative questions of interviewees? ' or simply `How 
dare you imply that I have contributed to a morally reprehensible activity'. The point 
here is that the actual contribution of the interviewer (speaker KM) at this juncture 
is reflexively oriented to the possibility of its being taken as raising a range of 
potentially damaging inferences which have the effect of threatening continuation of 
the interactional encounter given the range of assumptions regarding moral 
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responsibility for war and violent conflict (and the interviewee's relation thereto) that 
they might be read as raising. It is in anticipation of just such a reading that these 
remarks are directed. The particular way that this is accomplished here is through the 
employing of the interview schedule as a resource to anticipate and foreclose such a 
response. 
At the same time, it is in the actual response to the very inferences that are 
thus made available (in speaker KM's work of anticipatory foreclosure) that speaker 
DB addresses his own reply ('Just, you know, as my personal opinion? Or uh-', line 
24). Notice, though, that his doing this involves working to negotiate the significance 
of the inferences through the formulation of their relevance to the very interaction 
itself. Specifically, this involves speaker DB making available a distinction between 
what he refers to as personal opinion and some other (as yet, unnamed) category of 
knowledge. 26 Now, what is important for our point here is not the question of 
whether the reply that speaker DB subsequently goes on to develop later in the 
interview is indeed an instance of personal opinion or not; but rather of how 
precisely, in making the distinction available as he does here, speaker DB's reply is 
dialogically oriented to the potential responses on the part of his interlocutor (the 
interviewer, speaker KM). In this particular case, the distinction very nicely 
anticipates the potential for the interviewer to find his (speaker DB's) account 
inadequate given the significance of the category entitlement (as a member of the 
diplomatic corps) whose relevance the interviewer works to make available in his 
prior turns-at-talk (lines 1-11). 27 It is in exactly this way - through the broaching 
of contrastive categories and the subsequent construal of them as situationally 
relevant - that both speakers work to negotiate the very terms on which the 
conducting of their interactional engagement is to proceed. That is, in their mutual 
orientation to the classificatory distinction, they interactively co-constitute it as the 
basis upon which they can proceed with their talk. 
Finally, notice further that in the interviewer's uptake (lines 26-29) to speaker 
DB's initial response (line 24) to his (the interviewer's) question (lines 14-22), the 
interviewer also attends to the accountability of his own question and the relevancies 
for its appropriateness as attended to in speaker DB's previous turn-at-talk (line 24). 
In replying as he does with a reference to the inclination of his interlocutor 
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('whatever you feel inclined to GIVE me, actually', lines 26-27), the interviewer 
works here to foreclose his own accountability for the answer speaker DB is yet to 
provide to the query in the original question. At the same time, however, he (the 
interviewer) also attends to the possible suggestion implicit in speaker DB's response 
that the initial query might have been a request for information that he (speaker DB) 
was unable to provide; and in so doing, displays his acceptance of the classificatory 
distinction it introduces along with the implicationally available constraints that it 
makes relevant. " It is in responses to the anticipatory foreclosure work - the 
internal dialogue - which they take to be available in one another's contributions that 
these speakers negotiate how their talk is significant for the setting of which it is 
constitutive. This is the result of jointly negotiation accomplished in the responsive 
orientation they display towards one another. Thus, it is in this sense that the 
internally dialogic aspect of a given utterance (of the first sort we considered) features 
in the interactive dialogue (of the second sort) by providing the contrastive vocal 
content in relation to which a response is formulated. 
Dialogue and the Dualism of Representationalism 
The implications that this sort of dialogic orientation hold for a social theory are quite 
far-reaching. The work of Bakhtin is closely related to the debate surrounding the 
adequacy of ethnographic description that we touched upon in the previous section 
because it addresses the dualism implicit in a representational model of language. 
Specifically, in conceiving of the utterance as dialogically oriented, the very 
independence of perspective which is implicitly deployed to bolster the credibility of 
an account is itself respecified. The question of whether a particular account is 
adequate is only meaningful in a context where one assumes a subject-object 
dichotomy. In that a dialogic approach works to suspend such an assumption (since 
it regards the nature of some object as intrinsic to the dialogic activity by which it is 
objectified), the problem concerning the adequacy of an ethnographic description 
simply fails to emerge. That is, the very problem with the adequacy of one's 
perspective (or account) of the world is dissolved in and where that world is regarded 
as relationally defined in dialogic interaction with some interlocutor. This raises a 
number of interesting theoretical considerations. In particular, this means that the 
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position that one adopts, so to speak, is always open-ended since it is always 
relationally defined. `The ... assumption of a gap 
between mind and world is 
understood by Bakhtin as a necessary interdependence between the two, making all 
discussion of a transcendental ego superfluous or at least inadequate' (Clark and 
Holquist, 1984: 67). For an ethnomethodologically inspired discourse analysis, as for 
Bakhtin, the `world' within which `mind' interacts is that of a projected relationship 
with some Other - the dialogic potentiality in the discursive position of one's 
interlocutor (see also discussion of related strands of sociological theory in Knorr- 
Cetina, 1988: 22-27). Remarking upon this matter, Clark and Holquist (1984: 90, 
italics in original) note: 
Alterity is the name Bakhtin assigns to the logic that determines mind, in the sense 
that it grants the capability of imagining whole entities to some aspects of the 
perception, namely to other selves that are not that mind, but it denies that capability 
to another aspect of perception, namely the self that is the mind. 
As we have seen, Bakhtin's analytic work on voice is particularly important 
because, among other things, it attempts to reveal the way that utterances or 
contributions in dialogue are designed in relation to their reception - to the voice of 
an Other. Bakhtin worked out an analytic taxonomy of no fewer than seventeen 
distinct categories with different dispositionally relational orientations ranging from 
that of `[d]irect, unmediated discourse directed exclusively toward its referential 
object, as an expression of the speaker's ultimate semantic authority' (Bakhtin, 1984: 
199) to various subtle yet distinct discriminatory refinements in orientation to 
alternative perspectival positions referred to as `double-voiced discourse' (ibid. ), 
including here various sorts of parody, stylization, etc. One way of approaching talk 
might be to elaborate upon this taxonomic categorisation by looking for instances of 
these different sorts of voice throughout an analytic corpus of material. To do this, 
however, would in some sense be to do violence to the interaction by failing to 
examine the business-at-hand in that talk. It would be to leave aside the work of the 
participants in favour of the development of a taxonomy -a move to which Bakhtin 
himself would no doubt have been opposed. 29 Thus, while the notion of voice is 
clearly relevant in exploring the talk at hand, it is secondary to exploring that talk's 
business -a heuristic or analytic prosthesis. Far more significant 
here is to explore 
the kinds of relevancies - the shared assumptions - that participants orient to as 
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relevant to the conducting of their situated interaction, and to examine how the social 
interaction is constituted in and through such activity. 30 
Alterity and Accountability 
To summarise at this point, the significance of a dialogic approach for the present 
investigative work, one of the issues with which this thesis is concerned is that of the 
problem of the Other - the issue of alterity. This is so in at least two different ways. 
In the first place, the thesis is concerned with alterity as a accomplishment in and of 
talk. That is, it is concerned with how interactional participants orient to the 
perspective of an interactional Other (or Others) in formulating their own relationally 
contrastive position. We have considered how this first kind of alterity is explained 
employing the metaphor of dialogue. The second kind of alterity with which this 
thesis is concerned involves the way that perspectival difference itself features as a 
topic of talk, and with how such talk is itself employed as a resource or device with 
which to situate one's position in contrast to an (often potential) interlocutor - that 
is, to a contrastive rhetorical position. The concern with alterity taken up in this 
thesis, then, will be with how the theoretically disputed issues concerning alterity are 
themselves deployed in argumentative and other contexts as a way of attending to the 
interactional business-at-hand in those contexts (Knorr-Cetina, 1988: 44-49). 
Otherness (perspectival difference, alterity) is thus a concern in this thesis as both an 
interactional accomplishment - the outcome or achievement of actual situated 
dialogue - and as a topic of concern to be pursued within such dialogue (and with 
which this first, interactionally achieved, alterity can be accomplished). " 
It is important to make this distinction clear because an analysis of alterity in 
talk (the topic of this thesis) can easily get confused with issues of alterity as a 
participant concern. In other words, because the issue of alterity is essential to an 
examination of the work that speakers do in conversational interaction, the temptation 
in exploring alterity as a topic of talk in the materials we examine is to engage in the 
same sort of analytic level-mixing that Hammersley and some of the other 
anthropological theorists we have considered do in their discussion of the issues 
surrounding the realism/anti-realism debate. That is, because the concern of 
participants is with the self-same theoretical issues that our own analytic endeavour 
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takes as its concern, the tendency is to confuse the issues that we seek to explore in 
our own analysis of talk with the (very situationally distinct and contextually relevant) 
issues that participants pursue in their own talk. 32 
Contributions to Social Constructionism 
Throughout the preceding section, a number of references have been made to various 
sorts of analytic contributions from ethnomethodology. In this section, we will turn 
to consider more explicitly the relation of ethnomethodology to social 
constructionism. This will involve examining certain similarities between the two as 
already mentioned. Perhaps more importantly, we will also examine some contentious 
or problematic issues that distinguish ethnomethodology from other work in social 
constructionism. Again, we shall see that the work of Bakhtin provides a useful point 
of departure with which to highlight the methodological issues that are of relevance 
to informing the analysis in this thesis. 
One way to go about this comparative task is to stress the sorts of concerns 
that are common to both a Bakhtinian analytic and ethnomethodology - concerns 
which characterise a social constructionist approach more generally. Possibly the most 
significant among these is an emphasis upon mundane, everyday social interaction. 
Bakhtin himself confined his exploration of analytic materials to works of 
literature; 33 however, as Morson and Emerson (1990) point out, the theoretical 
implications of Bakhtin's analytic work is of far greater significance in terms of the 
implications it raises for a philosophy of the social than his choice of analytic data 
might otherwise suggest. Indeed, Bakhtin's choice of analytic materials was to some 
extent decided by the limitations of the technologies as his disposal; and while access 
to audio- and video-recording equipment makes it possible to examine the most subtle 
and minute details of interaction with an attention to detail that was not possible for 
Bakhtin, it is still the same analytic interest with situated interaction that is of primary 
concern in the work of both Bakhtin and ethnomethodology. Both projects are 
concerned to explore how interlocutors accomplish mutual orientation in mundane 
interaction - an activity that Bakhtin referred to with the term prosaics and which 
ethnomethodology glosses in terms of the practical accomplishment of 
intersubjectivity. More specifically, the two share an emphasis on the anticipatory 
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responsiveness of interlocutors to one another's contributions - both actual and 
potential - in given episodes of situated interaction. 
This common concern means that the two bodies of work share a great deal 
in terms of the detail of their analytic methods. For instance, both approaches are 
concerned to examine the utterance as the fundamental unit of analysis (as opposed 
to some other structurally defined entity such as the linguistically categorised sentence 
or the logical proposition of analytic philosophy). 34 The reason for this, of course, 
has to do what the interactional nature of an utterance as oriented to the uptake with 
which it is met in conversational interaction. In contrast, structural analyses were 
among Bakhtin's most enduring targets of criticism precisely because they fail to take 
into account this relational aspect of interaction as dealt with in the sort of analysis 
that he worked to develop under the rubric of meta-linguistics. 35 For both Bakhtin 
and ethnomethodology, the utterance is to be understood as retrospectively and 
prospectively oriented, relationally constituted by as well as constitutive of its context 
and as involving an in-principal, infinitely defeasible or unfinalizable project about 
and within which more can always be said (Garfinkel, 1967: Ch. 1). 
Addressing the details of this particular context-related feature of talk, 
Heritage (1984: 242, italics in original; quoted in part in Edwards, 1997: 100) notes 
that within an ethnomethodological approach: 
it is assumed that the significance of any speaker's communicative action is doubly 
contextual in being both context-shaped and context-renewing. A speaker's action is 
context-shaped in that its contribution to an on-going sequence of actions cannot 
adequately be understood except by reference to the context - including, especially, 
the immediately preceding configuration of actions - in which it participates. This 
contextualization of utterances is a major, and unavoidable, procedure which hearers 
use and rely on to interpret conversational contributions and it is also something 
which speakers pervasively attend to in the design of what they say. The context- 
renewing character of conversational actions is directly related to the fact that they 
are context-shaped. Since every `current' action will itself form the immediate 
context of some `next' action in a sequence, it will inevitably contribute to the 
framework in terms of which the next action will be understood. In this sense, the 
context of a next action is repeatedly renewed with every current action. Moreover, 
each action will, by the same token, function to renew (i. e. maintain, alter or adjust) 
any more generally prevailing sense of context which is the object of the participants' 
orientations and actions. 
In terms of the sorts of analytic issues with which we are concerned in this thesis, 
these comments relate to the way that the talk of participants is dialogically oriented 
to the possible reception with which it can potentially be met (as we saw in the 
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analysis of Extract 1.0 above). In addition, however, this prospective/retrospective 
feature of interaction also means that a given set of assumptions potentially made 
available in talk itself provides the dialogic context relative to which speakers 
ongoingly formulate their remarks within a single turn-at-talk. That is, the context in 
relation to which a given utterance is situated is such that it involves making available 
various (often conflicting) assumptions that participants orient to as relevant in their 
talk and to which they display an orientation in their ongoing contributions to the 
interaction (Buttney, 1993). With reference to the conversational interaction we shall 
consider in the analytic chapters of this thesis, these assumptions are specifically 
related to a range of different issues having to do with both the awareness of cultural 
difference and prejudice. In particular, this means that speakers attend to the potential 
for their talk to be taken as an instance of prejudice while at the same time working 
to express an awareness of and/or sensitivity to cultural difference when accounting 
for their experience of living in the Middle East. In so doing, these speakers are 
reflexively oriented to a number of concerns regarding the accountable nature of the 
descriptive practices in which they themselves are engaged at the time. More 
interesting still is how talk about either cultural difference or prejudice are mutually 
co-implicative in the sense that by working to attend to one such demand, a speaker 
necessarily neglects its opposite, which in turn creates the context for subsequent talk 
with which to attend to the opposite concern. Talk about either prejudice or cultural 
difference are thus mutually co-occasioning. 36 In working to display sensitivity to 
and tolerance of cultural difference, speakers then orient (in subsequent talk) to the 
potential for that very work itself to be construed as prejudicially motivated. 
Likewise, talk about prejudicial expectations itself occasions subsequent talk by which 
speakers work to display an awareness of and sensitivity to cultural difference. 
Prejudice and the awareness of cultural difference thus form a constitutive 
contradiction which functions as a sort of vehicle for the interaction by which 
speakers account for their presence in the Middle East since either one occasions its 
opposite. 
These sorts of issues are important for how they relate to social 
constructionism in that they point up how the social (defined in terms of the sharing 
by participants of various norms and values which they thereby realise as relevant for 
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the conducting of their interaction) is an ongoing accomplishment of situated 
activities. The social is constituted in and by the jointly accomplished activity of 
mutual orientation. 37 
Table 1 Points of Similarity in the Approaches of Bakhtin and Ethnomethodology 
BAKHTIN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
the `already-spoken-about' and the `not-yet- 
spoken' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 136-138) 
retrospective/prospective orientation, context- 
shaping and context-renewing relation 
metalinguistics (Bakhtin, 1984: 202) emphasis on actual talk in use 
open-endedness/unfinalizability ongoing accomplishment in uptake 
prosaics (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 21-23) emphasis on everyday, mundane 
utterance emphasis on utterance 
joint creation of word 
interactive accomplishment of sense (a la 
Wittgenstein) 
Points of Comparison: Differences in Contributions to Social Constructionism 
314. Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty-I might say-is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. "We have already said everything. -Not anything that 
follows from this, no, this itself is the solution! " 
This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in 
our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. 
The difficulty here is: to stop. 
(Wittgenstein, 1967: 58e, emphasis in original; quoted in part in Heritage, 1984: 101) 
An investigation conducted under the auspices of the practical management of social 
order does not and cannot provide an answer to the question `what general principal 
provides for social order? ' If examined from the point of view of an interest in that 
question then such an investigation will appear to lack an answer to it. However, 
such a study does not fail to produce an answer, since it does not try to answer it. 
It has withdrawn that question and substituted another one. 
(Sharrock and Anderson, 1987: 294, emphasis in original) 
In touching on points of similarity between the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and 
ethnomethodology as we have above, our concern was to highlight briefly some of 
the central features of a social constructionist take on talk in general. In this section, 
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we will consider some of the more problematic issues that this relates to in terms of 
social theory. Specifically, we will be concerned here with how the respective 
approaches developed both in the work of Bakhtin and in ethnomethodology differ 
with regard to two specific theoretical issues: that concerning the nature of (1) social 
structure, and (2) individual identity/subjectivity. These two issues, as we shall see, 
are very closely related in that the approach which one adopts to an analysis of social 
interaction necessarily entails making certain assumptions about individual identity 
and vice-versa. The principal difference that distinguishes the work of Bakhtin and 
that of ethnomethodology is that of the degree to which either of them takes these 
issues up as their own concern. In the case of Bakhtin's work the issue of individual 
subjectivity and its relation to the social is a matter of some concern, and Bakhtin 
devotes considerable attention to exploring what he takes to be the theoretical 
implications of a dialogic approach that emphasises the responsive nature of talk. In 
contrast, for ethnomethodology, the matter of individual subjectivity is of interest only 
where it arises as an issue for participants in their talk. Where individual subjectivity 
is not a matter of participant concern, ethnomethodological analyses opt to focus on 
examining the business-at-hand to which interlocutors devote their activities in a given 
episode of interaction. 
This issue is particularly relevant to this thesis because of the reflexive 
implications that a social constructionist exploration of talk about social structure 
holds for the analysis whereby that exploration is accomplished. More specifically, 
the issue of social structure is particularly relevant to this chapter because any 
methods chapter involves accounting for and justifying the analytic techniques 
employed in the thesis itself. This typically means working to establish the 
independence of the analytic referent from the objectifying discursive practices 
whereby that referent is made available. However, in that a social constructionist 
position is one where this assumption is itself called into question, then an account 
of the very methods whereby an exploration of this objectifying practice is 
accomplished by speakers in their conversational interaction is one which must 
necessarily also take itself into account. In other words, this chapter is concerned with 
methods ('Approaching the Other: A Theory of Methods'), and the method adopted 
in this thesis is one of examining the details of talk as a way of deconstructing or 
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ironising (and thereby objectifying) the practices that social actors themselves pursue 
to engage in objectification. Now, in that the very ironising activity that forms social 
constructionism's analytic object is itself the activity (on participants' part) of 
objectification (specifying analytic objects), then the thesis' own analytic work 
whereby such participants' ironising activity is made available is itself implicated as 
an instance of that very activity it sets out to investigate - that is, as an instance of 
instance making. Thus, the implications for the thesis of an exploration of objectifying 
practices is reflexively multi-levelled. This is especially so in a thesis where the 
reflexive implications (for that thesis) of reflexivity-in-the-talk are the means whereby 
speakers hold structure accountable to dual and conflicting assumptions about the 
practice of accounting for activity with reference to some social structure (i. e., Arab 
culture). It is this sort of problematic that is definitive of any project of deconstructive 
irony. It also reflexively constitutes the thesis' problematic - that is, the problematic 
of the methods section of the thesis. " This further relates to the crisis in 
anthropology (surrounding the adequacy of ethnography) to which we referred at the 
beginning of the chapter. 
Not Somewhere Else: The Eminence of Social Structure 
One writer who takes up the issue of social structure and who argues for structure as 
an accomplishment of talk in interaction is Emmanuel Schegloff. For example, the 
issue of social structure is taken up in his article `On Talk and Its Institutional 
Occasions' where he considers how the interview constitutes a social institution whose 
structure is accomplished in the mutual orientation and display between interlocutors 
to the question-and-answer pair-part format. Discussing the way that social structure 
is an accomplishment of situated activity, Schegloff addresses related matters in his 
discussion of relevance and procedural consequentiality, noting the 
ethnomethodological emphasis upon the relevance, for participants, of institutional 
structure and its consequentiality to the conducting of their interaction. Schegloff 
(1992: 109-110, emphasis in original) makes his point this way: 
Now let us be clear about what is and what is not being said here. The point is not 
that persons are somehow not male or female, upper or lower class, with or without 
power, professors and/or students. They may be, on some occasion, demonstrably 
members of one or another of those categories. Nor is the issue that those aspects of 
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the society do not matter, or did not matter on that occasion. We may share a lively 
sense that indeed they do matter, and that they mattered on that occasion, and 
mattered for just that aspect of some interaction on which we are focusing. There is 
still the problem [however] of showing from the details of the talk or other conduct 
in the materials that we are analyzing that those aspects of the scene are what the 
parties are oriented to. For that is to show how the parties are embodying for one 
another the relevancies of the interaction and are thereby producing the social 
structure. 
Schegloff's point here is to say that at issue is not whether the interaction took place 
in a given institutional setting, but that the relevance of that setting is oriented to by 
participants. In other words, unless the setting is demonstrably consequential to the 
conducting of the interaction in which it takes place (versus its being an otherwise 
irrelevant feature of that occasion), and unless the speakers are so oriented to it as 
such and display for one another their orientation thereto; then it cannot, for an 
ethnomethodologically inspired project, be employed as an explanatory resource in 
an analysis of the interaction in question. Schegloff's concern is, again, with the way 
in which participants make their activities meaningful for one another, and he is 
interested in institutional settings to the extent that their relevance is provided for by 
participants (when it is provided for) in the course of their work to accomplish that 
task. The relevance of setting to an analysis of interaction is thus, for Schegloff 
(ibid.: 111, emphasis in original), 39 not something to which an independent appeal 
(independent of participant activity) is methodologically justified: 
Even if we can show by analysis of the details of the interaction that some 
characterization of the setting in which the talk is going on (such as "in the hospital") 
is relevant for the parties, that they are oriented to the setting so characterized, there 
remains another problem, and that is to show how the context or the setting (the local 
social structure), in that aspect, is procedurally consequential to the talk. How does 
the fact that the talk is being conducted in some setting (e. g. "the hospital") issue in 
any consequence for the shape, form, trajectory, content, or character of the 
interaction the parties conduct? And what is the mechanism by which the context-so- 
understood has determinate consequences for the talk? 
Of particular significance, once again, is that the social structure of setting is 
constituted in and through interactional work whereby participants provide for the 
relevance and consequentiality of a structure for the procedural conducting of their 
activities. It is in and through such activity where structure is brought off - 
accomplished. Structure is eminent in activity where its relevance is provided for. 4' 
Bakhtin's take on all this is somewhat different. Specifically, Bakhtin employs 
the notion of social structure as an analytic resource. That is, he employs the notion 
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of such structure as an explanatory device with which to inform his analysis of 
dialogue; and while not always consistent in this regard, he at times nonetheless 
accounts for the activity of dialogic interlocutors as in some sense determined by pre- 
existing structures of the social. In particular, this is apparent in Bakhtin's treatment 
of social language, national language and speech genre. For example, with regard to 
the first of these, Wertsch notes: `In Bakhtin's view, a speaker always invokes a 
social language in producing an utterance, and this social language shapes what the 
speaker's individual voice can say' (1991: 59). Another way of saying this is that in 
expressing parody, straightforwardness or any of the other vocal qualities that Bakhtin 
distinguishes in the taxonomy of voice types he outlines; a speaker is said to do so 
in relation to some alternative type. The vocal disposition (point-of-view or 
perspective) is defined in relation to some social language through which he or she 
ventriloquises and which, in this sense, is determinative of his or her talk. 
In an ethnomethodological approach, one does not assume the pre-existence 
of some language form that determines or shapes what the voice can say, rather one 
would analyze an utterance by saying that the vocal disposition acquires its status as 
such in the uptake with which it is met in the interactional encounter where it occurs. 
In other words, for ethnomethodology, whether some conversational contribution is 
or is not an instance of what Bakhtin refers to as ventriloquisation is itself a 
participant concern as displayed by participants for one another in the uptake that a 
given utterance occasions. Thus, if an utterance is responded to by an interlocutor in 
a subsequent turn-at-talk as somehow non-serious, a joke, or in some way not a 
straightforward expression of what its speaker intended; then the social language that 
it is taken to be a parody of is simultaneously taken to exist (by virtue of the manner 
in which the contribution is regarded as different). That is, the alluded to social 
language of which the utterance is said to be a send-up is itself constituted in the very 
taking - as displayed in uptake - of that utterance as parodic. 
In Bakhtin's work, it is not altogether clear whether these distinctions are 
purely analytic or whether they are taken up exclusively as participant's categories. 
It is the `ready-made' aspect of structures such as speech genre (see discussion in 
Wertsch, 1991: 60-62) that is problematic for ethnomethodologists (Sharrock and 
Watson, 1988). Bakhtin's writings are notoriously unclear (Lodge, 1990), and it may 
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be the case that he is either not specific or else inconsistent on this point. What does 
seem clear, however, is that the matter of the eminence of structure is not made as 
explicit in Bakhtin's writing as it is in the related theoretical work in 
ethnomethodology. 41 
The Question of Subjectivity/Identity: Personhood as Project or Accomplishment 
For Bakhtin, related to the issue of social structure is a range of rather interesting 
moral issues concerning the matter of one's individual identity. In particular, the 
activity whereby interactional participants construe the dialogic position of their 
interlocutor(s) is itself regarded by Bakhtin as a sort of gift. That is, dialogue is the 
activity by which speakers give one another something to work with, as it were: some 
discursively formulated disposition relative to which they can formulate a response - 
be it one of agreement, disagreement, or (more interestingly) creative modification 
by which a speaker takes up a contrastive position while still attending to what he or 
she takes the concerns of the interlocutor to be. Now, where this contrasts with 
ethnomethodology is that Bakhtin employs this responsive model of interaction to 
inform a discussion of identity. In particular, Bakhtin is interested in the degree to 
which interlocutors formulate their identity from within the set of assumptions made 
available in and through the contribution of some dialogic Other(s), and he takes this 
matter up in a discussion of individual authenticity (which he glosses with the term 
answerability). Crucial to Bakhtin's point here is the notion that no voice is 
autonomous - it is not our own, and it is on that point that our unique place of 
answerability is said to lie. Our uniqueness thus consists in our ability to alter the 
understanding of the Other in dialogue. Again, such alteration is not simply a matter 
of agreement or disagreement; but rather is a question of the extent to which one 
makes the assumptions of an Other's contribution (their gift) his or her own, thereby 
taking responsibility for those assumptions (whether in an act of responsive alignment 
or disalignment). Thus, even where one aligns him- or herself with those 
assumptions, one's authenticity/answerability is said to emerge to the degree that 
those assumptions are taken on as one's own. For Bakhtin, then, this matter of 
individual authenticity is an ongoing project that one pursues, one in which an 
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individual works to situate him- or herself relative to an Other (or Others) where that 
situating work itself is the activity for which one assumes individual responsibility. 
Within a Bakhtinian analysis, the issue of individual freedom is quite 
important, freedom being defined in terms of authenticity accruing from the extent 
to which one modifies the range of assumptions made available by his or her 
interlocutor(s) in a given dialogic encounter. 42 In contrast, for an 
ethnomethodological analysis, the issue of authenticity is relevant only when and 
where it emerges as a participant concern. That is, ethnomethodology is concerned 
with authenticity as an issue that interactional participants themselves attend to in the 
course of their talk as a way of attending to that talk's business. Thus, where a 
Bakhtinian analysis might attempt to account for authenticity, an ethnomethodological 
approach would examine the situated activity whereby authenticity is taken up as a 
participant concern. For an ethnomethodological analysis, this would include 
examining how speakers work to align themselves with a particular position in such 
a way that they attend to the potential for their doing so itself to be undermined as 
an instance of some sort of social contagion - that is, of merely going along with 
what others think and do (Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). For Bakhtin, these 
concerns are taken up as a matter of concern to be settled by him; whereas for 
ethnomethodology, the taking-on of these concerns (of individual authenticity) as an 
accountable matter is itself an investigable phenomenon. It is a matter of concern for 
participants; and for ethnomethodology, the interest is in exploring how it is attended 
to by them as such in their talk. 
Thus, the question of individual authenticity is, within ethnomethodology, 
regarded from within an analytic approach that sees individual subjectivity as an 
accomplishment of and in talk (Sharrock and Button, 1991). Pollner (1987: 134) takes 
up the issue of the individual in his discussion of mundane reasoning practices: 
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Mundane reason is the `construal' of `construing "ourselves" in relation to reality"'. 
`I' do not construe mundane reason: mundane reason construes `I'. The notion of the 
subject ... 
is so deeply enmeshed in mundane discourse that we almost boggle at 
conceiving of action as description without reference to an `individual' or `person'. 
If persons are constructions what does the constructing? ... 
if mundane 
autobiography establishes a subject over and against an object, what casts itself in this 
fashion? 
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In terms of the conversational material we will consider in this thesis, this issue of 
subjectivity is central to the analysis of how speakers attend to the potential for their 
contributions to be construed as raising a range of implications which they work to 
foreclose in the very design of their contribution (see especially the analyses in 
Chapter 4, below). In other words, we will explore not only how speakers foreclose 
the potential for their talk to be construed as raising a range of implications in terms 
of their individual motivation (either as racist or as culturally [un]aware); but we will 
also examine how in so doing, those speakers also reflexively attend to the potential 
for their activity of attending to such foreclosure work itself to be construed as raising 
further implications for their individual authenticity. 
Thus, with regard to the issue of individual subjectivity, Bakhtin and 
ethnomethodology differ in the degree to which they consider the issue to be 
constitutive of their own analytic undertaking. Ethnomethodology suspends the 
question, addressing it only insofar as it is a participants' concern while Bakhtin 
enters into the debate using the insights of a dialogic take on interaction in order to 
inform an analysis of the issue of individual subjectivity. 44 To this degree, both 
Bakhtin and ethnomethodology are concerned with dialogic interaction, but 
ethnomethodology is more ubiquitous in the degree to which its analytic methods are 
counted upon to do the work of theorisation. 
Analytic Materials 
The prior discussion has been concerned with looking at some of the theoretical issues 
that bear on an analysis of talk about prejudice on the one hand and cultural 
difference on the other hand. In particular, the concern there was with how the two 
are oriented to in talk as mutually co-implicative concerns in the work that 
conversational interlocutors pursue to account for their presence in the Middle East. 
The point of this thesis, then, is that the business of accounting for Western 
involvement in the Middle East (as well as the way that speakers attend to how they 
themselves might be regarded as personally implicated in the demands for 
accountability that are entailed thereby) is accomplished by speakers in the 
conversational material under analysis through and with the work that they do to 
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manage the conflict between competing demands for accountability. That is, the 
conflict is constitutive of the talk by which such accounting is accomplished. 
The analytic corpus itself is comprised of a tape-recorded archive of some 
sixty hours of face-to-face, open-ended interviews that were collected in various 
locations throughout Kuwait over a ten-month period in the year immediately 
following the Persian Gulf War of 1991 - from October 1991 to July 1992. All such 
recordings were fully transcribed and, in total, amounted to a printed output of some 
one-thousand, two-hundred pages of single-space, type-written material. Participant 
subjects numbered fifty-five in total and were selected from among the community 
of British and American expatriate residents of the area. These individuals were 
employed in various professions, including that of corporate and privately owned 
business administration, military personnel, diplomatic representation, journalism, 
higher and secondary education, etc. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of 
interview participants had been resident at different times in other countries 
throughout the region as well (Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, etc. ). 
The actual selection procedure itself was somewhat more idiosyncratic in that 
the researcher collected data from those who were willing and able to participate. 
Potential interviewees were approached as opportunities arose, either fortuitously or 
as the result of directed effort. That is, contacts with potential interviewees were 
made by the researcher who initially depended upon a network of personal 
acquaintances with whom he was familiar in the expatriate community. 45 These 
initial interview encounters soon resulted in other contacts being made as participant 
interviewees referred the researcher to additional friends and acquaintances with 
whom he was not then familiar; and while initial efforts to canvass participants with 
requests through the post resulted in the collection of some quite interesting and 
useful materials, the overwhelming number of interviews came about as a result of 
the spontaneous and unanticipated referrals made available through word-of-mouth. 46 
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Table 2 List of Participant Subjects 
Pseudo-initials Sex Age Occupation Citizenship 
JA [32] M late 20s Engineer British 
WA [20] M early 20s Student/Ex-Soldier American 
DB [44] M late 20s Junior-Level Diplomat American 
EB [30] F 24 Secondary School Teacher British 
FB [50] M 30s Defense Consultant American 
RB [49] M early 40s Private Business Owner British 
UB [50] F 30s Business Manager American 
AC [62] F late 20s British 
LC [41] M 50s Bomb Disposal Expert British 
OC [18] F early 40s American 
RC [62] M late 20s Educational Consultant British 
SC [18] M 40s Retail Food Distributor American 
TC [64] M 20s Quantity Surveyor British 
ND [13] M 50s Business Manager 
OD [48] F late 20s Tax Accountant/Attorney American 
WD [14] M 40s Business Manager 
OE [08] F early 20s University Instructor Kuwaiti 
VE [37] M 40s Business Manager American 
DF [61] M early 40s Business Manager British 
TF [46] M 40s Senior-Level Diplomat British 
UF [07] F early 40s Librarian/Information Scientist American 
BG [19] M 40s Business Manager American 
OG [60] F 30s Journalist American 
CH [16] M 40s Educational Consultant British 
DH [31] M 49 Interior Designer British 
LH [63] M 30s Educational Consultant British 
TI [06] M 27 Civilian Military Advisor American 
RJ [23] M early 20s Private Business Owner British 
RK [06] M early 30s Civilian Military Advisor American 
AL [61] F 50s British 
JL [61] M early 50s Business Manager British 
NL [61] M early 20s Student British 
AN [49] F late 30s Private Business Owner 
CN [03] M early 40s Architect British 
EN [33] F early 20's British 
GN [59] M 40s Senior-Level Diplomat American 
WN [33] M early 20s Junior-Level Diplomat British 
AO [25] F early 30s American 
MO [25] M 30s School Headmaster American 
AP [29] F early 30s Corporate Sales Representative American 
GP [24] M 63 Medical Consultant American 
IP [48] F late 20s Management Consultant American 
TQ [32] M late 20s Engineer British 
IR [40,43] M early 40s University Instructor American 
CS [53,55] M early 20s Private Business Owner British 
IS [53,55] F early 20s Market Researcher British 
ET [48] F early 20s Administrative Assistant American 
PT [22] M 20s Junior-Level Diplomat American 
UT [38] F 30s Corporate Sales Representative American 
EU [40] F 60s University Instructor British 
DW [25,26] M 20s Unemployed/Ex-Soldier American 
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OW [58] F late teens Student American 
LY [40] M early 20s University Instructor American 
AZ [08,40,431 F early 40s University Instructor American 
IZ [58] F late teens Student British 
Representativeness 
One possible objection that could be raised with regard to the selection of these 
particular materials for analysis involves the question of representativeness. To what 
extent, it might be asked, does the talk recorded in the interviews typify interaction 
among the community of British and American expatriates in the region? This chapter 
has, in some sense, been an effort to address this sort of objection by working to 
problematise the very assumptions that inform its asking in the first place. More 
specifically, the question of sui genera representativeness is dealt with in the analysis 
of these materials (where it arises) as a participants' concern, made available as a way 
of attending to the business-at-hand of that talk on the occasion of its use. Thus, the 
question of representativeness is simply not relevant here because the work of 
discourse analysis informed by social constructionism (as discussed above) shares with 
ethnomethodology an emphasis upon the in situ constitution of meaning as an 
accomplishment brought off in and on every occasion of talk (Dubois and Sankoff, 
1992; Heritage, 1984,1995: 402-406; Heritage and Roth, forthcoming; Schegloff, 
1993; Sharrock and Anderson, 1987). 
Treating talk as a unique instance of the discursive resources that speakers 
employ - that is, as situatedly contingent - is not the whole story, 
however. 
Another possible objection is that the interview is somehow tainted, as it were - that 
the setting up of an interview situation is itself to affect what people say and do. This 
need not be regarded as a problematic, and in fact can rather be seen as an interesting 
feature of talk. In particular, it is precisely this feature of interview data and of 
attending to the interview situation as one that entails a range of specific demands 
which is of particular interest here in this thesis. In short, this means that the 
circumstances in which talk is produced for the purposes of being overheard as an 
instance of data upon which particular sorts of analytic conclusions might be drawn 
is one to which speakers themselves attend to as constitutive of the occasion. 
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For example, as we have seen in the analysis of Extract 1.0 above, the 
interviewee is confronted with the conflict as between being forthcoming and `giving 
the interviewer what he wants' on the one hand, while also attending to the potential 
for his own remarks to be construed in just the way that he works to foreclose. It is 
the management of this conflict - between the providing for of warranted data and 
the foreclosure of potentially damaging inferences which that activity might itself be 
seen to entail - which is the task of the interviewees in the encounter under 
consideration. 
Similarly, the interviewer is faced with his own paradoxical task of managing 
the conflict between being seen to elicit information relevant to the experience of 
British and American expatriate residents of the region, and yet not be seen as 
implicating his interlocutor (the interviewee) in the damaging implications that that 
activity might otherwise be taken to make available. Note that it is not simply the 
case here that speakers could, if only they wanted to do so, somehow bypass these 
problematic conflicts in order to get on with the business of their talk. Rather, it is 
the skilful management of these problematics which is the business of that talk. In 
other words, it is this management which is constitutive of the very setting. Thus, this 
thesis is an investigation into talk about Western involvement in the Middle East. The 
talk under analysis is not, as I have tried to say above, to be regarded as a tool 
whereby that experience can be accessed; rather, that talk is the data. 47 The thesis 
is thus an investigation into the concerns that speakers take to be relevant in 
accounting for their presence in the Middle East; and as I shall go on to substantiate 
in the analytic chapters which follow, these concerns involve a range of assumptions 
about demands for an awareness of cultural difference and prejudice. Citing Psathas 
(1995: 45), Edwards (1997: 89) remarks: 
Data may be obtained from any available source, the only requirement being that 
these should be naturally occurring, rather than produced for the purpose of study, 
as in the case of laboratory experiments or controlled observations. In practice, this 
has meant interactional phenomena that would have occurred regardless of whether 
the researcher had come upon the scene; therefore, conversations, news interviews, 
therapy sessions, telephone calls, dinner table talk, police calls, as well as all manner 
of interactional phenomena that the researcher may be able to come upon and record 
are potential data sources. 
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The interviews are, of course, produced for the purpose of study; and yet their 
`naturalization', as Edwards refers to it, treats the interaction of the interview 
situation itself as the object of analysis (Edwards [1997: 89] refers to Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt, 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; and Wooffitt, 1992; as providing 
examples of such naturalization of data; see also related discussion in Potter and 
Wetherell, 1995). 
The task of this thesis is to explore how theorising about the nature of 
prejudice and cultural difference is a practical accomplishment in and of mundane 
conversational interaction. Further, it is concerned with how that theorisation is 
consequential for the conducting of that interaction. Thus, the thesis does not take 
prejudice and cultural difference as its concern except insofar as it is a consideration 
for interlocutors in the conversational episodes that we consider in the analyses. This 
is not to say that matters of prejudice and cultural awareness are of little or no 
significance - that they are somehow unimportant - but rather that it is precisely 
the way in which their importance is provided for (in what specific contexts and in 
terms of what interactional business is accomplished thereby) that is of interest here. 
One could do no differently to pursue an investigation into the situated attention to 
concerns categorised as (racial and/or ethnic) prejudice and cross-cultural contact than 
to explore the specificity of mundane interactional encounters wherein such concerns 
are attended to by social actors. The question thus becomes: what actions are involved 
in the mundane theorisation of prejudice and cultural difference and to what 
interactional business does such theorisation attend? ' It is with this analytic task that 
this thesis is concerned. 
Transcription Conventions 
Finally, a word is in order about the conventions employed to transcribe the audio- 
recorded interviews. With the exception of all but the exchange recorded in the latter 
section of Chapter 2 and in note 18 of that same chapter, the written record of talk 
examined in this thesis is based on the well-known system originally devised by Gail 
Jefferson (1985) and extended with a number of substantive modifications as 
developed by John Du Bois and his colleagues (Du Bois, 1991; Du Bois et at., 
1993). ßn In his detailed description, Du Bois (1991) argues for the merits of these 
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modifications to the Jefferson conventions on the basis of five basic design principles: 
(1) `category definition', (2) `accessibility', (3) `robustness', (4) `economy', and (5) 
`adaptability'. Without reproducing the details of his arguments here, suffice it to say 
that, among other things, these modifications are designed to make for a transcription 
that, among other things, is easier to read. As Ochs (1979) and others point out, the 
task of transcription is itself one that involves making a range of interpretive decisions 
with regard to the (audio- or video-taped) material of which it is a record (see also 
related discussion in Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 225-226). In short, the rendering 
of a transcript involves making theoretical decisions about the sorts of events which 
occurred in the interaction of which that transcript is a record. This point is in 
keeping with the theme of this chapter generally: viz., that any analytic 
undertaking - be it one that involves theoretical explication or the `mere' 
presentation/transcription of what constitutes that talk - is similarly interpretive. The 
particular choice here with regard to adopting these conventions, however, is that of 
rendering the materials not only more easily accessible for analysis, but also to render 
them available for whatever other sorts of analytic tasks the conventions specifically 
work to make it available to. 
Conclusion 
This chapter developed a dialogic approach to interaction. It situated this in relation 
to the set of problematics that define a Cartesian dualism, especially as these are 
attended to in anthropology and taken up in related theoretical discussions concerning 
the adequacy of ethnography. A dialogic approach to interaction (such as that 
developed in the work of Bakhtin) is significant to this range of concerns because of 
its respecification of the issues involved. Specifically, if alterity is a gloss on the 
problematics surrounding representationalism, then to approach that set of 
problematics as both the topic and heuristic means of investigation is essentially to 
make problematicity an investigative concern which is itself attended to in and through 
a reflexive display of same. Alterity becomes the investigative object where it is a 
topic for participants, and it is in pursuit of that topic (by participants) that they bring 
their activities off as a display of that very activity to which they refer (in and as does 
this construal thereof). 
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The concern with dialogue is also of particular importance here too because 
it points up how meaning is negotiated in situ. That is, just as we saw in analytic 
reading of the dialogue between the investigative interviewer and the junior-level 
diplomat (Extract 1.0), a responsive orientation to alternative voices is not an activity 
that involves an appeal to pluralism. Rather, the orientation to particular alternatives 
is an activity whereby speakers work to deny the availability of a particular 
argumentative trajectory to their interlocutor(s). This relates to the entire issue of 
alterity as it is taken up in the debate surrounding the adequacy of ethnographic 
description because implicit in that debate is often just such an appeal to pluralism. 
That is, the ethnographic enterprise is approached for its accountability in `letting the 
Other speak', or `letting the voice of the Other be heard'. In respecifying this 
question in terms of dialogue as negotiation - of dialogue as an activity wherein what 
the voice of the Other is, is itself taken to be a matter of concern to and competition 
between interlocutors - then that debate is taken up as the analytic concern itself. 
Thus, even an appeal to pluralism is one that is oriented to the assumption that 
alternative perspectives merit attention. As such, that appeal itself works to 
accomplish the rhetorical task of marginalising the alternative perspective which 
regards some voices as not worthy of attention. The analytic significance of this here 
is not to articulate a position for or against pluralism, rather it is to topicalise how 
such assumptions are made available in dialogue where dialogue is itself taken up as 
an issue of concern by participants. What, we want to know, are the concerns 
attended to with such activity? What rhetorical work does one set out to accomplish 
in addressing the situated rhetorical nature of perspective? In the materials we will 
consider in the analytic chapters to follow, it is attending to demands for 
accountability to assumptions of both pluralism and the definitive privileging of a 
particular position - the truth (even if only specific to this instance) - that speakers 
work to accomplish in their talk. 
Notes 
1. Indeed, as Pollner (1987) shows, this is the assumption that informs mundane reasoning in the 
explanatory work of day-to-day accounting practices. Representationalism becomes particularly evident 
where conflicting accounts of events - reality disjunctures - are adjudicated 
(see further discussion 
in Potter, 1996: 53-57). 
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2. Bruner nicely summarizes the sorts of concerns that define the social constructionist take on 
interaction - basically in terms of intersubjectivity. More to the point of how this relates to the 
Enlightenment project of distinguishing subject and object, with reference to the representational models 
of meaning developed in the 17th Century, and citing Taylor (1985), Bruner notes: `Such doctrines 
have the effect of marginalizing the essentially intersubjective nature of human meaning-making. 
Designative theories of meaning gave such pride of place to the achievement of objectivity that only 
opprobrium could be left for subjectivity with its potential for self-deception and folly. This was all 
part of the battle against enchantment being waged by science' (1995: 20-21). The point here is that 
perspectivality and the Other - that is, the perspective construed of the Other - entails the assumption 
that there exists some unmediated access to transcendence. This is the yearning of the Enlightenment. 
The quest to reveal perspectival limitations depends upon or assumes that there is some independent, 
perspectiveless or transcendent criteria of measurement with which to determine the extent that culture 
affects one's view. 
3. Latour and Woolgar (1986) extend the work of Gilbert and Mulkay on this point by suggesting a 
range of variation as between the binary opposites of mind-independence and perspectival contingency. 
This is represented as a scale of modalities (scale, minus the italicised glosses at either end, reproduced 
in Edwards, 1997: 57): 
empiricist repertoire 
[... ] (that is, implicitly available and therefore not necessary to make explicit) 
X 
X is a fact 
I know that X 
I claim that X 
I believe that X 
I hypothesize that X 
I think that X 
I guess that X 
X is possible 
contingent repertoire 
The point that Latour and Woolgar make here is that scientists appeal simultaneously and in varying 
degrees to different and competing assumptions about the nature of mind in order to account for their 
activities. In other words, the appeal to contrasting assumptions about the nature of mind and reality 
is not simply a matter of selecting one or the other contrastively opposed assumptions; but that in any 
given case where such an appeal is made, both assumptions are necessarily invoked, though to differing 
degrees (see also related discussion in Potter, 1996: 112-113). 
4. Pollner remarks upon this feature of investigative inquiry into the social: `[P]ractical inquiry's 
recognition of itself as practical depends on the availability of contrasting alternatives, [between `lay 
inquiry' and some other] one of which is scientific inquiry. The two modes of inquiry are in this way 
dialectically dependent upon one another for the reflexive sense of themselves. [... ] What is specifically 
excluded from scientific and practical inquiry's puzzlement with the world is the ways in which inquiry 
manages to furnish itself with a world which can be the object of its concern' (Pollner, 1987: 9-10, 
11). 
5. Here Gergen's remarks are particularly useful in addressing the criticisms directed at the former 
position concerning how the implications of a constructionist position are taken reflexively to include 
itself: 'Is the social constructionist position not itself a social construction? To this the coherent 
constructionist can only respond yes. The arguments for constructionism are, after all, social artifacts: 
tied together by metaphor and narrative, historically and culturally bounded, and used by persons in 
the process of relating. However, in taking such a stand, the aspiring critic has essentially vindicated 
the constructionist position. That is, the attempt to undo constructionism in this case is based on the 
same constructionist premises that the critic strives to undo: it seeks to establish the socially constructed 
character of constructionist arguments. [... ] The critic now stands in the same ontological space as the 
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target of the putative attack-thus adding further weight to the constructionist thesis' (1994: 76-77, 
emphasis in original). 
6. Relatedly, Danziger (1997), in a review of the influential series of publications edited by Kenneth 
Gergen and John Shotter released under the banner title Inquiries in Social Construction points to a lack 
of consensus among contributors to the series, especially with regard to their respective approaches to 
issues of power and social structure. One of the features of an ethnomethodologically informed take 
on interaction that distinguishes it from some of the other strands of work to which Danziger refers 
is an insistence on the in situ constitution of meaning and structure, the attention to structure as a 
participant concern, and a resistance to efforts at the reification of such structure as an analytic 
resource (see McKinlay et al., 1987; Potter and Litton, 1985; Potter et al., 1990). 
7. The reference to anthropological discourse here ignores the subtle features by which, say, social and 
cultural anthropologies are distinguished by professional practitioners (Watson, 1984). For present 
purposes, what is of concern is the way that alterity is discursively accomplished relative to the activity 
whereby it is made accessible as Other (Watson, 1997). 
8. Denzin (1997) refers to Hammersley's position with the term postpositivism - as involving a 
response to the reflexive implications of an appeal to the situated contingency of discursive production 
which itself works to reestablish the epistemological authority of an account with reference to `a set 
of rules that refer to a reality outside the text' (1997: 6; see also Guba, 1990 for an approach similarly 
grounded in a critical realist ontology). 
9. Compare this with the reflexive approach developed by Ashmore (1989: Ch. 3) who argues that the 
fact that claims regarding situated contingency necessarily include themselves within their scope need 
not be taken as self-refuting; but, on the contrary, can be seen as displaying the very point that they 
work to make with regard to such contingency. In other words, that a claim concerning how claims 
are situationally contingent is itself contingent only goes to show that this is the case - it is consistent 
with itself (see also Edwards et al., 1995). Along related lines, Gergen remarks: `The typical objection 
leveled at the constructionist [position] ... 
is its seeming absurdity in the face of an obdurate reality. 
[... ] Although laced with the full rhetorical power of everyday convention, such objections are 
ultimately based on a misunderstanding of the constructionist position. Constructionism makes no denial 
concerning explosions, poverty, death, or "the world out there" more generally. Neither does it make 
any affirmation. As I have noted [in preceding remarks], constructionism is ontologically mute' (1994: 
72). In addressing the question of whether this might not be read as linguistic or social solipsism, his 
response is that: `constructionism does not yield the conclusion that there is no world outside of its 
representation. Constructionism is simply mute on matters of ontology. [... ] One may, within a local 
perspective, take up a study [of some object]. However, the reflexive moment in the constructionist 
process then serves as a safeguard against reification and universalization' (ibid.: 300, n. 3). 
10. Notice that reference to some representation-independent reality itself involves a contradiction since 
its independence as such is constituted in the referral thereto (Gergen, 1994; Fuller, 1993; Barnes, 
1974). 
11. This same sort of drift is a feature of some of the other work that Hammersley considers as well. 
For example, consider the following remarks by a participant in the discussion concerning the adequacy 
of ethnography in reference to the debate itself: `I agree with Rosaldo (1989: 181) that the dismantling 
of objectivism "creates a space for ethical concerns in a territory once regarded as value-free. It 
enables the social analyst to become a social critic. " Marcus and Fischer (1986: 42-43) argue that this 
is, in fact, the point of all this postmodern experimentation with ethnographic form: to revitalize 
anthropology by repatriating it as cultural critique. Not, as Tyler (1986: 139) forcefully points out, by 
"hawking pictures of alternative ways of life as instruments of utopian reform, " but by making 
ethnography's "own contextual grounding part of the question. "' (DiGiacomo, 1992: 114, emphasis 
in original). It is this making of ethnography's own grounding as part of the question which my 
concern for the reflexive aspects of the investigative interviewing is concerned. The interview is 
concerned with its own doing (that is, it involves the reflexive display of concern with its own 
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accomplishment) but too it is concerned to attend to the issues of its own authority relative to the 
assumptions regarding the nature of ethnographic and social scientific investigative work to which it 
is a contribution and to which participants display to one another that they take the encounter to he 
about. 
12. Norman Denzin discusses responses to the reflexive implications of representational dualism in 
terms of their development through various moments, from positivism to postpositivism on to the 
postmodern and what he refers to with the term critical poststructuralism: `antifoundational and 
poststructural elements merged with a commitment to an emancipatory project shaped by feminist, 
cultural studies, postmodern ethnographic, and interpretative perspectives ... 
[a terrain both] complex 
and contradictory, enfolding within its borders multiple paradigms and epistemologies ... 
' (1997: 
27, n. 2; see also related discussion in Denzin, 1996). In terms of what this implies for this thesis, the 
project and the implications to be developed in the analyses in chapters to follow are concerned, among 
other things, with how these very issues regarding the reflexive implications of representational dualism 
are taken up as participant concerns in talk where culture and prejudice are at issue. The point is that 
the management of the contradiction between the dualistic assumptions of a representational model and 
the reflexive implications of that model are constitutive of discourse where representation is at issue. 
As such, the identifying of different moments that Denzin undertakes, while heuristically useful, 
nevertheless underplay the extent to which the implications of reflexivity are at issue even in those 
moments which he refers to as positivist. In short, it is quite possible to read even the most apparently 
dualistic texts in an ironic vein - as a sort of sacramentalist exercise by which the text 
implicitly 
celebrates its own production in and through the explicit denial (or, at least, marginalisation) of the 
reflexive implications which it entails. It is the issue of this sort of take on that production which is 
simultaneously explored and displayed in the conversational interaction considered in Chapter 3 
('Incumbency and Entitlement: Category Membership and Identity as Participant Concerns') to follow. 
In terms of the analysis of participants' talk (where matters of culture and prejudice are at issue), the 
relation this has to the different moments that Denzin identifies is that of pointing up the discursive 
work which participants pursue in order to attend to the reflexive implications of ironisation without, 
however, giving up the appeal to objectivist assumptions which that rhetoric provides for. `The 
unfolding pro-postmodernist, anti-modernist canon envelops the concerns of the promodernist text while 
erasing the distinction between fact and fiction and exploring in detail ... multiple 
forms of 
verisimilitude and poststructural validity' (Denzin, 1997: 20). 
13. Fabian is adamant on this point: `If coevalness, sharing of present Time, is a condition of 
communication, and anthropological knowledge has its source in ethnography ... then the 
anthropologist qua ethnographer is not free to "grant" or "deny" coevalness to his interlocutors. Either 
he submits to the condition of coevalness and produces ethnographic knowledge, or he deludes himself 
into temporal distance and misses the object of his search' (1983: 32, italics in original). 
14. Geertz refers to this sort of rhetorical work as involving the claim of having `been there': `The 
ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less to do with either a factual 
look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has with their capacity to convince us that what they say 
is a result of their having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by) another form of 
life, of having, one way or another, truly "been there. " And that, persuading us that this offstage 
miracle has occurred, is where the writing comes in' (1988: 4-5, cited in Hammersley, 1992a: 52). 
15. The common feature of all of these different approaches is taken up in Denzin's (1997) discussion 
of what he refers to with the gloss critical poststructuralism. What is important for our purposes here 
is the feature by which responses to contingency appeal to the very assumptions that they set out to 
interrogate. Thus, `the discussions of logical, construct, internal, ethnographic, and external validity, 
text-based data, triangulation, trustworthiness, credibility, grounding, naturalistic indicators, fit, 
coherence, comprehensiveness (see Eisenhart & How[e - sic], 1992, pp. 657-669), plausibility, truth, 
and relevance (Atkinson, 1992, pp. 68-72) [are regarded] as attempts to reauthorize a text's authority 
in the postpositivist moment. Such moves cling to the conception of a "world-out-there" that is 
truthfully and accurately captured by the researcher's methods' (Denzin, 1997: 6). Similar work toward 
the development of `standpoint epistemologies' is of particular relevance to the theoretical responses 
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of Hammersley, Fabian, Geertz and others for the rhetorical significance such efforts entail (see 
Fabian, 1991 as well as other contributions to the volume in which it appears). Specifically, in 
celebrating the partiality of knowledges - as from their own and others' perspectives - such 
epistemological positioning effectively works to resist rhetorical efforts for any particular take on 
reality to be held accountable to an assumption concerning the possibility of transcendence from the 
specific conditions of its production. Just as the assertion that `we are all each constrained by our own 
cultural perspectives' has the effect of affording its speaker with the warrant for an appeal to 
transcendence (since, in the activity of proffering the concession involved, he or she displays an 
awareness of his or her own cultural contingency and paradoxically displays him- or herself not to he 
constrained thereby); so too standpoint epistemologies, in the very claim to champion situated 
knowledges, work implicitly to mount a transcendent position (McKenzie and van Teeffelen, 1993). 
16. Though, as we will see, this is not always the case as some conversational participants do 
reflexively attend to such mediation when engaging in parody. See related analysis of Extract 4.2 and 
Extract 4.3 in Chapter 4, below. 
17. Similarly, the assumption among social actors that they share identity in perspective - the 
assumption of intersubjectivity - is likewise itself the outcome of interactional work 
(Poliner, 1987). 
18. This is not to say that an account is so oriented simply by virtue of its ontological distinction to 
some alternative (but otherwise unnamed or unindicated) account(s), but rather that the orientation of 
an account is displayed as a manifest feature of its design. Edwards describes this particular aspect of 
talk's production in his discussion of description: `There are all kinds of ways to describe any given 
activity or scene, and any description could always, in principle, be further explicated or extended. So 
the selection or assembly of any particular, description (where all descriptions are particular ones) may 
be inspected, by participants as well as by analysts, for its specificity from amongst an indefinite set 
of possibilities, and therefore as performing some action and making available some implication. Those 
actions and implications are not themselves another infinite set, but precisely the ones that participants' 
subsequent talk will, in some manner, deal with' (1997: 100, emphasis in original). It is part of the 
business of this thesis to consider the details of how the contrastive rhetorical design is brought off in 
the talk that comprises the analytic corpus under investigation in Chapters 3-6 to follow. 
19. Of course, the reflexive work of a given account can never fully anticipate the response with which 
it might be met if for no other reason than that the anticipatory work is itself something to which a 
response might be generated. And even providing for the possibility that one can work at a further 
step's remove, as it were, to anticipate just such a response (to one's anticipatory work itself) only puts 
off the anticipation one step further since that effort is also something to which a response can be 
generated. In other words, there is always an open-ended aspect of dialogue - referred to by Bakhtin 
with the term unfinalizability - by which the response to a particular utterance can never fully 
be 
anticipated. It is the emphasis upon this particular feature that distinguishes a dialogic approach (as 
developed in the writings of Bakhtin and explored in the work of some social constructionist research) 
from a Kantian dialectics whereby an utterance is regarded as fully determined by the statement to 
which it is a response (for further discussion, see Holquist, 1990: 59-66). 
20. Thus, negotiation is not - as some uses of that term might be taken to 
imply -a matter of 
coming to agree about the legitimacy of ones position (though, of course, negotiation is necessarily 
involved in and where such agreement is accomplished); rather, negotiation involves the interactive 
establishment of a dialogically contrastive position in the work through which a particular construal of 
one's contribution is anticipated in its design. Coulter's remarks on the distinction between 
understanding as opposed to interpretation as a member's practice are of particular relevance here: 
`Note well that, even if we grant the (disputed) claim that contextualisations are uniformly or inevitably 
both `assumptive' and `interpretive', this would not in itself bar them from invocation in resolving 
doubts or deciding cases of specific sorts. What is there to prevent someone from basing an effective 
or decisive adjudication upon an `interpretation' - provided it was the right interpretation? The 
claimed omnirelevance of `interpretive work', `perspectivality', and `acts of interpretive construction' 
is actually undermined by recognising the inter-articulated nature of conduct-and-its-context(s): the 
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supposedly free play of `interpretive' construction is harnessed by the common practices of practical 
relevancy determinations, except perhaps where `contexts' are being `constructed' as disengaged, 
purposeless, or `idle' exercises' (1994: 697, emphasis in original). 
21. Clark and Holquist contrast Bakhtin's approach with that of Derrida as distinguished by, among 
other things, the former's `concentration on the possibility of encompassing differences in a 
simultaneity' (1984: 9). That is, where for Derrida meaning resides in the structure of the general 
possibility of difference, for Bakhtin the activity of dialogue is one in which individuals `work to 
comprehend ... 
disparate energies simultaneously' (Clark and Holquist, 1984: 10). Citing work 
published under the name of one of Bakhtin's close associates (Voloshinov, 1973: 85-86), Clark and 
Holquist elaborate: `the word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for 
whom it is meant ... 
A word is territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and 
his interlocutor' (1984: 15, emphasis in original). 
22. Even assuming that one attempts to foreclose a particular construal of one's own anticipatory 
foreclosure work itself only puts the problematic hack a step, since those attempts at second-order 
foreclosure do not anticipate a third-order response with which they can be met. 
23. A description of the data collection is included below in the penultimate section of this chapter. See 
the Appendix for a description of the transcription conventions employed here and throughout the 
analytic chapters in this thesis. 
24. That is, the question-and-answer format is the way in which speakers work to generate the content 
of their talk and to bring off its accomplishment as that of the doing of an interview. By contrast, in 
other circumstances, questions might be the means by which speakers establish the relevance of certain 
background knowledge or accomplish some other such interactionally relevant work (Clayman, 1992). 
That speakers can also accomplish interactionally relevant work in the broaching-of-questions in an 
interview situation is not at issue here; rather, it is the specifics of that work's interactional relevance 
which makes the interview situation different from other kinds of talk. 
25. Not only here in talk concerning the Gulf War but elsewhere throughout the corpus, speakers 
reflexively attend to the significance of their contribution in terms of its implications for their own 
accountability in the circumstances in which it takes place - that is, in the context of the interview 
situation as the generating of interaction through the asking-and-answering of questions. At the same 
time, the talk is also reflexively oriented to by the participants as the doing of a (perhaps sociologically 
informed) investigation into the sort of practices of which it is itself constitutive. Addressing this issue 
in relation to the investigative work of anthropology, Pollner remarks that `the respondent is often 
treated, albeit implicitly, as a social scientist vis-ä-vis his or her own life' (1987: 152, n. 7). In the 
conversational material here, this is demonstrated in that the participants orient to their interaction as 
the doing of an investigation into the socially constituted and situatedly contingent nature of shared 
knowledge - that is, into accounting practices - regarding the 
Gulf War. 
26. Here we have the use of what Harvey Sacks (1972,1974,1992) refers to as a Standardized 
Relational (s-R) pair -a subset among a broader set of Membership 
Categorization Devices (MODS) 
the use of which involves speakers orienting to the distribution of certain rights and/or knowledge 
within some kind of relational configuration definitive of that MCD's referents (see also related 
discussion in Schegloff, 1991). In the case of an S-R pair, such rights and/or knowledge are regarded 
as distributed between members in a pair-part relation (referenced with glosses like husband-wife, boss- 
employee, etc. ) rather than between constituent members of some larger unit (such as that glossed with 
a term like family, or team). Jayussi (1984,1991) has extended Sacks' notion of an MCD to reflect 
members' joint orientation to both asymmetrical power relations between category bound members in 
a duplicatively organized or pair-part relationship as well as a distinction in status as between different 
social groups (see also Edwards, 1991). 
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27. The reflexive feature of situated activity - in this particular case, that of the conducting of an 
interview - is such that that activity is the analytic object. Remarking upon this same concern, 
Baker 
notes: `The interview itself is a site for displaying the cultural knowledges that can be used to account 
for oneself as a competent [member] .... 
These cultural knowledges turn on the naming of or 
sometimes merely alluding to category, category-relations or category-bound activities' (1997: 135). 
28. Alternatively, he might just as easily have made the distinction accountable with a question as to 
the relevance and motivation of the relational contrast in the first place. For example, a possible 
response on the part of speaker KM here might have included something like `What do you mean by 
personal opinion? As opposed to, what, state secrets? ' or any other response that would have called 
into question the relevance of the contribution to which it constituted uptake. Of course, his doing this 
would involve formulating a contribution having a similar status to that of the response in question here 
(the contribution of speaker DB represented in line 24) in that its speaker calls the relevance of the 
interviewer's immediately previous contribution into account as ill-conceived or not sufficiently 
informed through his (speaker DB's) uptake thereto. At the same time and while so doing, however, 
he also provides a means with which the interviewer can make his initial question so relevant - i. e., 
the very category distinction in terms of which his implicit request for an account is worded. It is in 
this way that speaker DB very elegantly works to make the distinction essential to the carrying on of 
the conversation. 
29. For a discussion of the theoretical implications of a dialogic approach to interaction, see the work 
published under the name of Voloshinov entitled Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973), as 
well as related discussion in Morson and Emerson, 1990: 38-40. 
30. Of interest in relation to the anticipatory foreclosure undertaken in dialogic interaction is the 
theoretical concern with utility and excess. In particular, the notion of the excessive can be related to 
that responsive feature in dialogic interaction which is beyond an interlocutor's attempt at anticipatory 
foreclosure (see note 19, above). Pawlett remarks that `utility and excess must not be conceived as 
binary oppositions, as mutually exclusive. Clearly, what might be in excess of the usual, right or 
proper in one age may be deemed perfectly acceptable in an earlier or later one' (1997: 95). In terms 
of how a dialogic take on social interaction would differ in its approach to that here, the norms of 
acceptability to which Pawlett refers are conceived in terms of their situated use within conversation - 
an `age' being conceived as constituting the scope of some turn-at-talk. As we have shown, it is the 
pursuit by interlocutors of this open-ended potentiality of meaning in one anthers' contributions that 
sustains or drives conversational interaction, keeping it going as it were. Respecifying excess in these 
terms means that we need not go further afield than situated interaction in order to see utility and 
excess as mutually co-implicative. In this way, we can retain an emphasis on the eminence of social 
structure while nevertheless attending to the theoretical concern in sociology for the trans-individual 
nature of structure. That is, we can regard dialogue and what takes place with and in the appropriation 
of a participant's efforts at anticipatory foreclosure by that participant's interlocutor(s) in terms of 
Durkheim's and Mauss's concern for the `irreducibility of the social and collective to the sum of 
individual action' (Pawlett 1997: 94; see also related discussion in Ashcroft, 1994). Pawlett's reference 
to Plotinsky's (1993) treatment of Nietzsche's, Bataille's and Derrida's take on general economy in 
terms of Bohr and Heisenberg are similar to Holquist's (1990: 115-120,155-162) discussion of 
parallels with relativity theory in the work of Bakhtin. 
31. This distinction between the relevance of the Other in talk is one to which Heritage refers in 
differentiating between accountability as a `running index' of implicitly available assumptions to which 
speakers hold one another accountable in the turn-by-turn pursuit of conversational interaction and 
accountability as an explanatory activity pursued from within that running index: `[S]hared methods 
of reasoning generate continuously updated implicit understandings of what is happening in social 
contexts -a `running index', as 
it were, of what is happening in a social event. [... ] Both 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis are thus concerned with two levels of `accountability'. On 
the one hand, there is the taken-for-granted level of reasoning through which a running index of action 
and interaction is created and sustained. On the other, there is the level of overt explanation in which 
social actors give accounts of what they are doing in terms of reasons, motives or causes' (1988: 128). 
57 
Similarly, Edwards, in his discussion of knowledge structures, remarks: `The notion of `shared 
knowledge' has three senses that I shall use: (1) Cultural knowledge - things that people generally 
know about the world or can be expected to know, within a given speech community, and that they 
use across different occasions of talk. [... ] (2) Mutual knowledge - things that individuals in 
interactions assume each other knows, and think the other person knows [that] they know (and so on), 
and that they update continuously as the conversation proceeds. (3) Pragmatic intersubjectivity - shared 
knowledge as a participants' practical concern; what their talk treats as shared, and when, and how. 
[" 
". 
] [T]he study of pragmatic intersubjectivity ... overrides and subsumes the other two senses of 
`shared knowledge" (1997: 114-115, emphasis in original). 
32. And for me here to topicalise the distinction between analyst and participant as such is itself to 
work up the concern of participants as both similar to and different from myself in this thesis. This 
itself is to pursue the business-at-hand of the thesis as distinct from that of participants; and further, 
it works to make such a distinction between levels of analysis (as between participant and analyst) itself 
distinct from the work that those very participants themselves (the ones under consideration here in this 
thesis) do to distinguish between levels of analysis (as between participant and analyst). In other words, 
in the same way that the problematisation of level-mixing is here made available to accomplish the 
analytic business-at-hand of this thesis, so too speakers in the talk we shall examine work to 
prohlematise level-mixing in order to accomplish the business-at-hand of their own talk. The business 
of that talk is different from the business of this thesis, and yet it is the same in that it deploys the 
situated topicalisation of distinction (alterity) as such to accomplish its end. So, in a rather paradoxical 
manner, where that end is different is in its very similarity (see related discussion of similarity and 
difference in Mulkay, 1985: 133-177; 1988). 
33. This includes most notably the work of the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky as well as other 
well-known novelists of the 19th and 20th Centuries. Bakhtin's work with regard to literature 
is 
comprehensive, involving a theoretical historiography of the literary form from its earliest appearance 
in the European tradition with the ancient Greeks to the work of the early 20th Century, and including 
a detailed analysis of the Mennipean satire and the carnivalesque. For further discussion, see Bakhtin's 
own Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics (1984) as well as the review of Bakhtin's work in Morson and 
Emerson, 1990. 
34. This rendering into English of the Russian term smysl (as utterance) involves a particularly 
extended definition of that word so as to include not only (though possibly primarily) verbal 
contributions to conversational interaction; but also all and any intonational, kinesic, gestural or other 
sort of contribution that interlocutors might orient to as significant for the conducting of their 
interaction (Morson and Emerson, 1990: Ch. 4). In reference to intonation, for example, Morson and 
Emerson note that `[o]ften tone is all an utterance conveys. [... ] Often gestures serve a similar 
function, carrying a silent intonation (or they may be accompanied by an intoned word). Indeed, tone 
itself is a sort of gesture, and the two are typically fused. Such "meaningless" words and gestures may 
be complete, and highly expressive, utterances' (ibid.: 134-135). Relatedly, see also Sacks' (1992, Vol. 
I: 81-94) lecture concerning the way that glance features interactionally and compare, for example, 
Wittgenstein's remarks that `[w]e do not see the human eye as a receiver, it appears not to let anything 
in, but to send something out. [... ] (It casts glances, it flashes, radiates, gleams)' (1967: 40e, para. 
222) or "'Consciousness is as clear in his face and behaviour, as in myself"' (ibid.: 40e, para 221). 
35. Similarly, ethnomethodological work from its very inception has been critical of a Parsonian 
sociological analysis for what are regarded as autonomously existing social norms and values as 
independent of and determinative of situated actions rather than eminently accomplished with and in 
those actions. For further discussion, see Schegloff, 1984; Hilbert, 1992; Heritage, 1984: 7-36. 
36. Mehan and Wood discuss this in terms of related ontological implications: `A metaphysics drawn 
from the hermeneutic spiral identifies constitutive Being with Interpretation [ä lä the hermeneutic- 
dialectic tradition] and identifies deterministic Being with Understanding [k lä the logico-empiricist 
tradition]. Interpretation and Understanding are related to each other as are understanding and 
interpretation. The latter exhibit in the everyday epistemological microcosm what Understanding and 
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Interpretation exhibit in the Empyrean ontological macrocosm. Like interpretation and understanding, 
then, the two Beings are related as are night and day. Neither is said to be the source, and the other 
the emanation. Each is at once source and emanation. Each is independent of and dependent upon the 
other. Neither is denigrated. Neither is elevated. As constitutive Becoming and deterministic Becoming, 
the two are mutually constitutive. As constitutive Being and deterministic Being, the two are mutually 
contained. Indexicality and reflexivity generate these relations. Constitutive Being indexes deterministic 
Being. By so indexing, constitutive Being both emanates from and becomes a source for deterministic 
Being .... 
The former relation is established by constitutive Being's dependence upon deterministic 
Being's horizon of possibility. The latter relation is established by constitutive Being's reflexive 
disappearance into deterministic Being, thereby recasting that Being. Constitutive and deterministic 
Being are, therefore, One and Many' (1975: 202-203). 
37. Shorter (1993a: 59-60) outlines the main emphases in his approach to conversational interaction as 
involving (1): a Vygotskian emphasis on what Shorter calls joint action, (2) responsiveness in Bakhtin's 
sense of dialogism, (3) Billig's emphasis on the rhetorical, (4) Vico's notion of sensory topic - "the 
rhetorical enthymeme in which an argumentative structure, unavailable to an individual speaker, is 
completed by the speaker's audience as an aspect of joint action" (ibid.: 60). These concerns inform 
related work in ethnomethodology as well, of course. For example, Vico's notion of sensus communis, 
topoi and the way that the shared understandings are inexpressible but yet form the grounding for 
activity and the sense accomplished in and through that activity relates to similar emphases in 
ethnomethodological work (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; see also related discussion of Vico in Shotter 
ibid.: 54-56). 
38. Mehan and Wood describe the reflexive implications of an analysis of (lay) analytic practices 
whereby participants make sense of their world thus: `To claim that any reality, including the 
researcher's own, exhibits a coherent body of knowledge is but to claim that coherence can be found 
upon analysis. The coherence located in a reality is found there by the ethnomethodologist's 
interactional work. The coherence feature, like all features of realities, operates as an incorrigible 
proposition, reflexively sustained. [... ] All realities may upon analysis exhibit a coherent system of 
knowledge, but knowledge of this coherence is not necessarily part of the awareness of its members. 
Features emerging "upon analysis" is a particular instance of reflexivity. These features exist only 
within the reflexive work of those researchers who make them exist. This does not deny their reality. 
There is no need to pursue the chimera of a presuppositionless inquiry. Because all realities are 
ultimately superstitious, the reflexive location of reflexivity is not a problem within 
ethnomethodological studies. Rather, it provides them with their most intriguing phenomena' (1975: 
18,19; emphasis in original). 
39. As presented here, ethnomethodology is seen as a monolithic and unitary practice. Not all versions 
of ethnomethodology, of course, are of this sort. For example, there is some debate surrounding the 
nature of conversational `mechanisms' (Jayussi, 1984,1991; Lynch, 1993 as well as McHoul, 1996) 
as well as some discussion concerning the extent to which the analytic activity (of ethnomethodology) 
is reflexively extended to be self-inclusive. For present purposes, Schegloff is chosen as emblematic 
of what is referred to as an ethnomethodological take for the shared concern with the eminence of 
social structure that distinguishes the work of Garfinkel, Sacks and others. 
40. Similarly, in Giddens' (1984) structuration theory, there is a concern with the in situ 
accomplishment of social structure in specific episodes of interaction. Thus, Giddens' take differs 
from 
a Parsonian approach to the social in that he does not maintain that there exists social structure 
independently of the activity whereby it is instantiated. At the same time, however, Giddens 
nevertheless maintains a theoretical distinction between action and structure - specifically on analogy 
with language and linguistic structure. For an ethnomethodological approach which emphasises the 
eminence of social structure, however, such a theoretical distinction is of concern only where 
it is made 
relevant by participants as a resource for the pursuit of their own interactional business. Just as when 
Giddens regards language to be `virtual and outside time' (1976: 127; quoted in Thompson, 1989: 60); 
he accepts the sorts of assumptions that talk about linguistic structure makes available (compare, 
for 
example, Bakhtin's [1981: 72-2331 treatment of Russian Formalism [see also related discussion 
in 
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Morson and Emerson, 1990: 16-23]) - i. e., the sorts of assumptions about language 
being `virtual and 
outside time' that speakers invoke in situations where they work to make one another accountable in 
the form of their talk - so too, in regarding social structure analogously, 
he fails to consider the sorts 
of situated work that participants set out to accomplish with the invocation of the related assumptions 
about the independence of social structure as such. In essence, he simply takes these assumptions on 
as his own rather than considering what activity that work itself (the situated activity of making it one's 
own concern) does in the circumstances of its use (Schatzki, 1997). Giddens' approach thus succumbs 
to the same sort of problematics that a traditional Parsonian approach entails and which forms the basis 
of the ethnomethodological objection to mainstream sociology - viz., he conflates analytic objectives 
with participant concerns. 
Now, this is particularly significant to this thesis because it is this very activity of conflation 
which occurs in the talk where speakers attend to the issues of prejudice and cultural awareness. By 
breaching the distinction between analyst and participant as does Giddens, and by drifting back and 
forth between the two, participants are able to attend to their own accountability. That is, the drift 
between analyst concerns and participant concerns functions (for speakers in the talk) as a resource by 
which they can manage the conflicting demands for accountability with which they are confronted in 
their talk. Thus, the whole issue of eminence of social structure and the drift between structure as an 
analytic topic and resource is relevant here in at least two different ways: (1) as a theoretical concern 
in the analysis of conversational interaction and (2) as a concern for participants who employ it as a 
resource in their interaction. 
41. In what is an otherwise excellent review of Bakhtinian and ethnomethodological work related to 
the dialogic constitution of significance, Jacoby and Ochs remark upon the related issue of historicity: 
`This is not to say ... that co-construction 
is not historically and culturally situated. Any present 
moment is paradoxically both responsive to its immediate interactional sequential environment and 
is 
the complex product of a history of conversations and interactional moments (and their consequences) 
experienced individually and collectively over time, though it is rather more challenging for analysts 
of discourse, language, and social interaction to sufficiently demonstrate [sic] this latter point' 
(1995: 
178). Again, for ethnomethodology, the responsiveness of any moment is eminent to and made 
perspicuous in the situated activity of that moment. This includes the responsiveness of activity as `the 
complex product of a history'. In other words, the historical situatedness of an activity - its historicity 
as such - is eminent to the situation 
in and where participants orient to the historical as the business- 
at-hand of that activity's conduct (Coulter, 1985). In this way, the historical link of an episode - that 
is, the status of any given event as itself related to some past event and as involving the production, 
reproduction and/or alteration of same - is itself established by participants as 
locally relevant to the 
business-at-hand of their interaction. (This would, of course, include the link made available in and 
with Jacoby and Ochs' remarks above, as well as in these remarks here which attend to those remarks 
as so related). 
42. Similarly, this is a concern taken up in Heidegger's discussion of what he refers to as the `they'. 
Simply put, Heidegger's concern here seems to be analogous with that which Bakhtin takes up in his 
own discussion of voice. For Heidegger, as for Bakhtin, our own being, our unique place of 
answerability (Heidegger employs the same term), is established in relation to some Other - the 
`they'; and one's own individual uniqueness lies in his or her ability to alter, as it were, the 
understanding of the Other (the `they') in dialogue. Steiner remarks on Heidegger's concern 
for 
authenticity as so defined: `Inauthentic Dasein lives not as itself but as `they' live. Strictly considered, 
it scarcely lives at all. It `is lived' in a hollow scaffolding of imposed, anonymous values. In 
inauthentic existence we are constantly afraid (of other men's opinion, of what `they' will decide for 
us, of not coming up to the standards of material or psychological success though we ourselves 
have 
done nothing to establish or even verify such standards)' (1978: 91-92). Balditin develops this 
in a 
disparate set of writings that Clark and Holquist (1984: Ch. 3) refer to with the title The Architectonics 
of Answerability (see also related discussion in Holquist, 1990: Ch. 6). 
43. Similarly in remarking on the Cartesian cogito, Nietzsche notes: "'There is thinking; consequently 
there is that which thinks"-that is what Descartes' argument comes to. Yet this means positing our 
faith in the concept of substance as "a priori true. " When there is thinking, something must be there 
60 
which thinks-that is merely a formulation of our grammatical habit, which posits a doer for what is 
done' (1976: 455, italics in original). 
44. It is this concern for and emphasis upon individual authenticity that Bakhtin's analytic approach 
has in common with Merleau-Ponty's (1962) project of phenomenological investigation. In contrast, 
an ethnomethodological take makes no ontological distinction between the individual and the structured 
interactional events of and in which he or she takes part as a constituent member. Remarking upon this 
point, Sharrock and Watson note that: `ethnomethodology is interested in actions, activities and courses 
of action, and not in individuals at all (thus, one can talk about `the member' not as a `person' at all 
but as a `mastery of natural language' (see Garfinkel and Sachs [sic - Sacks], 1970: esp. 342-5)) (sic) 
.... 
The way to avoid this kind of misapprehension on this occasion is (perhaps) to say something 
about the way in which we ask `what is involved in doing X? ' which is not to be understood as `what 
is involved in an individual doing action X? ' since this gratuitously formulates the question in a way 
which isolates individual action ... 
' (1988: 62-63). 
45. The researcher was, at the time, employed as an instructor at the national university where he had 
already been working for two years (from 1988 to 1990) prior to embarking upon the collection of 
interview data. 
46. My own `being there': on a personal note, I would of course be grossly remiss were I not to 
acknowledge the generous hospitality to which I was treated by those who agreed to speak with me. 
This remark is not intended merely as an expression of the gratitude that 1 owe to my former hosts 
(though it is, of course, that as well); but is also meant to convey a sense of the sort of occasions upon 
which the talk was recorded. These took the form of something more along the lines of very friendly 
social gatherings to which it was kindly consented that I bring a tape-recorder rather than that of a 
formal interview setting. Thus, this fieldwork stage of conducting the research project was indeed a 
personally enjoyable experience that involved being treated to quite a few rather satisfying meals, 
exposed to a variety of interesting professional routines by different people in workplaces to which I 
certainly would otherwise not have had access, and generally enjoying the stimulating company of new 
and interesting people with whom I would not otherwise have had the opportunity to speak at such 
length. While I, of course, treat the accounts in their talk as discursive material to be analyzed, the task 
of recording that interaction was an immensely rewarding personal experience and for that I am duly 
grateful. 
47. It is in this way that talk is to be naturalized (Edwards 1997: 89) - that is, treated as natural 
(versus being treated as an otherwise adequate means or method of producing something else which 
is to count as data). Heritage, in discussing this particular feature of an occasion's eminent 
accomplishment notes: `Insofar as the participants in an institutional setting such as a courtroom for 
a social science interview] pervasively organize their turn-taking in a distinctive way that is fitted to 
the roles and tasks of the setting, it can be shown that they are also pervasively oriented to this 
`institutional' context and its associated tasks and roles' (1995: 408). 
48. For a detailed description of these conventions, see the Appendix below. 
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Chapter 2 
WORK ON WORK ON (WORK ON) THE OTHER 
Literature Review - Writing an Argumentative Foil 
THIS CHAPTER IS TO BE READ BACKWARDS - for (reflexively significant) 
reasons that will (have) become evident, I('d) hope(d) 
[Open this with a quote from Marx - where's that statement he makes about the 
bourgeoisie deconstructing everything except itself? ] 
The situation wouldn't be so bad if only he would let me spell out, clearly and 
precisely, the relation between reflexivity and fictioning. But he won't, I know lie 
won't. He's obsessed by this idea of doing and not saying, or doing the saying by 
means of the doing, or acknowledging what one does while one does it. 
(Ashmore, 1989: 166) 
This is possibly the most difficult thing I've ever written. How to write about 
reflexivity and display that point about which you're writing without saying so in so 
many words (since in that case, you'd be doing something other than accomplishing 
such a display - or would you). 
Just Do It - advertising campaign slogan for Nike sportsgear 
[Look, play the fool here! Be as brazenly critical of the lack of reflexivity in these 
comments as you can. That way, you'll succeed in eliciting the same criticism of your 
own analysis of that work by your reading audience. 
In the previous chapter we were concerned with the task of introducing the analytic 
work undertaken in this thesis and with relating it generally to certain strands of 
research inspired by an ethnomethodologically informed analysis as compared to some 
of the theoretical insights developed in the work of the Russian social philosopher and 
literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. In particular, we were concerned with key notions 
in ethnomethodology having to do with how the eminent constitution of meaning is 
regarded as the fundamental business of a situated interactional encounter and with 
how participants, in their orientation to one anothers' responsive contributions (or the 
potential for such), work to constitute that encounter for what it is. In this way, 
participants work to render a given sense to their activities from within the meaning 
provided for by those activities themselves - as endemic to those activities - in what 
Shotter (1990) refers to as knowing of the third kind (see also related discussion in 
Shotter, 1993a; 1993b). More specific to the analytic work of this thesis, however, 
our interest with these concerns involves the way that they relate to how participants 
regard matters of both prejudice and (cultural, racial and national) identity as relevant 
to the activities in which they are involved. In other words, we are concerned here 
with how issues of prejudice and cultural awareness are taken up as matters of 
concern for participants in their own talk. We want to explore how participants 
approach these matters in attending to the business-at-hand of the interactional 
encounter of which they take part in the interview encounters we shall consider, and 
how it is those participants constitute the social structures to which they refer, 
orienting to such structures as relevant or germane to the sense-making of their own 
social interaction (Schegloff, 1991). 
Now, in this chapter, our concern will be to situate this thesis in the context 
of related scholarship having to do with matters of prejudice and the awareness of 
cultural difference. Doing this, however, is perhaps more complicated than it might 
at first appear. This is because the relevant literature is of at least two different sorts. 
On the one hand, there is a tremendous body of work in which prejudice and cultural 
difference are worked up as the phenomena of investigation. On the other hand, there 
is also the body of scholarship which takes just such work as its own object in a sort 
of second, meta-level of analysis. ' So, for example, the literature of anthropological 
ethnography is situated in this first group in that it constitutes a body of work whose 
production is an activity through which cultural difference is made observable as 
such. The historical relation of anthropological scholarship to its precursors in 
missionary and travel literature (van den Abbeele, 1992) makes its production a 
professionalised practice in which cultural difference is constituted in and through the 
diversified range of conceptual apparatuses that it brings to bear in formulating its 
object (everything from models of kinship to linguistics to the anthropologies of food 
and medicine). Similarly, included in this first group is the extensive literature 
devoted to matters of prejudice. This includes research into the nature of national 
character (Adorno et at., 1950), as well as the immensely divergent range of 
theoretical and experimental work in the (social) psychology of discrimination and 
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prejudice. Also included here is the work in social cognition on intergroup relations 
(Tajfel, 1978; Turner and Giles, 1981), attribution theory (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; 
Forgas, 1981); for critical reviews, see Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992; and Edwards, 1997) as well as the experimental research into racial and 
ethnic discrimination. Ultimately, the modern interest in matters of prejudice can be 
related historically to the writings of Condorcet and the ideologues of the French 
revolution (Billig, 1982). 
All of these different sorts of discursive productions constitute this first body 
of scholarship with which we are concerned. It is, however, the second sort of 
literature - research which takes this first kind of literature as the object of its own 
analytic investigation - that is more closely related to the concerns of the review in 
this chapter. This body of work comprises the range of deconstructive analytic 
readings to which this first body of scholarship has itself been subjected. Thus, this 
second, meta-level analytic literature, then, is a range of post-structuralist 
deconstuctive critiques of the work undertaken in the first sort of literature. Such 
meta-level readings concern themselves, for example, with the work that 
anthropological theory accomplishes in order to develop temporal models that render 
culturally distinct perspectival systems observable and which situate those systems 
relative to one another on an evaluative scale of teleological development (Fabian, 
1983; McGrane, 1989). Also included here is a range of work informed by the 
discourse analytic project of Michel Foucault (1972,1973) which approaches (social) 
psychological and psychoanalytic research as a practice by which the definitional 
marginalisation of the insane works to organise a conceptualisation of the social and 
thereby to enact a particular distribution of power within that organisation as so 
defined (Parker and Shotter, 1990; Rose, 1990,1996). 2 More generally included here 
is a body of research which sets out to investigate matters such as gender and sexual 
identity (Dollimore, 1991; Henriques et al., 1984; Kitzinger, 1987), the Sociology 
of Science and Technology (Haraway, 1991; Law, 1991; Woolgar, 1988), media 
studies (Chomsky, 1988; Kellner, 1995; Said and Hitchins, 1988), post-colonial 
theories of globalisation (Anderson, 1983; Gates, 1986; Gilroy, 1987; Moore-Gilbert, 
1997; Pratt, 1986a, 1986b), and (post)modern sociological theories in general 
(Berman, 1982; McGowen, 1991; Smart, 1991,1993). While the different kinds of 
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work in this second, meta-level of analysis are quite divergent with regard to the sorts 
of discursive materials that they take as their analytic object, what they have in 
common is a shared emphasis upon historical and cultural relativism and with the 
development of what Gergen (1982) refers to as the transformation of social 
knowledge because they objectify the very activity whereby social knowledge is itself 
objectified at a further, meta-level of remove. 
Methodological versus Theoretical Appeals to Transcendence 
It is with the matter of exactly how extensive the transformation to which Gergen 
refers that is of particular concern in this chapter. Specifically, this touches upon a 
debate in the human and social sciences surrounding the issues of constructionism and 
realism. The details of the arguments are rather involved, but basically what is at 
issue in this debate are the anti-foundational implications that a dialogic approach to 
the construction of meaning entails; and perhaps more importantly, what these suggest 
for a project of social criticism. In other words, this debate relates to how the 
theoretical assumptions brought to bear in the analysis of discursive materials are 
themselves related to the analytic work which a reading of those materials itself sets 
out to accomplish. Thus, there is a great deal at stake in the issue of how an analysis 
itself relates to the theoretical and methodological assumptions that it works to 
develop in relation to its own object. 
One way to begin approaching the details of what is involved is with the 
observation that an inevitable feature of any deconstructive critique is that it implicitly 
depends upon the very assumptions of an essentialist model of representation which 
it works to make both observable and accountable in the discursive practices that it 
takes as its own analytic object. That is, in exploring the different representational 
practices of the discursive products that it considers as its own object of analysis 
(such as those mentioned in our first category of scholarship, above), such research 
works to objectify the very objectifying practices which it finds accountable in the 
work of its own analysis. It is this particular aspect of the analysis of social 
interaction that Pollner (1987: 119, emphasis added) refers to as an inevitable feature 
of any sort of analytic enterprise. It is simply a characteristic aspect of any interaction 
65 
that it must in some sense itself be exempt from the deconstructive work it sets out 
to achieve in order successfully to accomplish that work. 
[l]t is perfectly conceivable that the meta-sociological framework can be relegated 
to the field of data by the adoption of a meta-meta-sociological framework ad 
infinitum. In this linear fashion, any particular position can be rendered an object of 
analysis. But at each level of inquiry, insofar as there is to be an inquiry, the 
position from which all other positions are viewed is accorded asylum from its own 
programmatic formulations in order to produce the distinction between analysis and 
object. 
These remarks suggest that not only is the selective deployment of essentialist and 
nominalist assumptions a characteristic feature of analytic work, but that it is 
constitutive of that work. In other words, in that the activity of analysis is itself a 
discursive undertaking with which objectification is accomplished, then no analysis 
can occur without the making available of essentialist assumptions which that act of 
objectification entails. This is necessarily the case with analyses that work to make 
nominalist assumptions relevant in explaining their own analytic referent (i. e., the 
objectifying practices which they take as their object) at a higher meta-level of 
analysis. Thus, where analysis is concerned to examine the objectifying work 
accomplished in and through discursive activities per se, the higher meta-level 
analysis by which that work is subsumed as its own object of reference must 
necessarily engage in this selective and variable occasioning of different models of 
discourse in order to accomplish its work. Where the critical upshot of an analysis 
is such as to make the deployment of essentialist assumptions an accountable 
matter - where, for example, the `accuracy', say, of representation is at issue - 
then that reading must necessarily rely upon the very sorts of essentialist assumptions 
whose deployment it finds accountable in order to give the nominalist reading of those 
practices their critical purchase. 
So, for example, work in the tradition of critical linguistics (Caldas-Coulthard 
and Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 1989,1995; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 
1988; Kress, 1985; van Dijk, 1993,1994) approaches discourse and discursive 
interaction as an activity constitutive of its object of reference so that the assumptions 
made available in the discursive practices by which its objects are referenced are said 
to constitute that referent. At the same time, however, the adequacy of that 
objectifying activity is decided in such meta-level analyses with reference to a range 
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of alternative assumptions that are not made available in the discursive interaction 
under consideration but whose relevance is provided for in the reading of that 
activity. Matters such as class, gender, race, etc. are regarded as relevant to an 
interaction's accomplishment (even when and where those issues are not attended to 
in the talk itself) as a means of accomplishing the critical work of the second, meta- 
level analysis. The point here is that both essentialist (realist) and nominalist 
(constructivist) assumptions are selectively appropriated relative either to the analysis' 
object or else to the analytic activity accomplished in the meta-level reading of that 
object itself. 
Similarly, the research of some discourse analysts who work to develop a 
range of Marxist implications to their analyses have been criticised for doing the same 
(Parker, 1989; Burman and Parker, 1993). So too, work in Serge Moscovici's theory 
of social representation (Farr and Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983), 
while exploring different discursive representations of the social, employs the very 
categories whose use it sets out to investigate as a resource to accomplish that 
investigative work itself (see related discussion in Potter and Litton, 1985). Crucially, 
the problematics of social representation theory relate to the variation in accounts that 
given individuals in the same situation may work paradoxically to make available. 
Representational accounts are thus not considered for what they do for the participants 
who use them and for how they relate to alternative representations, so much as they 
get employed (by those working in social representation research) to specify a set of 
criteria with which to define those groups. Social representation theory assumes a 
homogeneity to representations which overlooks the fluid and situationally contingent 
nature of the accounting practices which are taken by Moscovici to be an expression 
of such representations (see also related discussions in McKinlay and Potter, 1987; 
McKinlay et al., 1993; Potter and Billig, 1992). 
Further, even certain strands of ethnomethodological work have been criticised 
for this kind of selective occasioning of different assumptions concerning 
objectification. 3 More significantly, it is the failure reflexively to consider that this 
selectivity is an inevitable feature of analysis (rather than that it takes place) which 
is regarded as problematic. What all of these various analyses have in common is the 
selective use of these different assumptions. More importantly, perhaps, this drift 
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between essentialism (realism) and nominalism (constructivism) is employed in order 
to pursue a rhetorical project of critique - that is, a project of making the practices 
which these analyses take as their own object accountable to a range of assumptions 
provided for with and in that analysis. In short, these approaches do not assume of 
their own activity what they assume of others - viz., that accounts are rhetorically 
oriented and contingent upon the circumstances of their production. 
The approaches to discursive interaction that we have touched upon in this 
section thus reify their own objects of analysis - be it with their objectifying 
reference to 'discourse', `social representation(s)', (the Foucauldian) `episteme', 
`social structure' or whatever other gloss they may provide to effect their work. The 
very analytic activity that accomplishes this reification is activity that does that which 
it claims that its object of analysis does. Now, in and of itself, this is neither 
problematic nor particularly objectionable. Where it raises difficulties, however, is 
with the work of critique which such analyses are employed to accomplish. 
Essentially, the problem with analyses of this kind is the problem with all critical 
analyses that work to make objectification an accountable matter: that in pursuing its 
critical work, it undermines the very basis upon which that critique might be effected 
by doing the very activity that it works to make accountable. That is, it sets itself up 
for critique by pursuing the very activity of making the basis for that critique relevant 
to and for the analysis. In working to make objectification accountable, the critique 
renders itself subject to the self-same demands for accountability which that analysis 
is itself employed to effect. 
The problem with the analytic work we have considered here, then, is not that 
it grants asylum to its own project of scrutiny; but rather that, to varying degrees, it 
fails to consider this as an inevitable feature of any analytic undertaking - including 
its own. In other words, it is unreflexive about the implications that it raises, 
selectively providing for their relevance in order to pursue the critical work for which 
those implications are appropriated. This is problematic because while the making 
available of essentialist (realist) assumptions is an inevitable feature of any analysis, 
the failure reflexively to take that fact into consideration means that the analysis 
makes itself vulnerable to the demands for accountability that it sets out to make 
available. By contrast, when and where the accountable adequacy of a first-level (that 
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is, subsumed non-meta-level) analysis of objectifying practices is regarded as lying 
not in some implicitly realist criteria of comparison but rather elsewhere (say, with 
an appeal to some other factor eminent to the interaction [Rorty, 1980; 1982; 1989; 
1991a; 1991b]); or where an analysis remains agnostic regarding the adequacy of its 
object's own analysis (in what Garfinkel and Sacks [1970] refer to with the term 
ethnomethodological indifference), then these problematics raised with a critical 
approach to discursive interaction are no longer of relevance . 
They simply lose their 
force. Furthermore, where this is the case, the analysis of objectifying practices can 
paradoxically display the very point they work to make (in regard to their own object 
of analysis) in and through the very activity of objectification which they must pursue 
in order to make that point. ' 
In the discussion which follows, we shall consider these issues in greater detail 
for how they relate to the literature that is of more direct concern to this thesis - 
literature that concerns itself with the objectifying practices by which the (Arab) racial 
and cultural other is referenced. Also, we will be concerned with how these issues 
relate to the talk we will consider in the analytic chapters to follow. In particular, we 
will be concerned to examine the way that, in discussing Western involvement 
abroad, the British and American expatriate speakers whose talk we consider are 
oriented to the conversational situation as one in which they are accountable to the 
very demands that both sorts of literatures make available. That is, speakers attend 
to the potential to be held accountable as informed by the concerns to which both of 
these bodies of scholarship attend. Thus, not only do they work to show themselves 
to be aware of cultural difference (especially with regard to Arab culture) as informed 
by the sorts of assumptions of this first kind of literature, but they also address the 
potential for their remarks to be held accountable as informed by the critique of 
objectifying representational practices whereby the Arab Other is rendered observable 
as well. In this regard, talk in the interviews shares a great deal with both of the 
different kinds of scholarship in that the speakers attend to the demands which they 
work to make available. 
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Crisis in Anthropology Revisited: The Case of Orientalism 
One body of research that relates rather closely to the debate concerning the adequacy 
of ethnographic description that we considered in the previous chapter is the critical 
work of the literary theorist Edward Said. Said's work is extensive, addressing a 
broad range of topics; but in particular, his book entitled Orientalism has perhaps 
been his most influential piece of work, providing the impetus for a range of related 
research (Barker et at., 1985; Sharabi, 1990). Such work expands upon various 
critiques of anthropological ethnography by focusing upon the specific body of 
scholarship which takes as its own analytic object the society and culture of the 
Middle East. Included here in this corpus of literature is a very broad range indeed 
of philological-linguistic, historical, sociological, literary and other writings whose 
production spans at least two centuries. Further, such writing is itself said to be 
related to a body of earlier European Christian polemic directed against Islamic 
thought (McGrane, 1989). Also included for consideration within Said's analytic 
scrutiny is the range of work referred to as Middle East and/or Asia Area Studies. 
Said's analytic object thus encompasses a vast range of otherwise thematically 
disparate work under the rubric of Orientalism, the different writings having in 
common a shared concern for and analytic orientation to the particular geographically 
associated, socio-historically related peoples referred to with the term Orient (or some 
other functional equivalent). 
Further, what it is that makes these writings the object of Said's analytic 
concern - that is, what it is that makes them candidates for inclusion as instances of 
orientalist work - relates to the critical objective that he pursues with his analysis. 
Specifically, this criteria is that the relevant texts are deployed in the legitimation of 
a Western project of exploiting the Orient, employed as a means in the control of that 
object. This is particularly interesting because the analytic undertaking which Said 
pursues in Orientalism is one that involves establishing its criteria of objectification 
with reference to the critical implications which that inclusion itself works to make 
available. 
Said is clear as to the details of what this inclusional criteria involves. 
Specifically, orientalist writings are said to legitimate Western exploitation and effect 
control of the Orient on at least two different levels. In the first place, with the very 
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activity of referring to the Orient as altern - that is, in taking its object of reference 
(the Orient) as an entity which somehow exists independently of and distinct from the 
very discursive activity whereby it is referred to as such - the Orient 
(geographically, ethnically, religiously, socio-culturally, etc. ) is said to be textually 
constituted as an object; and thereby, in that particularly discursive sense, 
controlled. ' In the second place, the writings which Said includes are regarded as 
contributing to Western exploitation because the range of assumptions made relevant 
in and through those writings work (as anthropologically oriented ethnography is said 
to do generally, [cf., Fabian, 1983, especially remarks in the Preface and 
Acknowledgements, pp. ix-xv]) to legitimate the project of physical, military and 
social colonisation of the Orient by the West. It is with these two ways of defining 
control that Said delineates the corpus of writing which constitutes his analytic object. 
Now, what is particularly interesting about these points for how they relate 
to this thesis is the way that the marshalling of these criteria itself involves the use 
of different and competing assumptions about the nature of language and discursive 
representation. Specifically, Said's analysis entails a theory of language and discursive 
interaction such that linguistic representation is regarded as reflecting a reality which 
is independent of that representation and which, to a greater or lesser degree, can be 
analytically regarded as accurate. At the same time that he relies upon such 
assumptions, however, Said also makes implicitly available an alternative assumption 
which presupposes that reality is constituted from within discursive practices - that 
is, as endemic to those practices. From such a model, discursive interaction regards 
reality as attending to the relevances provided for by participants in their interactional 
encounters, from within those encounters. Thus, Said draws upon both nominalist and 
essentialist assumptions in the pursuit of his own critically directed project of 
analysis. So, for example, in the introduction to Orientalism, he comments (ibid.: 5, 
emphasis added): 
There were-and are-cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their 
lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that 
could be said about them in the West. About that fact this study of Orientalism has 
very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly. But the phenomenon of 
Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence between 
Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas 
about the Orient ... 
despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with 
a "real" Orient. 
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Or further on in the same introduction, Said remarks (ibid.: 21-22, emphasis in 
original) : 
Another reason for insisting upon exteriority is that I believe it needs to be made 
clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly 
circulated by it is not "truth" but representations. [... ] In any instance of at least 
written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a re presence, 
or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a written 
statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally 
depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence 
to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any 
such real thing as "the Orient. " Thus all of Orientalism stands forth and away from 
the Orient: that Orientalism makes sense at all depends more on the West than on 
the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted to various Western techniques of 
representation that make the Orient visible, clear, "there" in discourse about it. 
Now, what is interesting here is the particular way that Said oscillates between 
the assumptions attending to both essentialist (realist) and nominalist (constructivist) 
theories of discursive representation. That is, it is not only the case that the attendant 
assumptions of these two positions are made relevant; but also that in making these 
assumptions available as he does here, Said works to bring about a particular 
rhetorical effect in terms of the analysis his reading accomplishes. Specifically, the 
critical purchase of his reading is one that implicitly depends upon the relevance of 
the set of realist assumptions that he makes available through his tacit 
acknowledgement of that `brute reality' which is the object that orientalist writing 
purports to describe independently of that description itself (see emphasized statement 
reproduced in quotation from p. 5, above). That is, in the course of his analyses, the 
efforts he employs to deal with what he refers to as the `internal consistency' of the 
different discursive practices (i. e., those assumptions which are said to objectify the 
Orient, constituting it as an external entity) themselves implicitly employ as their 
comparative criteria of adequacy the very different entity that his `tacit' (realist) 
acknowledgement makes available. Thus, it is the realist model of discourse that gives 
the constructivist model its critical bite. Ultimately, then, Said trades off between 
opposing models of the discursive, making available a range of realist assumptions 
by way of bolstering his own (deconstructive) constructivist reading of orientalist 
discourse(s). He makes realist assumptions available in order to give critical purchase 
to his reading and yet he adopts a theoretically constructionist approach in order to 
bring that realist reading off in the first place. ' 
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Said's work itself constitutes a discursive product which seeks to manage the 
availability of competing theoretical demands. That is, Said's writing on the 
representational practices by which the Orient is made observable itself comprises the 
work of managing the extent to which the demands for accountability as between 
essentialist and nominalist assumptions are made relevant (Said, 1981,1985,1989). 
What makes this interesting is that it allows Said to attend to very different sorts of 
work in and with his own writing. In particular, it allows him to keep the Orient 
open-ended, to sustain a continuing dialogue on the nature of the Orient as an object, 
suspending any sort of judgemental or evaluative take thereupon. That is, it allows 
Said to make selective use of essentialist assumptions without providing any criteria 
in relation to which the degree of a representation's accuracy might be measured. At 
the same time, however, it also allows Said to manage the reflexive implications of 
a nominalist model by drawing upon essentialist assumptions as a way of giving 
critical purchase to those very efforts in suspending judgement. The two sets of 
assumptions are thus co-implicative in that attending to the one 
(nominalism/constructionism) provides for the other (essentialism/realism), and vice- 
versa. The object which that appropriation of an essentialist position works up is itself 
the discourse of Orientalism. ' 
These concerns for what we have been referring to as nominalist and 
essentialist takes on representation are of relevance to the conversational material we 
shall consider below as well. There we will see that speakers also make available 
such assumptions in a similarly co-implicative fashion. In their conversational 
interaction, they work to manage the reflexive implications of a constructivist model 
of representation, working to foreclose the potential for their talk to be construed as 
entailing the use of a reductionist account of Arab identity. To do this, however, 
Said's work differs from what the speakers in the interview situation do because while 
those speakers attend to the potential for their talk to be made accountable to the 
implications of a constructionist model, they nevertheless do so while providing for 
an evaluative judgement on the Orient - that is, they do so in order to make a 
statement about what Arab culture and society entails. In contrast, Said works to 
suspend just such a judgement. Thus, his attention to the implications of a realist 
model extends only to the point where doing so grants critical purchase to his analytic 
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reading of orientalist texts. In this sense, then, the management work he does is more 
limited in its scope than that of the speakers in the interview material. Said works to 
suspend judgement; speakers in the interviews work to shield their judgement from 
being undermined as an instance of reductionism. 
It is this feature that distinguishes the interactional work conducted in the 
interview situation from that of Said's analytic reading of the texts he takes under his 
purview. In a sense, that talk does more than Said because it displays an awareness 
of and sensitivity to issues of cultural content which Said does not venture to 
undertake. It hazards to provide a judgement on the Arab Other as a way of 
displaying an awareness of cultural difference. Thus, speakers orient to the interview 
as a situation in which they are accountable to display an awareness of and sensitivity 
to cultural difference. In this way, speakers orient to the situation as involving a more 
extensive range of demands for accountable (to assumptions regarding the cultural and 
the prejudicial) than does Saida Thus, Said's dilemma and the speakers' dilemma are 
somewhat different. It is, among other things, this difference in the extent to which 
the conflicting demands for accountability are managed that distinguishes Said's work 
from the work that participants pursue in the interviews. 
The interview situation is thus one in which the participants are working 
interactively to determine what it is that constitutes their activity. That is, they work 
to determine when and to what extent the conversational circumstances call for them 
to display cultural awareness (and therefore to participate in a discourse of 
ethnographic description) as well as whether and how the situation calls for them to 
attend to such description itself as an instance of prejudice. In other words, speakers 
are faced with the demands required in assuming either an essentialist (realist) or a 
nominalist (constructivist) approach to culture as an object of inquiry. What they do 
is both. The reason is that the two are dialogically related. Similarly, Said attends to 
these competing demands in writings such as Orientalism. Where his writing differs 
from the talk in the interviews, however, is that Said attends to essentialist 
assumptions only to the extent that doing so undermines the writing which he himself 
takes as his object of analysis. The two different participants work to accomplish 
quite different rhetorical tasks, though the concerns that they each attend to in the 
pursuit of their respective tasks is quite similar. Specifically, in that Said makes no 
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claim to engage in the sorts of practices which the writing he considers is said to 
accomplish, and in that he does not hold himself accountable to do so in the same 
way that the speakers in the interviews attend to their accountability for producing an 
ethnographic accounts, these two differ. Nevertheless, we can see that the two sorts 
of concerns are dialogically related, and that attending to the accountability for the 
one necessarily entails accounting for the other as a constitutive feature of the 
discursive undertaking itself. 
In terms of how this relates to the analytic undertaking of this project itself, 
one aspect that distinguishes the thesis' analysis from the sort of work that both Said 
and the conversational interlocutors that we consider is that this project attends to the 
mutually co-implicative nature of these different assumptions in discursive interaction 
where issues of Arab identity are a part of the business-at-hand of that interaction. 
Thus, this thesis seeks to examine the details of how two sets of otherwise mutually 
exclusive assumptions necessarily implicate each other, and how it is that this aspect 
of discursive interrogation is exemplified in the analytic material under consideration 
(the interview data). That is, it seeks to make evident the way that issues of prejudice 
(related to constructionism and the making accountable of constructivist assumptions) 
are both implied by as well as implicative of issues of awareness (related to realism 
and the making accountable of realist assumptions). In other words, the accountability 
for the making relevant of one set of assumptions necessarily entails the making 
relevant of the opposite set of assumptions. Said could have sought out the ways that 
the discursive work he takes as his object attends to this feature - that is, how 
orientalist writers anticipate and work to foreclose particular readings of their work 
as predisposed to find the features of the Orient which they claim to reveal. He does 
not do so, however. So, one way that this thesis differs from Said's project is that it 
examines the way that speakers attend to the very sorts of critiques which his (Said's 
own) selective appropriation of the conflicting demands for accountability itself 
exemplifies. Furthermore, this project also seeks to draw attention, in a way that Said 
does not, to that fact itself - that is, to the fact that all discursive production of the 
sort that concerns itself with the examination of some analytic undertaking necessarily 
must do this as a condition of the (analytic) undertaking which itself it sets out to 
accomplish. This thesis thus works to display not only that essentialism (realism) and 
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nominalism (constructivism) are dialogically related in a co-implicative fashion, but 
that a relationship whereby the two necessarily entail one another to their mutual 
exclusion arises `as an inevitable feature ... of the same style of sociological 
argument as it [i. e., such argumentation itself] applies to other substantive areas' 
(Woolgar and Pawluch, 1995: 224). Thus, we are concerned here to draw attention 
to how Said's analysis engages in the same sort of practices which affords it with its 
own critical bite, and that to do that is an inherent feature of all analytic practices, 
as also exemplified in an examination of the interview material (with a reading of that 
material in just those terms). 
Social Cognition and Racism 
Another body of research that is of some relevance to this thesis is a discourse 
analytic project directed at addressing matters of ethnic and racial prejudice. 
Particularly relevant here is the work of Teun van Dijk (1984,1986,1987a, 1987b, 
1987c, 1991, inter alia). This work is quite extensive in terms of the diversity of 
discursive materials that it addresses in examining racism, but what makes this 
research of particular significance to this thesis is the model of cognitive processing 
that informs his analysis of these materials. This work provides a rather interesting 
case for comparison with which to contrast the sort of ethnomethodologically inspired 
approach adopted here in that it draws attention to the problems inherent in a 
mentalistic model of interaction. 
So, whether in his insistence on analysing textual organisation as reflective of 
a hierarchical structure of cognitive schemata (van Dijk, 1979; van Dijk and Kintsch, 
1983; compare with textual organisation as treated in Woolgar, 1988: 73-77), to his 
assumption of shared cognitive processes as definitive of social groups (as aspect of 
his writing that draws upon Moscovici's work in social representation theory), van 
Dijk's work ultimately approaches discourse and discursive interaction as the 
manifestation of underlying mental structures. This is not to say that he does not 
consider discursive interaction as a means of accomplishing structure in the 
orientation of participants to the relevancies whose availability they provide for in 
attending to their interactional business; but van Dijk nevertheless regards these 
two - the cognitive and social structure - as ontologically distinct. Thus, in his 
76 
analyses, he ultimately conceives of interactional business as a vehicle through which 
underlying mental structure is, to varying degrees of success, manifested or given 
expression. 
It is this insistence upon a mentalistic model of interaction that results in the 
encountering of a range of analytic difficulties in dealing with account variability and 
contradiction in talk. In particular, when analysing contradictory claims made by the 
same speaker in the course of his or her talk, one way that van Dijk deals with this 
is through recourse to a theory of face-saving (Goffman, 1990) which is employed to 
retain the essentialist assumptions that inform his reading of the interaction. In other 
words, where speakers express contradictory argumentative positions in the course 
of their talk, claiming to oppose racism but making some statement that might be 
construed as racist, van Dijk's analysis privileges one of those positions (the latter) 
as expressive of what the speaker truly believes. Further, he accounts for the 
contrastive claim (the former claim opposed to racism) as a manifestation of some 
ideologically based social constraints which are said to have the effect of modulating 
the expression of the speaker's essentially durable beliefs. 
This response to variability in talk is problematic for a number of reasons. For 
one thing, such an account takes the nature of the ideological constraints to which it 
refers as unproblematically external to the speakers; and in that it does so, it fails to 
consider how the notion of an ideology can be distinguished from personal belief as 
such. By what means, one might ask, are such ideological positions incorporated into 
a speaker's cognitive structural apparatus? What distinguishes these ideological 
structures from the `real' beliefs that their expression contradicts? What, indeed, if 
not the very essentialist assumptions which that privileging makes available. Thus, 
rather than taking contradiction and the situated work that is accomplished with the 
management of contradiction as his analytic topic, van Dijk's task would seem to be 
that of contributing to the project of developing an essentialist model of the mental 
and of the individual by the deploying discursive materials that he does. 
Interestingly, however, this essentialist approach does not mean that van Dijk 
fails to give analytic consideration to the matters of interactional work that is 
accomplished in talk. Consider, for example, van Dijk's (1987: 91) remarks under 
the heading `Apparent denial and negation': 
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One of the most stereotypical moves used in prejudicial talk is Apparent Denial, 
which usually contains a general denial of (one's own) negative opinions about ethnic 
groups, followed by a negative opinion: "I am not a racist, but ... ," or 
I have 
nothing against foreigners, but .... 
"[... ] We call this Apparent Denial because it 
is not a real denial of what was said, but only a denial of possible inferences the 
recipient may make, as well as a statement that is inconsistent with what is actually 
stated in previous or next assertions. 
The theoretically significant problem with this, of course, is that van Dijk fails to 
provide any criteria with which to distinguish between `what was said' and the 
`possible inferences the recipient may make'. That is, he fails to provide some 
meaningful analytic means by which to differentiate between what he refers to as real 
as against the apparent - except, perhaps, (by implication here) that the former 
entails an unequivocal assertion which is not in any way inconsistent with what the 
speaker might say elsewhere. Why this is problematic is in the assumption that the 
equivocal is somehow disingenuous, that speakers cannot maintain inconsistent 
positions, that `X cannot both be a cause and an effect of Y (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 
174). 
Another, perhaps more significant, problem with this is that van Dijk reads 
participants' anticipatory foreclosure work as a concession to or ratification of the 
very reading which that work sets out to resist. That is, he sees participants' work (of 
foreclosure) as transparently indicating some underlying racist cognitive schemata. ' 
What is interesting about this here is that his efforts to relate the talk to underlying 
structures (here glossed in terms of motives) leads van Dijk to ignore the very 
interactional concerns of the speakers themselves - concerns which he takes as a 
manifestation of that structure. Specifically, it is in anticipatory foreclosure of the 
very sort of reading that van Dijk develops in his analysis of their talk that speakers 
direct their contribution. In other words, van Dijk's analysis is exactly the sort of 
reading which their contribution reflexively works to resist. As an analytic take on 
that talk, therefore, van Dijk's reading surely fails to engage in an analysis of 
participant resources and of how those resources are employed in response to the very 
concern by which that response is occasioned. It is in this way that van Dijk's 
research abandons the analytic work of explicating participant resources in favour of 
engaging in the meanings and interpretations that arise as a result of their use. 
Furthermore, this sort of analysis is such that it not only `finds' racism, but it also 
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removes the analyst from the culpability that such an analysis makes relevant in the 
first place. 
It is a result of van Dijk's insistence on referring to these rhetorical positions 
in terms of underlying cognitive structures and his related assumption that such 
structures cannot be inconsistent that results in his analysis encountering considerable 
problems. In contrast, an analytic take which instead sees argumentative positions as 
rhetorical resources - resources with which speakers work to situate their 
contribution in anticipation of its potential reception - is one that provides a more 
interesting take on what occurs in, and indeed as constitutive of, the setting. In other 
words, by regarding the expression of these alternative and often contradictory 
positions in terms of the interactional work of situating one's voice (thereby foregoing 
the question of cognitive structures), such an analysis not only puts such problematic 
features to one side - making them non-problems, in effect - but it also works to 
explore how social structure is eminently constituted by participants in situ. That is, 
it attends to what the speakers themselves are doing. In contrast, van Dijk's insistence 
upon cognitive schemata and his implicit insistence on consistency lead him to ignore 
the most obvious features of the talk - the inferential potential to which speakers 
attend. In contrast, the analytic take developed in this thesis is one which regards 
such argumentative positions (on issues of prejudice, for example) in terms of their 
situated use, and which deals with contradiction by examining the ways in which 
speakers work to manage the conflict in the implications raised by their conversational 
contributions - in limiting the extent to which certain of those implications are made 
available and others are foreclosed. 
More to the point of this thesis, in his eagerness to privilege a particular 
reading of the talk he considers, van Dijk fails to explore how speakers manage the 
extent of the inferences in their talk. So, while van Dijk acknowledges that speakers 
attend to the potential for their talk to be construed as raising a range of inferences; 
he does not consider in any detail the relationship between those inferences which are 
ratified and those which are sanctioned, especially as regards the extent of their 
mutual constraint. For van Dijk, racist discourse is simply racist discourse. There is 
no variation in the extent to which speakers endorse the implications of attending to 
race and ethnicity as a significant consideration in the pursuit of their own 
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interactional business, nor is there any consideration of how that attention might be 
constitutive of that interaction's business. 
In sum, then, van Dijk's work on racism constitutes an analysis which, again, 
implicitly privileges a particular account of motivation in terms of underlying 
cognitive structures - one which the speaker works to foreclose. What this fails to 
do is to explore the situated work that the speakers do reflexively to constitute the 
significance of their own activities in favour of the relevancies which his analysis 
assumes. Moreover, his failure to do so overlooks the creative way that speakers 
employ the very sorts of category terms (that is, what constitutes `prejudice') that he 
himself brings to bear in the analysis. It is not that van Dijk is unaware of the situated 
nature of the work that these speakers do (as he makes clear in his statement about 
the `real' and the `apparent', reproduced above); but that he fails to consider the 
problematic nature of a range of implicit assumptions about cognitive structures. His 
analysis is in great part, therefore, determined by these assumptions. This also means 
that he cannot attend to contradiction in any other way except by privileging a 
particular version over another. 1° This is also problematic because it means that in 
dealing with contradiction, van Dijk is unable to provide any procedural criteria for 
choosing one version over another (Potter and Wetherell, 1988). In favouring a 
cognitive approach, he must necessarily disregard the situated work that speakers 
attend to in employing contradictory assumptions. " 
Reflexive Implications in Social Constructionism 
So far we have considered two examples of research into discourse where the topics 
of concern to the participants involved - those whose writing and/or talk is under 
analysis - are taken up as considerations by the researchers as well. Specifically, 
where the Orient (in the case of Said's work) or the psychology of racism (in the case 
of van Dijk's work) are of concern for the participants themselves, so too the 
researchers who examine the production of discursive products where those concerns 
are dealt with employ their analysis of those products as a way of addressing the self- 
same concerns raised therein. Now, one interesting aspect of the relationship between 
the literature on Orientalism (or social psychology or whatever) and the discourse 
which is the analytic object of that literature is the question of whether and how the 
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production of such discursive interaction constitutes a response to prior analytic work 
for which it is an object. 
Mapping Various Directions: The Language of Racism 
Up to this point, we have also considered a range of different research that in some 
way or other relates to discourse concerned with prejudice and cultural difference. 
We have already noted that a great deal of this work is problematic for this thesis 
because, to different degrees, it approaches such issues as unproblematically 
straightforward, so that prejudice and/or culture are more or less regarded as given. 
That is, it takes prejudice and/or culture to be ontological primitives even while it 
attends to the nature of those primitives as constituted in discursive interaction (just 
as we have seen in the case of Said's work). Now, where this thesis departs from 
such work is that rather than regard prejudice and culture as presumably known and 
known-about - as `out there' - it seeks to examine precisely how such matters are 
attended to themselves as participant concerns. Thus, we want to explore in what 
ways and under what circumstances speakers display an orientation to these issues as 
relevant to the interactional business of their talk. Where and to what effect are 
prejudice and culture matters of speaker concern? 
Closely related to this, we are also interested in examining the way that such 
concern is itself variably occasioned. That is, we are interested in exploring the range 
of different interactional business that speakers attend to in taking such matters as 
their concern. This aspect of variability in interactional business is important because 
it relates to the contingent nature of the relevant assumptions (about prejudice and 
culture). It points up the way that what gets taken as an instance of prejudice or what 
is regarded as an expression of culturally determined behaviour, for example, is itself 
the outcome of interactional work and not predetermined prior to that works' 
accomplishment. Thus, where that interactional work varies, so too the nature of the 
assumptions whose relevance is provided for varies in relation to the business those 
assumptions are called upon to do (Edwards, 1991). 
One piece of research which takes up this analytic task is that of Margaret 
Wetherell and Jonathan Potter's Mapping the Language of Racism (1992). This book 
is a rich resource not only for how it covers the broad extent of theoretical work 
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concerned with racism and the contingent nature of that category's relevance as 
provided for in research which takes race as its topic (see, for example, the 
discussion of Miles' [1989] work, pp. 14-33), but also for how it explores the way 
that categorisation is variably worked up in talk. It is this latter feature of their work 
that is of particular relevance to the work of this thesis. Specifically, Wetherell and 
Potter examine the details of how culture gets taken as a relevant matter in talk 
among white New Zealanders - descendants of the Europeans who colonised the 
islands. Of concern in their analyses is the way that a range of different assumptions 
as to what constitutes culture are made available relative to the argumentative 
implications which those assumptions entail in the specific context of their use. Talk 
about culture thus becomes a resource with which to argue for, among other things, 
the legitimacy of difference (culture-as-heritage), where the responsibility for social 
inequality lies (culture-as-therapy), or the sources of social unrest (culture-as- 
ideology). Wetherell and Potter thus show how the category of culture varies with the 
discursive context in which it is made available. As such, their work might be 
regarded as exploring the reflexive implication of the use of culture-talk in order to 
demonstrate how the significance of such talk is related to the context of its use. In 
this regard, this thesis shares a similar concern with their work. 
One way that this thesis seeks to extend the work that Wetherell and Potter 
do on variability is to consider the relationship between the assumptions whose 
relevance is provided for in talk about culture and the interactional context by which 
that work is occasioned. What this means is that where Wetherell and Potter consider 
the argumentative implications of the various assumptions made relevant in talk about 
culture, specifically addressing their analyses to the way in which those assumptions 
provide for a range of different argumentative inferences; in this thesis, we will 
consider how the assumptions made available in talk about culture are co- 
implicationally related to a contrastive range of assumptions provided for in talk about 
prejudice, and with the way that the conflicting demands for accountability which 
those assumptions involve are mutually related as providing the grounds for their 
relevance. It is this relationship between competing demands for accountability and 
the connection which that has with the variability in talk about either culture or 
prejudice which is the point of departure for this thesis. So, while Wetherell and 
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Potter explore how the assumptions made available in talk about culture are variably 
employed argumentatively to legitimate exploitation (much as I do with cultural 
sensitivity and the legitimation of u. s. involvement in the Gulf War in Chapter 6, 
below), they do not examine how these are related to demands for accountability to 
assumptions regarding prejudice. More importantly, they do not deal with how these 
two sorts of demands are related in a mutually co-implicative fashion as manifested 
in actual episodes of talk and with the work that speakers do to manage the conflict 
involved. 
Wetherell and Potter's book thus focuses primarily on talk about practical 
politics, exploring the way that attending to issues of prejudice and sensitivity to 
cultural difference are employed as resources to argue for the legitimacy of a certain 
configuration of social relations. This thesis, in contrast, expands upon that work by 
examining the way that talk about prejudice and sensitivity to cultural difference are 
employed in attending to concerns such as the speaker's epistemological warrant - 
matters related to the significance of the speaker's contribution as constitutive of the 
setting in which it occurs. In commenting upon the limits of their project, Wetherell 
and Potter remark: `we suspect that talk about ... the 
discursive small-change 
recognized as prejudice, will prove just as flexible and inconsistent in practice as the 
discourse of practical politics' (1992: 198). In fact, it is to issues such as what it is 
that constitutes such discursive small-change and its recognition as prejudice (and to 
the implications that this holds for the participants involved in formulating that 
recognition) that this thesis expands upon the work of Mapping the Language of 
Racism. 
All of this is not to say that Wetherell and Potter neglect the matter of how 
speakers work to foreclose the construal of their talk in terms of prejudice. On the 
contrary, they deal with this matter in considerable detail. Their work, however, 
focuses specifically upon the talk of political legitimation. In fact, they implicitly 
assume a model of discourse that differs from an ethnomethodological treatment of 
social structure. Thus, social structure, while considered as the topic-of-talk in the 
conversational materials Wetherell and Potter analyze, is still considered 
independently of the talk's occasion. ` Consider, for example, the following 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 214): 
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[A]ttention to the [different] interpretive resources alone misses the flexible 
application of that resource in practice. When we look at practice it becomes clear 
how prejudice discourse begins to double back on itself so that what was once an 
accusation or critique of racism becomes mobilized as an important part of the 
rhetorical work which maintains the status quo. 
By distinguishing, as they do here, between the use of resources and their practical 
application - between talk and practice - Wetherell and Potter equivocate with 
regard to the ethnomethodologically relevant point about how talk is practice, and 
with how social structure - the `status quo' to which they refer here as distinct from 
talk - is eminent to that talk. To provide for a distinction between talk and the 
consequential implications of that talk in practice (talk-in-its-practical-consequences), 
while perhaps potentially valuable as a rhetorical device to promote the utility of 
one's analysis, is nevertheless to ignore the theoretical issue of how the practical 
consequences of talk are such as to effect the concerns that are of relevance to that 
setting from within that setting (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; 1988). To regard the situated 
occasion as a manifestation of some social structure which transcends that occasion 
is the business to which speakers attend in their talk. 
Of course, Wetherell and Potter are not entirely consistent in this regard (a 
response, perhaps, to the analytic use made by Ashmore [1989: Ch. 5] of 
inconsistencies in both their own prior writing [Potter and Wetherell, 1987] and in 
related work). At certain places they attend to these ethnomethodologically informed 
theoretical concerns with the eminence of social structure; but in pursuing (the 
practical task of) their work, they necessarily employ a description which 
distinguishes between talk and its implications-for-practice -a distinction which the 
talk they consider itself makes available - in order to address that conversational 
activity. So another important way that Mapping the Language of Racism relates to 
this thesis is in respect to their take on discursive interaction and social structure. 
`Studies of Work' as New Literary Forms 
One area of ethnomethodologically related work that is also significant to this thesis 
is a body of analytic research referred to as the `studies of work' project, in 
distinction to an approach referred to as `talk and social structure'. The theoretical 
significance of this distinction is the topic of concern taken up in a special issue of 
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Human Studies (1995, vol. 18, no. 2-3) edited by George Psathas and entitled 
`Ethnomethodology: Discussions and Contributions'. In particular, this publication is 
concerned with the degree that social setting is constituted in the interactionally 
accomplished activity of making and orienting to setting as relevantly available or the 
possibility that `what they [participants in an encounter] are engaged in doing is also 
analyzable in terms of more than the immediately available interaction' (Psathas, 
1995: 142). This is an important issue because if, as Schegloff and others argue (as 
discussed in the earlier part of this chapter), it is the concern of participants to make 
such relevancies available - that is, to do social structure in the activity of making 
its relevance available - then to do as Psathas suggests (that is, to offer an analysis 
`in terms of more than the immediately available interaction') is itself to engage in 
doing what participants do: to provide for the availability of the extra-situational as 
relevant to and, to some degree, determinate of the activity which takes place there 
in that situation itself. It is to make a claim for the claim-independence of the 
referent. 
The very claim to claim-independence achieved in this way is, therefore, 
contradictory in that the activity of discussing the claim-independence of the activity 
(`in terms of more that the immediately available interaction' [Psathas, 1995: 142]) 
is itself constitutive of the activity of making those otherwise irrelevant concerns 
available. That is, it accomplishes that which it says is done in the very activity of 
saying that it is not done. In this way, the very relevancies which the analyst seeks 
(as independent of the situation to which it is referred) are found - provided for - 
in the very activity of his or her seeking. 
Now, this is paradoxical. It is also reflexively brilliant in that one can read 
such claims as working to display the very point that a talk-and-social-structure type 
analysis (Schegloff, 1991,1992) itself works to make - viz., that the object of 
analytic activity (whether it be that of an ethnomethodologically informed activity, or 
that of the lay members whose methods such an analysis purports to investigate [see 
Garfinkel, 1974]). The claim to claim-independence and the claim-dependence thereof 
is displayed in the claims of such analysts to be seeking for `more than the 
immediately available interaction' (Psathas, 1995: 142). Further, the fact that that 
itself is what they claim participants are about (viz., granting asylum to their own 
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situated analytic activities, 13 then to do the same with their very own analytic 
activities is reflexively to display the very point about the situatedness and 
contingency of structure which they seek to make - in and through the very activity 
of calling that point into question (Ashmore, 1989: Ch. 3). 
This is how I choose to read this take on what work by the likes of Graham 
Button, etc. (what Psathas glosses as the `studies of work' research) are doing. So, 
for example, the contentiousness of their position itself provides for the relevance of 
the very point about how the situation-independence of structure is always ever 
provided for in situ. Thus, for example, at the `Symposium on Cognition and Action' 
held at the University of Nottingham on 15 October 1996 (proceedings organised and 
moderated by David Greatbatch under the auspices of the School of Social Studies at 
that institution), the remarks recorded below were made during the question-and- 
answer period following the presentation of Graham Button's contribution entitled 
`The Fallacy of Distributed Cognition' . 
14 Among other things, Button provided a 
contrastive analysis of working operations in a mass-production printshop by way of 
developing a critique of the analytic work in Edwin Hutchins' book Cognition in the 
Wild (1995): 
Button: it's perfectly possible in the- in- in- in- in the world to find that people 
can go around um- uh- describing the world in intelligible ways, and 
that what- where the problems come, and most of the problems come, 
is when we enter the scene, as sociologists (laughs), and want to now 
redescribe it, yeah? And then have good fights. You- you know, make 
our careers, out of debating with one other which is the best way of 
redescribing it. And I think a lot of problems with social science, the 
problems with human science, is the problem of redescription, and I 
think that's what Hutchins in doing. 
Antaki: But you're not. You're not. [smiley voice] 
Button: I don't know. 
(audience laughter) 
Greatbatch: Mike. [offers floor to Michael Lynch] (sighs) 
(audience laughter) 
Suchman: Time for a beer! [smiley voice] (laughs) 
(audience laughter) 
Button: You- you- in- in- in- in what way- in what ways am I producing a 
redescription. 
At a latter point in the same question-and-answer period, the discussion continues: 
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Potter: I think the sharp issue- one sharp issue here is uh- are we treating 
members' practices as somehow homogeneous or cons- or consen- or 
consensual, or is it possible that within this universe that you're 
looking at, of print workers, there are for example the kind of 
alternative vocabularies like- that Gilbert and Mulkay [1984] show in 
their study of biochemists. Because your story sounds to me very much 
like the official story of the biochemists. Where they tell it all working 
very properly or smoothly, not giving these other sides, these 
problematical (indistinguishable), and of course for Gilbert and Mulkay 
their- their point is not that one or either of these stories is correct, 
that you could go and check one out, but both of them are part of the 
culture of biochemistry. Both of them are used to do particular things. 
And I'm wondering whether there are voices and stories in your 
materials that are actually- don't allow you to simply say "Ah, this is 
what the participants say", because you're faced with the problems 
(indistinguishable) participants are saying more than one thing, more 
than one kind of thing. 
Button: It's a very simple thing, printing, uh- it- 
(audience laughter) 
some lines omitted 
Button: In- in the- the simil- the similar situation uh- where you walk- where 
you go into uh- uh- a- a particular setting, um- I don't know whether 
or not what I'm being invited to do is to see some managerialist um- 
uh- uh- version uh- of the world, um- all I can do is to kind of like 
describe the activities and the actions um- as those activities and 
actions are presented, in terms of the ways in which they display 
certain orientations, um- and the ways in which they display certain 
orientations such as uh- "we'll do the finishing after the printing's been 
done", that "we'll do x after uh- uh- y has been done", that there are 
um- ways in which we can um- uh- work to um- put an order to 
something, and then ways in which we can work to then reorder that 
thing when we put an order to it, um- I don't know if that's- it's- 
that's um- necessarily uh- I didn't- I wouldn't know what it is to have 
a- a variety of voices on that. Uh- oh- oh- you might get a variety of 
voices on- on it in terms of uh- um- uh- uh- "this is an exploitative 
way" or "this is uh- entire-" something other way, you know, I just- 
I just do not know what it would be to say, yeah, that these people are 
working in such a- it- d- d- other than to say in doing x they're 
displaying some orientation to a sequential order of printing. I don't 
know what it- I don't know what another voice would be there. But it- 
you know, if you can show me there is one, I'm- I'm pleased. 
some lines omitted 
Button: What I'm just trying to say is for some of the act- for some of the 
activities that you can see, uh- I just don't know what it would be to- 
to- to- to have some other sorts of descriptive category. I just don't 
know what it would be. If somebody could tell me that then I might- 
might have- w- w- well take that into account. I just do not see what 
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it would be. To say that when- that- uh- uh- that a- (sighs) "that this- 
this process", yeah, "is organised to precede this process" is not an 
orientation to some sort of notion of a sequential order, then there's a 
lot of work that's been done to make that order play out as they want 
it to do, but I just know that it would be to describe that other than- 
you know- I don't mind, you know, like you mean use another word, 
that's not what he's [refers to Potter] meaning. 
In the first of these exchanges (with Antaki), Button contrasts the sort of description 
that he develops in his own analysis of printshop activities with that which Hutchins 
provides in his analysis of the coordination of seamen's activities on a naval vessel. 
In particular, Button is quite explicit in contextualising this contrast within the set of 
problematics that he claims are definitive of the social and human sciences. Now, 
what is interesting about this is that by offering his analytic take on participant 
activities in the way that he does - that is, in privileging his own analytic work over 
Hutchins' and by granting his own analytic work asylum from the scrutinising 
deconstruction that he wields against Hutchins - Button literally begs the question 
as to the transparency of his own analytic undertaking. In so doing, he works to 
display the very point that situated analytic practices (including the analytic practice 
of examining others' practices) grants itself asylum from analytic scrutiny, and that 
it must necessarily do so if there is ever to be any analytic practice at all. 
In other words, if the theoretical point of an ethnomethodological 
investigation is to show that participants employ a range of (ethno)methods by which 
to make sense of their situated activities, and if the point is further to show that social 
structure is constituted thereby for those participants in their mutual orientation to 
such structures as efficacious to the circumstances in which they take part; then the 
implications of this theoretical point is itself also no less the case of the situated 
activity of analysing those participants' analytic practices (such as that pursued by 
Button in his analysis of printshop activities). " Put another way, the point about 
analytic asylum is just as true of ethnomethodologists as it is of those whose situated 
analytic practices ethnomethodologists set out to investigate. Thus, by begging the 
question as to how his own analysis of printshop activities constitutes a redescription 
(`in what ways am I producing a redescription'), Button refuses to take his analytic 
practices themselves under analytic consideration and thereby displays the very point 
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of an ethnomethodological theory - viz., that structural relevancies are eminent in 
participants' analytic sense-making practices. To do otherwise - that is, to have 
engaged in the subsequent analytic scrutiny of his own analytic practices (those 
accomplished in his take on printshop work) - would be to have done something 
other than to have granted his own prior analytic activities scrutinising asylum. It 
would instead be to pursue analysis at another (meta-)level. It would be to have 
turned to engage in a different analytic activity - viz., that of considering his own 
prior analytic activity of printshop workers' activity. In that case, however, the 
activity with which he would then and thereby be engaged would be accorded the 
same analytic asylum which had formerly been the privilege of that prior analytic 
practice (of describing the printshop workers' activities) before it had been subjected 
to scrutiny. Moreover, for him also to have said that that was itself the case - that 
is, that the subsequent subjecting of his analysis of printshop workers' activities to 
analytic scrutiny was an activity which, in its very undertaking, would be granted 
analytic asylum - would itself be to have engaged in yet another (meta-meta-)level 
of analytic scrutiny which would also thereby be granted analytic asylum. Thus, by 
begging the question as he does, Button ceases from engaging in the proliferation of 
analytic level-jumping. More importantly, however, he also works to display that this 
is what he is doing without his having to say so in just so many words. ' 
In saying something like `I just don't know what it would be to- to- to- to 
have some other sorts of descriptive category' or `It's a very simple thing, printing', 
Button fails - that is, refuses - himself to provide for the relevance of alternative 
categories. Thus, in so doing, he again paradoxically displays the very point about 
how such relevancies are made available in participants' activities of providing for 
their significance (or not, as the case may be). Again, by failing himself to engage 
in analytic consideration of his own prior analysis; Button works, in and through his 
refusal, to display the ethnomethodologically relevant point that situated analytic 
activity grants asylum to it's own analytic practices. " Again, this is further 
displayed in the second exchange (with Potter) in and through the concessionary 
remarks Button makes concerning the introduction of such an analysis by some other 
party (`if you can show me there is one, I'm- I'm pleased', `If somebody could tell 
me that then I might- might have- w- w- well take that into account'). The point here 
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is that, with these remarks inviting (though not engaging in) the introduction of an 
alternative analytic take, Button displays the way in which such an analytic gesture 
would itself constitute a subsequent occasion for mutual orientation in and with the 
uptake on his own prior analysis. " 
Now, the sort of response to Button's remarks that I have provided here are 
quite interesting; but they are contentious. It is possible to offer an alternative reading 
of those remarks and indeed of a variety of ethnomethodological work in general. It 
could, for example, be argued that analysts in the `studies of work' line (Button and 
Sharrock, 1993; Bjelic and Lynch, 1992; Coulter, 1989; Watson and Seiler, 1992, 
inter alia) are simply failing to be reflexive about their own work. That is, it could 
be argued that they are not pointing up the reflexive nature of their own analytic 
activities but are merely privileging the analyst's (their own) take. 19 Essentially, this 
is the position taken in this review with regard to the work of those discussed in the 
previous sections. The same could be said in relation to an ethnomethodologically 
informed sociological project generally. For example, consider this recent critique of 
the ethnomethodological insistence upon the constitution of meaning as eminent in 
situated practices (May, 1996: 97, emphasis in original): 
[A sociological concern with `truth' as related to time and convention] is the theme 
which variants of CA [conversation analysis] appear to overcome by generalizing 
about conventions of language free of social context as if reasons for actions were 
causes of actions. If such practices are submitted to the original canons of 
referential reflexivity which ethnomethodology has called for, it would clearly fall 
short of meeting these standards. Instead, what is now produced is a supposed 
authoritative inquiry which fails to see how its own grounds of thinking are 
themselves constituted as a product of social relations (McHugh et al. 1974). 
One of the assumptions made relevant here is that if, as the argument might go, 
they - ethnomethodologists - were to refer to the reflexive implications of their own 
analysis (that is, the asylum which they accord to their own analysis), then perhaps 
they might be more convincing to their audience if for no other reason than for their 
consistency. However, if they were indeed to do this (that is, make the effort to point 
this up), then in so doing they would no longer be effecting the display itself but 
would instead be working to accomplish something different than to display the 
inconsistency of making the claim about claim-independence. They must be 
inconsistent in their claims-about-consistency in order to achieve the reflexive display 
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concerning the theoretical point - i. e., that analysis grants asylum to its own 
undertaking (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). 20 Interestingly enough, to criticise it for 
doing this is to engage the very point it works to make - albeit to reject its efforts, 
or to fail to accept the relevance of those efforts. In so doing (that is, in rejecting), 
it nevertheless paradoxically buys into the very point such a reflexive analysis sets out 
to make in order to make that rejection effective. 
Thus, the phenomenology of a `studies of work' analysis itself reflexively 
displays the very point it works to make about analytic practices as such. In regarding 
such studies in this way, I choose to read Button, etc. as working with their analysis 
to author the sort of reflexive work that Potter (1988: 49) refers to in his discussion 
of New Literary Forms; ` and further, I choose to read both Antaki's and Potter's 
remarks at the Nottingham symposium as facilitating just such a reading of Button's 
work by providing for its relevance in their taking of Button's remarks as 
problematic. In other words, their remarks provide an argumentative foil that works 
up the issues Button (and, by implication, the `studies of work' project generally) 
seeks to display, and thereby also articulate the objections whose expression makes 
those very concerns for consistency availably relevant. The point here is that the 
expression of disagreement itself also works to display the point about how the 
relevance of in situ concerns is itself provided for in situ - even the situation 
independence of those concerns is only ever provided for in situ. It goes without 
saying that this relates to the thesis project here in that I seek to work to display the 
reading of the situated (analytic) activities of the participants in the interview material 
as a reading, and thereby to display the point about how New/Alternative Literary 
Forms reflexively call attention to the sort of work that participants accomplish in 
their own execution. 22 [Strike that last sentence out as it is inconsistent with your 
overall point. ] 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined a range of different research all of which takes as 
its topic issues related either to ethnic and racial prejudice or else to cultural 
difference. What all of these different bodies of research have in common is a 
concern to explore the relationship between discursive activity and the nature what 
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is referred to as the object of that activity. A crucial difference that distinguishes 
much of the work we have reviewed, however, is that related to reflexivity. Simply 
put, this involves the theoretical assumptions concerning what exactly is involved in 
representation. Thus, for some, in taking instances of discursive representation as its 
own analytic object, the object of that first-level discursive reference (that is, the 
discursive activity being so scrutinised) is regarded as distinct from that activity of 
representation itself. Thus, language/discursive representation itself is taken as 
mirroring its objects of reference to greater or lesser degrees of accuracy. Such a 
theory of language usually remains implicit in such work in that the comparative 
criteria by which that measure of accuracy might be determined is itself left 
inexplicit. Particularly interesting here is the fact that such work lacks a reflexive 
aspect in that it grants analytic asylum to its own activity of scrutiny, failing 
reflexively to consider the implications of its own activity of distinguishing between 
its object-of-discursive-reference (that is, the first-level discursive activity which it 
objectifies) and that objectifying activity itself. That is, such work sets out to 
deconstruct discursive representation, demonstrating how the object of reference and 
the activity of referral are inherently related. This work then seeks to discredit or 
undermine that discursive representation on the implicit assumption that the inherent 
relationship so demonstrated is not inaccurate. In this way, the subject-object 
distinction is therefore selectively made available as a means of affording critical 
purchase to the deconstructive work of the analysis by which it is made available in 
the first instance. 
Notes 
1. Edwards (1997: 271-276) distinguishes between at least three types or levels of analysis where in 
Type 1, a text develops a sort of picture of events (as with ethnographies and oral histories), in Type 
2 the first level type texts are themselves treated as objects, as constituting a technology whereby things 
and/or events are represented to a greater or lesser degree of accuracy, and in Type 3 where 
discourse 
is the analytic object such that the issue of a representation's accuracy is irrelevant to that analysis. 
Edwards includes his own research in the latter category of analysis. In so doing, however, he 
implicitly addresses matters of the analysis's adequacy (if not accuracy). That is, Type 2 analyses are 
implicitly taken to be inadequate in that they make available the assumption that there exists some 
correct or unmediated version of events by which the adequacy of their object (the Type 1 texts 
in 
question) can be determined. In implying that the Type 2 analyses are inadequate, Edwards engages 
in the same sort of work that those (Type 2) analyses do to determine the adequacy of the Type 1 
representations which they take as their object of analysis. In other words, the issue of accuracy 
is 
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replace here with the issue of adequacy. The issue is one of mediation: to what degree is a text's 
referent provided with direct access. 
2. The mutually co-implicative relationship of social structure to the conceptual apparatuses by which 
the classification of distinct groups (the sane and the insane) is accomplished is explored creatively in 
Will Self's brilliant novelistic work The Quantity Theory of Insanity (1991). 
3. So, for example, in response to the suggestions for the development of ethnomethodology as a 
project of social criticism that McHoul (1988) develops inhis reading of Coulter's (1971,1973,1979) 
work, Bogen and Lynch remark: `Rather than situating Coulter's arguments for `disinterested analysis' 
against the backcloth of explanatory theorising, McHoul takes Coulter to be expressing a blanket 
indifference to, and hence, total detachment from, the normative commitments intrinsic to the analytic 
`object' (viz., language). [... ] The central confusion in McHoul is that he makes pointed nonsense of 
Coulter's notion of `disinterested description' by construing it as a blanket claim to the transcendental 
correctness of analysts' descriptions (the descriptivist fallacy), rather than as a reasoned indifference 
to the successes of specific conventional methods of sociological and philosophical explanation. That 
this confusion leads him to misinterpret the `critical' import of Coulter's analyses is evident throughout 
the text' (1990: 516-517, emphasis in original). 
4. This relates to the discussion in McHoul which in turn involves McHoul discussing what Mehan and 
Wood (1975: 162) describe as the Reflexivity problem - the Rr-problem: `Herein lies the rub of my 
attempted (dis)solution of Rr as a trouble. In doing actual investigations, ethnomethodology might 
usefully rely upon the research heuristic ('myth') that the phenomena it treats comprise a real order 
of events, that they are objects in an independently existing world. In its investigative mode (for want 
of a better term) ethnomethodology's self-understanding is that it is codifying or explicating practices 
which indeed do exist in the lay (=non-ethnomethodological) world absolutely independently of 
ethnomethodological interests in them but which are (simply) unthematised in that lay world. Such a 
`realist heuristic' it might well share with other analytic forms of life (including, presumably, 
transformational grammar and psychoanalysis). However, in addressing itself as such a phenomenon, 
ethnomethodology can, by contrast, hold that those very objects and practices (which it takes as `topic') 
in fact emerge as a product of the concerted, reflexive work of the ethnomethodological tradition and 
discourse. Here what previously looked like existents in a real and independent world beyond 
ethnomethodology become discernible as effects of ethnomethodology reproducing its own form of life' 
(1982: 101, emphasis in original). 
5. More specifically, Said develops the notion that this is accomplished in the way that orientalist 
writings address their object from within a set of internally available assumptions having as their 
corollary the comparative placement of that object (the Orient) in an inferior position, as determined 
on an evaluative scale which those writings make relevant. Thus, in constituting its object with 
reference to those assumptions, such writing is said to achieve the relational prominence or 
preeminence of the West over the Orient. Said thus remarks upon how `Orientalism depends for its 
strategy [of control] on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series 
of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand' (1978: 7, 
emphasis in original). 
6. This particular feature of Said's work has been noted by at least one other writer as well: `[T]he 
entirely correct refusal [by him] to offer an alternative to Orientalism does not solve the problem of 
how Said separates himself from the coercive structures of knowledge that he is describing. What 
method can he use to analyze his object that escapes the terms of his own critique`? [... ] This problem 
can be seen to be more serious as a general level in relation to the whole project of the book 
[Orientalism] in which, according to the logic of Said's own argument, any account of `Orientalism' 
as an object, discursive or otherwise, will both repeat the essentialism that he condemns and, more 
problematically, will itself create a representation that cannot be identical to the object it identifies. In 
other words, Said's account will he no truer to Orientalism than Orientalism is to the actual Orient, 
assuming there could ever he such a thing' (Young, 1990: 127,128; emphasis added). Notice too that 
even in Young's claim here that Said's work fails reflexively to engage the critical implications that 
93 
it raises, Young himself engages in the same activity for which he works to make Said accountable. 
This inevitable feature of any sociological analysis (Woolgar, 1988; Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985) 
means that not only is this the case of Said's work and of Young's analytic reading thereof; but that 
it is also the case of an analysis of that analysis (or a disclaimer of that analysis' work as in the 
statement `as in this statement here', ad infinitum). It is this open-ended, potentially infinitely defeasihle 
aspect of a retrospective take on a prior dialogic turn that Bakhtin (1984) refers to in his discussion of 
unfinalisability (see also related discussion in Morson and Emerson: 1990: 36-49). 
7. This sort of selective making-relevant of realist and constructionist assumptions is quite similar to 
what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) refer to with the term ontological gerrymandering. Said's work 
differs from ontological gerrymandering, however, is that it attends to the potential to be rhetorically 
undermined as an objectivist account (that is, as objectifying the Orient), even while working implicitly 
to give critical purchase to his deconstructive project with the making available of realist assumptions. 
In other words, Said attends to and manages the demands between the two assumptions in a way that 
the work which Woolgar and Pawluch discuss does not. So, in discussing several instances of research 
involving this selective availability of the different theoretical assumptions, Woolgar and Pawluch note 
that `the authors fail to acknowledge that their identification of ... or their assertion of the constancy 
of a condition or behaviour [analogous, here, to the objectification of the Orient], can itself be 
construed as a definitional claim' (ibid.: 217). Said, however, does do this. He is thus reflexive in the 
endogenous sense though he is not, however, reflexive in the referential sense (see note 15, below). 
For a discussion and extension of the notion of ontological gerrymandering to include the selective 
making relevant of phenomenon in description, see Potter 1996: 183-187 as well as related discussion 
of what Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994) refer to with a distinction between `strict' and `contextual' versions 
of social constructionism. 
8. This is not to suggest that Said neglects such concerns, only that he attends to a different set of 
rhetorical considerations as occasioned by his participation in the circumstances than do the Western 
expatriates whose talk we consider. In contrast to the way those speakers attend to assumptions about 
cultural sensitivity, Said deploys the work of category entitlement in references to his personal history 
as a member of the Palestinian diaspora community. Consider for example the following remarks: 
`Much of the personal investment in this study [Orientalism] derives from my awareness of being an 
"Oriental" as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those colonies 
(Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness 
has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon 
me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of 
all Orientals. [... ] Along the way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to 
maintain a critical consciousness, as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and 
cultural research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, 
however, have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been 
constituted as, "an Oriental"' (Said, 1978: 25-26). In that Said makes relevant the 
implicit claims to 
category entitlement that are available in these remarks, his comments work to foreclose the potential 
that they might be construed as personally motivated -a consideration that would not, of course, arise 
for those British and American speakers whose talk is under consideration in this thesis. 
9. Similarly, research into what is referred to as the new racism (Barker, 1981; see also Gilroy, 1987 
and related discussion in both Gabriel, 1994: 184-194 and Solomos and Back, 1996) relies upon the 
assumption of an underlying racist motive or intention in any discursive efforts to foreclose a reading 
of one's contribution as an instance of racist discourse. 
10. In the note to an article in which he attempts to relate discourse analytic work with more 
traditionally informed work in social cognition, Shi-xu writes: `Of course, pluralistic social settings 
and environments may impose contradictory and even contrary demands on the social 
individual in a 
particular situation but it does not follow that these cognitions themselves - ideologies, attitudes, group 
representation - are inherently inconsistent. 
It merely means that they may come into conflict in 
specific social situations, such that they become combined, lopsided, or smoothed over and that they 
may appear varied when compared across situations or may feature even within one situation. Thus, 
94 
according to Kress (1985: 27,39), text may appear as the expression of several competing, 
contradictory pieces of social information. In a similar vein, he claims that texts are more unstable and 
unpredictable whereas `discourse and ideology', more a category of the social domain and two sides 
of the same phenomenon, are relatively consistent in themselves. But then it may also be observed that 
people do maintain some degree of continuity of social cognition across different situations. Since a 
`dilemmatic' theory of social cognition fails to account for this phenomenon the allusion is to both 
Billig, 1987 and Potter and Wetherell, 1987 as cited in prior remarks], it cannot be supported' (1992: 
287). Here, Shi-xu's citation of Kress is in keeping with the entire tenor of his remarks in that they 
work simply to reiterate the very position which he initially introduces as problematic without, 
however, addressing the theoretical concerns by which it is informed. 
11. Similarly, in examining news materials, van Dijk's (1991) insistence upon a social cognition 
approach leads him to adopt the rather inadequate method of word counting as a device with which to 
indicate what he implicitly assumes to be the underlying cognitive structures that news items express 
(see review by Potter, 1992b). Again, this overlooks an entire range of rather interesting rhetorical 
work accomplished in and with news reporting and fails to consider how contradiction and the 
topicalisation of same is itself deployed in news items as a way of attending to the situated rhetorical 
work of privileging competing versions of events (see Edwards and Potter, 1992: Ch. 3). 
12. Potter remarks on this: `it's a fudge really rather than a developed social structured view' (pers. 
comm. ). 
13. The analytic activity itself constitutes its object of reference just as does the activity of the 
participants. This is consistent with the point that an ethnomethodology sets out to make: that the 
distinction between an object of discursive reference and the discursive activity are in some sense 
indistinguishable. This reflexive aspect of the analytic practice of examining participants' activities 
demonstrates the point it sets out to make, and is simply a characteristic feature of any interaction - 
that is, that it must in some sense itself be exempt from the deconstructive work it sets out to 
accomplish in order successfully to accomplish that work. 
14. Other attendants whose presence features here include Charles Antaki (Loughborough University), 
Michael Lynch (Brunel University), Jonathan Potter (Loughborough University) and Lucy Suchman 
(Rank Xerox). 
15. Pollner refers to these two different emphases in the ethnomethodological project as the concern 
for endogenous reflexivity ('how what members do in, to, and about social reality constitutes social 
reality') on the one hand and referential reflexivity (which `conceives of all analysis - 
ethnomethodology included - as a constitutive process') on the other. 
`Thus, ethnomethodology is 
referentially reflexive to the extent it appreciates its own analyses as constitutive and endogenous 
accomplishments. Referential reflexive appreciation of constitution is radicalized when the appreciator 
is included within the scope of reflexivity, i. e., when the formulation of reflexivity - as well as every 
other feature of analysis - is appreciated as an endogenous achievement' 
(1991: 372, italics in 
original). It is this radicalization of referential reflexivity - that is, the inclusion of the appreciator 
within the scope of reflexivity - which is the problematic feature of an analysis since any effort to 
make that work of analysis explicit is one which, in so doing, departs from the undertaking it works 
thereby to objectify. It is, again, to do something else - something other than that activity to which 
it makes reference. The way around this problematic is to engage in a sort of question-begging analysis 
of analytic practices that implicitly (or, rather, inexplicitly) invites the reader to consider the 
implications for the first-level analysis of the second-level analysis which such a first-level analytic 
reading accomplishes. 
16. Garfinkel refers to the eminence of participants' mutual orientation in the situated activities in 
which they engage with the phrase tacit knowledge - in short, that aspect intrinsic to any interactional 
event such that that `event means for both the witness and the other more than the witness can say' 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 56; cited in Mehan and Wood 1975: 100). In light of the responses Button provided 
at the Nottingham symposium then, consider Mehan and Wood's (1975) remarks on Schwartz's (1971, 
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n. d. ) reading of Garfinkel's project wherein he (Schwartz) points out that, just as with any other 
analytic practice, so too ethnomethodology is an ironising undertaking; and that `to analyze subjective 
phenomena necessarily distorts such phenomena. He [(that is, Schwartz) therefore] says that subjective 
phenomena should [instead] be displayed' (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 153, emphasis in original). I want 
to read Button's remarks here as providing just such a display. Further, I want to be read as reading 
Button's remarks as providing such a display, as well as to be seen here to be read as reading Button's 
remarks as providing such a display, as well as ... 
[Stop here. ] [Refer to previous remark. ] 
17. Even work which attempts to consider the implications of its own doing can only ever do so after 
the fact, as it were. That is, in considering the reflexive implications of one's own activity - even (and 
perhaps especially) when that activity involves the work of reflexively considering one's own analytic 
practices - that consideration is itself something 
different than the object of analysis: the theretofore 
subjective activity then becomes objectified. Thus, the moment that one turns to consider their own 
activity, they are thereby engaging in an activity (that of the turning, so to speak) that is different than 
that which they are then considering. Schutz (1967) captures this rather nicely with his metaphor of 
a cone of light. For a related discussion of how this particular matter is handled in what the pioneering 
semiotician Charles Sanders Pearce refers to with the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness, 
see Rochberg-Halton, 1986. 
18. Or, as per Pollner: `Reflective explication of the ethnomethodological practices through which the 
claim that "meaning is a construction" is achieved might commence with the observation that neither 
the indexical character of conversation nor the interpretive practices used to achieve closure are 
experientially self-evident to either conversationalists or analysts. [... ] Radical reflexivity stimulates 
a sluggish imagination at the metalevel. By inducing equivocalities that threaten to paralyze or subvert 
ordinary analytic discourse, radical reflexivity interrupts its normal operation, unsettles any version of 
reality, and makes visible the work of settling. It is in the face of the potential paralysis or subversion 
that inquiry encounters innumerable textual, embodied, cognitive, interactional, and institutional (e. g., 
Wolfe 1990) processes and practices operating like a gravitational field to keep discourse, inquiry, and 
inquirers within the realm of the "settled"' (1991: 375,276). 
19. For example, during a meeting of the Loughborough University Discourse and Rhetoric Group (26 
July 1995), Derek Edwards commented thus: 
Edwards: Because what's Cartesian and wrong (according to Button and Sharrock's (19931 
characterisation of social constructionism) is the distinction between the two the- and the 
relationship between the two (reality and representation). It just so happens that the 
standard story has reality first and representation following it. But all, you know, Woolgar 
does is just turn it 'round, you know, and have representation coming first and reality 
following that, but he hasn't done anything radical like get rid of it, you know, they- 
they're still doing the same dualism, and they're just just inverting it. Now, what that 
misses, I think, is a- is another crucial bit of Woolgar's [1988] little book. Which is the 
notion that ontology is investigated via epistemology. That ep- epistemology, which is 
"How do you know", "What counts as reality" becomes the topic, so that when Woolgar 
actually does his inversion, you're not left with the same reality you had, before being 
produced. He doesn't mean that when you do physics, black holes pop into being 
somewhere in the "real" universe. You know. He's not- he's not actually saying that 
representational practices create the reality world that on the first model is the one you 
think is out there that we just study. It's not actually just an inversion at all. It's a 
reconstitution of reality as what's counted as reality by practices, and reality becomes part 
of, topic of, practices. Rather like, in my view, it does in ethnomethodology. And these 
guys just haven't got that. And one reason they haven't got it is that they're unreflective 
about their own descriptive practices, and they're a bunch of realists. You know, who keep 
on having this reality out there as a weapon to wield against constructionism. 
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20. Button and Sharrock comment thus: `The world of natural facts against which we act (and in our 
actions produce) is a socially standardised world. One of the points made by Garfinkel's so-called 
experiments was to reveal the extent to which we display our agreement about these facts in our 
activities, so embedded in our activities is that "agreement". Whilst we constantly attest to the 
background, the scaffolding, of natural facts and of agreement in our activities we cannot, as a matter 
of course say, in detail, of what this agreement consists. Whilst this agreement is constantly accountable 
in our activities it is not the topic of our activities. It is, in Garfinkel's apocryphal expression, "seen 
but unnoticed"' (1993: 16, emphasis added). 
21. Potter remarks upon this in the following terms: [T]here is no principled difference between our 
readings of the original extract and our readings of participants' readings of the extract. In other 
words, there is no basic distinction between scientists' texts and texts-which-are-reading-those-texts 
(Potter et al., 1984). The latter species of texts are not somehow transparent and straightforward in 
a way other texts are not. [... ] The discourse analytic report is thus itself a New Literary Form; that 
is, a specific textual organization designed explicitly to draw attention to the constructed nature of the 
analyst's readings. [... ] DA is fundamentally an interpretive exercise which offers up readings of texts 
for scrutiny. In this way DA embodies one kind of reflexivity, which is reflected in the very form of 
its writings' (1988: 46-47,49,51; emphasis in original). MacMillan (1996: Ch. 1-2), for reasons 
having to do with the history of the literary form, prefers to employ the term `Alternative Literary 
Form [ALF]' rather than `New Literary Form' [NLF] in referring to the use of this kind of writing in 
the social sciences (see Mulkay, 1991: xvii). Whichever of these particular glosses one may choose 
to employ, however, what they have in common is an emphasis upon the reflexive nature of analysis 
as displayed in texts' expression - what Pollner (1991: 372) refers to as the radicalization of 
reflexivity (see note 15, above). 
22. Thus, the problem of analytic adequacy dissolves where the criteria for disinterestedness is 
regarded as simply untenable: `The sociologist doing reading-analysis inevitably trades on his/her 
competence as a cultural member in recognising the activities that s/he and a text, as participants to 
interaction, are engaged in; for example, it is by virtue of my status as a competent member that I can 
recurrently locate in my readings instances of `the same' activity. [... ] This is not to claim that 
members are infallible, either as members doing reading or as members doing reading-analysis, or that 
there can be ideal/perfect statements contending for the title `what is really going on here'; it is only 
to claim that no resolution of problematic cases can be effected by resorting to procedures that are 
supposedly uncontaminated by members' knowledge. For there is no way of even imagining what such 
ideally clean procedures could look like. In any event, we are not (by contrast with some forms of 
textual analysis) concerned to tease out meanings and interpretations from texts but rather to explicate 
the technical resources readers and texts conjointly and concertedly employ on any occasion of a text 
being read, whatever meanings and interpretations arise from that occasion. [... ] This requires the 
analyst to, as far as possible, explicate the resources s/he shares with other readers in making sense 
of the scriptal utterances composing a stretch of writing, a text, or part-text. At every step, inevitably, 
the analyst will continue to employ his/her socialised competence while continuing (as and in the very 
analysis) to make explicit what these resources are and how s/he employs them (cf. Turner, 1971, p. 
177)' (McHoul, 1982: 107-108, emphasis added). In terms of the concerns of this thesis, one question 
this raises, then, is that of what distinguishes an ethnomethodology. That is, if these remarks are true 
of, say, Said; then why should he not be considered to be an ethnomethodologist? The reason is 
because he is not concerned to examine the technical resources that readers and texts employ, whatever 
those meanings might be. Instead, Said is interested in examining those meanings and in engaging 
them. He employs his own competence, but does so not in order to explicate their use, but to further 
employ them to engage the upshot of the arguments to which they are a response. Said's work 
constitutes a kind of situated repair -a subsequent interactional turn, as 
it were. In contrast, an 
ethnomethodological analysis does not seek to engage in that conversation, except insofar as it 
facilitates the explication of that conversation's resources. 
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Chapter 3 
INCUMBENCY AND ENTITLEMENT 
Category Membership and Identity 
as Participant Concerns 
In the preceding discussion, one of the principal tasks with which we have been 
concerned has been that of establishing the theoretical significance of the responsive 
orientation that speakers display in dialogic interaction, and to examine the 
implications this has for an analysis of the details of talk. In particular, we were 
concerned with the matter of how reflexively providing for the relevance of various 
assumptions in an interactional encounter is a fundamental feature of the business that 
participants attend to in their talk. In particular, we considered how it is that 
participants work to provide for the significance of their contributions to an 
interactional encounter and how, in so doing, they work up their contributions as 
constitutive of that encounter's sense. 
So, for example, in the exchange we examined in Chapter 1 above (Extract 
1.0), we saw how it was that in making relevant a distinction between personal 
opinion and government policy (or some other unnamed category of knowledge to 
which personal opinion was taken to be relationally contrastive), the speakers 
involved were working to manage the subsequent implicational trajectory that their 
respective contributions made available in the setting where category membership 
might potentially be employed to hold one accountable for the adequacy of his or her 
subsequent response (Jayussi, 1984). Our point there was not to claim that either 
participant's contribution was or was not adequate (as determined against some 
independent criteria of comparison), but rather to examine how such matters are taken 
up by participants themselves as a way of displaying what they take the significance 
of one another's contributions to be. In this way, the distinction itself was employed 
as a resource in shaping the very context in which their talk was pursued. That is, in 
the responsive orientation whereby speakers attend to the implications that category 
membership might be taken as making available, they simultaneously work reflexively 
to establish what it is that constitutes that talk's business. Pervasive to this responsive 
orientation is the rather delicate and often subtle work of attending to a set of 
conflicting demands for accountability (see Billig, 1987/96; Billig et at., 1988). 1 
Now, in this chapter, we will continue with the concern for category 
membership that we touched on in our discussion of responsive orientation by 
examining how identity features as a resource that speakers employ in attending to a 
range of different demands for accountability which they take their participation in 
the circumstances of their talk to entail. Among other things, this will involve 
examining how expatriate identity features as the source of tension between the 
potentially damaging inferences that one's category membership can be taken to make 
available as against the category entitlement that otherwise arises from that 
membership. That is, we will explore how it is that in displaying an understanding 
of membership in a particular way, certain inferences are encouraged while others are 
foreclosed. One specific example of this that we will focus on is how expatriate 
identity can be the basis for a range of more or less noxious inferences about the 
speaker, his or her views, attitudes and so on; and how, at the same time, that 
identity can also serve as the basis for speaker credibility where the experience of 
Westerners living abroad is taken to be at issue in the talk. It is the management of 
this tension between these competing possibilities that is one of the principal activities 
to which speakers attend in accounting for their presence abroad. Speakers thus work 
to be construed as expatriates to the extent that their identity as such - that is, as 
expatriates - works to make them credible speakers in the circumstances of their 
talk. ' It is managing the degree to which speakers are themselves implicated in the 
demands for accountability that they attend to which is the business of their talk. 
Speaker Incumbency and Identity as Participant Concerns 
In their analytic work concerned with the language of youth subcultures, Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt (1995) examine a range of devices whereby speakers attend to the 
potential implications that their identity as subcultural group members might be 
construed to make available. Commenting on the details, the authors point out how 
speakers display (176): 
a sensitivity as to the kinds of inferences which could he warranted by a simple 
positive assessment of their identity or lifestyle as punks or whatever. That is, they 
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seem to be orienting to the way a characterisation of affiliation in terms of identity 
or identity relevant features, or the social benefits of affiliation, could make 
available certain unfavourable inferences about the basis of and motivation for their 
involvement. For example, to affirm the importance of subcultural identity may 
invoke implications of conformity and the loss of individuality. On the other hand, 
characterising affiliation in terms of benefits thereby accrued may be taken to 
imply that the motivation for affiliation is simply based on what they get out of it; 
that is, membership is merely instrumental rather than a matter of commitment. 
Now, while these remarks are concerned with talk in interviews among members of 
youth subcultures, Widdicombe and Wooffitt's findings have broader implications for 
issues related to social identity (as, indeed, they themselves make clear). ' Among 
other things, the point that Widdicombe and Wooffitt make here is that speakers 
reflexively attend to the issue of identity as potentially significant for the way that 
their contributions might subsequently be construed by others, present or non-present 
(see also Leudar and Antaki, 1997). In other words, speakers display in and through 
their response to interviewer questions about their identity what they take the 
significance of such queries to be. In the case of the speakers whose talk Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt consider, this involves attending to, and thereby making relevant, a 
range of assumptions having to do with individual authenticity. It is through such a 
display that speakers work to show that they are not mere unreflexive `cultural dopes' 
(to employ Garfinkel's [1967] gloss) who are the simple object of social scientific 
investigation, but rather that they actively attend to the analytic concerns which they 
construe the interview of which they are a part to be about. 
Similarly, in the interview encounters we will consider in this chapter, 
speakers also work reflexively to display what they take the identity relevant features 
of their participation in the circumstances of the talk to be. A particularly interesting 
aspect of this involves the direct conflict that arises between the assumptions that 
speakers orient to as relevant for a discussion of expatriate identity and the reflexive 
implications of taking part in such a discussion itself. In other words, there is a 
tension between the implications involved in what a speaker has to say about 
expatriate identity and the inferences raised in and through his or her activity of 
saying it in the first place. By working to show themselves to be competent 
participants in (and thereby entitled to contribute to) the interview situation of which 
they are a part, the very talk by which speakers attend to this task is itself potentially 
construed as making available a range of inferences which they work to foreclose. At 
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the same time, the very activity of resisting this range of unwanted implications has 
the effect of undermining their entitlement - their epistemological warrant - to 
speak as expatriates in the context of the interview. The task with which they are 
faced, then, is to manage these conflicting demands by working to show themselves 
to be credible commentators on the matters at hand without at the same time making 
themselves vulnerable to the accusations to which they attend in their talk about those 
concerns. 4 
Accounting for Social Mobility 
To get an idea of what the details of this sort of discursive work involves, we shall 
begin by considering how identity features in talk where social status and its relation 
to one's financial resources is at issue. Consider the following extract which was 
taken from an interview involving a young married couple in their early twenties 
who, at the time, were working as business professionals in Kuwait. As we shall see, 
speakers work to foreclose the construal of their presence in the Middle East as 
specifically motivated by a desire for financial gain and upward social mobility. 
(3.1) Interview, 53 - private business owner, market researcher 
1 CS: Another thing is most people in Kuwait are fairly secure in their 
2 jobs. Most expats. [And they-] go to work day in, day out, fo=r 
3 IS: [Mm. ] 
4 CS: their two-year contract, their five-year contract or whatever, and 
5 they'll know that for that period, they've got the job. It doesn't 
6 matter what they do. [And-] so you don't rea=lly have to work 
7 IS: [Mm. ] 
8 CS: very hard to maintain a reasonable lifestyle. 
9 1S: Well I think everyone here has a much higher standard ANYway 
10 than they would back home. A lot of the people that I've seen here I 
I1 sometimes wonder, because you come over here and this- suddenly 
12 they've got thi- this money that they've never had, and uh- they're 
13 meeting people that have a lifestyle that they've never known, or 
14 have never been able to afford. And they just go crazy. They- this 
15 is it. And a lot of them turn into real snobs and- <P because they 
16 really they- they just love themselves for having done this P>, but 
17 you do get that. You meet some people that you know back in 
18 wherever they come from, probably not be able to afford any of 
19 this. And I guess, when you go back ho- when you go back to 
20 wherever you come from, your neighbours, whatever, probably 
21 resent you, because= you've come from there and uh- the next 
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22 thing they know you're coming back on holiday in your new car, or 
23 whatever, and you've bought yourself all these things and- 
24 KM: I mean, has that happened to you. 
25 
... 26 IS: Not really. 
27 CS: No = I- I get on really well with my <@ neighbours in the] 
28 IS: [@@ 
29 CS: UK @> @@. Bu=t I don't know about the UK but I can see it 
30 happening more over here. 
31 IS: How do you [mean. ] 
32 CS: [Um-] Well, people coming out and especially being 
33 British, going up, say, one rank in society, yeah. Okay, you get the 
34 maid, u=m- and then you start to assume the attitude of someone 
35 who's always had, [say, domestic help or whatever. ] 
36 IS: [Yeah. That's exactly what I'm trying to say. ] 
37 Yeah. 
38 KM: Mm hm. 
39 IS: They just u=h- sort of get all these airs and graces. Which is a bit 
40 ridiculous. 
There are, of course, a number of different considerations that the speakers attend to 
with this talk; but of immediate interest to us here is how the matter of financial 
earnings and the related matter of social mobility feature as concerns for the 
participants. Specifically, the desire for increased earnings is made accountable in this 
particular context precisely where expatriate identity is at issue in the talk. This is 
interesting because one could easily conceive of a range of contexts in which the 
desire for increased earning capacity might be attended to very differently. For 
example, one could imagine circumstances in which a speaker might argue about the 
appropriateness of his or her pay as a measure of intrinsic worth or as adequate 
renumeration for the relative merit of his or her contribution to the work efforts for 
which it serves as payment, marshalling a range of assumptions to argue for an 
increase in wages. In just such argumentative circumstances, it would not be the 
desire for an increase in earnings, but rather the failure in attempting to earn more 
money that might be made accountable. In this way, someone might be held 
accountable, say, for not attempting to realise their earning potential. 
The point to all of this is that the desire for social mobility and a relative 
increase in earning power need not necessarily be made accountable in the way that 
the speakers do here, but that doing so is occasioned in these circumstances to attend 
to a very specific set of situated concerns. In particular, the speakers here treat the 
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desire for higher earnings and increased social status as accountable and in taking up 
a critical stance as they do, employ a range of comparative distinctions (in social class 
and resident status) as a way of attending to the potential for their own presence to 
be construed along similar lines. 
With regard to the details of how this work is brought off, this would include 
the glossing of expatriate identity in terms which make relevant the assumptions 
regarding the accountability of social position ('a lot of them turn into real snobs', 
line 15). This is further emphasized in this talk with an ascription of those features' 
typicality ('but you do get that', line 17). Indeed, it is this aspect of scripting up 
expatriate activity as somehow conforming to a set of characteristic features that 
betokens the conflict between the work that speakers do to display themselves as 
somehow departing from that set of features while nevertheless still retaining their 
entitlement (and the epistemological warrant to be derived therefrom) to speak as 
expatriates. ' 
Further, in this particular exchange, such a formulation of expatriate identity 
progresses along a rather interesting trajectory. Specifically, the assumptions initially 
made relevant in this talk concern the accountability of motivation as it relates to job 
security and work as an intrinsically desirable pursuit in and of itself ('they'll know 
that for that period, they've got the job. It doesn't matter what they do. And- so you 
don't rea=lly have to work very hard to maintain a reasonable lifestyle', lines 5-8). 
The speakers here work to make the motivation for job security accountable as a 
matter of personal complacency. At the same time, while attending to the 
accountability in this way, the speakers also work implicitly to minimalise the 
relevance of these glosses to and for themselves (Well, I think everyone here has a 
much higher standard ANYway than they would back home', line 9). This latter work 
is even more explicitly attended to in the exchange which follows speaker IS's turn-at- 
talk (lines 24-29). Note also the corroborative nature of this work in that the implicit 
availability to which speaker IS's remarks attend are further made available in the 
interviewer's uptake (`I mean, has that happened to you', line 24) which, in turn, 
occasions a response from both speakers IS and CS. Speaker IS's laughter (line 28) 
provides for the relevance of the formulation as attending to this sort of concern. The 
point here is that not only is the conflict between competing concerns managed by the 
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participants, but that that work itself is reflexively attended to as such in the implicit 
referral thereto (line 24) and in the responsive laughter with which it is met in 
interlocutor uptake (lines 27-29). The management of the inferences that these glosses 
make available is both a jointly pursued undertaking and one which also reflexively 
attends to the potential for that work itself to be construed as motivated. The joint 
activity of these speakers here anticipates and forecloses the potential for the work it 
accomplishes itself to be construed in term of its motivatedness. Overall, then, the 
speakers here employ expatriate identity as a resource to make the desire for social 
mobility accountable while at the same time working to foreclose the negative 
inferences which their own status as members of that category might otherwise make 
available. 
One interesting feature of how this work takes place is that speakers do not 
seem to have any problem with distancing themselves from the noxious inferences 
made available with the expatriate identity they work to formulate in the first place. 
That is, speakers IS and CS offer no reason why they themselves are not similarly 
affected by the experience of living abroad, except to say that this is not the case 
(lines 24-27). The question here is why this should be so. How is it that the speakers 
do not find it necessary in this context to foreclose the potential to be similarly so 
implicated? 6 The reason for this has to do with the endogenously reflexive nature of 
the interaction as involving the sort of understanding that the participants display in 
that interaction. It is as if there is an unspoken agreement, realised in and through the 
activity of conducting the talk itself, that the interviewees will provide the sort of 
responses which their entitlement as expatriates warrants them to make in exchange 
for which they will not be held accountable by their interlocutor to the assumptions 
those responses potentially make relevant. Thus, it is significant here that such 
demands are not explicitly imposed by the interviewer, speaker KM (though, as we 
have already noted, their relevance is implicitly provided for in his remarks and in the 
responsive laughter that they occasion). It would appear to be the case, then, that the 
interviewees themselves can attend to the potential to be implicated when and if they 
choose to do so, but the same is not true of the interviewer (or, at least, not without 
that activity involving a threat to the tacit agreement - the display of assumed good 
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faith - upon which the entire encounter is based and which it depends for its ongoing 
conduct). ' 
Yet another interesting aspect of this talk involves something to which 
Michael Billig refers with his use of the term kaleidoscope of common sense. 
Specifically, what this refers to is how the different inferentially argumentative 
resources that speakers employ and the assumptions that those resources work to 
make available are related to one another in a sort of mutually-implicative and self- 
validating fashion. Thus, the intelligibility provided for with the use of one resource 
is itself made available through the use of an alternative resource. Discussing how this 
takes place, Billig (1992: 48, italics in original) points out: 
It is not the case that some beliefs are always used as justifications (as explanans) 
which support axiomatically a set of beliefs to be justified (the explanandum). 
Explanans and explanandum swap places. One moment a belief acts as a 
justification, and the next moment it finds itself being justified by the very bit of 
common-sense which it has been justifying. Around the beliefs can go in their 
kaleidoscopic whirl. 
In other words, the various resources work to occasion one another in providing the 
grounds for each other's intelligibility. In terms of how this relates to the talk 
recorded in Extract 3.1 above, the assumptions about social class that are involved 
in making a desire for upward social mobility accountable themselves contradict the 
very assumptions which expatriate identity is formulated to make relevant. 
In other words, the demands for accountability in virtue of which expatriate 
identity is formulated themselves depend upon the assumption that the individuals 
referred to (the `expats' who are said to `go crazy' and `turn into real snobs', lines 
1-15) are somehow inauthentic - that by enjoying a lifestyle to which they would not 
otherwise have access, they are somehow violating an essential feature of their own 
identity. It is as if they are masquerading, enjoying a lifestyle to which they are not 
entitled. Now, the crucial point here is that that identity of which they are said to be 
in violation is itself paradoxically determined in virtue of their socio-economic status 
in their home country. That very entitlement is itself defined in terms of certain social 
circumstances by which it is rendered intelligible (or meaningfully relevant) in the 
first place. Thus, the speakers here work to make expatriates accountable for taking 
earnings as an indicator of social status, but they themselves do that very activity (of 
taking earnings as an indicator of social status) in order to give purchase to their 
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demands. In this way expatriates are implicitly criticised for assuming a social station 
to which they are not entitled, and yet that entitlement is itself defined with reference 
to their supposed financially derived social status in a different setting. The status of 
the expatriate as defined in terms of social setting is variably occasioned in that it is 
accorded sanction to the degree that it applies to their status in their home country, 
but not in the country to which they have expatriated. 
This variable feature of conversational logic is even more evident in the 
following extract. The material here is the partial record of a much longer interview 
with a secondary school teacher in her mid-twenties. 
(3.2) Interview, 30 - secondary school teacher 
1 EB: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
U=m- well, I don't know. I mean, I think people do= gen- 
genuinely like it here, most people like it, 
KM: Mm hm. 
EB: and if they don't like it, they go <P obviously P> so people who 
are here like it, and, I mean, I think they like it because- I really 
think that most- the reason- the most important reason why they like 
it is because um- they find they're somebody. They're somebody 
important. I really think that's it. I mean, you know, you get- I 
don't know if you can tell- I mean, I- this is- <P I'm not being 
snobbish here, okay, but P>I don't know if you can tell the 
difference between different uh- English dialects, okay, the way 
people speak, but um- you get people out here uh- who um- their 
accent- you know how accents give a lot- lot- lots away, eh? 
KM: Uh huh. 
EB: So they're- they're talking, they've got a real um- Geordie accent or 
something, and you can s-] Ge- Geordie, these are from Newcastle, 
KM: [A real what? ] 
EB: [[okay, ]] and they- um- and just by looking at them, you know, or 
KM: [[Uh huh. ]] 
EB: whatever, <p the way they talk, whatever P>, you can tell they're 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 KM: 
um- they're- they- working class in England, say, okay, and they 
come out here and they live, you know, in a fabulous villa and um- 
I mean, you know, and they're- everybody knows them and they're- 
you know, they're um- you know, they're having a really good 
time, they're making lots of money, and that's why a lot of people 
STAY here because all of the sudden they're- you know, they're- 
they're um- they're doing really WELL. You know, they- and they 
go back to England and they're a nobody again, you know, they're 
[just somebo]dy from- from Newcastle. I think people do like to be 
[Uh huh. ] 
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33 EB: SOMEbody, I mean, this is IT. This is human nature, you know, 
34 
35 KM: Well, yeah. 
36 
37 EB: and um- they like- they love it here. You know, they're- they're- 
38 they're doing- you know, doing really well and- and not only that, 
39 they go back home and everybody thinks "Wow", you know, "wow, 
40 you earned lots of money" and 
41 
42 KM: Mm hm. 
43 
44 EB: "gosh, look at this house", I mean, a typical- okay, the re- reason 
45 I'm saying this is I went to this- these- this couple the other day, 
46 and um- these- these- this couple are re- real Geordies, okay, um- 
47 very very wor- very nice but they're obviously very working class 
48 and they had all these snapshots of their- this villa that they were 
49 living in Kuwait, and the wife was telling me that she'd gone back 
50 to England and was showing all her friends these pictures you see, 
51 and her friends were saying to her "That's- wow, you've really 
52 done well", you know, "in your life you've done really really well", 
53 and, you know, that's obviously- I think they- they really LOVE it. 
54 Of course they love it, you know, because all their friends are 
55 jealous of them and everybody thinks they're doing really well, you 
56 know, and that's how people like it in Kuwait 
Just as with the talk we examined in the previous extract, so too the speakers here 
work to hold certain individuals accountable for implicitly laying a claim to a 
particular social status to which they are said not to be otherwise legitimately entitled 
in virtue of their presumed group affiliation in the home country. That is, the 
assumption made relevant here is that the living standard they enjoy is somehow false 
or illegitimate relative to the comparative criteria of their socio-economic status in the 
different setting of their country of origin. 
Again, what is particularly interesting about this is that the implicit accusation 
of disingenuity or subversion' involved is itself one that depends upon the relevance 
of the very assumption it finds objectionable in order to give it any sense. That the 
legitimacy of certain actors' claims to social status is made accountable to an 
assumption that the nature of identity as not legitimately established by income (and 
associated group affiliation) is itself made meaningful here with reference and in 
contrast to an identity which is attributed to them on the basis of just such criteria 
(`just by looking at them, you know, or whatever, <P the way they talk, whatever 
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P>, you can tell they're um- they're- they- working class in England', lines 20-23). 
Thus, the substantiation of the implicit criticism or complaint depends for its sense 
upon the very assumptions the terms of which that complaint makes accountable. 
Specifically, speaker EB works to make the individuals she describes accountable for 
deriving their sense of identity and worth from their superior socio-economic status 
relative to the compatriots with whom they are contrasted in their homeland ('the 
most important reason why they like it is because um- they find they're somebody. 
They're somebody important', lines 7-9). At the same time, she also works to provide 
for a contrastive group affiliation in relation to which that very contrastive identity 
can itself be made accountable. In this way, the upshot of her remarks is that 
expatriates enjoy the privilege of a station which is not appropriate to the identity 
attributed to them in their homeland ('they go back to England and they're a nobody 
again, you know, they're just somebody from- from Newcastle', lines 29-31). It is 
as if they are really, authentically, merely the persons of that former station 
masquerading with the trappings of the financial privilege they have acquired but 
which is not, in the end or by other criteria, appropriate to the essence of their 
identity. Interestingly, it is in rejecting this set of assumptions that speaker EB also 
works to display an awareness of the potential for this sort of self-delusion to occur 
and, in so doing, works to avoid being implicated in the demands for accountability 
involved. 
We see in examining these extracts, then, a rather delicate balance where 
assumptions about individual identity are made intelligible with reference to issues of 
class membership, which is itself employed as a resource in the service of establishing 
that identity. In other words, class identity and the assumptions made relevant with 
that identity are employed as a resource in the formulation of expatriate identity 
which, in turn, is itself employed as a device to foreclose the construal of 
implications that it raises for the speaker. At the same time, this talk also works as 
a way for the speaker to foreclose the potential to be construed as similarly so 
motivated. 
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Minimising the Relevance of Socio-Economic Mobility 
So far, we have examined how participants attend to the potential for their own 
residence abroad to be construed as motivated by the desire for financial gain and 
social mobility. In particular, we saw that through their efforts both to make such a 
desire accountable and to display a critical regard for those who they construe as 
illegitimately appropriating a superior social status to which they would not otherwise 
have access, speakers work both to sanction and to distance themselves from such a 
characterisation. Now, another means by which speakers attend to these potential 
demands for accountability is to render the relevance of social mobility unavailable 
as an explanatory resource in their particular case. That is, speakers work to minimise 
or show as irrelevant the significance of their income to account for their own 
presence abroad. Thus, while they do display an orientation to the desire for social 
mobility as an accountable matter, its relevance to their particular circumstances is 
put at issue. In this way, speakers engage in a rather different sort of work than that 
which we examined in the previous section. 
Consider, for example, the following extracts of data wherein speakers 
minimise the relevance of their pay as a way to account for their presence abroad. 
The first of these two extracts is taken from an interview with a couple who had 
returned to Kuwait to resume the operation of their private business in the aftermath 
of the then recent Gulf War. The second extract is taken from an interview with a 
long-term expatriate who had lived and worked in different locations throughout the 
world and was then employed as the local manager for an international business 
conglomerate with operations in Kuwait. 
(3.3) Interview, 49 - private business owners 
1 KM: well this is a question I ask <P and not everybody wants to answer 
2 it so- P> but how much money do you make. Um- I mean, to be 
3 rather direct, or how would you compare it with how much money 
4 you could make, say, in the UK or something. 
5 ... 
6 RB: I'm making a lot of money. 
7 
8 KM: Okay. (Hx)@ @[@ (H)@ 
9 AN: [Hm@I 
10 RB: I mean I'm talking uh- uh- se- serious money, this- this year I- I'm- 
il after- making a lot of money and uh- yeah, put it this way, I- I used 
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12 to work for an American company in (NAME OF EUROPEAN CITY) in 
13 1980 before I came here and I was making about seventy-thousand 
14 dollars net because there was- there was no taxes at the time, I left 
15 partly because I wanted to make more than that, 
16 
17 KM: Uh huh. 
18 
19 RB: and, you know, I'm- 
20 
21 KM: So I imagine- I imagine you're making over a hundred-thousand 
22 dollars a year. 
23 
... 24 RB: Seriously over a hundred-thousand dollars a year. 
25 
26 KM: Two-hundred thousand dollars. [(Hx)@] 
27 RB: [Oh, ] you're getting close now. 
28 
29 KM: Okay [1 well- 1] 
30 AN: [1 Wo =w! 1] @@ <@I never know that, @> why don't 
31 you ask me <@ how [2 much I'm making, 2] 
32 RB: [2 @@@@ 2] 
33 KM: [2 Well now, 2] wait a se@[3 co@nd no@w, 
34 (H)@ 3] 
35 AN: [3 @@ <@ xx a second, 3] xx- @> Wo =w, I- [4 yeah, well 
36 anyway- 41 
37 RB: [4 @ No, but I've been 4] putting uh- a lot of it back into business 
38 you see, 
39 KM: Uh huh. No, I mean, [how-] 
40 RB: [now] I'm not. Now- now- uh- if you ask me 
41 now, I've- I just uh- stashed away uh- you know every month I'm 
42 stashing away [on- on] that level. 
43 KM: [Mm hm, ] 
44 
45 KM: mm, yeah, uh- it's- it's really just a question to sort of uh- get an 
46 idea of, you know, how to kind of place you all demographically 
47 [xx-] 
48 RB: [But I- I mean] I haven't been uh- living on that lifestyle, 
49 KM: Mm hm. 
50 RB: because I- I've been earning a lot of money over the last few years 
51 but I- I invested most of it back in business, 
52 KM: Yeah. 
53 RB: and the Iraqis took half of it. 
54 (CONTINUES WITH DISCUSSION OF LOSSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF 
55 EVENTS RELATED TO GULF WAR) 
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(3.4) Interview, 37 - business manager 
I KM: So it sounds like- (Hx)@ I mean, you have uh- more spending 
2 power at least, uh- is it- is that because the costs are lower when 
3 you go abroad or is it because you make more money going abroad. 
4 Or is it a combination of the two. 
5 ... 6 VE: Well, no I- you're referring to spending power and I'm not actually 
7 referring to spending power at all, ] I'm talking about LIFEstyle, 
8 KM: [Oh, I see. ] 
9 
10 KM: Uh huh. 
11 
12 VE: u=m- it's not the money aspect because in the early days when I 
13 was living abroad I saved no money at ALL, I mean it was- hu@h, 
14 you know, hand-to-mouth, u=m- because your expenses are- are 
15 high and in many respects that you don't imagine. To buy a 
16 magazine costs typically double NEWSstand price and you for- can 
17 forget about a subscription because if you want to get it uh- by 
18 subscription you have to pay ten times as much or something to get 
19 it air mailed, and to get it by uh- SURface so that you get it six 
20 weeks after it appeared on the newsstands in the States (Hx)@ 
21 who@@ ca@res you know, 
22 KM: Mm hm. 
Notice, that in both of these extracts the work speakers do is not the same as making 
alternative implications available in accounting for their presence in the Middle East. 
Instead, they work to minimise the relevance of the implications about the desire for 
socio-economic mobility. In other words, they do not express a principled objection 
to the cogency of demands for accountability that are made relevant with a certain set 
of assumptions; rather, they question the relevance of those demands to account for 
their specific circumstances. Thus, even while these speakers attend to the issue of 
their income as a potentially accountable matter, they work to minimise its relevance 
as a way of accounting for their presence in the area. For example, in the first 
extract, speaker RB works to show that an account of his behaviour in terms of the 
desire for social mobility would not be relevant in that the money he makes is not 
something from which he derives personal or individual benefit given that he is said 
to reinvest it in the business that he owns ('But I- I mean I haven't been uh- living 
on that lifestyle, because I- I've been earning a lot of money over the last few years 
but I- I invested most of it back in business, ' lines 48-51). Notice that in this context, 
the effectiveness of this explanatory account depends upon the implicit assumption 
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that the pursuit of business interests is an activity from which the speaker derives no 
personal benefit (or at least that such benefit is irrelevant in accounting for his 
presence in Kuwait) despite the associated increase in earnings (and presumably in 
professional status) relative to that in the countries where he has formerly resided. 
The glossing of this distinction in terms of `lifestyle' (line 48) is the way by which 
he provides for the relevance of this difference in order to obviate the demand for 
accountability that might otherwise be made available. ' 
In the second of these two extracts, the glossing of activities as `lifestyle' 
features in very much the same way ('you're referring to spending power and I'm not 
actually referring to spending power at all, I'm talking about LIFEstyle', lines 6-7 ). 
With this gloss, speaker VE is similarly able to make relevant a distinction between 
earnings and the benefit he can (or cannot) derive to himself as a result. Specifically, 
he accomplishes this with the reference to unanticipated expenses (lines 12-2 1). In this 
way, he is able to minimise the relevance of earnings to account for his presence 
abroad. Thus, even though at another point in the same interview while describing 
his earning capabilities, speaker VE emphasises the advantages that he enjoys relative 
to his American business peers for a number of reasons (such as the tax gains 
incurred as a result of living abroad, benefit of luxury accommodation provided for 
him at company expense, etc. ); in this particular context, he is able to minimise the 
relevance of earning power to account for his presence abroad. 
The Root of All Evil 
So far we have considered how talk about money and earning power is made 
accountable in this context. Our interest in looking at this talk was to examine the 
discursive means by which speakers attend to the potential for their presence abroad 
to be held accountable as motivated by the desire for upward social and economic 
mobility. In the interactional encounters we considered, we saw how speakers attend 
to the potential demand for earning power to be made accountable, though in different 
ways. With one strategy, speakers work to foreclose the potential to be held so 
accountable with a display of rhetorical distance from those they depict as so 
motivated. Interestingly, we saw that accomplishing this work involves displaying the 
very assumptions whose demands were made accountable in the first instance. In 
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addition to this, we also saw that when accounting for their presence in the region, 
speakers introduced an implicit distinction between potential and currently realised 
assets so that in actual terms they are construed as not-so-well-off (such actual terms 
often being determined by the comparative criteria of the homeland). In virtue of this 
distinction, speakers attend to the demand for accountability through a rather elegant 
specification of its scope, thereby undermining its relevance in their own particular 
circumstances. 
What is of interest in the way that speakers attend to these matters is that the 
desire for an increase in one's earning capacity is taken as accountable in the first 
place. The relation this bears to our concern with expatriate identity is that of how 
speakers manage their own credibility in circumstances where their implicitly 
available category entitlement is potentially damaging to the effective formulation of 
their contribution in and to the circumstances of the talk. Expatriate identity thus 
features as a device in attending to the demands that might otherwise be made 
relevant to account for the speakers' participation in the circumstances of the talk to 
which he or she is then currently a party. It is in this way that speakers display what 
they take the business-at-hand of the talk to be about. By construing expatriate 
identity in particular terms from which they work to distance themselves, speakers 
foreclose a similar construal of their own participation in the talk. 
Anticipating Criticism: Reductionism and the Description of Culture 
In our discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, we examined a range of literature which takes 
as its object either the cultural and ethnic Other, or else the rhetorical means by 
which that body of literature itself is said to constitute the object of its own analysis. 
As we pointed out, this difference is one that involves distinguishing between the 
critique of a particular body of writing and the objectifying practices whereby that 
body of writing is itself taken to be an object of analysis in the accomplishing of that 
critique. Now, in this section, we will continue with a consideration of the concerns 
surrounding category membership by exploring how it is that speakers orient to the 
potential for their own residence abroad to be construed in terms of the sorts of 
ironizing, deconstructive critique to which ethnographic and anthropological writing 
have been subjected in the body of work which takes that rhetoric as its object of 
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analysis. That is, we will be exploring how speakers work to foreclose the potential 
for their experience of living abroad to be subjected to the same sorts of implicit 
criticisms as those developed in the second, meta-level body of analytic work that we 
considered in detail in Chapter 2- the work that critiques ethnographic writing as 
objectifying the Other. 
Our claim here in this is not that speakers are responding to the concerns that 
they have encountered through exposure to this ironising literature - that is, as a 
result of exposure to such literature - but rather that they display an orientation to 
the same sorts of demands for accountability as are made relevant there. Specifically, 
this involves attending to the potential for the descriptive practices in one's work to 
be construed as involving the use of some socio-cultural cliche, say, as an instance 
of stereotyping. That is, speakers attend to the potential to be construed as viewing 
Arab culture and society along fixed and inalterable parameters in their references to 
customs of behaviour, religion and dress. 10 Another, similar set of inferences that 
speakers work to foreclose are those in which their residence abroad is seen as 
motivated by the desire to pursue sexually promiscuous behaviour that would not 
otherwise be available to them in their country of origin. The question of how 
representations of the Arab Other involve a sexual aspect is another of the sorts of 
concerns that is taken up in the second, meta-level research on writings about the 
Orient (as will be discussed in further detail below). As we will see, identity features 
in the talk we consider here as a resource to foreclose these sorts of inferences in the 
same way that expatriate identity is employed to foreclose the inferences potentially 
raised in talk about earning capacities. One difference in these materials, however, 
is that the identity involved is not always that of the expatriate but also includes 
compatriot identity (of those from the speakers' own country of origin). What these 
sorts of identity have in common is that their use involves the description of features 
from which the speaker works to distance him- or herself. " 
Again, it is the issue of speaker credibility to which participants attend in the 
interview talk under consideration here. That is, there is a tension involved between 
the epistemological warrant made available to a speaker by virtue of his or her 
membership in the category referred to with the identity formulation (expatriate) and 
the extent to which he or she is implicated in the demands for accountability which 
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that category membership might otherwise be deployed to make relevant. One crucial 
difference in the materials where the identity of compatriots (versus fellow 
expatriates) features is that epistemological warrant implicitly accrues to a speaker as 
the basis for a critical comparison of one's outlook as informed by the experience of 
travelling abroad versus that of the relative inexperience arising from exclusive 
residence in one particular country. In other words, category entitlement arising from 
membership in either category (that of expatriate and of exclusive-resident-in-the- 
speaker's-country-of-origin) means that a speaker is potentially able invoke the 
experiential authority of the one identity to inform an assessment of the other. As we 
will see, this involves some rather complex interactional work. 
`I Really Try to Avoid Talking to Them' - Of Friends and Acquaintances 
Consider the following extract of data taken from a different part of the same 
interview we examined in Extract 3.4 above. In the particular episode of talk 
represented here, reference to compatriot identity is attended to as a matter of some 
importance. 
(3.5) Interview, 37 - business manager 
1 KM: I mean, for example, how do you describe being here 
2 
3 VE: X- 
4 KM: when you go back to the United States, I mean, uh- I assume that 
5 uh- people you know there must ask you what it's like to live here, 
6 
7 VE: No. 
8 
9 KM: No? 
10 ... 11 VE: No they don't really and- I mean I think that's the first thing is that- 
12 that your real friends don't bug you about "Do the women really 
13 wear veils", you know, your friends, your family don't ask you 
14 dumb questions like that, 
15 KM: Mm hm. 
16 
17 VE: u=h- whereas uh- the waiter who finds out that you're from 
18 Kuwait, "Is it true that they all have four wives, and they keep them 
19 in harems and"- uh- I don't know what, u=m- these kind of 
20 questions come from people that really DON'T know and- and they- 
21 1 really try to avoid talking to them. 
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This extract is particularly rich in terms of how the identity of compatriots is 
deployed as a device in attending to the speaker's accountability to assumptions 
concerning the nature of representation as a reifying activity. The sort of work for 
which that identity is deployed is occasioned by the interviewer query regarding the 
sort of portrayal of experience living abroad that his interlocutor (speaker VE) might 
render to compatriots ('I mean, for example, how do you describe being here when 
you go back to the United States', I mean, uh- I assume that uh- people you know 
there must ask you what it's like to live here', lines 1-5). 
Notice here that it is with the initial broaching of the question in just such 
terms that the interviewer displays an orientation to description as potentially 
problematic for the inferences it might involve. Specifically, in requesting an account 
of the sort of description that might be included in a report rather than eliciting a 
more straightforward description per se (say, as worded with a remark like `please 
describe your being here in the Middle East'), speaker KM works not only to display 
an orientation to the potentially accountable nature of the assumptions entailed but he 
also works to foreclose the sorts of inferences that might be raised with the activity 
of his introducing the question in the first place. In other words, speaker KM works 
to foreclose his being held accountable for ratifying the assumptions whose relevance 
the question makes available in the first place since the query involves the request for 
an account of an account, as it were. 12 This additional step-of-remove is one through 
which such work is elegantly brought off. 
In the uptake to this question, speaker VE displays a similar orientation to the 
reflexive implications that such a description potentially entails. Further, his 
management of these is more complicated for how he works to foreclose any potential 
to be implicated as endorsing the assumptions that a description might provide. In that 
any kind of description he might provide could be heard as endorsing certain 
assumptions, by responding as he does with the conversational repair (line 7) with 
which he rejects the presumptions that speaker KM explicitly invokes (line 5), speaker 
VE's response is one with which he very elegantly forecloses that potential. 
At the same time, however, speaker VE is nevertheless able to attend to the 
related assumptions as an accountable matter with his description of the waiter and 
in the report of the conversational encounters that he relates in quoted speech. By 
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articulating the substance of the assumptions (about Arab culture) in the quoted voice 
of the waiter, speaker VE is able to display a familiarity with the details involved in 
those assumptions ('the women really wear veils', lines 12-13; `they all have four 
wives, and they keep them in harems', lines 18-19) without himself being implicated 
as ratifying them. In this way, he is able to foreclose the implications that a 
cataloguing of such details might otherwise raise while also attending to their use as 
accountable. Further, the distinction he makes with the phrase `real friends' (line 12) 
is especially significant in this context. The implication involved in this choice of 
lexical items is that what distinguishes a real friend for speaker VE (as opposed to, 
say, a false friend or someone with whom he otherwise routinely comes in contact as 
a matter of happenstance) is that particular individual's lack of orientation to the 
features of presumed Arab social custom that speaker VE catalogues in the reported 
speech attributed to the waiter. It is with the implied choice in this distinction - one 
which he also makes explicit ('I really try to avoid talking to them', line 21) - that 
speaker VE is able to display an orientation to the demands for accountability made 
available in the interviewer question while also working to manage the extent to 
which his activity of doing so might itself be taken to implicate him in the 
assumptions that are involved. In this way, compatriot identity and the distinctions he 
works to make feature as a resource to manage his own accountability for the 
assumptions whose particulars he relates. In other words, he deals with his 
accountability by distinguishing between different kinds of compatriots (those who ask 
dumb questions and those who do not), affiliating with the latter category. 
`Had I Never Come Here' - Travel and Epistemological Warrant 
So far, we have examined the way that distinctions in identity are deployed as a 
device by which speakers attend to the problematic of accountability involved in 
producing a description while at the same time providing a resource to foreclose the 
potentially damaging inferences that such a description might entail. In the following 
extract, we will consider how a similar sort of work is accomplished in talk about 
travel and the experience that is said to be gained by it. The following is taken from 
an interview with two ex-U. S. soldiers who were working in Kuwait as civilian 
advisors to the Kuwaiti military at the time the encounter was recorded. 
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world is screwed up", and that "America is the greatest", and- a lot of them are very 
prejudiced, lines 2-7). Further, these speakers work to foreclose a construal of their 
own talk as reductionist while at the same time working up their description in terms 
of a sensitivity to cultural difference in a detailed inventory of the activities and 
behaviours the articulation of which might otherwise be taken as accountable ('the 
Islamic belief', lines 10-11; `if you touch an Arab with your left hand', lines 17-18; 
`Putting my bare foot- your bare foot up to them', lines 20-21; `wearing a <AR 
dishdash AR> ((MEN'S ROBE-LIKE GARMENT))', lines 22-23). The reported 
representation typifying both Arab religious beliefs and details of custom delicately 
attend to competing demands of the talk in much the same way that speaker VE's 
quoting of speech by the waiter does in the talk recorded in Extract 3.5. 
Perhaps more interesting still in Extract 3.6 is the way that Kuwaiti identity 
features in the talk here as a resource in attending to the reflexive implications 
involved in the discussion where the details of what are oriented to as reductionist 
accounts are related. Again, the potential problem for the speakers here is to display 
an awareness of certain details (about Arab customs and behaviour) and to attend to 
the potential for that awareness to be taken as an instance of reductionism without, 
however, thereby compromising the potential for such a display to be regarded as 
expressing a sensitivity to cultural difference. Here, the speakers are able to 
accomplish both of these tasks with the reference to Kuwaiti deference ('And 
everybody we've talked to, all the- all the Kuwaitis that we've talked to and stuff said 
"It'd be an honour", you know. "It's great that you would want to try to be more like 
us"', lines 26-28). The voice of the Kuwaiti Other features as providing the 
collaborative account by which the details of custom are corroborated. Further, this 
has the additional advantage that Kuwaiti category incumbency entails the entitlement 
by which such an account in warranted. 
Moreover, American identity is also deployed here in attending to the 
potential for that prior work accomplished with the use of Kuwaiti identity itself to 
be made accountable as motivated. In other words, the very work by which the 
speakers attend to the competing demands to be construed as neither reductionist nor 
as insensitive to differences in customs and behaviour is itself work which might be 
held accountable. This is so because the prior talk of speakers TI and RK itself 
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(3.6) Interview, 6- civilian military advisors 
1 TI: I think getting to travel a lot like that really helps you develop and 
2 to grow too to have a better understanding. A lot of people are- like 
3 the farmers in the us that have always stayed, you know, down 
4 South somewhere, never been out of the country, they think, you 
5 know, these- these thoughts about "Everybody else in the world is 
6 screwed up", and that "America is the greatest", and- a lot of them 
7 are very prejudiced, because they've never had to interact with other 
8 people and get the experience to learn why certain countries or 
9 certain people have beliefs that they have, uh- just like the Muslim, 
10 had- had I NEVER COME here, I'd have never understood the 
11 Islamic belief like I do now and- and been able to relate to their 
12 feelings and their ideas about why they do certain things. Uh- 
13 
14 KM: [What do you mean. ] 
15 RK: [That means] you go a lot on conjecture, you know, [[what]] 
16 TI: [[Yeah. ]] 
17 RK: somebody's told you, you know, like uh- like if you touch an Arab 
18 with your left hand, you know, they'll be just absolutely insulted if 
19 you uh- oh what are some of the other ones, [1 Well, like- 1] 
20 TI: [1 Oh! Putting my 1] 
21 bare foot- your bare foot up to them, [2 xxx, 2] 
22 RK: [2 Or wearing a 2] < AR 
23 dishdash AR> ((MEN'S ROBE-LIKE GARMENT)). Like [3 THAT was 
24 supposed to be an 3] insult to them, [4 xx- 4] 
25 TI: [3 xxxxx. 3] [4 And everybody 4] we've 
26 talked to, all the- all the Kuwaitis that we've talked to and stuff said 
27 "It'd be an honour", you know. "It's great that you would want to 
28 try to be more like us", you know, u=h- and you know w- the 
29 Americans are the same way, we think it's cool that people want to 
30 be like us but then sometimes we- all the sudden we get this 
31 two-faced attitude "Well- oh they're trying to copycat us", you 
32 know, and- and everything, it's like "Who the hell do you think you 
33 are", you know, "trying to be like us", you know? 
In the same way that the speakers whose talk is represented in the previous extract 
display an orientation to the potential for a description of their experience to be 
construed as somehow reductionist, so too these speakers deploy identity as a way of 
attending to the same potential. In particular, the identity of the secluded, insular 
American farmer is employed as a resource in attending to the potential for the 
speaker's contribution to be construed as prejudiced ('like the farmers in the us that 
have always stayed, you know, down South somewhere, never been out of the 
country, they think, you know, these- these thoughts about "Everybody else in the 
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world is screwed up", and that "America is the greatest", and- a lot of them are very 
prejudiced, lines 2-7). Further, these speakers work to foreclose a construal of their 
own talk as reductionist while at the same time working up their description in terms 
of a sensitivity to cultural difference in a detailed inventory of the activities and 
behaviours the articulation of which might otherwise be taken as accountable ('the 
Islamic belief', lines 10-11; `if you touch an Arab with your left hand', lines 17-18; 
`Putting my bare foot- your bare foot up to them', lines 20-21; `wearing a< AR 
dishdash AR> ((MEN'S ROBE-LIKE GARMENT))', lines 22-23). The reported 
representation typifying both Arab religious beliefs and details of custom delicately 
attend to competing demands of the talk in much the same way that speaker VE's 
quoting of speech by the waiter does in the talk recorded in Extract 3.5. 
Perhaps more interesting still in Extract 3.6 is the way that Kuwaiti identity 
features in the talk here as a resource in attending to the reflexive implications 
involved in the discussion where the details of what are oriented to as reductionist 
accounts are related. Again, the potential problem for the speakers here is to display 
an awareness of certain details (about Arab customs and behaviour) and to attend to 
the potential for that awareness to be taken as an instance of reductionism without, 
however, thereby compromising the potential for such a display to be regarded as 
expressing a sensitivity to cultural difference. Here, the speakers are able to 
accomplish both of these tasks with the reference to Kuwaiti deference ('And 
everybody we've talked to, all the- all the Kuwaitis that we've talked to and stuff said 
"It'd be an honour", you know. "It's great that you would want to try to be more like 
us"', lines 26-28). The voice of the Kuwaiti Other features as providing the 
collaborative account by which the details of custom are corroborated. Further, this 
has the additional advantage that Kuwaiti category incumbency entails the entitlement 
by which such an account in warranted. 
Moreover, American identity is also deployed here in attending to the 
potential for that prior work accomplished with the use of Kuwaiti identity itself to 
be made accountable as motivated. In other words, the very work by which the 
speakers attend to the competing demands to be construed as neither reductionist nor 
as insensitive to differences in customs and behaviour is itself work which might be 
held accountable. This is so because the prior talk of speakers TI and RK itself 
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establishes the context of assumptions that are in conflict with the interactional work 
these speakers act to achieve here. The dilemma involved is that if the details of Arab 
customs and behaviour are not of the sort mentioned in the description they provide 
(as these speakers seem to suggest through their implicit criticism of those details 
provided for with the term `conjecture', line 15); then to that extent, the experiential 
authority that such a display might afford them is thereby undermined. By deploying 
American identity as a comparable case in this discursive context, speaker TI is able 
to provide for the latter assumptions which warrant the implicit claims to experiential 
authority ('the Americans are the same way, we think it's cool that people want to 
be like us but then sometimes we- all the sudden we get this two-faced attitude', lines 
29-31). This work is quite subtle in its elegance because it potentially involves all the 
speakers (including the interviewer) as implicated in a further range of additional 
demands for accountability. Specifically, where such a claim about disingenuity as 
characteristic of Americans is involved, any efforts to resist or interrogate such a 
claim is potentially implicative of the speaker. That is, in this context where all 
participants are implicated as `American', to deny the claims made about what 
Americans do has the potential itself to be regarded as defensively motivated. It is 
precisely this feature of American identity which here makes it a particularly effective 
device to foreclose the potential availability of inferences made relevant with the 
invocation of Kuwaiti identity in the talk by which it is immediately preceded. 
`Crazy Weird Stuff' - The Orient as Playground 
We have so far examined how speakers attend to various demands for accountability 
in and through their talk, and how that very activity itself creates a context where 
additional, often contradictory, assumptions then come into play in the talk. 
Throughout, we have seen how various identities feature as a resource in conducting 
this work, in some cases providing a device with which to legitimate the deployment 
of one particular identity in the context of its use (as, for example, where reference 
to geographically associated, socio-dialectic identity is deployed in working to provide 
an implicit accusation of disingenuity or subversion that we saw in the analysis of 
Extract 3.1 and Extract 3.2 above). 
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In all such talk, what is of particular interest for us here is the way that 
speakers display an orientation to both issues of category membership and to the 
activity of providing for the relevance of identity itself as accountable matters. 
Paradoxically, identity is thus made relevant as a way of attending to the making- 
relevant-of-identity itself as an accountable matter since in talk where speakers display 
an orientation to that activity (viz., the activity whereby identity is made relevant as 
an accountable matter), they themselves employ identity relevant features to 
accomplish that work. 
Now, in this section, we will conclude our examination of how identity 
features as a participant concern in this chapter by examining one further extract of 
data. Consider the following transcript of an exchange that occurred in an interview 
involving a woman in her thirties who, at the time of the interview, was employed 
in Kuwait as a regional sales representative for a major u. s. -based agri-business 
concern. 
(3.10) Interview, 38 - corporate sales representative 
1 UT: You know, there's some people who come here and have good 
2 working relationships with Kuwaitis and there's some who just do 
3 nothing but complain. I mean they sit and "Ah these dirty Kuwaitis, 
4 they're- don't know what they're doing, their government's stupid, 
5 their- people are ignorant, their women are arrogant and selfish", 
6 and it ju- everything about them they hated but they were all here 
7 making money, you know, and I- I just couldn't listen to that. Tsk 
8 (H) a=nd (Hx) some expatriates come here and they do crazy weird 
9 stuff and, I don't know, I think sometimes there's a lot of women 
10 who come out here and think that- because their- this i- their 
11 families aren't here (Hx) that they can do whatever they want, 
12 (Hx) = such as sleeping around with men an=d drinking a lot and 
13 that sort of thing, l- I always stayed away from that. It was just- ki- 
14 it was just sort of like this- when people are real decadent and 
15 immoral here they go all the way, [(Hx)@ _] <@ whether 
16 KM: [Yeah. ] 
17 UT: they're @> Kuwaiti or whatever they are. (Hx)@ =I have heard- I 
18 have known people who I've heard they've done some of the most 
19 @ sick, dirty things, [and you know, ] you just wonder "What for". 
20 KM: [Like what. (Hx)@] 
21 UT: O=h, people who have parties and the stewardess- some- there are 
22 some stewardess from Kuwait Airways, there- there's a- sort of a 
23 mentality about some of the stewardess here in the Gulf that their 
24 earnings are so small that they supplement their income, with 
25 prostitution, so= I've heard these parties where they're having 
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26 orgies, or people who makes films of themselves, o=r- (Hx)@ 
27 you@- crazy stuff like that, 
At the very outset of the encounter recorded here, we can see how an orientation to 
identity is itself taken up as an accountable matter in talk about the motivation for 
representation of Kuwaiti nationals ('there's some people who come here and have 
good working relationships with Kuwaitis and there's some who just do nothing but 
complain. I mean they sit and "Ah these dirty Kuwaitis, they're- don't know what 
they're doing, their government's stupid, their- people are ignorant, their women are 
arrogant and selfish", and it ju- everything about them they hated', lines 1-6). Just 
as we saw in our analysis of Extract 3.2 above, so too here the work of attending to 
the accountability for the use of (in this case, Kuwaiti) identity has the effect of 
implicitly making expatriate identity available in and through the contrastive reference 
to `some people' (line 1). This is further made available with the reference to earning 
capability (where the issue of income might otherwise be of no such significance 
where permanent residents of the region are concerned) as an accountable matter ('but 
they were all here making money', lines 6-7). Finally, the category relevance is made 
explicit in the subsequent reference to expatriate identity ('Tsk (H) a=nd (Hx) some 
expatriates', lines 7-8). Such work is not dissimilar to the way in which identity 
features in the talk we have considered in previous extracts. 
One way in which expatriate identity is oriented to here that is different from 
the sort of work we have considered previously, however, is that the issue of morality 
features in the terms that speaker UT specifies in her talk ('they do crazy weird stuff 
and, I don't know, I think sometimes there's a lot of women who come out here and 
think that- because their- this i- their families aren't here (Hx) that they can do 
whatever they want, (Hx)= such as sleeping around with men an=d drinking a lot 
and that sort of thing', lines 8-13). Here, speaker UT construes expatriate identity in 
terms of an implicitly available set of demands for accountability that she glosses with 
the words `decadent' (line 14) and `immoral' (line 15). At the same time, she attends 
to the potential to be similarly so implicated, both with a gloss that is non-inclusive 
('some', line 8) and with remarks by which she explicitly works to distance herself 
from the activities so described (I don't know', line 9; `I always stayed away from 
that', line 13). Of interest here is the delicate balance she works to manage between 
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her own epistemological warrant and the potential inferences that this raises in terms 
of her own culpability. Specifically, the implicit claim involved is that she is not the 
kind of person who has an interest in these sorts of activities, and yet the activity of 
making just such claims could undermine her entitlement to speak about these things 
in the first place since she might not otherwise know about them. By making these 
claims as she does, she is able to manage the delicate balance between the competing 
demands involved in employing identity as a resource to make a particular set of 
assumptions regarding morality available while also limiting the extent to which she 
herself is implicated in the identity as so construed. 13 
In addition, another interesting feature of this talk that is the way that 
reference to the region itself works as a resource to account further for behaviour that 
is otherwise made sense of with the formulation of identity in the first instance. 
Specifically, speaker UT works to foreclose the potential for her own formulation of 
expatriate identity itself to be construed as dismissive - as perhaps involving an 
implicit claim to moral superiority on her own part - by offering a mitigating 
account wherein the geographic region itself features as the cause of the activities she 
holds accountable ('when people are real decadent and immoral here they go all the 
way', lines 14-15). The making available of this inference is quite delicately managed 
here though in that this mitigating work is itself oriented toward the reflexive 
implications (for a construal of her own motivation) that her immediately prior talk 
might be taken to raise, but not so much so that it impinges upon the assumptions 
about the nature of that behaviour (as censurable) that she works to make available. 
Here, it is as if expatriate residents are absolved from responsibility for their 
own actions abroad since their behaviour is somehow effected by their presence in the 
region itself. And yet, at the same time, there is an ambiguity involved. On the one 
hand, the implication is that residence abroad provides a justification for those 
individuals in question: being far from the demands of their home provides them with 
an excuse to do what they would not do in that environment ('there's a lot of women 
who come out here and think that- because their- this i- their families aren't here (Hx) 
that they can do whatever they want', lines 9-11). On the other hand, the 
accountability might also be taken to lie with the geographic region which provides 
them that excuse. It is this ambivalence in regard to the ultimate cause of 
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accountability that speaker UT deploys to foreclose the potential for her own 
formulation of expatriate identity itself to be construed as dismissive. In other words, 
she works to excuse expatriate behaviour without claiming that it is legitimate. To do 
otherwise would potentially be to contravene the work she does to foreclose the 
construal of her own category incumbency in the terms she holds accountable. 
Notice here also the subtle work that speaker UT does to attend to the 
potential for this work itself to be taken as implying criticism of Kuwaitis (` <@ 
whether they're @> Kuwaiti or whatever they are', lines 15-17). In the work she 
does to excuse expatriates for the behaviour that she holds accountable, she employs 
a mitigatory explanation the use of which itself might be taken to implicate Kuwaitis 
as well. This is particularly problematic for speaker UT here because her remarks 
could be heard as an instance of complaining - an activity which she herself has 
taken care to hold accountable in prior remarks (lines 1-6). Thus, the very work to 
foreclose one particular construal of her talk itself creates the basis upon which 
further inferences can be drawn - inferences which, in this case, involve her 
potentially being taken to imply that the behaviour she claims is inherent to the region 
is characteristic to its indigenous population. Thus, she manages the very delicate 
business of construing the activities she holds accountable as inherent to the region 
without at the same time attributing personal responsibility to its Kuwaiti residents. 
In this way, she can display that she regards such concerns (for the accountability of 
expatriate behaviour) to be that about which the encounter is concerned while at the 
same time working reflexively to foreclose the potential for her talk to be taken as 
implicating others. Overall, making reference to the region in just this way is a very 
delicate undertaking in which the speaker attends to a range of conflicting demands 
that are raised by both category incumbency and the reflexive implications devolving 
from the activity of attending to such incumbency. 
One interesting aspect of this reference to the region is that of how similar 
such explanations feature in the critical accounts of representations of the Orient. For 
example, in discussing 19th and 20th Century literature, Said (1978: 190) remarks 
upon the way in which the Orient14 is constituted as a space of sexual alterity, a 
domain of erotic free-play that contrasts with that of the European space in opposition 
to which that identity is constructed: 
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[T]he association is clearly made between the Orient and the freedom of licentious 
sex. We may as well recognise that ... sex 
had been institutionalized to a very 
considerable degree. On the one hand, there was no such thing as "free" sex, and 
on the other, sex in society entailed a web of legal, moral, even political and 
economic obligations of a detailed and certainly encumbering sort. Just as the 
various colonial possessions-quite apart from their economic benefit to 
metropolitan Europe-were useful as places to send wayward sons, superfluous 
populations of delinquents, poor people, and other undesirables, so the Orient was 
a place where one could look for sexual experience unobtainable in Europe. [... ] 
What they looked for often-correctly, I think-was a different type of sexuality, 
perhaps more libertine and less guilt-ridden ... . 
Now, this similarity between the very different settings where the Orient is imbued 
with this sort of significance raises a very interesting issue regarding the nature of 
shared knowledge. In particular, the issue is that of whether these two discursive 
contexts are related to one another independently of the sort of speculative connection 
made in an analysis (such as this one) where the two are compared. In other words, 
is it the case that speaker UT draws upon the same basis of knowledge that Said does 
in his remarks concerning the assumptions made available in the literature he 
considers? After all, in both cases, their remarks seem to be oriented to an association 
between geographic location and the issue of the legitimacy of sexual activity. Might 
it be the case, for example, that speaker UT is familiar with Said's writings? In short, 
to what extent are the two different contexts related to one another? 
It has been the approach of this thesis to respecify just such questions in 
terms of participant concern. Specifically, the similarity in the discursive work that 
both speaker UT and Said accomplish with their remarks is a correspondence worked 
up in a comparative consideration of that relationship such as is accomplished with 
these very remarks above. What the relationship between the two contexts is not, 
however, is a concern that either speaker UT or Said take up in their own respective 
discussions. In other words, the question of similarity here is not made relevant in the 
participants' interaction. It is quite beside the point of their talk (though, of course, 
it is not beside the point of our discussion in considering whether it is their concern). 
This question of the relationship between different discursive contexts is taken 
up by Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995: 205) in their discussion of the commonsense 
knowledge that is said to define the cultural milieu - that is, the shared cultural 
resources - of talk among the speakers that they interviewed about subcultural 
identity: 
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[S]ome respondents' orientation to the political or ideological dimension of punk 
was obviously resonant with both the sociological and lay theorising about the 
meaning of the subculture. This is not surprising, for sociological interpretations 
have permeated the media and become part of our lay or common-sense knowledge 
about the meaning of subcultures; so that it is a culturally available assumption that 
punks are `rebelling against society'. These kinds of explanatory formulations for 
social behaviour are interpretative resources which both insiders and outsiders can 
draw upon in making sense of the subculture. Moreover, it is perhaps because of 
the availability of the sociological assessments of the subculture's meaning that 
respondents' descriptions of punks' rebellion often had the character of formulaic 
assessments. 
And again in the footnote that accompanies this passage: `Indeed, this assumption 
informed the interviewer's question, in which she referred to media portrayal or 
whatever' (ibid.: 207, n. 8). This particular take on the talk that Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt consider in their work differs rather markedly from the 
ethnomethodologically informed approach that they otherwise advocate. In particular, 
it differs from the arguments for a sociological analysis that they develop in pointing 
out how speakers take questions as raising a range of implications, and demonstrate 
with their talk that they do so; but it is in the taking - that is, in the uptake - that 
the question has this status (as raising the implications which the speakers address), 
and not (for ethnomethodology, that is) in the question itself, as monadically or 
independently informed by social psychological or any other literature (or any other 
source, for that matter). In other words, for ethnomethodology, the status of an event 
(like a question) and the nature that it has (as being so informed, or not informed, 
etc. ) are matters that are constituted in the situated activity of retrospective accounting 
(as displayed in uptake). The account that Widdicombe and Wooffitt provide of the 
nature of the question is only another of these accounts; and even the status of their 
interview questions which they claim were informed by the concerns of the 
sociological and social psychological literature, is itself a retrospective gloss upon 
their investigative interviewing activities created in the analytic reading (their write- 
up) that they provide. is 
Further, for an ethnomethodological approach, what it is that Widdicombe 
and Wooffitt refer to as the resonance between punks' accounts and the theorising 
about the meaning of the subculture is itself constituted in the very display which 
those responses make available (viz., that the questions raise just such implications), 
not in some lay or common-sense knowledge that exists independently of such a 
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display. In addition, the very significance of that display is itself constituted in the 
analysis of it as itself orienting to the prior turn-at-talk as raising just such 
implications (as is the significance of Widdicombe and Wooffitt's analysis of that talk 
constituted in this reading of it). To refer to the meaning of subcultures (or the 
meaning of anything else, for that matter) as drawing upon culturally available 
resources (that is, commonly held assumptions or knowledge) is itself to construe the 
commonsensicality and sharedness of the assumptions which the researchers regard 
their respondents to be taking the interview questions to be making available. A more 
satisfactory way to deal with the issue of the relationship between discursive contexts 
would involve a reflexive gesture in the analysis. In the case that Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt consider here, it would involve pointing out either that punks' responses 
imbue the significance of the utterance to which they constitute uptake, and that their 
own analysis of that uptake imbues it (the uptake) with the significance it has as 
meaning-imbuing (as does this analysis of Widdicombe and Wooffitt's analysis). If 
the point of an ethnomethodological analysis is that participants constitute for 
themselves the very sorts of structures and referents in their joint activity of mutual 
orientation, then the point that an analytic practice which employs the same sorts of 
analytic activities only goes to demonstrate the very point which that analytic practice 
is itself being employed to substantiate. 
Conclusion 
Our concern in this chapter has been with the reflexive implications made available 
in talk - that is, with how talk is reflexively constitutive of the activities of which 
it is a part. Our specific concern here was with the way that the formulation of 
identity in which the speaker is potentially implicated as a category member involves 
some rather complicated and delicate interactional work in terms of managing the 
conflict between epistemological warrant and the availability of noxious inferences. 
In formulating expatriate identity as a participant concern, speakers attend to the 
competing tasks of constituting their contributions to that talk as the activity of a 
co-participant of an investigative encounter where identity features as an issue, as well 
as managing the availability of inferences which their category membership potentially 
entails. Attending to category entitlement is in direct conflict with attending to 
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epistemological warrant, and the successful management of this conflict involves 
working to provide for category membership to the extent that the one is warranted 
in making the claims which he or she does, but not to the extent that one is implicated 
in the demands for accountability that are thereby entailed. 
Even though we have examined how identity features as a resource in this 
talk, this chapter is not, strictly speaking, concerned with identity per se. Instead, the 
concern here has been with the paradoxical tension involved in talk about identity 
where a speaker is potentially implicated in the inferences that related category 
incumbency might otherwise be taken to imply. In the talk we examined here, this 
involves a range of negative inferences, but the same tension would also exist where 
inferences are positive as well - as, for example, where a speaker's talk might be 
taken as an expression of boastfulness (Mulkay, 1984; 1985: Ch. 6). In either case, 
the reflexive implications raised in talk where category membership potentially 
includes a party or parties present to the talk is a matter that speakers attend to as 
relevant to the setting. In this chapter, we focused on talk about identity also because 
we wanted to explore some of the assumptions on which their implicitly critical 
formulations depend. That is, we wanted to examine the assumptions involved in the 
activity of accounting for the residence of expatriates in the region. We saw that, 
among other things, these include a range of assumptions about the accountable nature 
of formulation itself, as well as the concern for issues like earning capacity and other 
concerns all of which speakers display an orientation to as associated with expatriate 
identity. Again, attending to these concerns is related in a complicated fashion with 
the tension between both the entitlement and availability of potentially damaging 
inferences that category incumbency entails. It is that managing of that tension which 
is the principal business of speakers in the talk where they formulate their identity. 
In the following chapter, we will continue with an exploration of what is 
involved in this tension by examining a further range of assumptions having to do 
with the accountable nature of attending to race and national identity. In other words, 
we will explore how the question of attending to race and national identity are taken 
up as participant concerns and with the relationship this has to accounting for Western 
presence in the Middle East. 
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Notes 
1. Rorty (1991b) refers to this sort of conflict in his discussion of transcendental mysticism and 
contingent irony. 
2. That is, speakers work to make relevant their identity as expatriates to the extent that this identity 
is definitive of their participation in the encounter to which they are contributing. At the same time, 
they work to distance themselves from this identity to the extent that it allows for a range of 
implications which they do not want to be taken as warranting. This tension between incumbency and 
disassociation itself involves the insider-outsider problematic that is constitutive of any 
anthropologically oriented interrogation (whether it involves investigating the socio-cultural, or any 
other domain) as discussed, for example, in the work of Geertz (1988). See Latour (1981) for a 
discussion of this problematic as constitutive of a sociology of scientific knowledge - one which works 
toward `the demystification of science, in the name of science' (ibid.: 205, emphasis in original) and 
thereby cultivates its insider-outsider status. As Latour describes this: `All methodologies must derive 
from this axiom: no account qualifies as an explanation if it simply restates the account it is supposed 
to explain. The difference between the two accounts is the qualification which permits us to see one 
account as an explanation of the other' (ibid.: 201, emphasis in original). He elaborates further in his 
remarks that: "'Repetition" should be understood in a narrow sense. If I record with great care a myth 
that is told to me, I am not repeating it; rather I am putting it in a new framework (field study, sheaf 
of papers); this is enough to fulfil the requirement of the axiom even if I have no theory or grand 
explanation of this myth' (ibid.: 214, n. 7). For further discussion along related lines, see also 
Mulkay's (1985: Part 2) treatment of repetition (including especially his take on Borges' Pierre 
Menard, author of the Quixote, ibid.: 142-144) as well as the related discussion in Mulkay, 1988a. 
3. Widdicombe and Wooffitt devote a great deal of attention to reviewing the details of a variety of 
theoretical literature on social and personal identity, all of which differs from the 
ethnomethodologically informed approach which they themselves seek to develop in their analysis of 
talk among youth subcultures. This literature includes research in macrosociological theory (Burkitt, 
1991), role theory (Greenwald, 1980; Jones and Pittman, 1982; McCall, 1987; McCall and Simmons, 
1982; Schlenker, 1980; Snyder, 1979; Tedeschi, 1981), social cognition (Abelson, 1981; Eiser, 1986; 
Leyens and Codol, 1988; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Tajfel, 1981), social identity theory (Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1972; Turner et al., 1987), and certain specific developments within an analytic 
approach to discourse that draws upon the work of Foucault (Burman and Parker, 1993; Marks, 1993). 
While these bodies of work differ from one another in important ways, what is of significance for how 
they compare to the approach advocated by Widdicombe and Wooffitt is the assumptions they share 
with regard to the nature of social structure as an independent analytic concern distinct from identity 
as a concern for participants in social interaction. In contrast to such work, Widdicombe and Wooffitt 
explore the details of how social actors display an orientation to social identity in specific episodes of 
conversational interaction, and thereby approach the issue of individual agency and social structure in 
order to `show that individual and society are inseparable, the one utterly implicating the other' (1995: 
3). 
4. Referring to this particular aspect of talk in their investigation of Oliver North's testimony in what 
has come to be referred to as the Iran-Contra hearings, Bogen and Lynch remark upon the way `that 
stories routinely display intransitive elements that bind them to the present context [of their telling] and 
to the unique entitlements of their current teller' (1989: 203). What this means in terms of talk about 
expatriate identity is that speakers work to foreclose the availability of a range of implications which 
their own participation (as representative of those living abroad in the Middle East) makes available, 
and that they also attend to the implications which that identity implies for their competence as 
participants in an investigation into that very identity. This involves them in a conflict of situated 
interests because to the extend that they attend to their category entitlement, they also make themselves 
vulnerable to accusations which that work might potentially be construed as making available. In other 
words, in working to show themselves to be knowledgable speakers entitled to remark upon a range 
of different issues where their status as expatriates might he of relevance (such as, say, cultural 
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difference), the very talk with which they attend to this task is potentially construed as making available 
a range of inferences which they work to foreclose. At the same time, to the extent that they work to 
foreclose the potentially unwanted implications which that category entitlement makes available, they 
undermine their credibility to act as participants in the interactional encounter of which they are a part. 
The task with which they are faced, then, is to manage the conflict between these competing demands, 
working to show themselves to be credible without making themselves vulnerable to the accusations 
to which they themselves attend in their talk. 
5. For related discussion concerning the situated employment of script formulations, see Edwards, 
1997: Ch. 6; 1991; 1995; in press. 
6. Notice, the claim here is not that speakers never attend to this potential to be so implicated. The 
activity of attending to the potential for one's own category entitlement to implicate him or her as a 
member is analyzed as a prominent feature of expatriate talk in Chapter 4 to follow. 
7. Heritage, quoting Garfinkel (1967: 41-42), refers to this aspect of talk in his discussion of the 
inherently moral significance of social interaction as involving a `demand for various forms of 
interpretive co-operation' by which participants `are themselves entitled and entitle others to claim that 
they know what they are talking about and that what they say is understandable and ought to be 
understood. In short, their seen but unnoticed [that is, not remarked upon] presence is used to entitle 
persons to conduct their common conversational affairs without interference' (1984: 96). What this 
means in the setting we consider here is that where epistemological warrant arising from category 
incumbency meshes smoothly with the regard for accountability which that category incumbency 
otherwise involves, it is a constitutive feature of that interaction itself. In other words, it is because 
implicating a speaker in the demands for accountability that his or her use of identity makes relevant 
would itself constitute a morally sanctionable violation of the interpretive co-operation upon which 
interaction depends that talk about identity can work in this paradoxical way. 
8. This feature of what an activity is or might be taken to be as apparent is referred to by Sacks (1992) 
with the term subversion. On this matter, Edwards remarks: `[subversion] consists in the enlisting, by 
participants, of actions' visibility, such that actions will be taken for what they appear to be [... ] It is 
a matter not so much of deception, machiavellianism, or insincerity (though it can be, or be taken to 
be), as of Garfinkel's [1967] dictum regarding the accountability-seen-to-be-done nature of social 
actions' (1997: 98-99, emphasis in original). In the talk we consider here, the issue of insincerity is 
a participant concern as is displayed where speakers topicalise the issue of how an activity can be 
enlisted for how it (that activity) is likely to be taken as part-and-parcel of attending to their own 
situated activity of enlisting how that activity (i. e., the topicalisation) might be understood in the 
situation of the interview setting where it occurs. 
9. Note too that the talk in the first of these extracts by which speaker RB brings this off involves the 
use of a particular rhetorical device that Atkinson (1984: 157-163) explores in his discussion of the 
three-part list (see also related discussions in Jefferson, 1990; Potter, 1997: 195-197). In Extract 3.3, 
this occurs in speaker RB's mention of mitigating causes as involving: (1) lifestyle, (2) reinvestment 
in business, and (3) losses incurred as a result of events related to the Gulf War (lines 48-53). Also, 
in Extract 3.4, this occurs in the interviewer question with speaker KM's mention of: (1) lower costs, 
(2) travel abroad, and (3) a combination of these two factors (lines 2-4). 
10. Similarly, van Dijk (1984) provides a list of such features that recur in interview material he 
considers, reading these as an outward expression of some underlying mental organisation or structure. 
One way that such an approach differs from that taken up here is that it fails to consider how a concern 
for the (stereo)typicality of such aspects itself features as a participant concern. 
11. Hollway (1984), citing the work of Jahoda (1961) and Fanon (1968), remarks in passing upon her 
own, prior derogatory reference to `women' as denoting a discursively constituted group identity from 
which she works to exclude herself, comparing her gesture with similar moves among West African 
and other speakers who refer to `blacks' as a group from which they (those speakers) work to distance 
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themselves thereby, according to Hollway, `reproducing the racist discourses with which whites 
position them' (ibid.: 260, n. 2). Of concern to us here, however, is not whether such discourses are 
racist (or sexist or whatever); but that the identities which speakers orient to and which they make 
available in their talk (whether as black, white, woman, man, expatriate, Arab, what-have-you) are 
deployed as resources in attending to the work of situating their contributions in anticipation of a range 
of responses with which they might be met in uptake. In this sense, while the deployment of identity 
is certainly oriented to as making available a range of assumptions (regarding that which terms such 
as black, white, male, female, expatriate, etc. refer to); to claim, as Hollway does, that their 
deployment thereby reproduces some autonomous discourse or discourses (of racism or sexism, etc. ) 
is to introduce a range of concerns which are foreign to the interaction in which they occur. Thus, 
reference to categories of women, blacks, expatriates, etc. is not necessarily made in order to 
perpetuate racism, sexism, culturalism, etc.; but to attend to the concerns which an alternative, 
ironizing reading of those terms' use (such as that accomplished in Hollway's account) itself makes 
available. Along similar lines, Hollway herself remarks: `I was attracted to men, partly because I 
aspired to be like them' (ibid.: 229). Aspiring to be like men - from within a form of life in which 
men are seen as different from and better than women - is not at all the same thing as perpetuating 
a discourse of sexism from within that form of life itself. 
12. In terms of the sorts of considerations taken up in a dialogic analysis, Bakhtin (1984: Ch. 5) might 
refer to this sort of interactional work as involving the use of what he refers to as the word with a 
loophole. 
13. This is a feature of talk referred to by Potter (1996: 124-132; 1997: 150-158) as stake 
inoculation -a pervasive aspect of talk's reflexive character that we will also encounter in our 
analyses of interaction in subsequent chapters below. 
14. For an interesting critique of Said's writing in which the author discusses his (Said's) work for its 
lack of reflexive analysis, see Young (1990: 119-140). In brief, Young finds in Said's work the very 
constitutive activity which he (Said) works to distance himself from. 'Said's hope is to illustrate the 
formidable structure of cultural domination involved in the duality of `the Occident' and `the Orient' 
and by doing so perhaps to eliminate it altogether. But if he shows how Orientalism works by this 
opposition he does not so much try to undo it [the opposition] as simply deny it, with the result that 
he repeats the inside/outside structures of dualistic thinking himself. [... ] The problem of Orientalism 
is that without a concept of an inner dissension Said is constantly led simply to condemn Orientalism's 
projections of dissonance on to external geographical or racial differences - even as he himself repeats 
such a structure by identifying Orientalists as `for' or `against'. Meanwhile Orientalism's own internal 
divisions re-emerge inexorably in the series of theoretical contradictions and conflicts in Said's text' 
(137,140). In terms of how this relates to the analysis of the talk considered in this thesis, there is at 
issue, again, the paradoxical and yet co-constitutive aspect of the talk in which participants attend to 
their accountability for calling into being the object of their reference while nonetheless employing that 
reference to do so. That is, speakers work to make the use of certain terms accountable and in so doing 
employ the very terms whose accountability they work to put at issue. The accountability for racism 
or orientalism (or any other -ism, for that matter) is paradoxical in this sense. It is the failure to engage 
this particular aspect of discursive production which Young finds wanting in Said's work. 
15. This is not to say, of course, that the matter of the relationship between a particular account and 
a similar account as such is never made available by participants. Where this is the case, however, the 
issue of shared knowledge, background, etc. is then attended to by participants to conduct whatever 
work that they might attend to in that case. The difference here is between shared knowledge as a 
participant concern and as an analyst concern. On this account, Widdicombe and Wooffitt are not 
consistent, appealing in some places to the former and in others eliding the distinction. 
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Chapter 4 
REFLEXIVITY, RACISM AND 
THE VOICE OF THE OTHER 
In the previous chapter, we examined how speakers employ talk about identity as a 
way of managing the availability of a range of implications with which their talk and 
their participation in the circumstances of that talk's production (the interview) might 
be construed. In particular, we saw how speakers work to situate their contribution 
in relation to the dialogic counters they take to be constitutive of the talk of which 
they are a part through theorising about category membership of various social actors 
('expatriates', `Americans', `farmers down South somewhere', etc. ) in talk where 
identity is topicalised. 
Now, in this chapter, we will consider how the identity of the cultural Other 
is similarly employed as a resource in situating the speaker's dialogically contrastive 
position relative to the conflicting demands with which he or she is confronted in talk. 
Specifically, in referring to the perspective of the cultural Other - that is, in 
construing what the perspective of that Other might be - speakers thereby display 
a sensitivity to the view of that Other in the very pursuit of that discursively 
constructive activity itself. In this way, their talk is oriented to foreclosing the 
potential accusation of insensitivity to or unawareness of Arab cultural difference. ' 
At the same time, however, this proves problematic because in pursuing such 
foreclosure work, speakers occasion further demands for accountability. The very 
perspective which they construe to be that of the Other is displayed in ways that 
speakers might otherwise work to make accountable as an instance of prejudicially 
reductionist representation (i. e., with the sorts of cataloguing or description of Arab 
custom and behaviour that we examined in the previous chapter). 
In exploring the details of what this sort of problematic involves, we will be 
attempting to cash out some of the theoretical notions of a rhetorico-responsive 
approach to conversational interaction as extended from Mikhail Bakhtin's work on 
voice that we initially touched on in Chapter 1 above. To review briefly, voice is the 
term that Bakhtin employs to refer to the rhetorical positioning that a particular 
interactional contribution has relative to possible alternatives in anticipation of which 
it is directed. It is in working to anticipate a particular construal of one's own 
contribution that a speaker establishes the significance of his or her voice as 
relationally contrastive to a set of possible alternatives and thereby establishes in that 
talk what he or she takes those alternatives to be. ' Thus, it is in this anticipatory 
work (which Bakhtin refers to with the term addressivity [see Holquist, 1990]) that 
the voice of the Other is constituted for its significance at any given point in an 
episode of conversational interaction. 
In addition to this, there is also a feature of talk about the Other that in the 
course of pursuing this anticipatory activity, what it is that the voice of the Other 
entails can itself be taken up as a topic of concern among participants. Thus, in 
actually addressing a conversational interlocutor, the work of topicalising addressivity 
itself can feature as the means by which the situated activity of anticipating that 
interlocutor's discursive position is accomplished when and where the perspective of 
some third party - some other Other - is itself the topic of that talk. ' The 
implications this holds for our analysis of the talk we will consider in this chapter is 
that relational situatedness of voice here does not, then, simply refer to the 
perspective of the cultural Other per se. That is, it is not merely a way in which a 
speaker construes his or her own contrastive viewpoint relative to some cultural 
Other. Rather, what is involved is how the voice (or perspective4) construed of some 
cultural Other is itself employed in pursuing the work of managing the inferential 
concerns which the speaker takes to be that of his or her interactional Other (the 
conversational interlocutor). Because of the way in which talk about the Other raises 
this set of rather complicated reflexive implications for its own use, it is absolutely 
crucial to make this analytic distinction between the voice of the Other as a 
rhetorically contrastive position in relation to which speakers work to situate their 
own contribution - the argumentatively oppositional alternative construed in the work 
of anticipatory foreclosure - and the voice of the Other as a theoretical construct, 
the situated analytic concern for which can itself be employed reflexively in talk as 
a way of effecting the contrastive situating of voice in dialogue. ' This chapter is 
concerned to explore the details of how this takes place. As we shall see, this will 
involve looking at the identity of the Arab Other both as the topic-of-talk and as a 
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position the details of which are articulated in reported speech imputed to various 
Arab Others. 
The Spectre of Racism 
In exploring expatriate identity as a device as we did in Chapter 3 above, we 
considered a range of different inferences that speakers work to foreclose in their 
talk - inferences related to the desire for socio-economic mobility and accountability 
for the use of category generalisations. Now, another issue which we will see that 
speakers attend to in their talk is that of racism. There is, of course, a vast literature 
devoted specifically to issues of race and of how race as a category is employed in 
the discursive/representational constitution of identity. For example, a great deal of 
work has been devoted to exploring the psychodynamics of racism (for a review of 
how this relates to both mainstream sociological and psychological treatments of race, 
see Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Dollimore, 1991). Based initially on the research into 
personality and national identity originally conducted by scholars working with 
Theodor Adorno in the period immediately following World War II (Adorno et al., 
1950), such work is concerned to explore the cognitive structures and shared mental 
representations by which social categorisation is said to take place (Billig, 1982). One 
way that such work differs from the discursive approach adopted here is in this very 
foundational assumption that racism is the expression of perceptual mechanisms which 
it is the task of the researcher to reveal. Rather than regard racism as the 
manifestation of underlying cognitive structures or mechanisms which determine the 
way that social actors discriminate between individuals across a range of different 
situations, a discursive approach instead seeks to explore how issues of race and 
racism are consequential to the production of talk where they are at issue in that talk. 
This means examining how the issue of perceptual distortion and/or influence is itself 
regarded as a topic among conversational participants as well as how their attending 
to this issue as a concern in their talk has consequences for that talk (quite apart from 
the consequentiality of perceptual distortion which it may be the business of that talk 
to consider). Thus, a discursive approach to racism considers how talk about racism 
is itself oriented to the interactional business of participants in the circumstances 
where it takes place. In contrast, by assuming (as it implicitly does) what it is that 
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racism consists of, work in the tradition of research which seeks to reveal perceptual 
distortion fails to examine those very settings where racism itself features (viz., actual 
occasions of mundane social interaction where racism is taken up as a concern by 
participants). In this way, a discursive approach seeks, among other things, to bring 
about a respecification of the working assumptions that inform research into racism 
or any other matter of relevance to investigating a psychology of the social. 
One rather interesting result of this respecification is that one does not ever 
encounter talk that is taken by the participants themselves to be an expression of 
racism. This is so because where racism is taken up as topic, it is necessarily 
regarded as accountable. That is, to even topicalise racism as such is to attend to the 
activity by which the relevance of race is made available as itself an accountable 
matter. Thus, what we do not find in talk where racism is an issue is the activity of 
speakers working, say, to undermine someone on the basis of race. Rather, what we 
find is that it is the business of such talk to make available a range of assumptions 
regarding the accountable nature of discrimination on the basis of race. In other 
words, we do not ever find participants engaging in talk which they themselves regard 
as an instance of racism. ' 
This stance contrasts rather markedly with that adopted in the analytic 
investigations of van Dijk (1986,1987a, 1991, inter alia) where not only does he 
work to find prejudice in discourse (1984) - in particular, working to read certain 
interactional contributions as expressing underlying (racist) attitudes and opinions - 
but where he also takes speaker efforts to anticipate and foreclose just such a reading 
of their talk as an instance of impression management and therefore as a confirmation 
of the presupposition which he (van Dijk) brings to the analysis. What is significant 
about such work for the approach we take up here is that it fails to appreciate both 
the way that racism features as a concern for participants, and how participants work 
to attend to racism as an accountable matter in and through their very work of 
foreclosing a reading of their talk as racist. ' This is not to say that there are not 
occasions where speakers construe either their own or an interlocutor's talk as an 
instance of racism, but rather that this activity itself involves the taking up of an 
ironic stance with which those speakers attend to racism as an accountable matter. As 
we will see, even where participants work to provide for a reading of their own talk 
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as racist, their activity of doing so is brought off as a part of their overall efforts to 
attend to the reflexive implications of their talk as otherwise making that very reading 
of their activity available. 
Thus, for how the issue of race relates to our interests in this chapter, our 
principal concern is with the way that speakers attend to the potential for their talk 
to be construed as racist; and also with how, in so doing, those speakers 
simultaneously work to construe what it is that constitutes racism as such. As we will 
see, what it is that speakers formulate as an instance of racism is itself contingent 
upon the circumstances in which racism is taken up in the talk. That is, what it is 
which speakers take racism to consist of is very much a determinate of the sort of 
rhetorical work by which the discussion of racism is occasioned in the context where 
speakers seek to address the inferences of their own talk. 
In addition, we will also see that attending to racism is a much more involved 
and potentially delicate matter than the sort of work we saw in the previous chapter 
where speakers account for the desire for social mobility or where they attend to the 
potential for their talk to be construed as reductionist. This is because the very 
categories which speakers make available are so readily appropriated in the terms 
which they themselves elsewhere work to make accountable. The discursive task of 
the speakers, as it were, is to talk about Arabs and Arab culture as well as Kuwaiti 
and other nationalities and to employ such category glosses while at the same time 
working to ensure that their own use of these terms is not itself construed as 
motivated by racism. The interesting analytic question, then, is one of how speakers 
attend to this dilemmatic aspect of their talk. How do they work to make participants 
accountable for the use of categories which they themselves employ in their talk about 
categorisation? In short, how do speakers employ identity as a resource in order to 
make the employment of identity as a resource an accountable matter? 
Contingent Definitions of Racism: Attention to National Identity and/or Phenotype 
Consider the following transcript of conversation taken from a latter point in the same 
interview that we initially encountered in our analysis of Extract 3.1 and Extract 3.7 
in the previous chapter. In the talk recorded here, the conversation turns from the 
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matter of expatriate identity to that of theorising the relationship between racism and 
national identity. 
(4.1) Interview, 53 - private business owner, marketing researcher 
1 CS: 
2 
3 
4 
5 IS: 
6 
7 
8 CS: 
9 
10 
11 IS: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
KM : 
IS: 
CS: 
KM: 
IS: 
And plus <P especially for a Brit P>, colonialism comes into it. 
You know, because you are treated like you're so much better than 
your fellow workers <P be they Indian, Thai, Filipino, whatEVER 
P>, and, [so=-] 
[That's going to make] a noise on the tape. ((REFERS TO 
BODILY MOVEMENT BY CS)) 
I suppose lots of people do = start to feel that they ARE themselves 
better than their Indian workmates or whatever. 
I think it- it also makes a lot of people more racist. Because you 
could come from a- a background in wherever, u=h- and- and be 
quite happy having lived in- a lot of your life with <P whatever 
P>, different races. Because most countries- most Western 
countries now have got a mix of many different races. But you 
come out here and all the sudden you're put on this uh- this pedestal 
because you are white or whatever. And uh- even someone who 
probably wasn't racist before, because he hears everyone else say 
"Oh, bloody Arabs" or "Bloody Indians" or whatever, they'll start 
to behave that way as well. And you can end up being a racist 
person, when you started off not being so at all. Because everyone 
else says "Well, all Arabs are stupid, so they must-", you know, 
that sort of thing. 
Mm hm. 
You start to believe it. And also, [u=h-] because- 
[It's true. ] ((SMILEY VOICE)) 
(Hx)@ (Hx)@ (H) (Hx) 
And also maybe the- because you have a certain way of living, and 
uh- you've- you've always been accustomed to the other races IN 
your country having the same sort of way of life, but you come 
here, and the Arabs and the Indians here REALLY ARE different. 
They think differently, they do everything differently. So you just 
assume that they're stupid because they don't do things the way you 
do. 
Mm. In fact I had a friend of mine who worked in university, 
u=m- he reckoned <P I don't know what he feels NOW about- 
he's still in country P>, [but-] 
36 CS: 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
IS: [Who, ] Richard? 
CS: <P Yeah, Richard. P>, when he first came out, after the first year 
43 IS: 
or so, he thought Kuwait was more racist than South Africa was. Or 
more segregated. 
Yeah, he x lived in South Af@ri@ca@ as well. 
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44 CS: Yeah. THAN South Africa was. 
45 KM: In= what way. I don't understand. I mean- 
46 
47 IS: It's the way everything's nationality in this country. 
48 CS: Yeah. 
49 IS: The minute you meet someone, the first thing they want to know is 
50 where you're from. They'll always- they'll always ask you that. It's 
51 like the second question they ask you. Whereas = somewhere else, 
52 certainly in England, they don't even bother to ask you. They just 
53 take you for what you are. In this country they have to know. And 
54 that changes their entire perspective on- on YOU and what you're 
55 like. So if you say "Well, I'm from England", "Okay. That's 
56 good". If you say "Well I'm from Philippines", it's completely 
57 different attitude. They'll change the way they react towards you. 
58 And it's that sort of society where everything depends on where 
59 you- where you're from. 
60 KM: Who changes their attitude. Who are you talking about. xx- 
61 IS: I'd say mainly it's u=m- oh I've always had this with uh- with 
62 probably Arabs and Kuwaitis. They always want to know where 
63 you're from. The first thing they want to know. And that's why you 
64 notice all the ID's and everything in this country carries nationality. 
65 It really isn't that important at all. If you have an ID in the States, 
66 that doesn't- does it say nationality? I don't think it does. In 
67 England it doesn't say nationality. They just assume that you're 
68 whatever. But here it's one of the most important things, 
69 nationality. 
There is a range of quite complicated interactional business taking place in this 
encounter, not all of which we have space to consider here. We will instead confine 
our analysis of this extract to the work that the speakers do in attending to issues 
which they gloss initially with the terms `colonialism' (line 1) and `racist' (line 11). 
Notice here that attending to the issue of racism entails some rather delicate work in 
order to make the regard for national origin accountable as an instance of racist 
discrimination. Specifically, the distinguishing of individuals in terms of national 
identity is implicitly made accountable as an instance of racist behaviour ('The minute 
you meet someone, the first thing they want to know is where you're from. They'll 
always- they'll always ask you that. It's like the second question they ask you. 
Whereas = somewhere else, certainly in England, they don't even bother to ask you. 
They just take you for what you are', lines 48-52). One particularly interesting aspect 
of how this takes place is that while the speakers work to make such categorisation 
accountable, they also make national identity and group affiliation relevant in order 
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to accomplish that work. In other words, the accountability of group affiliation falls 
along lines which are themselves made sense of in terms of national identity. For 
example, the very attention to national identity which is made accountable as an 
instance of racist behaviour is itself related to a contrastive case the sense of which 
is provided for through the making relevant of, again, national identity ('If you have 
an ID in the States, that doesn't- does it say nationality? I don't think it does. In 
England it doesn't say nationality', lines 64-67). It is in the United States and in 
England that national identity is said not to be attended to as relevant. In addition, the 
censuring of the making-relevant-of-group-affiliation is also itself undertaken in terms 
of group affiliation ('I've always had this with uh- with probably Arabs and Kuwaitis. 
They always want to know where you're from', lines 60-62). In other words, 
speakers employ the very sorts of explanations whose use they otherwise work to 
make accountable. This is very much the same sort of activity that we have seen in 
our analysis of Extract 3.2 and Extract 3.3 in the previous chapter where, in talk 
concerning the accountability of social mobility, speakers make available the very 
assumptions (about earnings as an indicator of social status) which they themselves 
work to hold accountable. Here, again, we see the same sort of conversational logic 
in which, as a result of the context-shaping and context-renewing features of talk, 
explanans and explanandum emerge as mutually self-validating argumentative 
resources. 
Another interesting feature of the talk in Extract 4.1 above is the way that the 
speakers also work to make relevant a range of assumptions about social influence as 
a way, again, of attending to the potential for their own talk to be construed as 
motivated by racism. Specifically, what they do here is not so much resist the 
potential accusation of racism as to make their activities accountable on other 
grounds. These speakers thus do not offer a denial of racism. Neither do they work 
to establish how the particular set of activities which might be construed as racist can 
be regarded as exceptional and thereby excluded as an instance of same (Billig, 1996: 
148-185). Rather, what they do here is to construe their activities as a product of 
racist social influence ('And you can end up being a racist person, when you started 
off not being so at all. Because everyone else says "Well, all Arabs are stupid, so 
they must-", you know, that sort of thing', lines 20-22). In this way, they abrogate 
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the need to account for their behaviour since, being the result of such influence, 
racism is not something for which they need be held personally responsible given that 
it is beyond their control. 8 
Note further that in this context, the speakers even work actively to provide 
for an account of their activities as an instance of racist behaviour. This is really 
rather interesting because it is by so doing that they can manage the conflicting 
demands with which they are confronted in their talk. In the first place, by adopting 
such a position, they demonstrate and attend to the talk of which they are a part as 
that of an encounter which has racism as its concern. They thus attend to racism as 
a complainable or accountable matter. At the same time, however, in providing an 
explanation of that behaviour as determined by social influence, they are able to 
manage their own accountability. Thus, not only do they foreclose the potential for 
their talk itself to be construed as motivated by racism (by working to obviate the 
need to account for that behaviour); but at they same time they are still able to attend 
to racism as an accountable matter. Further, their doing so in this way also entails the 
additional feature of attending to the speakers' epistemological warrant in making the 
claims that they do. Specifically, by providing the grounds for an account of their 
activities as an instance of racist behaviour (even while denigrating the relevance of 
such an account), they also demonstrate their warrant for making such a claim. In 
short, who better to understand what racist behaviour entails than someone who 
engages in such behaviour themselves? Who better to know what racism is than a 
racist? In this way, the account also works reflexively to foreclose the potential for 
the talk itself to be construed as involving the disingenuous denial of racism. Far 
from denying racism, these speakers display a concern for the accountability of their 
activities to just such assumptions; and, in so doing, they attend to the demand for 
such accountability even while countermanding its relevance. This particularly subtle 
attention to the conflict between epistemological warrant and the expression of 
concern for the accountable nature of racism is a particularly elegant bit of discursive 
work. 
Another interesting aspect of this talk involves the way that speakers attend 
to other concerns as well which relate to these demands in complicated implicational 
relations. For example, just as we have seen in the talk about culture that we 
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examined in the analysis of Extract 3.5 and Extract 3.6 in the previous chapter, so 
too here speakers also attend to the demands for an awareness of and sensitivity to 
cultural difference with their remarks about how residents of the area 
characteristically think and act ('but you come here, and the Arabs and the Indians 
here REALLY ARE different. They think differently, they do everything differently', 
lines 29-31). Through this reference, they display with their talk a concern for 
cultural difference. In addition, however, they also attend to the potential for this very 
situated construal of such difference itself to be made accountable as an instance of 
prejudice ('So you just assume that they're stupid because they don't do things the 
way you do', lines 31-33). Again, by working to preclude the need to account for 
their activity (in terms other than that of social influence), the speakers are able to 
demonstrate with their talk a concern with racism while foreclosing the need for the 
activities to which they refer themselves to be made accountable. They are able to 
refer to the activity which they construe as realising racism in order to attend to the 
demands it would otherwise make relevant while at the same time advancing their 
epistemological warrant in doing so. In this way, the speakers are able very elegantly 
to manage the different demands with which they are faced in pursuing their talk, 
including the reflexive demands of anticipating how the anticipatory work they do is 
itself potentially construed in subsequent uptake. They work at a range of different 
levels, as it were, managing the issues of sensitivity and prejudice and attending to 
their warrant for doing so, while also managing the implications which that 
management work itself might be taken to involve. 
Another point to notice about this talk is that with the comparative example 
of the South African regime by which the speakers develop and substantiate their 
account of social contagion, it is in reference to some third party's implicitly 
evaluative claim that their own work is accomplished ('when he first came out, after 
the first year or so, he thought Kuwait was more racist than South Africa was. Or 
more segregated', lines 40-42). In identifying the comparison as one formulated by 
a `friend' (line 36), the speakers attend to at least three different concerns here. 
Firstly, they attend to the credibility of the claim itself since, presumably, the 
referent's having lived in South Africa would render him in a position to know. 
Secondly, they attend to the warrant for their own claim about that comparison since, 
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presumably, the intimacy of their acquaintance would mitigate against the possible 
motivation for misrepresentation as well as providing the basis for knowledge of what 
he (the South African friend) said. Thirdly, they also reflexively attend to the 
potential for the comparison and implications it makes available themselves to be held 
accountable as motivated since they are said to originate from a different source. 
Thus, with this account attributed to the former resident of South Africa, the speakers 
are able here to foreclose the implication that the construal of Kuwait as a racist 
country is itself simply designed to substantiate the work of attending to their (the 
speakers') own accountability for racism with a theory of social contagion. This 
account acts as a sort of collaborative viewpoint, providing a corroborative take that 
rather neatly lends credibility to both the substance of and motivation for the 
speakers' explanation. 
Finally, another way in which speakers attend to the potential inferences that 
their category entitlement might be construed as making available is with a range of 
qualifying remarks employed throughout this episode of talk ('be they Indian, Thai, 
Filipino, whatEVER', line 3; `lived in- a lot of your life with <P whatever P>, 
different races', lines 13-14; `because you are white or whatever', lines 16-17). This 
qualification - signified with the word `whatever' - works to manage the speakers' 
commitment to the categorizing terms they employ, providing their situated activities 
with a ready-made resistance to undermining that Potter (1996: 124-132; 1997: 150- 
158) refers to with the term stake inoculation. That is, by qualifying their 
commitment to the categories of nationality, race and physical phenotype; speakers 
attend to the potential for their use of the associated glosses ('Indian', `Thai', 
`Filipino', `different races', `white') to be construed in terms which they themselves 
work to contravene. In this way, the speakers are able to employ the very category 
terms whose use they themselves work to make accountable. 
Situated Implications of Theorising: Changing Definitions in the Topicalising of 
Racism 
In the talk that we have considered so far, we were primarily concerned with the way 
that the speakers employ the very sorts of categories whose use they work to make 
accountable. In particular, we examined how the sense with which attending to 
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national identity is construed as an instance of racism is itself provided for in the 
context where national identity is made relevant to foreclose a similar construal of 
racism on the part of the speakers themselves. This involved exploring the 
hermetically self-sufficient way by which the account of social contagion makes this 
possible. That is, one's attending to national identity in the course of making attention 
to national identity itself accountable is a pursuit by which speakers employ the 
noxious inferences they contravene in and through the very provision for their 
relevance. In particular, the talk about social contagion heads off the demand that the 
speaker be held accountable to the assumptions about national identity and racism that 
he or she works to make available. The implication would seem to be that while it 
is indeed racist on the part of the speaker to attend to national identity, this 
nevertheless only goes to confirm the whole point regarding social influence. Thus 
the pervasively innocuous nature of racism is doubly accountable for being contagious 
as well, and the relation that this has with social contagion is mutually supportive of 
the work that speakers do to attend to racism in the first instance. 
Another interesting feature of such work is how these efforts raise yet further 
implications to which speakers then attend in subsequent talk. In brief, the talk about 
social contagion is double-edged because while it provides speakers with an 
explanation for their activities, to the extent that those activities are still regarded as 
racist, the speakers remain implicated. Speakers are thus in the paradoxical situation 
where providing for the relevance of expatriate identity enhances the epistemological 
warrant upon which they base their claims for accountability, but at the same time 
this is accomplished at the expense of potentially implicating themselves in the very 
assumptions whose accountability they work to make relevant. `Around [they] go in 
their kaleidoscopic whirl' (Billig, 1992: 48). Speakers thus can't win, so to speak, 
since their efforts in attending to one demand raises the opposite to which it is 
related; though, of course, they do win in the sense that managing this tension itself 
constitutes the way that accounting for their presence in the region is ongoingly 
conducted as a situated activity. In this section, we will continue to explore how 
speakers manage this tension by examining the way that what is taken to constitute 
the substance of racism is itself contingent on the reflexive implications involved. 
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Consider the following extract of material taken from a latter point in the 
same interview as that recorded in Extract 4.1 above and which begins here with the 
turn-at-talk immediately following the contribution of speaker IS which ended that 
exchange. 
(4.2) Interview, 53 - private business owner, marketing researcher 
1 KM: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mm. What u=m- Yeah. I- I mean I- it sounds like you had some- 
some people in mind though. I mean maybe some expatriates as 
well that, you know, I mean- 
IS: You want us to name names? 
KM: No, no! [I don't want you] to name NAMES, that's not what I'm 
IS: [@@] 
KM: [[saying, but]] I'm just trying to get the perspective of= uh- you 
CS: [[xx. ]] 
KM: know, you mentioned uh- you know, it's- that "Nationality is 
important to Kuwaitis to Arabs", you said, [and so-] 
IS: [Even Arabs! ] Yeah! 
KM: Uh huh. And so I'm thinking "Well, okay then, what about uh- 
those of us that are here from, you know, the States or the UK or 
something, what- [1 would xx- 1] 
[1 Oh. Would they- would 1] nationality matter to 
them? [2 <x You x> think? 2] 1 don't think so. 
16 IS: 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
KM: [2 Right. 2] 
CS: U=m- yes. I'd say so. To lots of people. It rubs off. [3 Yeah, 
because 3] 
IS: [3 After they've been here 3] for a while. 
CS: after you've been here for a while, you'll tend to see other people, 
<P or other races P>, the way the people around you see them. 
You know like, say you're looking through a cv and it says "Date 
of birth, place of birth, country of origin" and it says "India", uh- 
you're not going to look at it in the same way as if it said he was a 
Brit or an American or a European. 
I don't really agree with that. I'm sorry. 28 IS: 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
CS: I do. 
IS: No I don't think so. [1 If- 1] Well you've always been raised as the- 
CS: [1 xx. 1] 
IS: [2 <@ xxxxxx. @> 2] 
CS: [2 xx. I haven't been- 2] [3 I HAVEN'T been x. 3] 
KM: [3 Put- put the ashtray 3] down. Put xx. 
@@ (Hx) @ 
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37 IS: 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
@ No. I don't think so. I- uh- I think you would sort of read the 
rest of it. I think- [Well it- it depends, ] I mean, 
CS: [Yeah. There is-] 
IS: [[he's talking about]] expatriates like they're a=11 exactly the same. 
CS: [[Sure. ]] 
IS: You're going to get some racist bastards who- who are living out 
here. You get them everywhere else in the world, why shouldn't 
they come out here. 
46 CS: 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Mm hm. 
KM: Mm. 
IS: But, I don't agree with that. In general, a normal level-headed 
expatriate wouldn't do that. But then what is a normal 
level-<@ headed expatriate. @> 
KM: I mean, well yeah. [I mean-] 
IS: [I think-] I think this nationality thing is- is more 
important with the Arabs. I mean even KuWAITis- and this really 
gets me, is that you get some Kuwaitis who are really dark, you 
know they've- they've got sort of black u=m- African whatever, 
and THEY are really <@ racist as well @>. @ It's quite amazing 
that if you are a- a black Kuwaiti, you're discriminated against. So 
for example the Crown Prince, I've heard Kuwaitis say "Oh, he's 
just a nigger". You@ kno@w. And it amazes me. And they're 
always- They're being really RACist. And I just can't believe it. It 
just shocks me when they- when they say things like that. 
KM: I've never heard that. 
CS: xxx[x. ] 
IS: [I've] heard a lot of Kuwaitis say that, and it- it just- it's just 
incredible. So you get that- that sort of racism with- within the 
Kuwaitis. And of course if you happen to be an Egyptian or 
whatever who IS dark, or Sudanese, then of course you're 
discriminated against as well. There were a few black Americans 
here, <P there are not many P>, and they were discriminated 
against. Even though they said "Look, I'm an American", but they 
we=re because of their colour. And that is really shocking. 
74 KM: Mm hm. 
75 
76 IS: 
77 
That they do that sort of thing. But I think as far as what C was 
saying, they are- it is a very rare na- racist nation. 
We can begin looking at this episode of talk by examining the exchange between 
speakers IS and CS recorded on lines 31-34. At this particular juncture in the talk, 
a disagreement takes place between speakers IS and CS regarding the relevance of the 
account of social influence in reference to the circumstances which speaker CS 
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describes as an example of racism (the scrutinizing of details concerning national 
origin as contained in a c. v., see lines 24-27). That is, speaker IS works to anticipate 
how the identity of the speakers (herself, and by implication, her interlocutors) is 
implicated in the assumptions regarding social contagion that her partner makes 
available in reference to expatriates. She works to resist the account he offers as a 
way of foreclosing those implications. There is a tension here, then, between the 
particular devices that each of the two speakers - IS and CS - work to employ, and 
the interactive (co-operative) way of making a particular device available is itself a 
matter which the speakers attend to in the pursuit of their talk. 
In addition to this, however, the exchange is interesting for how the speakers 
reflexively deal with the implications of their own respective contributions in making 
social influence a relevant concern. In other words, they do not simply show 
disagreement over the matter of social influence, but they also employ that 
disagreement itself as a resource to display their attention to the implications for 
accountability which that work raises. They adopt an ironising detachment from their 
own detached ironisation in the course of its very enactment. So, in the exchange 
recorded on lines 31-34, speaker IS can make assumptions concerning social influence 
relevant as a way of accounting for speaker CS's disagreement with her over the issue 
of social influence itself. Her argument would seem to be that speaker CS's 
maintaining the explanatory relevance of social influence can itself be accounted for 
as a result of just such influence ('Well you've always been raised as the- <@ 
xxxxxx @ >', lines 31-33). In this way, she can work reflexively to recruit speaker 
CS in her efforts to argue that he himself is in the wrong by drawing attention to the 
paradoxical nature of that position. That is, if social influence accounts for one's 
stance, then the stance speaker CS adopts here (viz. that social influence accounts for 
one's stance) can itself be dismissed since the credibility of his independence in 
arguing for that position would be thereby undermined. In this way she can marshall 
the very assumptions that he seeks to make relevant as a resource in arguing for their 
irrelevance. 
This is all pursued in a rather jovial, reflexively self-parodic fashion, as 
displayed in the attendant laughter, in speaker CS's reflexive response wherein he 
colludes with the assumptions made available by speaker IS ('I haven't been- I 
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HAVEN'T been x', line 34) and in speaker KM's remarks that ironically address the 
couple's disagreement as escalating into physical violence ('Put- put the ashtray down. 
Put xx. @@ (Hx) @', lines 35-36). The point to all of this here is that the speakers 
employ the very resources they make relevant to manage the demands for 
accountability to which they attend in their talk - demands which they address and 
those which arise both in the course of and as a result of their activity of attending 
to these demands in the circumstances where they are made relevant - and that 
through their reflexive display they are able to demonstrate their attention to this itself 
being the case. 
The reflexive work pursued in this way dovetails rather elegantly with the 
work speaker IS then does in managing the extent to which the assumptions of social 
influence implicate the speakers themselves. Specifically, in introducing the 
distinction between level-headed expatriates and racist expatriates (lines 40-50), 
speaker IS is able to manage the extent to which she herself is implicated in the 
assumptions which that identity might otherwise be taken to make relevant, even 
while then moving on to develop an account of racism among Kuwaiti(s and) Arabs 
(lines 53-62). In other words, the distinction between level-headed and racist 
expatriates is employed to attend to the problematic which the device of expatriate 
identity raises in the first place. So, in the previous chapter we saw how these same 
speakers employed expatriate identity as a device with which to construe certain 
motivation and in so doing distance themselves therefrom thus foreclosing the 
potential for their own talk to be taken as motivated in the same way; here we see 
how that identity is problematic for the implications it makes available for the 
speakers in that the identity so construed potentially implicates the speakers 
themselves. 
Again, there is a tension involved here having to do with the speakers' 
credibility. The speakers enhance their warrant in an interview wherein they speak 
on behalf of expatriates to the degree that they are themselves expatriates. At the 
same time, this identity, is double-edged in that when employed as a device to 
foreclose the construal their own involvement, it potentially implicates them. The rub 
is that to the degree that their use of the device is effective - to the degree that they 
are portrayed as credible expatriates - it also implicates them in the very construal 
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which they work to foreclose. The question here, then, is: how do the speakers 
manage to play these two off against the other? How do the speakers manage to 
enhance their credibility as participants in the circumstances of the talk while 
nevertheless resisting the implications which this makes available? This is 
accomplished with the distinction between kinds of expatriates. In this way, while 
discussing social influence, the speaker can employ expatriate identity as a device to 
display a concern for racism while at the same time enhancing her epistemological 
warrant in the circumstances (if for no other reason than that that identity is 
potentially implicated as racist). 
Note too that the work of accounting for racism among Kuwaiti(s and) Arabs 
involves a subtle shift here from attending to the making relevant of national identity 
as an instance of racism to that of attending to physical phenotype ('I think this 
nationality thing is- is more important with the Arabs. I mean even KuWAITis- and 
this really gets me, is that you get some Kuwaitis who are really dark, you know 
they've- they've got sort of black u= m- African whatever, and THEY are really <@ 
racist as well @>. @ It's quite amazing that if you are a- a black Kuwaiti, you're 
discriminated against', lines 53-58). With these remarks, speaker IS effectively 
equates racism with discrimination on the basis of bodily physical features. In this 
way, she very elegantly balances the range of different demands which constitute this 
form of talk: demands for epistemological warrant, for accountability to assumptions 
regarding racism, and to the reflexive work of managing the implications for 
accountability raise in the very pursuit of the talk's work itself. 
Another interesting feature of this extract is what we mentioned in relation 
to Bakhtin's work on voice. Specifically, that has to do with the way that different 
speakers employ quotation as a device for attending to the implications that might be 
raised in the talk they pursue. For example, this occurs where speaker KM broaches 
a question which implicitly attends to the reflexive implications of making attention 
to national identity itself accountable while attending to national identity in the course 
of doing so ('you mentioned uh- you know, it's- that "Nationality is important to 
Kuwaitis to Arabs", you said, and so- Uh huh. And so I'm thinking "Well, okay 
then, what about uh- those of us that are here from, you know, the States or the UK 
or something', lines 10-15). That is, the question broached by speaker KM regarding 
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the relevance of national identity is one which itself also makes national identity 
relevant in the very asking thereof. The question depends upon attention to national 
identity to interrogate the reflexive implications of making attention to national 
identity accountable through the paradoxical making relevant of national identity - 
in a sort of triple stage of remove, as it were. Speaker KM's question does the very 
thing it asks about in the activity of asking itself (which is, of course, also that very 
activity about which it asks as well). That is, through referring to the remarks of 
some other party, speaker KM is able to raise the issue of the paradoxical nature of 
the demands for accountability that were raised beforehand - that is, the paradoxical 
nature of attending to national identity as an instance of racism - while managing the 
potential for this to be construed as an accusation. His contribution here is one which 
occasions the subsequent work of speakers IS and CS in reflexively attending to the 
self-sufficiency of the talk, and in this way it constitutes the co-operative interaction 
through which the speakers mutually orient to the pursuing of their conversational 
interaction as talk which has just such issues as its concern. 
This particular extract, then, shows speakers attending to a rather complex 
range of work. In particular, we can see them constituting the basis for the pursual 
of their subsequent talk. In other words, we can see how speakers attend not only to 
the various demands with which they are engaged in the talk - demands related to 
cultural sensitivity and prejudice - but we can also see how their reflexive attention 
to the same itself attends to the potential to be made accountable as designed. That 
is, their efforts are reflexively attentive to their own doing. Thus, it is not that 
speakers are unaware of what they are doing - of the reflexive implications of their 
talk and their talk's work - but rather that their awareness can only be expressed in 
the terms which they are employed to elucidate in the first place. 
Self-ironising parody thus is one of the devices by which speakers reflexively 
manage the implications for accountability that their pursuit of accountability 
requires. ' Specifically, it is in the reflexive gesture afforded by parody that speakers 
are able to display the awareness of the reflexive implications of their talk in terms 
which that talk works to interrogate. In ironising their own contributions, speakers 
can attend to this aspect of their talk. This sort of work is accomplished with 
intonational cues which it is difficult to capture in transcription but whose relevance 
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is provided for in interlocutor uptake, such as that of laughter, etc. We shall consider 
one more, single brief extract taken from the same interview involving speakers CS 
and IS by way of example. This exchange occurred at a point following an 
interruption to the interview proceedings. 
(4.3) Interview, 53 - private business owner, marketing researcher 
1 (SOUND OF KNOCK AT DOOR) 
2 IS: You turn that off? ((REFERS TO TAPE RECORDER)) 
3 CS: around- Come in! 
4 (... ) ((BRIEF PAUSE OF INDETERMINATE LENGTH DURING WHICH 
5 TAPE RECORDER DISENGAGED)) 
6 KM: We took a time out, and here you are. (Hx) @ 
7 IS: @@ 
8 CS: Right then. U=m- and then there's the stereotype that you get after 
9 living out here and observing them for a while. That on the whole 
10 they're brainless morons. 
11 IS: Tsk! C! @ 
12 ... 
13 CS: [Well? ] 
14 IS: [@@@] 
15 CS: I'll [[<x keep to x> the point then. ]] 
16 IS: [[Well, no uh-]] 
17 KM: @@ (Hx) 
18 IS: Everyone wants to put everybody into um- into nationalities and 
19 describe each nationality, but on the whole, u=m- it's difficult 
20 working with Arabs because they do have a different way of looking 
21 at things. 
This is a rather interesting exchange -a sort of light-hearted moment in the 
interview proceedings which, despite its apparently frivolous nature, belies some 
complicated and elegant interactional work. 1° In particular, this involves the 
responsive orientation of speaker CS in his initial turn-at-talk upon resumption of the 
interview ('Right then. U=m- and then there's the stereotype that you get after living 
out here and observing them for a while. That on the whole they're brainless 
morons', lines 8-10). 
The issue here, both for the participants involved and for us conducting an 
analysis of this talk, is how to understand these remarks. Are they the (perhaps vulgar 
and crude) expression of racist sentiment on the part of speaker CS, or are they 
instead remarks that are reflexively oriented to the possibility of just such a reading? 
That is, might they not be ironic? Evidence for the latter such reading lies in the 
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response with which these remarks are met in the interlocutor uptake that they 
occasion. Included here is the laughter by speakers IS and KM (lines 4 and 7, 
respectively). In addition, the formulative gloss that speaker CS provides of his 
remarks as tangential also works to accomplish this reading ('I'll <x keep to x> the 
point then', line 8). Thus, not only do speakers attend to the demands for 
accountability to assumptions concerning racism, their own epistemological warrant, 
etc.; but they also work to foreclose the potential for that work itself to be construed 
as motivated through a sort of self-referential parody. 
Attending to Arab Identity: Race, Nation and the Voice of the Other 
So far, we have examined the way that speakers work to construe racism along 
certain lines - as involving the attending to of either national identity or physical 
phenotype. Continuing with a theme from the last chapter, we also saw how this is 
related in subtle ways with the work that speakers do to manage the demands for 
accountability which their own identity as expatriates potentially makes available. This 
includes work to obviate the need for accountability in the first place, as with the 
making relevant of certain assumptions about the contagious nature of social 
influence. Also included here would be the work speakers do to circumscribe their 
own category membership as when a distinction between different kinds of expatriates 
is introduced. 
We will now go on to explore how speakers manage the availability of 
potentially damaging implications of talk about race and racism through the use of 
third-party accounts - that is, through reference to the voice of the Other. 
11 We 
have already mentioned this in our analysis of Extract 4.2 above where we were 
reminded of the relevance of Bakhtin's work on voice. Here, however, we shall be 
concerned with a slightly different set of issues. This will involve looking at the talk 
imputed to the Arab Other - specifically, where the voice of the Arab cultural Other 
is employed as a device in taking up the concerns construed of the speaker's 
interlocutor(s), the interactional Other(s). This means looking at how speakers employ 
the reporting of third-party talk to manage the need to account for their (the 
speakers') own potentially damaging inferences raised by the making relevant of 
assumptions about Arab culture and identity. The difference in the way third-party 
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reports feature in this context is that the details concerning the criteria by which the 
cultural Other is to be distinguished are presented as mediated in employing that 
Other's voice as a warrant. 
In order to see what this use of the Other's voice entails, we will first 
consider the following, rather lengthy extract of conversation in which the speakers 
take Arab identity as the topic of their own talk. This particular extract is taken from 
an interview involving a group of friends - all of whom had resided for lengthy 
terms at various times and in different locations throughout the Gulf region. Here, the 
speakers represented in this extract include a married couple (speakers JL and AL; 
husband and wife, respectively), their son (speaker NL, whose contribution to the 
conversation here is negligible) and a business associate of the husband and long-time 
friend of both he and his wife (speaker DF). This exchange was recorded in the home 
of the couple during a dinner party kindly hosted, in part, for the benefit of speaker 
KM as a way of providing him with the analytic material recorded here. 
(4.4) Interview, 61 - business managers, spouses, student 
1 AL: And I'm sure i- if you speak to some Arabs alREADy they're 
2 feeling- <P well Arabs have said to me P>, that alREADy they're 
3 feeling the loss of identity. 
4 ... 
5 DF: What do you mean by "Arab". 
6 ... 
7 JL: Kuwaiti, Bahraini, 
8 AL: [No no no, ] Bahraini is Bahraini. Bah- uh- Bahraini does not cou- 
9 DF: [No, hang on. ] 
10 AL: i=s not an Arab. A Bahraini is a Bahraini. 
11 DF: Okay. What do you mean by Arab. Because that- that's an 
12 interesting concept which in certain areas has very different 
13 meanings. 
14 JL: You- you said "The Arab is [1 f- feeling that he's losing his 
15 identity" .1] 
16 DF: [1J, J, 1] <@ let her x a>. (Hx)@ <@ Let her 
17 [2 answer. @> 2] 
18 AL: [2 The Arab, 2] where do I take the Arab [3 from. 3] 
19 DF: [3 Yeah. 3] Where is 
20 [4 that x. 4] 
21 AL: [4 U= 4] = h- from the top of the Gulf to the bottom of the Gulf 
22 to=- 
23 ... 
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24 JL: Do you mean a Yemeni, an E[1 gyptian, a Leba 1] 
25 DF: [1 xx- x- 1] 
26 JL: [2 nese, a Jordanian, 2] a [3 Palestinian, 3] a Moroccan, 
27 AL: [2 No, Egyptians aren't Arabs. 2] 
28 DF: [3 Well hang on. xa Gulf. 3] 
29 JL: [4 xx. 4] 
30 DF: [4 Hang on. 4] 
31 AL: [4 No no 4] no no no. 
32 DF: Hang on. 
33 AL: Nothing in North Africa is- is by a true Arab is classed as an Arab. 
34 ... 35 DF: Right. [Is Saudi. ] 
36 AL: [xx-] Ye- yeah, Saudi? U=m- 
37 ... 
38 DF: Is Kuwait. 
39 ... 
40 AL: Saudi, Kuwait, the Emirates, u=h- [D-] 
41 DF: [All] of the Emirates? 
42 JL: D- D's question was "What do you mean by an Arab". 
43 ... 
44 AL: Uh- what do you mean what do I mean by an [1 Arab. 1] 
45 JL: [1 What- 1] what do 
46 [2 you mean 2] by an Arab. Is an Arab an Algerian, 
47 DF: [2 Well xx. 2] 
48 JL: [3 to a Yemeni, 3] 
49 AL: [3 No, that's North 3] Africa. No. 
50 NL: x it's the Gulf. 
51 
52 JL: S- [xx-] 
53 AL: [An Arab-] 
54 JL: The Gulf- 
55 DF: [But that's doesn't include] Saudi. The majority of Saudis do not 
56 JL: [The Gulf Arab? ] 
57 DF: live in the Gulf. 
58 ... 
59 JL: What- what- what do you mean by "an [Arab", ] 
60 NL: [Mm=, ] [[x]] they're- 
61 DF: [[Okay, ]] I mean 
62 that's a major problem. 
63 ... 
64 JL: Gulf Arab, 
65 
66 DF: Include Palestinians. 
67 ... 68 AL: No they're not Arab. 
69 ... 
70 JL: Well THEY think- they- they say they are. They are part of "the 
71 Arab-" 
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72 ... 
73 AL: But [Arabs-] 
74 NL: ["Great] Arab brotherhood". 
75 AL: Well right. Gulf Arabs do not class Palestinians- 
76 JL: No, what do [you=, ] you know, 
77 AL: [as Arabs. ] 
78 JL: [[D's question was "What do you mean by an Arab. ]] 
79 DF: [[Well- uh- uh- what were you trying to get across, ]] because I- I 
80 honestly don't understand it. There's many people have so many 
81 different things. And I would actually include Algerians. 
82 
83 AL: No, they're North Africa. 
84 
85 JL: But they are Arabs. 
86 DF: Yeah. 
87 
88 AL: They're NO=T. 
89 DF: Sorry, I [1 want- 1] 
90 JL: [1 THEY 1] consider 
91 [2 themselves to be Arabs. 2] 
92 DF: [2 look I'm- what [3 I'm- I'm trying to get 3] 2] is what YOU 
93 AL: [3 @@@ 3] 
94 DF: would. 
95 ... 
96 JL: [This is why the Damascus Con- Conference- what do you= define 
97 as an Arab when you say that "The Arabs] uh- do this, the Arabs 
98 AL: [Sorry, I- I- I was- I was brain- I was-] 
99 JL: are this, the Arabs are doing this, the Arabs, the Arabs, the Arabs". 
100 What do you mean by "the [Arabs". ] 
101 AL: [I sup]pose I was brainwashed back in 
102 1974 uh- no I wasn't brainwashed, I was shown an old <x world 
103 x> map by Khalid, and he said "These are the only true Arabs". 
104 JL: Okay, so [what did Khalid tell you were the Arabs. What do you 
105 think are the Arabs. ] 
106 AL: [And I'm trying to think- I am trying to think-] no Egyptians are 
107 Arabs, nor Palesti[[nians, ]] 
108 JL: [[In your]] mind what are the Arabs. 
109 
110 AL: U=h- from the top of the Gulf to the bottom [1 of the Gulf. 1] 
111 JL: [1 Okay, 1] 
112 [2 but what- what countries does that include. 2] [3 Iraq? 3] 
113 DF: [2 xxxx. @@@ 2] 
114 AL: [3 Well, x- 3] uh- 
115 no. Yes. Yes Iraq. 
116 
117 JL: Iraq, 
118 DF: Iraq? 
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119 JL: Jor[1 dan, 1] 
120 AL: [1 No, 1] no no. They're [2 xxtians. 2] No, they're 
121 DF: [2 Just Iraq. 2] 
122 AL: xx[3 tians. 3] 
123 JL: [3 I 3]raq, Jordan, 
124 ... 
125 AL: No. [No. Iraq-] 
126 JL: [No, not Jordan. ] Iraq- 
127 AL: Iraq, Kuwait, [[and]] um- 
128 JL: [[Kuwait, ]] Saudi, 
129 
130 AL: Saudi. 
131 
132 JL: Yemen, 
133 ... 134 AL: Yemen. 
135 
136 JL: Oman, 
137 
138 AL: Yes. 
139 ... 140 JL: UAE, 
141 
142 AL: Yes. 
143 ... 
144 JL: Qatar, 
145 
146 AL: Yes. 
147 
148 JL: Bahrain. 
149 
150 AL: Yes. No, Bahrain is Bahraini. 
151 
152 JL: Tsh- Bah- 
153 AL: Yes. Yes. [Arabs. Yeah. ] Yeah. Yeah. 
154 JL: [Bah- Bahrain, ] 
155 ... 
156 JL: U=h- Somalia, 
157 AL: No. 
158 ... 
159 JL: Sudan, 
160 AL: No. 
161 
162 JL: Egypt, 
163 AL: Nope, 
164 
165 JL: Syria, 
166 AL: no. 
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167 
168 JL: Lebanon, 
169 AL: No, 
170 ... 171 JL: S- okay. So that's your definition of "an Arab". 
172 ... 
173 AL: The others are Syrian, Lebanese, 
174 NL: Mm. 
175 AL: Palestinian, 
176 ... 
177 JL: Yeah but they consider themselves- 
178 AL: Algeri[ans, ] 
179 JL: [Ar]ab. 
180 AL: Yeah [[but they're not. They- Khalid]] explained it. In- on this old 
181 NL: [[x there not xxx poLltical. ]] 
182 AL: map. They are not true Arabs. 
183 ... 
184 DF: Yes but Genghis Khan @@ [wasn't either. @@@@] (Hx)@ (Hx)@ 
185 AL: [Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. ] 
186 DF: Yeah. 
187 ... 
188 KM: Well when you talk about "Arab", what are you talking about. [Are 
189 you talking about-] 
190 AL: [A true] Arab- a true Arab is someone- anybody who has tight curly 
191 hair is not a true Arab. Algerians, curly hair. 
192 
193 KM: Are you talking about [biological] race? 
194 AL: [Egyptians-] 
195 AL: Uh- (CLEARS THROAT) no. U=m- an Arab has soft hair, the 
196 Bahrainis have soft hair, Kuwaitis have soft hair, 
197 JL: Apart from the [1 fifty percent 1] of them that have got negroid 
198 AL: [1 Saudis- 1] 
199 JL: fea[2 tures 2] because [3 they're X. 3] 
200 AL: [2 Yes. 2] 
201 DF: [3 @@ 3] [4 @@@ 4] 
202 AL: [4 x, yeah. 4] But you look at the 
203 u= m- <P xxxxx bloody have an Egyptian, do@n't they@ P>, 
204 U=M- 
205 ... 
206 JL: You- you look at it as a- a- an- an- a- the Arab as the- the GULF 
207 Arab, but then [there's the] Middle East Arab, 
208 AL: [Yes. ] 
209 ... 
210 AL: Yeah but the Le[ban]ese doesn't- a Lebanese says "I'm LebanESE". 
211 JL: [Uh-] 
212 ... 
213 JL: Yes. 
214 AL: He doesn't say "I'm ARab Lebane=se". 
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215 
216 JL: I didn't say that Lebanese were Arab. 
217 
... 218 AL: No, that was [what <x we was talking about x>. ] 
219 JL: [We- we are- we were asking] for your definition. 
220 
221 DF: Hm. Just asking [xx] were saying. [[xx-]] 
222 JL: [Lebanese-] [[It's like who-]] who is a 
223 European. 
224 (CONTINUE WITH DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY) 
One of the very first things to note about this rather lengthy sequence is the business 
to which speakers attend in interrogating the criteria by which Arab identity is to be 
established in their talk. In the contributions they make and in the uptake with which 
those contributions are subsequently met, the speakers demonstrate that they take the 
issue of (what it is that constitutes) Arab identity to be that about which their talk is 
concerned and it is only at a single juncture that this matter is itself negotiated as 
potentially problematic ('Uh- what do you mean what do I mean by an Arab', line 
44). 12 Further, in pursuing this issue, speakers attend to criteria of both national 
origin and features of physical phenotype as problematically constitutive of Arab 
identity. The issue here is one of the very terms by which Arab identity is defined. 
The work they pursue is to conjecture upon identity - to raise the issue and to 
display an attention to it as problematic. 
This is interesting because in pursuing this concern as the business-at-hand 
of the talk - that is, in raising the issue and in attending to it as problematic - 
speakers actively work to suspend a resolution to the decision whose terms they 
articulate. Even minimal efforts to formulate (in definitive terms) the expression of 
concern with identity are passed upon here, as when speaker KM works to gloss the 
criteria to which speakers attend in terms of race ('Are you talking about biological 
race? ', line 193). Such efforts are responded to (with the notable absence of uptake) 
as beside the point of the encounter. 
Of more relevance to our concern with the voice of the Other, what is 
particularly interesting about this talk is how the perspective of that Other whose very 
identity is problematised in this way is construed and is itself deployed in the course 
of pursuing the business of the talk. For example, the relevance that geographic origin 
has to formulating Arab identity is addressed in terms of the very assumption which 
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it sets out to interrogate in speaker AL's remarks concerning the indigenous 
inhabitants of North Africa ('Nothing in North Africa is- is by a true Arab is classed 
as an Arab', line 33). In a similar fashion, the assumption that there exists some 
definitive Arab identity is itself made available in specifying the problematicity of its 
relevance to determining Palestinian identity ('Well THEY think- they- they say they 
are. They are part of "the Arab-", lines 70-71; `Well right. Gulf Arabs do not class 
Palestinians-', line 75). That is, the very object of analytic concern on the part of the 
speakers is itself employed in the talk to substantiate the classification by which it is 
addressed. The very assumptions about identity that are being problematised are 
themselves made available as a way of doing that problematising work. The point 
here is not merely that speakers provide for the relevance of geographic origin as a 
relevant criteria by which Arab identity might be defined, but also that they employ 
(what they construe to be) the viewpoint of the Other to do so. Thus, the very 
problematising of Arab identity and the interrogating of criteria by which that identity 
is constituted is itself oriented to as an Arab problem - that is, one that is of concern 
to those for whom the issue's very resolution is definitive ('Well THEY think- they- 
they say they are. They are part of "the Arab-", lines 70-71; "'Great Arab 
brotherhood"', line 74). In this way, the very work of taking Arab identity as an issue 
is warranted in and through reference to the issue as one with which the Arabs in 
question are themselves concerned. 
Things are more complicated than this, however; because at the same time 
that speakers employ Arab identity as a warranting device, they also reflexively attend 
to the potential for this very work of warranting itself to be made accountable as an 
instance of just such work. In other words, reference to the perspective of the Other 
itself involves attending to conflicting demands for accountability because the very 
work of construing what that perspective entails can itself potentially be made 
accountable as motivated. For example, with the very work of employing the 
perspective of the Other in attending to the relevance of national origin as constitutive 
of Arab identity, both speakers DF and JL work to distance the claims of their 
interlocutor, speaker AL, from the perspective of the Arab Other whose identity is 
at issue ('Sorry, I want- look I'm- what I'm- I'm trying to get is what YOU would', 
lines 89-94; `This is why the Damascus Con- Conference- what do you= define as 
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an Arab', lines 96-97). That is, they resist the work that speaker AL does to warrant 
the work to which they attend with reference to the perspective of the Other. The 
paradox involved here is to sustain the very activity of interrogating the perspective 
of the Other while also sustaining the alterity of that perspective. Thus, the voice of 
the Other is not only employed as a resource with which to warrant claims concerning 
the identity of that Other, but the distinction of that identity as Other is sustained with 
and in the pursuit of working to understand what it is. 
Elsewhere, reference to the perspective of the Other is similarly employed 
as a resource in the warranting of attention to both national/regional origin and 
phenotypical characteristics as constitutive of Arab identity. For example, speaker 
AL's deferential orientation to the voice of the Other effectively forecloses the 
demand to account for her construal of the Other's perspective itself while at the same 
time still displaying her sensitivity to that voice ('Sorry, I- I- I was- I was brain- I 
was- I suppose I was brainwashed back in 1974 uh- no I wasn't brainwashed, I was 
shown an old <x world x> map by Khalid, and he said "These are the only true 
Arabs"', lines 98-103). She demonstrates attention to the voice of the Other, thereby 
working to foreclose the potential for her talk to be construed as insensitive to or 
unaware of that perspective, while employing the voice of the Other as a device with 
which to construe what it is that constitutes Arab identity. 
This is still further complicated here in that with her self-referential remarks, 
speaker AL also works to attend to the accountability for deploying the voice of the 
Other as a device - as itself motivated. Thus, the self-deprecatory assessment 
involved in her gloss as `brainwashed' (line 101) is one that forecloses the potential 
for the reading of the activities it references itself to be construed as motivated. In 
glossing her awareness like this, she attends to the potential accusation that her 
willingness to be persuaded in this way - or rather the report of her having been so 
persuaded - is itself designed to render her attending to Arab identity accountable. 
Even this is itself ambiguous in that the remark can potentially be read as either self- 
deprecatory or deprecatory-of-Other as well - as expressed with the subsequent 
retraction of her remarks ('I suppose I was brainwashed back in 1974 uh- no I wasn't 
brainwashed', lines 101-102). Throughout, then, we see that efforts to attend to 
certain demands for accountability themselves generate further such demands making 
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the talk's work a sort of self-perpetuating activity which, in principal, is infinitely 
defeasible. The demands for accountability are themselves generated here through 
efforts to attend to them. 
Notice also that just as in the talk discussed in the analysis of Extract 4.2 
above, so too here the matter of attending to national origin alters with that of 
phenotypical characteristics. That is, speakers take up the issue of identity as 
problematically involving either national origin (geographic residence) or phenotypical 
features. In pursuing the activity of interrogating and/or problematising the 
determination of (implicitly racial, Arab) identity, speakers attend to issues regarding 
the adequacy of definitive criteria as involving either of these concerns. Even this 
distinction between origin and phenotype is itself rather complicated where the two 
are inferentially related in remarks by speaker AL ('A true Arab- a true Arab is 
someone- anybody who has tight curly hair is not a true Arab. Algerians, curly hair', 
lines 190-191). Finally, notice again that speakers employ the voice of the Other to 
warrant the claims they make. For example, speaker AL employs the voice of the 
Other to warrant attending to physical characteristics ('Algerians, Yeah but they're 
not. They- Khalid explained it. In- on this old map. They are not true Arabs', lines 
178-182). 
One final aspect of this talk that merits mentioning here is how, in discussing 
the issue of Arab identity, speakers not only display with their contributions that they 
take the significance of their talk to be about that identity, but they attend to the 
possibility for their contribution to be construed otherwise in efforts to foreclose an 
alternative reading. So, at the single juncture mentioned above where the self-evident 
nature of the topicalisation of Arab identity is potentially problematic ('Uh- what do 
you mean what do I mean by an Arab', line 44), the extended question-and-answer 
sequence initiated by speaker JL is talk in and through which the speakers 
subsequently display their orientation to the relevance of national origin as significant 
to the constitution of Arab identity. Similarly, speaker DF works to foreclose a 
reading of their talk as attending to something other than identity with both the 
formulation of the issue as topic ('Okay, I mean that's a major problem', lines 61- 
62), as well as the formulation of his talk as sincere ('Well- uh- uh- what were you 
trying to get across, because I- I honestly don't understand it. There's many people 
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have so many different things', lines 79-81). Formulation thus works to keep the talk 
on track, as it were, so that the issue of Arab identity and the taking of that issue as 
a participant concern is the indexical work that formulation accomplishes. " 
Recruitment and Corroboration: Colluding with the Voice of the Other 
So far in this chapter, we have explored the way that speakers deal with the 
problematics involved in discussing both racism and Arab identity as topics of their 
talk. One of the common features of the talk we have examined is the way that 
national identity and physical phenotype are attended to as relevant matters where 
either racism or identity are concerned. Where either of these concerns is at issue, 
we have seen how attention to national origin is related to that of physical 
characteristics in ways that are mutually implicative. The formulating of identity, 
whether attended to as an instance of racism or else when pursued by speakers as a 
concern to be dealt with by themselves, is a matter of which national origin and 
physical phenotype are integrally constitutive. 
Now, in this section, we will consider further how the perspective of the 
Other is employed in warranting claims about what that perspective entails. In order 
to see what this involves, consider the following extract taken from an interview in 
which the speaker -a medical training doctor whose work brings him in contact with 
different people in a variety of related professional settings - recounts an event 
related to his experience of working in the area. 
(4.5) Interview, 24 - medical consultant 
1 KM: but uh- well I mean, you told me about what you like, is there 
2 anything you don't like. 
3 GP: Well, yeah, there's a=- a- I'll- I'll sum it up by what one of my 
4 students s=- said to me <P an Iraqi P>, but he speaks generally of 
5 the culture, alright, rather than as an Iraqi or a Kuwaiti or anything, 
6 KM: Mm hm. 
7 GP: a=nd I went to visit him in Baghdad just uh- prior to the war 
8 ((REFERS TO GULF WAR)), <P and I had uh- been here a couple of 
9 times and we had gotten together here, we were- we had served on 
10 architectural juries and one thing or another here in Kuwait, and so 
11 P>u= h- wh- when he picked me up in = outside of the Sheraton 
12 Hotel in= Baghdad, u=h- <P after a comedy of errors coming 
13 from the airport and being told not to use my camera and, you 
14 know, even taking a picture of the taxi cab driver changing a dead 
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15 tire from our Chitney cab from Baghdad airport, a=m- and all that, 
16 u= h- P>, he finally picked me up, a= nd he uh- I went down to his 
17 car, and it was a- abou=t a twenty year old Mercedes with a 
18 cracked windshield and wipers that- one of them worked and one of 
19 them didn't, the headlight lens was cracked, it was dusty- dusty as 
20 hell, and he opened the door that the handle damn near came off in 
21 his hand, and with a great flourish he said "Welcome to the Twelfth 
22 Century" . 23 KM: (Hx)@ 
24 GP: @@@ 
This sequence of talk is particularly interesting here in terms of the way that speaker 
GP relates the speech which he reports of the Other to the concern with things 
cultural. In particular, speaker GP relates an event in response to the interviewer's 
question which he (speaker GP) takes as eliciting a concern with notions of culture. 
That is, he orients to the question as related to cultural expectations and not, say, to 
issues about working conditions, pay or any of an infinite number of other concerns 
that it might have been construed to indicate. The point here is that both speakers 
pursue the topics they discuss as concerned with culture and that the talk in which 
they are engaged here is one in which they pursue issues of what it is that counts as 
an instance of cultural norms. Speaker GP displays this in his response to that effect 
('but he speaks generally of the culture, alright, rather than as an Iraqi or a Kuwaiti 
or anything, ' lines 4-5), with which the interviewer colludes in his minimal response 
('Mm hm', line 6). In this regard, the speakers pursue their talk as constitutive of an 
occasion which has culture as its concern. 
In addition, here speaker GP also works to make relevant a range of 
assumptions related to an evaluative teleology of comparative cultural development. 
In particular, this relates to the sort of notions taken up in the anthropological 
literature that we touched on in Chapter 1 in which various cultures are seen as 
related to one another on an evaluative temporal scale so that the stage of 
evolutionary development is referred to in terms of time. That is, the relative 
placement of cultures in terms of development is accomplished with a time scale so 
that contemporaneous cultures are said to relate to one another not as coeval but as 
temporally distanced. Geographic movement between various loci of cultures thus 
becomes regarded as effectively constituting a form of time travel. In Chapter 3 
above, speakers were seen to attend to the potential to be made accountable for 
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occasioning the relevance of such assumptions with talk in which they were critical 
of expatriates. 
Here, the speaker similarly attends to the potential for his talk to be construed 
in such terms with the use of direct quotation ('and with a great flourish he said 
"Welcome to the Twelfth Century"', lines 21-22). What is particularly interesting 
about this is that by employing the voice of the Other in this way, speaker GP not 
only shows himself to be sensitive to the perspective of the Other; but he also works 
to foreclose interrogation of the claims (about the implicitly evaluative placement on 
a temporal scale) that he makes in the reported speech of the Other because to call 
the relevance of this teleological scale into question would imply calling the 
perspective of the Other into question. That is, in interrogating the assumptions that 
speaker GP articulates in the voice of the Other, the possibility is raised that that 
speaker could always accuse his or her interlocutor of insensitivity. `It isn't me who 
employs the teleological model of time, but the Other that does so. ' Thus, to question 
the validity of that model would be to question the Other's right to employ it. The 
implication is that this would be tantamount to an attempt to impose one's own 
viewpoint on the Other - to speak for that Other. Employing the voice of the Other 
in this way is itself responsively oriented to its possible negative reception. 
Specifically, if one were to question the assumptions expressed in this way 
(presumably in the interests of that Other whose voice is supposedly thereby 
employed), then he or she could be accused of hypocritically attempting to speak for 
that Other. In other words, there would be available a classic tu quoque in that the 
very thing one would be accused of (viz., presuming to speak for another) would be 
available to accuse the accuser (Ashmore, 1989: Ch. 3). `What do you mean, I 
presume to speak for the Other, ' one could retort; `isn't that what you yourself are 
doing here in launching your objection to my use of quotation? ' The use of reported 
speech here thus has a sort of in-built resistance to its own deconstructive 
interrogation. By employing it as he does, speaker GP can reflexively attend to a 
range of interactional business, providing claims about Arab culture which have the 
warrant accruing to that voice (the voice of the Arab Other) while resisting the 
potential accusation of reductionism. 
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Employing the voice of the Other to do this sort of interactional work need 
not involve either direct quotation or even reported speech in the way we have seen 
so far. Another related way in which this can be brought off is with the collusion of 
the cultural Other as reported in a recounting of events. That is, one can marshall the 
voice of the Other to do this kind of work through the report of collusive interaction 
on the part of the Arab Other. Consider, for example, the following, lengthier 
sequence of talk that took place at a latter point in the same interview of which the 
previous extract is a record. 
(4.6) Interview, 24 - medical consultant 
1 KM : 
2 
3 GP: 
4 KM: 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 GP: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
For people who are like um- <P Oh I don't know, let's say if- oh 
you must have done this with your kids, you know, and when 
Hm. 
they were coming to visit you P>, um- they probably- perhaps they 
have an idea of what it's going to be like to come to the Middle 
East, um- what would you say to them, I mean how would you uh- 
sort of prepare them to come for a visit, for example. 
We=11, to come here a=h- well first of all they knew- they knew 
some of the Middle Eastern Kuwaitis, you know, the- the Kuwaitis I 
knew in the States, 
KM: Mm hm. 
GP: and eventually uh- you know, i- i- invited me over here, they were 
al- they were always guests in my home too, so the uh- the- the- the 
first Kuwaitis they met, they didn't meet them in Kuwait, they met 
them in good o@@ld (NAME OF U. S. CITY AND STATE), 
KM: Uh huh. 
GP: see, and so they had SOME idea of what kind of uh- people they 
were, you know and so, you know, they- uh- they didn't have t- 
TOO romanticised an idea, and then on my subsequent visits over 
here and things and, you know, u= h- the- the wa =y when I 
brought the children over here, uh- <P the kids over here P>, uh- 
the way they were treated by these Kuwaiti families, <P again with 
this great generosity a[=nd] uh- P> there was one stereotypical 
KM: [Mm hm. ] 
GP: thing, which they didn't have but we thought we'd do it as a joke 
for fun, uh- there's the stereotype thing of the rich Kuwaiti with the 
Rolls-Royce and he just drives here and there and he has all this 
thing. So I got a Kuwaiti friend of mine, you know with- that had a 
Rolls-Royce, a=nd I said "We're going to play the ri=ch 
stereotype tonight with the girls", <PI had all the girl- uh- t- two 
girls over here then P>, and I said "How about that we'll pick them 
up at the airport in a Rolls-Royce and we'll drive them to this 
f= ancy restaurant and then we'll Rolls-Royce it and we'll have the- 
164 
35 and the ma=n and the chauffeur and all that", and the- he s- he- he 
36 went- he went along with it, he thought that was just great. He took 
37 them through the go = Id < AR souq AR > ((< TR MARKET TR > )), 
38 ordered them each a gold a=h- you know, uh- souvenir thing and 
39 all that, and played the very rich - 
40 KM: Mm hm. 
41 GP: kind of guy. They loved it. They knew it wasn't true, but they 
42 loved it [@@] anyhow see, so, you know, the- that's a uh- they've 
43 KM: [Mm hm. ] 
44 GP: had some very good experiences with these people, you know, 
The talk in this extract is similar to the encounter that we examined in Extract 4.5 
above, except that here the speaker does not attend to the perspective of the Other 
through direct quotation or through third-party reported speech as he does there. 
Instead, he recruits the perspective which he construes of the Other in his account of 
that Other's collusion in his activities and in the take which he provides of those 
activities as parodically self-ironising. That is, not only is the Kuwaiti Other here said 
to go along with the activities speaker GP describes as `stereotypical' (line 24); but 
it is implied that he does so for the same reasons that speaker GP describes himself 
as doing so ('as a joke for fun', lines 26-27), as indicated with the reported response 
on the part of that Other ('and the- he s- he- he went- he went along with it, he 
thought that was just great', lines 35-36). Note here that speaker GP attends to the 
prior description of these activities as potentially accountable with his initially hesitant 
and faltering remarks by which he works to account for his initial presence in the area 
as having taken place at the behest of the Kuwaiti Other (lines 9-18). In this way, he 
describes his own actions in relation to that Other as initially responsive, thereby 
foreclosing the accusation of insensitivity potentially provided for in an account of his 
contact as proactive. This lays the grounds for the subsequent work he goes on to do 
in recruiting the voice of that Other. These remarks work not only to foreclose a 
construal of the events he describes as accountable to assumptions regarding the 
holding of prejudicial expectations, but it also does so in a particularly elegant way 
because it is the matter of the accountability of those activities that speaker GP 
presents himself as addressing in and through the very pursuit of those activities 
themselves. That is, the very activities which themselves might potentially be made 
accountable as motivated by prejudicial stereotyping are themselves the activities 
through which the speaker describes himself as working to make the relevance of 
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accountability for stereotyping available ('to play the ri=ch stereotype', lines 30-31; 
`we'll pick them up at the airport in a Rolls-Royce and we'll drive them to this 
f=ancy restaurant and then we'll Rolls-Royce it and we'll have the- and the ma=n 
and the chauffeur and all that', lines 32-35). 14 That he should recruit the perspective 
of the Other in attending to the accountability for how the perspective of the Other 
is itself recruited is elegant indeed. 
What takes place here is similar to the sort of work that speaker CS pursues 
with his ironising, reflexive commentaries examined previously in our analyses of 
Extract 4.2 and Extract 4.3 in that the very accusations of stereotyping which he 
attends to as potentially accountable are corroborated with the collusion of the Other. 
In referring to the stereotypicality of images regarding the Kuwaiti, the speaker is 
able to foreclose the accusation of employing stereotypical images by distancing 
himself from them. At the same time, however, in providing for the collusion of the 
Other as he does, he is also able reflexively to foreclose the potential accusation that 
his employment of this device - this implicit criticism - is itself motivated by the 
desire to obscure the holding of stereotypes since it is the Kuwaiti Other who concurs 
with the use of that image itself. Thus, to call into question or interrogate his 
characterising of the image which is construed as stereotypical, would itself involve 
countering the voice of that Kuwaiti Other as well. That is, the very activity of 
construing the stereotypicality of the image of the rich Kuwaiti is inoculated from the 
need to be accounted for itself. In this way, the perspective of the Other is recruited 
in attending to the accountability for the recruitment of an Other's perspective. This 
is indeed a particularly elegant bit of rhetorical work. 
Yet another aspect of interest in this sequence is the way that speaker GP 
attends to the potential for his contribution to be construed as complaining through 
his gloss on Kuwaiti social contact as characterised by generosity ('the way they were 
treated by these Kuwaiti families, <P again with this great generosity a= nd uh- P>', 
lines 23-24). This is in keeping with the description of social reciprocity that speaker 
GP initially develops in his precursory remarks ('invited me over here, they were al- 
they were always guests in my home too', lines 13-14). With the referral to such 
reciprocity, the speaker is able to account for those activities relative to a range of 
potentially incriminating takes on what that interaction might involve. In other words, 
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this description attends to the demands in the talk for both cultural sensitivity on the 
one hand and prejudice on the other in that the speaker shows himself to be aware of 
different perspectives as demonstrated with his interaction with Kuwaiti friends. At 
the same time, working up the responsive aspect of that interaction attends to the 
potential construal of the encounters to which it refers as prejudicially motivated. 
Again, the point here is not to suggest that speaker GP is somehow attempting to 
misrepresent his otherwise genuine concerns, but rather that he attends to the 
interaction as an encounter in which these concerns are pervasively relevant and that 
he displays in his attention to them that he regards this to be the case. 
Similarly, the interviewer attends to these concerns in his question through 
the employment of the sort of devices by which he works to distance himself from 
responsibility for the inferences potentially made available with those queries (` <P 
Oh I don't know, let's say if- P>', line 1). Not only is there a lowering of tone and 
speeding up of delivery by which the relative import of those inferences can be 
intonationally provided for as minimally significant, but the question to which that is 
a preface is one in which the interviewer marshals the perspective of his interlocutor 
as a device to attend to his (the interviewer's) potential accountability for attending 
to the assumptions that the question might be regarded as making available (` <P you 
must have done this with your kids, you know, and when they were coming to visit 
you P>', lines 2-4). In other words, the interviewer works to recruit his interlocutor 
in ratifying the assumption (about preconceptions) that informs the question. In this 
way, the interviewer is not only able to employ the identity of his interlocutor 
(speaker GP) in attending to his own accountability for the making relevant of the 
assumptions concerning expectations, but can also employ the absent voice of the 
children to whom he refers in and through a construal of their expectations ('they 
probably- perhaps they have an idea of what it's going to be like to come to the 
Middle East', lines 4-6). That is, by referring to the expectations of the children, the 
interviewer is here able to address the possibility of what might otherwise be 
construed as prejudicial thinking on the part of his interlocutor (speaker GP) without 
making that interlocutor himself accountable to those assumptions. Note that even this 
is itself attended to with the modification of the clausal adjective from `probably' in 
the first instance to `perhaps' (line 4). That is, a similar sort of hedging or distancing 
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occurs here as between the upshot of the assertion and the interviewer's situated 
commitment thereto. By equivocating in this way, the interviewer's question raises 
the issue of potential accountability for the holding of preconceived (prejudiced) 
expectations while attending to the potential for his having done so itself to be made 
accountable. 
In all of this, then, we can see that this particular interactional sequence 
involves some rather complicated accountability work, both in terms of the conflicting 
concerns which are constitutive of the encounter and in terms of the problematics 
which arise from their situated attention. The voice of the Other - or rather the voice 
of different Others - is employed as a device in the management of conflicting 
demands for accountability with which speakers are confronted in their talk. In 
addition, the interactional work involved in doing this raises further implications to 
which the speakers attend in their talk. 
In this way, both speakers KM and GP attend to the interaction as an 
encounter which has the dual and conflicting demands of cultural sensitivity and 
prejudice as its concerns. This work is interactively negotiated in the sense that it is 
collusively managed: concern for issues to which the speakers attend is a joint 
undertaking. Where speakers deploy particular devices, the effectivity of that work 
is an outcome of the uptake with which it is met. So, for example, deploying the 
Other's voice with reference to the expectations of speaker GP's children is made 
effective in and through interlocutor uptake in his response where he attends to the 
concerns thus made available. Again, notice here that even while collusively managed 
in this way, such interactional negotiation does not involve unqualified alignment. In 
his response, speaker GP qualifies his support for the assumptions made relevant in 
the interviewer question even while still attending to them as relevant concerns ('so 
they had SOME idea of what kind of uh- people they were, you know and so, you 
know, they- uh- they didn't have t- TOO romanticised an idea', lines 18-20). The 
uptake to the assumption made available in the interviewer question is modified to the 
extent that it potentially makes the referents (GP's children) accountable. In this way, 
speaker GP attends to the potential for his to be construed negatively by working to 
undermine it through his qualifying remarks. At the same time, however, he attends 
to the accountability it makes available. The extent that the interviewer question 
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attends to the accountability for holding expectations while working not to implicate 
speaker GP is provided for in the response which speaker GP produces (just as is the 
effectiveness of the similar devices that speaker GP employs made effective in the 
uptake of the interviewer). Thus, here speaker GP delicately works to provide for (or 
allow) the question such that it makes those concerns relevant but not to the extent 
that it implicates his children. In doing so, he shows that he takes that to be the 
relevance of the question as proffered; and in going on with the talk as indicated with 
his minimal response (lines 12,17,25,40 and 43), the interviewer cooperatively and 
interactively works with his interlocutor to accomplish their talk as being about such 
issues. In this way, the speakers jointly attend to the pursuit of these concerns by 
employing the voice of an Other while also attending to the noxious inferences which 
the situated use of voice potentially makes available. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we began by looking at how racism features as a participant concern 
in talk where speakers account for their experience of living in the Middle East. In 
particular, we were concerned to explore how a range of reflexive implications arise 
in the setting where attention to national identity and/or physical phenotype are 
regarded as instances of racist behaviour. Thus, we saw that in talk where 
discriminating on the basis of national identity is taken up as an instance of racism, 
speakers are themselves potentially implicated in the selfsame demands for 
accountability that they work to make available in and through the very activity by 
which they provide for its relevance in the first place. The accountability for attention 
to national identity is itself limited in scope to those category members referred to 
using the categories of (national) identity the relevance of which is made accountable 
in the first instance. 
It is this reflexive feature of talk which then occasions further work to 
manage the extent to which speakers are themselves implicated in the demands for 
accountability. As we saw, this includes the work of limiting the scope of these 
demands so as to exclude the speaker, as with the distinction between level-headed 
and racist expatriates that we encountered in our analysis of Extract 4.2. This 
contrasts with the work by which speakers employ the reflexive inferences as a way 
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of warranting their account, as when they actively work to establish the basis for their 
own incrimination in the claims they make about social influence as we initially saw 
in examining Extract 4.1. We saw that where these two differ from each other is in 
the extent to which the speaker him- or herself is incriminated (as racist). That is, 
speakers work to incriminate themselves as culpable, but only up to (and not beyond) 
the extent that their doing so works to display an awareness of and sensitivity to the 
Arab cultural Other. Where one's talk is potentially held accountable as an instance 
of racism in its detail (that is, in the details of what is regarded as constituting 
racism, then what it is that is taken to count as racism alters between the attending 
to of national identity and physical phenotype. It is in this way that speakers are able 
elegantly to manage the delicate tension between expressing a concern with racism 
as an accountable matter and the reflexive implications that their activity of doing so 
raises in the setting of their talk. 
Finally, we were also concerned to explore how speakers marshall the 
perspective of the Other in working to foreclose the potential for their talk about that 
Other itself to be construed as motivated. Specifically, we saw how the perspective 
of the Other provides a collaborative voice the category entitlement of which is itself 
marshalled to corroborate the speakers situated efforts to attend to the reflexive 
implications made available in the first place. Thus, in Extract 4.5 and Extract 4.6, 
we saw how, by expressing a particular take on the perspective of the Other with and 
in the assistance of that Other (in the talk or activities that he or she is reported to 
have produced), a speaker can work reflexively to foreclose the potential that exists 
for his or her own efforts themselves to be held accountable. Interrogating the 
substance of what the perspective of the Other is said to be is tantamount to 
disalignment with that Other. 
Throughout, we saw that speakers are able to manage the conflicting demands 
which their participation in the talk confronts them in rather subtle and elegant ways. 
In particular, the conflicting demands for accountability are themselves deployed in 
a complimentary fashion so that the assumptions attending to one such demand are 
employed as a resource in foreclosing the potential demands attending to its opposite. 
The potential accusation of prejudice (either as racist or in some other terms) is itself 
marshalled to foreclose the demand otherwise made available in a speaker's 
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description of the Other's perspective by which he or she expresses a sensitivity to 
that viewpoint. Thus, not only does working to solve one discursive problem generate 
further problems; but that very mutually co-implicative aspect of the talk itself 
provides the resources by which speakers can manage the problems as so generated. 
Notes 
1. In the context of developing a rhetorical psychology, Billig (1991: Ch. 7) discusses the perspective 
of the Other and the work that is done with that perspective in his discussion of what he calls Taking 
the Side of the Other. He distinguishes between implicit and explicit aspects involved in employing the 
voice of the Other. Discussing this in light of the multiple and often contradictory implications that a 
particular argumentative position may entail, he notes how `Taking the Side of the Other can involve 
making explicit what may have been previously implicit. When someone Takes the Side of the Other 
they may not be developing something totally novel, in the sense that the classic experimental subject, 
who shows attitude-change, incorporates a totally new piece of information. Taking the Side of the 
Other involves building upon attitudinal elements which may have been implicit previously. There is 
a change in the sense that argumentative qualifications may be discovered, as implicit qualifications are 
made explicit. [... ] If a rhetorical approach is to understand a phenomenon such as Taking the Side of 
the Other, then it must accept that at any time there are both explicit and implicit argumentative 
features to attitudes. Moreover ... the 
implicit features may well be contrary to the explicit ones' 
(ibid.: 147). Among other things, it is the relationship between these explicit and implicit argumentative 
features that this chapter is concerned to address. 
2. Referring to the ancient tradition of Greek rhetoric, Billig similarly remarks upon this aspect of talk 
with his quotation of Protagoras' maxim that `in every question there are two sides to the argument 
exactly opposite to one another' (1987: 41; also cited in Michael, 1996: 28). For further discussion 
of how Bakhtin's work relates to developments in rhetorical psychology, see the related introductory 
remarks in the new edition of Billig's Arguing and Thinking (1996: 17-19). 
3. Just as these remarks themselves take addressivity as their topic in addressing the reader. 
4. The term voice could equally be replaced with the term viewpoint or perspective with a proviso 
countermanding the possible suggestion of a monadic, non-interactional autonomous position that the 
visual metaphor otherwise implies. 
5. Although tangential to our concern with the details of how a responsive orientation is brought off 
in situ, we might still note in passing that in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory this distinction is referred 
to with the terms big Other on the one hand (corresponding, roughly, to the discursive referent in 
participants' talk) and l'object petit a (loosely corresponding to the discursive position in anticipation 
of which speakers design the contributions in their talk, with the device of this first object, the big 
Other). For further discussion, see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985 as well as Zizek, 1989; 1994: 87-129. 
6. In exploring the rhetoric of neo-fascist discourse, Billig (1991: Ch. 5) similarly points to they way 
that speakers work to head off the construal of their own formulations as an instance of racist 
discourse. Where racism is taken up as a participant concern, it is definitively only ever attended to 
as an accountable matter. 
7. As Edwards (in press) remarks in relation to the sorts of work in social cognition in collaborative 
relation to which van Dijk situates his own projects: `It is an extraordinary psychology of mental 
processes that we are driven to when we ignore how discourse and social interaction work' (see also 
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Edwards, 1997 as well as the discussion in Button et al., 1995 of related concerns referred to with the 
term spectatorism). 
8. Note how this contrasts with the work that speakers do in the talk that Widdicombe and Wooffitt 
(1995) examine in which subcultural group members resist the construal of their behaviour as resulting 
from social contagion. Both in that talk and in the talk recorded in Extract 4.1, it is individual 
authenticity that is at issue; the difference, however, being that the authenticity of the speaker here 
would implicate him or her as maintaining a set of assumptions that he or she works to make 
accountable as racist. This is, of course, quite different from the work that the participants in 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt's research do in attending to individual authenticity itself as an accountable 
matter. (I wish to thank Mary Horton-Salway for drawing this difference to my attention). We can thus 
see that the accountability of individual autonomy (from the social) is itself contingent on the rhetorical 
circumstances where it is made relevant. 
9. Within the categories of vocalisation types in Bakhtin's (1984: 181-204) work, this would be 
classified as vari-directional, double-voiced discourse. Of primary significance to us here is not, 
however, so much the detailed specification of Bakhtin's system of classification as much as examining 
the responsive orientation to which this talk is directed in the circumstances of its use and the relation 
this has to a dialogic take on conversational interaction. 
10. Along these lines, Mulkay notes how `it is precisely the symbolic separation of humour from the 
realm of serious action that enables social actors to use humour for serious purposes (1988b: 1; quoted 
in Edwards and Potter, 1992: 113). 
11. There has been a great deal of theoretical concern with the voice of the Other, especially as related 
to a project of emancipatory political change. Not least significant of this is a broad spectrum of 
writing in feminist social and political theory (Braidotti, 1991; Flax, 1990; Gatens 1991; Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson, 1996; MacKinnon, 1989) as well as in certain approaches to interaction, many of which 
themselves look to the work of Bakhtin for theoretical inspiration (Sampson, 1993). A great deal of 
this work, while certainly evocative, is nevertheless somewhat deficient when it comes to actually 
examining the details of what the voice of the Other entails, confining their discussion to the level of 
theoretical abstraction. What is often missing is an examination of the details of how the voice of the 
Other features as a participant concern. More specifically, this involves eliding the distinction between 
the voice of the Other as a rhetorically contrastive position in relation to which speakers work to situate 
their own contribution and the voice of the Other as a theoretical construct, the analytic concern for 
which can itself be employed reflexively in talk as a way of effecting this contrastive situating of the 
speaker's own voice. 
12. This is very like the activity involved in the breaching exercises that Garfinkel devised in an effort 
to make explicit the tacit assumptions that are otherwise taken as unproblematically relevant in and on 
the occasion of talk's conduct. For example, consider Garfinkel's (1967: 41) remarks: 
The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about 
having a flat tire while going to work the previous day. 
S: I had a flat tire. 
E: What do you mean, you had a flat tire? 
She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: `What do 
you mean? What do you mean? A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. 
Nothing special. What a crazy question! ' 
For the participants involved in the interactional encounter to which Garfinkel refers as well as those 
in the encounter recorded here in Extract 4.4, the matter of reflexively attending to one another's 
intentions within the encounter itself is a means by which participants work to establish the significance 
of their talk. In the encounter here, this means implicitly working to provide for the relevance of 
assumptions about racial identity in the very activity of interrogating such assumptions ('What- what 
do you mean by an Arab. Is an Arab an Algerian', lines 45-46). The various means by which that is 
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brought off can, of course, differ - whether as accomplished with the sort of talk that Garfinkel refers 
to as involving a `hostile', accusing formulation or with remarks by which categories are problematised 
as in Extract 4.4. For further discussion of this reflexive work and its practical management in situ, 
see Edwards, 1997: 90-96. 
13. Mehan and Wood (1975), in their discussion of Schwartz's (1971, n. d. ) work, review the approach 
toward reflexivity developed in the ethnomethodological tradition, distinguishing it from an approach 
that sees reflexive formulation as the doing of situate work very much as it is here. They distinguish 
Schwartz's definition of reflexivity from that of Garfinkel, noting the latter's equating of reflexivity 
with accountability such that `activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized 
everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those settings "account-able. "' 
(Garfinkel, 1967, cited in Mehan and Wood 1975: 153, italics theirs; but see Garfinkel and Sacks, 
1970). It is relevant for our concerns here to note that accountability and the doing of formulation are 
usefully distinguished in this way in order to deal with the sorts of situated work that formulation does 
to provide for the mutual orientation of participants to the significance of their activities in a context 
such as this. 
14. Here again is an example of the mutual co-constitutiveness of `Being' and `being' (das Sein and 
das Seiende, respectively), to employ Heideggerian terms. The problematicity of what is made 
accountable - that is, the need to make the activities accountable - arises in neither a derivative nor 
a preceding relation to the work of pursuing that accountability itself, rather the two - the need to 
account and the work of attending to that need - are simultaneously produced. This is what Mehan 
and Wood refer to in their remarks to the effect that Being and being are mutually co-implicative - 
'dependent upon and independent of the other' (1975: 174) and that some X can simultaneously be both 
the cause and the effect of some Y. 
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Chapter 5 
20/20 HINDSIGHT 
Narrative as a Device in the Management 
of Competing Demands for Accountability 
In the previous two chapters, we looked in some detail at the way that identity 
features as a device to manage the availability of a range of inferences arising from 
participants' involvement in the circumstances of their talk. In particular, we 
examined how speakers work to foreclose a particular set of inferences which their 
participation in the circumstances of the interview setting potentially make available 
while at the same time working to manage the availability of inferences regarding 
their entitlement and warrant to make the claims that they do in the setting where the 
nature of and accountability for the experience of Western expatriates is taken to be 
at issue in the talk. Of particular significance in all of this was how identity features 
as a concern for participants in their own talk, and the reflexive implications that are 
entailed as a result for speakers in the pursuit of that talk itself. 
In this chapter, we will continue to pursue this analytic concern for the 
reflexively oriented nature of talk by considering how personal narratives similarly 
feature as a resource that speakers employ to manage the range of conflicting 
demands with which their participation in the circumstances of the interview confront 
them. So, just as in the talk where identity is deployed to display a regard for the 
accountable nature of certain assumptions that speakers hold category membership to 
involve (while at the same time providing for speakers' category entitlement); so too 
in talk where personal narrative features, speakers work to manage the conflict 
between competing demands with which they are confronted by the circumstances in 
which they are participants. 
The Analysis of Narrative 
The approach to personal autobiography taken up here is one that differs quite 
significantly from the range of research otherwise conducted under the rubric of 
narrative analysis. One such body of work is that of the structural analyses of literary 
and oral narratives (Bal, 1985; Ervin-Tripp and Küntay, 1997; Frye, 1975; Longacre, 
1983; Prince, 1982; Propp, 1968; Todorov, 1969) which, in turn, have been 
appropriated in the social sciences and in psychology in order to develop a model of 
narrative as an organising metaphor for perception. 
While these two trends of narrative analysis differ from one another in 
important ways, what they have in common is a shared reliance upon the realist 
assumptions that inform a representational model of language. So, for example, in 
reference to the structural analysis of narrative, Edwards (1997) points out how the 
implicit distinction between worked-up versions of events and actual events is one in 
which the typological categories are privileged over that of any given instance of a 
story's telling. The adequacy of a narrative is thus implicitly determined against the 
criteria of the ideal sequential ordering of events which is itself the outcome of 
generalised structure stipulated through a comparative study across a range of 
different story instances. ' The significance of this is not so much that the analytic 
criteria are privileged, but that doing so involves the assumption that events are 
accessible independently of an account as such. Accounts are thus taken to be more 
or less accurate depending on how they compare with either the dual criteria of some 
idealised structure or else with that of the supposedly independent reality of events 
to which those accounts are taken to refer (or some combination of the two). 
In a similar way, research in narrative psychology relies upon the same 
assumptions about the nature of representation in its efforts to appropriate story 
structure as a metaphor for perception. The analyst is thus assumed to have some sort 
of privileged access to what are taken to be the actual events that the narrative 
describes (versus some representation thereof). The problem with this lies, again, not 
in the comparison as such but rather in the realist assumption that informs the 
Cartesian dualism foundational to any project - psychological or otherwise - which 
has perception as its analytic object. Thus, the idea in recent appropriations of 
narrative study by psychology is that stories are expressive of at least one basic mode 
of perception (a significant other being the paradigmatic [Bruner, 1986]), and that the 
cognitive structures that narratives as said to express themselves constitute a potential 
source of distortion to perception and/or memory (Bruner, 1990; Chafe, 1990; 
Conway, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986; Schafer, 1976,1982). 
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In contrast to these particular approaches to narrative, the take adopted here 
is one that sets aside or suspends such realist assumptions about the nature of 
language. Informed by work in ethnomethodology and discursive psychology, it 
explores the reflexive implications that narrative entails in and for the setting of its 
use. That is, it approaches narrative as a means by which conversational interlocutors 
accomplish the situated business of their talk, including that of attending to the 
situated demands for accountability that they make relevant in their interaction. Thus, 
just as identity featured in the previous chapter as a participant concern, so too here 
narrative is considered in terms of the sorts of interactional work that speakers pursue 
in particular settings where it is employed. As we will see, this work involves the sort 
of foreclose of inferences and the attention to particular demands for accountability 
that speakers regard as relevant to the business of their talk. 
In terms of the detailed considerations taken up in attending to accountability, 
this means that the deployment of narrative involves speakers in foreclosing the 
potential for their participation in the setting of the talk to be construed either as 
prejudicial - as involving preconceptions about the events and experiences in which 
speakers describe themselves as having taken part as a result of living in the region - 
or else as unaware of and/or insensitive to cultural difference. In other words, we will 
see that speakers employ narrative as a resource to manage the conflict between 
competing demands for accountability so that they can display an awareness of and 
sensitivity to cultural difference, but not to the extent that their doing so can be taken 
to implicate them as prejudiced. Likewise, we will see that speakers work to display 
a lack of preconceptions concerning what they take to be Arab cultural behaviour, but 
not to the extent that doing so implicates them as unaware of cultural difference. It 
is the relating of personal, autobiographical narrative which provides a particularly 
elegant resource in the management of these demands. 
The Narrative Time Machine: Temporal Disjunction as a Resource 
In the conversational materials examined in the previous chapter where identity 
features, one particularly interesting point that we touched upon was the way that in 
attending to the competing demands with which their participation in the 
circumstances of talk presents them, speakers are involved in something of a conflict. 
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This could be described in terms of a problem that requires resolution. ' Specifically, 
the issue is that of how a speaker can work to make the relevance of category 
membership available for the epistemological warrant that it provides without at the 
same time being implicated in the demands for accountability that are entailed 
thereby. It was suggested that this tension is managed through talk about identity, and 
that the extent to which a speaker is so implicated is limited as a result of the 
reflexive implications of the membership category's situated relevance for all parties 
present to the talk. Where any one participant is implicated, so too all participants are 
potentially so implicated. Thus, even though it might be possible to breach the 
implicit limitations in the extent that a speaker is him- or herself implicated in the 
demands for accountability, to do so would be to threaten the very basis upon which 
the interaction is conducted. That is, it would constitute a breakdown in work that 
speakers do to display an assumption of good faith on the part of their interlocutor 
as an integral feature of their work to sustain the tacit assumption of intersubjectivity. 
Now, here we will see that another way in which managing the extent to 
which a speaker is implicated in the demands for accountability that his or her 
category incumbency might be taken to imply is with the recounting of an 
autobiographical narrative -a story of personal experience. Specifically, it is with 
the difference between claims that a speaker can make about him- or herself as a 
participant in past events referred to with the narrative and the implicit claims made 
with and through the recounting of those events in the account itself that he or she is 
able to manage the extent of category incumbency. This feature of telling a story is 
somewhat analogous to the distinction that Bakhtin (1979: 51-52) draws between the 
I-for-myself and the I for-other. 3 The crucial point is that in a speaker's activity of 
referring to his or her own self, a distinction is established between that self to whom 
he or she refers and the speaker bringing off that act of referral itself. The participant 
`I' to whom the speaker refers as a character in the narrative differs from the `I' who 
is the teller of the account; and, as we shall see, it is the tension between these two 
which can productively be employed as a resource to manage the conflict between 
category entitlement on the one hand and the potential relevance of inferences which 
the work of attending to that entitlement makes available on the other. Because the 
character of the story is said to act in ways that are at odds with how the teller of the 
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story behaves in and through the very activity of recounting that story itself, speakers 
are able to employ certain ways of talking which might otherwise be made 
accountable. Specifically, this means that narrators are able to discuss their experience 
with the use of categorizing generalisations about Arab culture and society, even 
while relating how it was that their failure to employ such generalisations gave rise 
to the problematic circumstances which it is the point of the narrative to recount. 
Thus, the very problematicity which is said to have arisen in connection with the 
events recounted in the narrative attend to the potential for the speakers themselves 
to be construed as prejudiced. At the same time, the very activity of telling such a 
narrative - of being able to remark upon just such an event as itself involving such 
problematics - is one through which speakers attend to the potential for their talk to 
be construed as indicating an unawareness of and/or insensitivity to cultural 
difference. Thus, speakers delicately manage the conflicting demands of their own 
accountability for maintaining a set of preconceived expectations while attending to 
their accountability as culturally aware. 
Now, in order to see what is involved with this sort of activity, consider the 
following, rather lengthy, narrative account in which the speaker - an American 
business professional married to a Kuwaiti citizen - recounts an experience that she 
relates as having taken place in the first year of her marriage at which time she was 
residing in a house, together with her husband and his family (her Arabic speaking, 
Kuwaiti in-laws). 
(5.1) Interview, 29 - corporate sales representative 
1 KM: Now what were your sort of expectations before you came here. I 
2 mean I'm- 
3 AP: Before I came to Kuwait? [My] expectations? I really had none, 
4 KM: [Uh huh. ] 
5 AP: u=m- tsk I didn't know what to expect, I didn't know anything 
6 about the place, a=nd it was a- it was a complete- in a way= I 
7 think it was probably something that very few people ever have in 
8 their life. I felt like I was just kind of like dropped into a 
9 completely different world. That's how it- really, that's how I felt. I 
10 didn't know anything about it, I didn't hang out with my husband 
11 and his friends uh- so I didn't have a large group of Arab people 
12 that I associated wi=th and that, you know, I was very unfamiliar 
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13 with the customs or anything like this, so for me = when I came to 
14 Kuwait it was=- it was a complete shock in almost every way. 
15 [I really] felt like was in a different- universe. And so = that is very 
16 KM: [Mm hm. ] 
17 AP: exhilarating, in some ways, but it was also very stressful. And it 
18 was very difficult. [So the] first year was like- I felt like- I felt like 
19 KM: [Yeah. ] 
20 AP: [[after]] going through that first year, <P because I lived with my 
21 KM: [[Yeah. ]] 
22 AP: in-laws in a home where no one spoke English and it was traditional 
23 and, you know, I had been told nothing, and I was a very 
24 independent person P >, and I went from being very independent, 
25 having a lot of friends and doing exactly what I wanted and, you 
26 know, having the whole world in my hand, to being completely uh- 
27 you know, DEpendent, isolated, lonely, with nothing to do, bored, 
28 and it was- that- that part of it was very difficult, but the other part 
29 of it- of being immersed in something so different, it was=- I don't 
30 know, it was- it was real exhilarating. It's- it was nice. I [liked it. ] 
31 KM: [Can you-] 
32 I mean, do you have any- anything specific, sort of uh- specific 
33 examples or anything, 
34 
35 AP: Well there's just situations of things that- that u=m- you know, you 
36 just assume that you='re- you're doing things that are okay and 
37 acceptable and you find out that no they're not okay and they're not 
38 acceptable, in fact they're very wrong, u=m- [my-] 
39 KM: [Such] as- 
40 AP: my mother-in-la=w um- well my mother-in-law is superstitious, and 
41 she's cooked- she's a very good cook, and she's cooked, you know, 
42 every day of her life probably, I'm sure, u=m- for like a huge 
43 family, like my husband's family they have uh- <P oh nine, ten, 
44 eleven ki = ds, and then, you know, her and her husband P>, and 
45 for her the afternoon meal, <P like in the afternoon, like at around 
46 two or three P> , 
is really her- this is for her. This is her thing. The 
47 house, the kids and the f- cooking are her domain, a=nd- so when 
48 she cooks for all of these people you can imagine that there's a huge 
49 volume of food, [right, well] my mom doesn't cook, so for- first of 
50 KM: [Uh huh. ] 
51 AP: all for someone to cook at all is amazing to me, second of all for 
52 someone to cook for that many people so consistently and so well, I 
53 mea=n, I just was really impressed. So I would co- I- I remember 
54 once I came in and she'd ma- had made out these hollowed out uh- 
55 uh- < AR cousa AR >? That's called < AR cousa AR >, it's u= m- 
56 it's a zuccini, 
57 
58 KM: Mm hm. 
59 AP: zuccini now, and you take and you ha- hollow them out by hand and 
60 then you stuff them, and then you carefully layer them in a big pot 
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61 and you cook them very carefully and gently, and the pot is maybe 
62 a diameter of like twenty inches by like, you know, twenty inches 
63 deep and it's full of these < AR cousa AR > s, okay, that took all day 
64 of only her working on them. So I came in and I went "(H) Wow, 
65 what a huge pot of things", meaning- I was trying to compliment 
66 her like "Wow, what a lot of work you did, this is really great, I've 
67 never seen such a big pot of food before", 
68 KM: Mm hm. 
69 AP: and she= just went into orbit, she started screaming and yelling 
70 and- and s- having this big tantrum and I'm like- 
71 KM: Why? 
72 AP: "What did I do", it- Why. Exactly, like "(Hx) N- what did I do 
73 now", you know, and so I was just like heartbroken, I'm like 
74 "Go=d, I can't win", you know, so my husband g- heard all this 
75 commotion and he came in and said "What's going on", I go "I 
76 don't know, all I did was tell your mother that I've never seen such 
77 a big pot of food on the stove before, you know", I mean it was this 
78 incredible huge pot. And so he's talking to his mother and- I guess 
79 she thought that I gave the food "the evil-e=ye", like you're 
80 supposed to = um- because somebody who spent that much time 
81 making a meal, and the family is d- waiting for the meal and it's- 
82 you know, your reputation is on the line with this meal, and uh- and 
83 if you= uh- say something like "Wow what a big pot of foo=d" 
84 and you don't say "< AR maash Alla =h AR > ", meaning, <P uh- 
85 you know, "God willing" or something like this P>, then what 
86 happens is you've kind of jinxed it, and "It's going to bu=rn, it's 
87 going to knock over, it's not going to taste good", I mean 
88 something's going- "It's going to be too salty, it's going to be 
89 mushy", somehow you've- they believe in this "hot-eye", this 
90 evil-eye thing, somehow you've like CURSED it, you know? Which 
91 I'm not like this at all, and so (Hx) it really hurt my feelings that 
92 she would think that in the first place, but- 
93 KM: Mm hm. 
94 AP: but she can't help herself, I mean she's been raised that way and- 
95 and I see- my comment seemed very out of context, it was very 
96 very uh- you know, it was a bad thing for me to say, 
Obviously, this is a rather involved episode of talk in which the speakers attend to a 
great deal of different business. For our purposes here, however, it is important to 
note how the speakers attend to different demands in terms of accountability. 
Specifically, speaker AP attends to the potential for her presence in the circumstances 
she describes to be construed in terms of prejudice. In particular, she is not only able 
to employ a way of accounting for the circumstances she describes in terms of certain 
expectations or stereotypes, employing talk about Arab culture and social 
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expectations; but she is also able to attend to her own accountability in and for doing 
so. Specifically, she describes herself as entering the circumstances without having 
any expectations as to what those circumstances might entail ('My expectations? I 
really had none, u=m- tsk I didn't know what to expect', lines 3-5). Furthermore, 
it is this very aspect of her experience which is construed as problematic ('I was very 
unfamiliar with the customs or anything like this, so for me = when I came to Kuwait 
it was=- it was a complete shock in almost every way', lines 12-14). At the same 
time, however, her description and in particular, her activity of producing such a 
description is itself one that makes relevant the very sorts of categorising terms which 
it is the effect of the narrative to demonstrate herself as lacking. Thus, this very story 
is one which depends upon those category terms for its sense and meaning. 
The work she pursues with this talk then, is very delicate in that the upshot 
is at odds with the means by which that upshot is produced with the talk. The 
outcome is that she can show herself - as the character in the story - to have been 
without expectations, while deploying the category terms involved with which to give 
her story meaning. This is quite subtle in that the teller of the story is able to look 
back on herself, as it were, in order to make sense of the events which her lack of 
expectations made confusing and problematic at the time. In so doing, she can attend 
to the potential accusation that she is prejudiced. It is the production in the narrative 
of her experience as problematic which accomplishes this. At the same time, and 
because she accounts for that problematicity in terms of certain expectations, she also 
attends to the potential to be construed as unaware of or else insensitive to cultural 
difference and social influence. In other words, it is only after having been in 
circumstances where a lack of expectations has given rise to certain difficulties that 
the speaker can then (perhaps reluctantly) arrive at a conclusion as to what to expect. 
An interesting feature of the conflicting demands involved in this talk is that 
it is not the use of generalising categories per se which is made accountable. Rather 
it is the nature of how those categories are arrived at in the first place which is 
attended to as significant. In other words, what is made accountable is whether the 
generalising categories one employs are preconceived or the outcome of some 
learning experience. It is thus in just such a context that the failure to orient to a set 
of expectations and generalising accounts is itself made accountable ('but she can't 
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help herself, I mean she's been raised that way and- and I see- my comment seemed 
very out of context, it was very very uh- you know, it was a bad thing for me to 
say', lines 94-96). In sum, speaker AP can attend to the implications which the use 
of certain categorizing generalisations might be construed to make available, 
foreclosing the relevance of those implications with a narrative the point of which is 
to demonstrate her lack of expectations. At the same time, and through the very 
recounting of that narrative, she can employ those category terms, thereby making 
herself accountable for sensitivity to and awareness of cultural difference. 
In terms of how this work is accomplished in the turn-by-turn contributions 
that the speakers make to the ongoing conversation, there is some rather interesting 
work that takes place in this episode of talk. For example, as in any other kind of 
interaction, the outcome or upshot of the talk is a jointly managed activity. This 
means that the telling of the narrative is not the sole responsibility of any single 
participant, but rather is an activity that involves speakers in jointly negotiating the 
suspension of the turn-taking activity which provides for the extended holding of the 
floor by a single speaker. Thus, both the interviewer (speaker KM) and the 
interviewee (speaker AP) collude in providing for the suspension of otherwise 
available turn-taking conventions. It is not that the narrative contribution and the 
provision for its relevance are the result of any one speaker's situate work but that 
this is jointly accomplished in the talk here. In this sense, they work interactively to 
attend to the significance of their contributions as constitutive of the setting in which 
they are involved. In this exchange, this involves not only the sort of recipient tokens 
whereby the interviewer registers feedback to speaker AP's contribution - the `mm 
hm's and 'yeah's that keep things moving, so to speak (lines 16,19,21) (see 
Gardner, 1997; Jefferson, 1983; Schegloff, 1982, cited in Hester and Francis, 1994, 
n. 11) - but also the more involved work of both occasioning and managing the 
relevance of the narrative to the interview ('Now what were your sort of expectations 
before you came here', line 1; `Can you- I mean, do you have any- anything specific, 
sort of uh- specific examples or anything', lines 31-33). It is with such contributions 
to the interaction that the interview occasions speaker AP's orientation to the 
competing demands for accountability that she attends to with and in her story. 
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Of course, even though providing for the significance of the narrative is a 
jointly conducted activity, attending to its actual production is a task in which speaker 
AP takes the major part in her (jointly-ratified and mutually worked-up) capacity as 
the teller of that narrative. We can see throughout that her doing this also involves 
some rather deft interactional work in managing the conflicting demands of attending 
to her category entitlement, on the one hand (so that she can work to make herself 
a credible participant in the circumstances of its telling), and working to foreclose the 
potential for that participation to be construed in terms of prejudice, on the other. In 
particular, she employs certain categorising terms to the extent that her doing so 
attends to the potential to be construed as unaware of or insensitive to cultural 
difference, and yet she also works to eschew the deployment of such terms to the 
extent that their use can be construed as prejudicial. For example, with her 
explanation of the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the episode of conflict 
between herself and her mother-in-law (the preparation of a meal), speaker AP 
accounts for her reaction to the events described in the narrative in terms other than 
those which she distances herself from with and in the telling of that narrative. That 
is, her relating of those events and the retrospective interpretation of them is an 
activity which itself involves an interpretation that differs from that as related in the 
narrative itself. So, in describing the preparation of the meal, speaker AP makes 
sense of those activities in their narrative telling that is different than those which she 
describes herself as having experienced in the events to which she refers. The 
preparation of the meal is related in terms of a sort of habitual activity characteristic 
of the mother-in-law's category incumbency as matron of the house ('This is her 
thing. The house, the kids and the f- cooking are her domain, a=nd- so when she 
cooks for all of these people you can imagine that there's a huge volume of food', 
lines 46-49). The potential for the use of just such a description itself to be construed 
as prejudicial, however, is foreclosed with the account of those events in the 
explanation that immediately follows ('right, well my mom doesn't cook, so for- first 
of all for someone to cook at all is amazing to me, second of all for someone to cook 
for that many people so consistently and so well, I mea=n, I just was really 
impressed', lines 49-53). In this way, she is able to portray herself as having a lack 
of expectations, thereby attending to the potential for her participation to be construed 
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as prejudicial, and yet at the same time she is able to employ the explanatory 
categories whose use might otherwise be so construed. 
Her glossing, then, of the very problematicity surrounding the events that she 
relates ('my mother-in-la=w um- well, my mother-in-law is superstitious', line 40) 
and her narrative accounting of that glossing ('she thought that I gave the food "the 
evil-ey=e"', line 79; `then what happens is you've kind of jinxed it', lines 85-86; 
`they believe in this "hot-eye", this evil-eye thing, somehow you've like CURSED 
it', lines 89-90), makes use of the tension between the speaker's identity as character 
in the narrative and her capacity retrospectively to assess the events so described. 
Note here the analytic point is not that in either case, the speaker is attempting to 
obfuscate or in some other way conceal her otherwise genuine or sincere 
understanding of these events, but that she employs the narrative as a device to attend 
to the conflicting demands with which she is confronted in the circumstances of her 
talk (the interview situation which has as its concern the experience of expatriates 
living in the Middle East). 4 
Another way that speaker AP attends to this same tension is with her 
employment of certain tokens whereby she works to distance herself from the 
implications that her statements might otherwise make available. Just as we saw how 
speakers attend to this sort of task our discussion of stake inoculation (Potter, 1996: 
124-132; 1997: 150-158) in the previous chapter, so too here speaker AP attends to 
the potential for her statements to be construed along certain lines with her use of 
different modal expressions qualifying her commitment to the remarks which they 
modify. In so doing, she can attend to her own accountability for the use of the 
category generalisations she employs in the explanation she offers throughout the 
narrative (as indicated here with italics: `but the other part of it- of being immersed 
in something so different, it was=- I don't know, it was- it was real exhilarating', 
lines 28-30; `she's cooked, you know, every day of her life probably, I'm sure', lines 
41-42). The point here is that she attends to the potential for her use of category 
generalisation to be made accountable in that she distances herself from the inferences 
they might otherwise entail. In doing so, she again attends to her accountability for 
the use of generalisations in terms of the potential for their use on her part to be 
construed as culturally insensitive. In that she employs such terms, and yet modifies 
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her commitment thereto, she manages the conflict between the use of the terms and 
her accountability to assumptions regarding their prejudicial nature. 
`And Then We Later On Found Out' 
The previous extract was one in which the principal speaker was involved in a great 
deal of discursive work to foreclose the implications with which her talk might be 
construed. Because the details of attending the implications potentially made available 
can be rather involved, it could be somewhat easy to lose sight of the work that the 
narrative accomplishes as a device. Again, this point relates to how both the telling 
of the narrative and that narrative's upshot can be at odds with one another, and how 
this tension can be productively employed in managing the range of inferences made 
available. Before moving on, we will consider one further, relatively short narrative 
anecdote. The following anecdote is taken from the same interview with the two ex- 
military servicemen that we encountered in Extract 3.6 from Chapter 3 above. 
(5.2) Interview, 6- civilian military advisors 
1 TI: Uh- other things that are really unique, like uh- Arab women here, 
2 basically have like head of line privileges and stuff, [when they-] 
3 KM: [I'm sorry? ] 
4 TI: Arab women have, like, head of line privileges and stuff in stores, I 
5 mean the =y expect to be= allowed to just- if you're in the Co-Op 
6 buying groceries, at first you're like "What's wrong with this 
7 woman, she think that I'm not here", you know, and "Boy she sure 
8 is ru=de", and then we later on found out well that's- that's just the 
9 way it is, they believe that, you know, she should be able to just 
10 walk up there ahead of you and go= 
Here, once again, we see a sort of retrospective account of one's self as different to 
the teller of the story. That is, the teller of the narrative here - as in the previous, 
lengthier extract - occupies a different sort of position from that which he does as 
the character of the narrative account in that he presumably has the advantage of 
knowing how things characteristically get done ('then we later on found out well 
that's- that's just the way it is', lines 8-9). Again, it is this lack of foreknowledge 
which is key to the problematicity that structures the story itself, and it is that 
problem's resolution which attends to the range of otherwise conflicting demands for 
accountability. Thus, the speaker is able to employ category generalisations while 
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attending to his potential accountability for doing so - that is, while attending to the 
construal of prejudice that is potentially made available. 
Narrative and the Rhetoric of Experiential Authority 
This notion of experience and of its construction in narrative accounts like this is 
something which a great number of scholars have noted as characteristic of the 
rhetoric of experiential authority in various ethnographic writings, especially that of 
anthropology (Atkinson, 1990; Clifford, 1983; Pratt, 1986; Kitzinger, 1987: 29-30). 
One feature of such rhetorical work is that it involves the use of personal narrative 
as a device to attend to a range of conflicting demands. The upshot of such 
narratives, as is the case with the accounts reproduced above, is to construct a 
portrayal of the participant in his or her role as narrative character as having arrived 
at certain conclusions only after a difficult process the very problematicity of which 
is said to arise as a result of the lack of foreknowledge. In this way, the speaker 
attends to the conflict arising from his or her category entitlement - working to make 
him- or herself appear as a credible observer while at the same time attending to the 
potential for the credibility of his or her assessments to be undermined as prejudicial. 
Thus, for example, Pratt notes how certain anthropological writings deploy elements 
of both `personal narrative' and `objectified description' as a textual means that 
`mediates a contradiction with the discipline [anthropology] between personal and 
scientific authority' (1986a: 32; cited in Atkinson, 1990: 60). In terms of how this 
relates to the use of narrative accounts in the talk we are considering here, this points 
up how speakers attend to both their category entitlement as credible participants in 
the investigative activity of which the related interview is a part and their 
epistemological warrant to make the claims which they do in that setting. 
In a great number of ethnographic accounts, the narratives which employ 
these different features of such rhetoric - that is, elements of `personal narrative' and 
`objectified description' - typically take the form of an arrival story wherein the 
author relates the problematicity arising from his or her unfamiliarity with the norms 
and expectations which it is the task of the investigative fieldwork to formulate. These 
narratives make use of descriptive detail to create a sense of experiential authority 
(Rosaldo, 1986; see also Fowler, 1977 [cited in Atkinson, 1990: 63-71] for a 
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discussion of similar work related to literary texts) - that is, to attend to one's 
credibility as derived from his or her `being there' (Geertz: 1988). 5 This is an aspect 
of talk we have already touched upon in our examination of Extracts 5.1 and 5.2 
above. The talk recorded there shares with ethnographic writings the attention to 
conflicting demands for both category entitlement (which is the raison d'etre of much 
ethnographic writing and the maintaining of an objective and value-neutral (in a word, 
scientific) approach to one's object of analysis. 
Atkinson (1990: 27), in his review of Clifford (1988: 34), discusses this 
aspect of ethnographic writing: 
Clifford describes how the development of `professional' anthropology, post- 
Malinowski, marked by claims for special expertise and practices, was 
accompanied by textual representations of anthropological authority. The new 
monographs introduced a `sharp image' of the outsider encountering and 
penetrating a new culture, `undergoing a kind of initiation leading to "rapport" 
(minimally acceptance and empathy, but usually implying something akin to 
friendship)' 
. 
Similarly, certain speakers in the interview corpus relate accounts of their own arrival 
in Kuwait as made problematic by the lack of foreknowledge as to what to expect. 
That is, they employ similar `sharp' images - constituting an identity of themselves 
which contrasts markedly from that of the teller of the narrative. The significance of 
the arrival narrative is to describe in the starkest possible terms the sort of identity 
that is in contrast to that which the narrator displays with the telling of that narrative 
itself. 
Two brief examples follow. In the first of these, the interviewee relates the 
circumstances of her arrival in Kuwait to take up a new position in a library at a local 
educational institution. 
(5.3) Interview, 7- librarian/information scientist 
1 UF: When I came in 1973, well- first of all I had never sought to come 
2 to Kuwait, I had never thought of working abroad, this guy walked 
3 in the library one day when I was working in (NAME OF U. S. 
4 STATE), and asked me if I knew of anyone in my speciality who was 
5 looking for a job. And it- I was- I was in a personal relationship 
6 that I wanted to get as <@ far away from as I@> possibly could, 
7 and the work situation had- there had been a change in the director, 
8 and I did not like the change and had been very vocal about it and 
9 was in real trouble work-wise so it was a very good time, so I said 
10 "How about me", and he told me about the job and at the end of 
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11 about an hour he said "The job is yours but I have to know by 
12 tomorrow". I had never heard of Kuwait, I knew nothing about the 
13 Middle East, nothing about Arabs, nothing about Islam, and 
14 basically all I knew was what he told me in- in that brief discussion. 
15 And I said "Yes" the next day, not having any idea what I was 
16 getting in for. @@@@ And I- you know, THEN there wasn't a 
17 whole lot of information available about Kuwait. And I- you know, 
18 I found a few State Department reports and a couple of books but I 
19 didn't know a whole lot about it. So I didn't- I didn't have a whole 
20 lot of- I didn't have a whole lot of- @@ I didn't have any idea what 
21 I was getting in for. 
22 
23 KM: Mm hm. No expec[tations. ] 
24 UF: [And uh-] Yeah, no real uh- other than that this 
25 was going to be a real adventure, you know. I'd go for two uh- my 
26 plans were to go for two years, come back and get a PhD. In the 
27 States. And- and uh- when I- I arrived in Kuwait, it was the end of 
28 August, when I stepped off the plane, <P that was back in the old 
29 days where you didn't have the jetways, you know P>, it was 
30 ten-thirty at night and it was a hundred and five degrees. And I 
31 thought "Oh my Go=d". 
32 KM: (Hx)@ (Hx)@ (Hx)@ 
33 UF: And I walked into the airport, there was not one Western face in 
34 there. It was all the- you know, men in dresses and women all 
35 covered in black and I thought "O =h my = Go = @d" . 
@@@@ 
36 (... ) (SOME LINES OMITTED) 
37 UF: But it got- it got better very quickly. But I really had no- I didn't- I 
38 didn't have any i- I didn't have a clue what I was in for. Not a clue. 
39 But because of that, I we- I went into it very wide-eyed and sort of 
40 ready for anything 
In this second extract, the speaker - an American national who, at the time of her 
arrival to Kuwait, was married to a Kuwaiti citizen - relates a similar arrival 
experience. 
(5.4) Interview, 38 - corporate sales representative 
1 UT: when I first got here I got out of that plane and walked in to that 
2 rece- uh- that waiting area and there wasn't anybody with Western 
3 clothes on it was all men. (Hx)@ _ (Hx)@ And I thought "Oh 
4 Lord, what have I come to" (Hx) and (H) I walked out and it was 
5 just sort of that image that you see in- in the media about how 
6 there's Rolls-Royces and these women all covered up and- and 
7 that's what I saw in front of the airport, all of these expensive cars 
8 with these women that are covered and these people that look like 
9 they walked out of the previous century, (Hx)= a=nd (H) I didn't 
10 like Kuwait much when I first came here, I mean I- the first night- 
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11 couple of nights I stayed in the ho- Regency, that was the most 
12 beautiful hotel here, beautiful beach, everything was just lovely, and 
13 my uh- at the time he was my fiance, took me to his family's house 
14 and I come to this very stark plain house and uh- we passed these 
15 areas like Hawally and Nugra ((SUBURBS OF KUWAIT CITY)) which 
16 are really slums and it looked so = Third World I just thought "Oh 
17 my God, I don't know if I can handle this", but then I= - this was 
18 my only boyfriend that I ever had and I was really in love with him 
19 and I waited two more years after that at home before I married him 
20 and THEN I moved here, and after a while after you live here and 
21 you associate mainly with Kuwaitis you don't see all that after a 
22 while, you know, you- you focus more on your family and u=m- 
23 your friends, u=m- you don't- I didn't associate- I cut off any 
24 association with other Arab nationalities because I couldn't stand to 
25 listen them complain all the time, 
26 ... 
27 KM: Complain about- 
28 
29 UT: Complain about Kuwait, their lives, this and that and the other 
30 thing. 
These two accounts, though different in the details of the background circumstances 
that the speakers discuss as having brought them to Kuwait, are strikingly similar in 
a number of important respects. In the first place, the speakers each recall the details 
of their arrival employing very similar narrative constituents. For example, they set 
the scene of the arrival by attending to the details of time and temperature, and by 
providing a description of the clothing worn by those whom they are said first to have 
encountered. Even in such descriptions, speakers display a sensitivity to the potential 
for their terms to be construed as reductionist as expressed in the ironic comparison 
with Western styles of dress. That is, speakers refer to such details not merely in 
passing, but they subtly display an orientation to the substance of such descriptions 
as just the sort of thing that typically gets noticed. This is made explicit in speaker 
UT's reference to media broadcasting ('it was just sort of that image that you see in- 
in the media', lines 4-5); but more interestingly, perhaps, is the implicit way this is 
accomplished with the choice of pronominal reference by which the existential claim 
is made. That is, rather than referring to such details with a remark such as `There 
were [details of description]', the speaker employs the pronoun `it' and the definitive 
article `the' by which to make available the assumption of mutual understanding ('It 
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was all the- you know, men in dresses and women all covered in black', Extract 5.3, 
lines 34-35; `it was all men', Extract 5.4, line 3). 
Another interesting feature is that in each account, the speakers also relate 
a sort of narrative peak with an expression of surprise through the use of a self- 
quotation involving an invocation of the deity ('and I thought "O =h my = Go = @d" . 
@@@@', Extract 5.3, line 35; `I just thought "Oh my God, I don't know if I can 
handle this"', Extract 5.4, lines 16-17). 6 While both these sorts of narrative details 
and the accompanying quotation provide for a heightened sense of one's `being there' 
(Geertz, 1988); they simultaneously attend to something else as well. With and in the 
very use here of these particular devices, the speakers employ the sorts of 
categorizing generalisations whose accountability it is the purpose of the story's 
telling to attend to. That is, speakers attend to the potential for their use of such 
generalising categories to be made accountable in the narrative telling of the related 
experiences that are said to be involved. By relating these details as giving rise to 
problems - as unexpected or surprising - the speakers provide for their relevance 
in accounting for the circumstances of their presence. At the same time, however, it 
is the unexpectedness of the circumstances so described which occasions the 
narrative's telling in the first place. This is an aspect that this narrative shares with 
respect to the relating of personal experience that we saw in Extract 5.1 above. Just 
as with that narrative, these narratives work to warrant the speaker's employing of 
certain category generalisations in that their use is demonstrated to be the result of 
experience rather than prejudice. In this way, the use of the category generalisations 
is itself made accountable to the assumptions regarding the prejudicial nature of such 
terms. The speakers thus demonstrate themselves to employ such terms 
legitimately - that is, only after having gained the experience from the troubles 
which it is the upshot of the story to relate. In both of these extracts, the speakers 
attend to their accountability for the use of such category generalisations, managing 
the conflicting demands between their category entitlement (working to ensure their 
credibility as participants who are aware of and sensitive to cultural difference) while 
working to foreclose the potential for that entitlement to be construed in terms of 
prejudice. 
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This work to manage the conflicting assumptions by which cultural difference 
is made sense of is similar to what takes place in accounts by scientists of their own 
professional activities. In their discussion of what they refer to as the truth will out 
device (TwoD), Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) note how the relevance of temporality is 
made available to manage the inconsistency as between contingent and empiricist 
accounts of success in the promotion of a scientific theory. Remarking upon this, 
Potter and Wetherell (1987: 155, emphasis in original) note: 
The problem [for the scientist who accounts for success as the outcome of various 
contingent factors] is that his own scientific actions begin to seem arbitrary and 
pointless. Why continue researching if beliefs are only accepted because of 
personalities and power [i. e. reasons articulated with the contingent repertoire]? 
However, the looming contradiction can be dealt with by producing a temporal 
separation of elements. There may be contingent factors operating at the present 
but in the future empiricist factors will come to dominate. 
Time thus features as a means by which scientists work to manage the 
conflict in their accounts. Similarly, in talk where prejudice and culture feature as 
situated concerns, time is deployed as a device in that a narrative account creates a 
temporal disjunction between the situated circumstances of the story's telling (the 
actual talk in the circumstances of its use) and the events which that story documents. 
Further, cultural difference emerges as ontologically privileged, tested in the crucible 
of the story-teller's own ignorance as recounted in the narrative of his or her personal 
experience. In this way, the speaker can manage the degree to which he or she 
endorses the lack of any preconceptions - viz., to the extent that it does not 
implicate the speaker as prejudiced. While it is the case that speakers attend to both 
demands for an awareness of cultural difference as well as to demands not to be 
construed as having preconceptions (that is, as prejudiced); in their temporal situating 
(their recounting within a temporal framework, so to speak), it is cultural difference 
that emerges as the `truth' that `will out'. Just as the TWOD works both to manage the 
conflict between the empiricist and contingent repertoires and to promote the former 
of the two as more basic to scientific understanding, ' so too the deployment of 
personal narrative displays a teleological trajectory which promotes cultural awareness 
as more basic to cross-cultural understanding. 
Notice also how the talk recorded in these extracts relates to the remarks 
about the rhetoric of anthropological authority produced in an ethnographic account. 
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Recall, for example, that the `sharp image' (Atkinson, 1990: 27, quoted above) by 
which anthropological authority was said to be derived itself involved the display of 
some sort of positive 'rapport'. Now, what is interesting about Atkinson's remarks 
in the context of these extracts above is that Atkinson fails to distinguish between the 
activity of recounting one's initial arrival on a given scene and the events as so 
described. The suggestion is that the rhetorical effectiveness of an arrival account 
possibly derives from the expression of positive regard for the Other - the 
expression of `empathy' and `something akin to friendship'. However, as we can see 
in examining the talk reproduced above, (especially in Extract 5.4), this is not 
necessarily the case. Indeed, a speaker can express a negative disposition - 
something akin to hostility - to those whom he or she describes while nevertheless 
providing for the warrant that the temporal disjunction affords. ' For example, we 
saw in Extract 5.4 that speaker UT expressed this sort of hostility which she goes on 
to detail ('I didn't associate- I cut off any association with other Arab nationalities 
because I couldn't stand to listen them complain all the time (... ) about Kuwait, their 
lives, this and that and the other thing', lines 23-30). The point here, then, is that an 
analysis of such arrival narratives should not elide the warrant made possible by the 
reflexive implications raised in and through the activity of recounting a narrative with 
the actual claims made in that narrative. ' 
Constructive Analysis: Theorising One's Presence 
We have already seen how speakers employ narrative and the situationally relevant 
implications that the activity of a story's telling affords as a way to manage the 
conflicting demands with which their participation in the circumstances of their talk's 
elicitation present them. It is in and through the very activity of telling a story that 
speakers are able to foreclose a range of inferences regarding the nature of how the 
category generalisations they employ in the course of telling that story are themselves 
arrived at as an outcome of a certain problematicity which it is the very point of the 
story to relate. Thus, the activity of recounting the narrative works to manage the 
availability of a range of different inferences, foreclosing some and making others 
available. 
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Now, another way in which speakers work to manage the availability of 
certain inferences is through direct theorising - what Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) 
refer to as constructive analysis - by which to make sense of their experience of 
living abroad. While such theorising is not the same activity as that of recounting a 
story, it is nevertheless relevant to our concern here with narrative because it shares 
with that activity the same feature of disjunctive tension between the subject as both 
the referent of an account and the teller of that account. Where the constructive 
analysis in talk differs from the use of narrative as a device, however, is that rather 
than attending to the availability of inferences (about motives, interests and other 
concerns entailed by their category incumbency), speakers explicitly formulate their 
concerns about those inferences. This is not to say, however, that in so doing they 
no longer need to attend to the inferentially available implications of their own talk. 
Instead, it means that they reflexively attend to the potential for that activity - that 
of constructing the formulation - itself to be construed as motivated. As we will see 
then, the work that speakers do with constructive analysis is similar to that of 
narrative in that they attend to certain assumptions in their talk, except that these are 
formulated, as such - that activity itself generating a further range of inferences that 
are then dealt with. In this way, we can see that there is no case where the 
assumptions for accountability are not made relevant as informing the activity of talk. 
Even where that activity itself involves the situated theorising of one's accountability, 
it simply creates a different setting where the business of one's participation is taken 
up as a concern in the accomplishment of that theorising. There is no `time out' 
(Garfinkel, 1967) from orienting to shared assumptions, even where theorising such 
orientation is the business of that talk. 
Consider, for example, the following extract of data taken from the same 
interview that we considered in our analysis of Extract 5.1 above. In the encounter 
recorded here, speakers take up the issue of subjectivity and the limitations that the 
contingencies of one's situation entail. That is, speakers pursue the work of theorising 
a transcendent position, even while discussing the contingency of perspective. The 
point in terms of how this relates to a speaker's own accountability is that in pursuing 
the task of constructing an analysis of his or her own experience, the inference which 
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the pursuit of that activity makes available is itself in conflict with the theoretical 
claims for which they are theorised. 
(5.5) Interview, 29 - corporate sales representative 
1 AP: 
2 
3 KM: 
4 AP: 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 KM: 
15 AP: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
I- of course I'm married to a Kuwaiti, <P I'm not married to [an 
Ameri]can so I have a different perspective than someone who is 
[Uh huh. 1 
married to an American and only for three to five years or 
something like this P>, I think that any time you = have the 
opportunity to be exposed to a different culture, religion, language, 
history, um- you know, it- it's enriching, a=nd it can't help but- 
but give you something to = relate your own upbringing, your own 
culture, your own religion to. You see you grow up in a certain 
environment and you just assume that everyone in the world thinks 
like you, acts like you, has the same interests, the same 
motivations, the same, you kno=w, beliefs, and that's not true, you 
know, the world is a very diverse place, [and so] for ME= it's 
[Mm hm. ] 
given me a reference point, you know, and so in some ways it's 
made me = be =- look much more uh- back on being raised as an 
American, and see where- what really it MEANS to be an 
American. Now I know what it really means to be an American, at 
least to ME=, 
KM: Uh huh. 
AP: u=h- where if you stay in the States it's kind of like you- you don't 
really ever have anything to compare it to, okay? 
KM: Mm hm. 
AP: So it's made me in some ways very much mo=re an American, in 
other ways it's made me very international where I feel like I'm not 
an American, I'm not a Kuwaiti, I'm not- there's a group of people 
that kind of transcends being in a nation and wha- and there's many 
of us, you know, uh- many of my friends that- and- and it doesn't 
come from being married to a foreigner, it can come from living 
outside of the States for a long time and having been integrated into 
another culture for a long time, and it's kind of like in some ways 
you feel like every place could be home but no place is home, and 
so=, you know, you don't get that sense unless you='ve been 
forced to = be outside of what you're familiar with, 
KM: Mm hm. 
AP: it's- it's- it's an interestin=g thing. So I think of it as a very 
enriching experience. I feel like I'm very fortunate to have had my 
life take that direction. I think that right now if I had have been in 
the States I probably would have been, you know, living in 
suburbia, working on my jo=b, and just having a very mundane 
boring life, and maybe- I'm not that kind of person ANYway so I 
think that maybe that's why I'm here to begin with, you know? 
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Perhaps the most obvious feature of the talk in this sequence is the work that speaker 
AP undertakes to provide an analysis of her identity as shaped by a diversity of 
experiences that she refers to in terms of cultural, religious, linguistic and historical 
difference ('I think that any time you= have the opportunity to be exposed to a 
different culture, religion, language, history, um- you know, it- it's enriching', lines 
5-7). Making these distinctions relevant rather nicely provides for the inference of the 
speaker's awareness of and sensitivity to cultural difference. In particular, just as is 
the case with the recounting of a narrative, here theorising about the effect of her own 
experience works as a reflexive display of the very awareness of and sensitivity to 
differences which it is the topic of that talk to discuss. In other words, the very 
activity of recognising, with this talk, the differences in virtue of which her identity 
`as an American' (line 16-17) is formulated itself demonstrates that the speaker is 
aware of and sensitive to cultural difference (even if she does or does not express a 
positive regard thereto). This is the case since otherwise the speaker would not be in 
a position to offer such a constructive analysis in the first place. Notice here too that 
this involves the speaker opening up for interrogation the same assumptions 
(concerning the contingency of view as culturally determined) that she elsewhere 
makes available to do the rather different work of foreclosing the potential to be 
construed as insensitive to cultural difference ('but she can't help herself, I mean 
she's been raised that way and- and I see- my comment seemed very out of context, 
it was very very uh- you know, it was a bad thing for me to say', Extract 5.1, lines 
94-96). Assumptions concerning cultural determination are variably occasioned by the 
work that they do in the specific rhetorical circumstances of their use. This ability to 
recognise perspectival limitations implies that the speaker is not constrained by the 
limitations so described (McKenzie and van Teeffelen, 1993). Difference is thus here 
made relevant as a way of formulating her own identity as aware and sensitive. Doing 
this means that she situates herself relative to alternatives - to the diversity of 
socially defined experiences ('You see you grow up in a certain environment and you 
just assume that everyone in the world thinks like you, acts like you, has the same 
interests, the same motivations, the same, you kno=w, beliefs, and that's not true, 
you know, the world is a very diverse place', lines 9-13). 
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A further feature of this is that it allows the speaker, in her capacity as 
speaker, to take up the different perspectives to which she refers - the American, 
the Kuwaiti - and yet not to be defined by those perspectives. It is as if they become 
resources which the speaker can employ but which do not limit her. Culture, religion, 
language and history are regarded as an available means of enriching the speaker's 
experience. In very much the same way that migration can serve as a metaphor for 
spiritual transformation, so too travel features in a sort of secularised version to bring 
about the juxtaposition of competing discourses out of which to recover new 
meanings - meanings which transcend the cultures from which they are derived in 
a sort of postmodern pilgrimage (Park, 1994: 262; see also Eade and Sallnow, 1991; 
Rojek and Urry, 1997). At the same time, however, speaker AP also attends to the 
potential for her claims along these lines themselves to be construed as culturally 
insensitive in that the very meta-position so achieved depends upon the sensitivity to 
and awareness of the claimed cultural norms and values that it is said to transcend. 
In other words, she attends to a conflict between the demands of contingency upon 
which her claims to transcendence rest. Thus, not only does she display in the 
formulating of her own identity - an identity which she claims is constituted by a 
range of cultural circumstances - that she is not limited by the circumstances so 
described, but she also makes the paradoxical claim to achieve transcendence on the 
basis of the identities as so described. Similarly, Wetherell and Potter (1992: 134), 
in their discussion of the different ways that talk about culture is employed as a 
resource among Päkehä (white) New Zealanders to describe relations with the 
indigenous Mäori, note: 
Whereas for the Maori, culture is presented almost as a burden, a double-edged 
and unavoidable duty, for the Pakeha it can be a potential playground. One can 
learn the Maori language like learning French or learning to ski. The strange is 
acquired and tamed and made one's own by an act of mastery. Acquisition for the 
Maori is, of course, not seen in the same light. Culture and identity are more 
ambiguous possessions for their `proper' owners ... 
but for the Pakeha, Maori 
culture can be a rich extra dimension, like having a Constable painting to decorate 
a wall. Pakeha are free actively to choose this culture, Maori can reject it only at 
the risk of being found anomic. [... ] Cultural discourse, unlike race, is, at this 
period of history, extremely `user friendly'. It is about being `sensitive', `tolerant', 
being sufficiently magnanimous and enlightened to `respect difference' and 
`appreciate' others. 
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Talk about culture and cultural difference works to provide a point of contrast relative 
to which the speaker situates her identity not simply as cultural Other - as an 
American in contrast to a Kuwaiti - but also as an Other distinct from that vantage 
of comparison itself - something to which she refers with the gloss `international' 
('So it's made me in some ways very much mo=re an American, in other ways it's 
made me very international where I feel like I'm not an American', lines 25-27). The 
norms and expectations thus provided for are fixed in the sense that they are not said 
to be alterable (Spoonley, 1988; cited in Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 135). That this 
should take the form of talk about culture and that that culture should be so regarded 
is itself a feature of the discursive interaction in which the conflicting demands of 
attending to cultural sensitivity and one's accountability for the employment of such 
terms is conducted. 
In addition to this aspect of talk, there is also involved certain reflexive 
implications that the speakers attend to in the talk. Specifically, this involves the 
kaleidoscope of common sense (Billig, 1992: 48) that we also encountered in talk 
about financial earnings in Chapter 3 above (in the analysis of Extract 3.1). In the 
same way that a particular assumption is employed argumentatively to legitimate the 
very notion upon which it depends for its sense (where status relates to one's earning 
capacity is itself deployed in making accountable that activity of determining status 
in the first place), here too the argument for the possibility of transcending one's 
perspectival limitations depends upon the assumption that perspective is situationally 
contingent. It is the claim for situatedness of perspective - for the contingency of 
particular outlook upon the (cultural, religious, etc. ) circumstances to which speakers 
refer - that is at odds with the very claims to transcendence which the reference to 
situatedness is marshalled to make available. In other words, speaker AP here 
describes the transcendence of her perspective, implicitly arguing that her view of 
things is not limited to any single culturally determined perspective and that her 
exposure to a range of alternatives has thus resulted in the ability to transcend any 
and all such viewpoints ('I feel like I'm not an American, I'm not a Kuwaiti, I'm not- 
there's a group of people that kind of transcends being in a nation', lines 26-28; `it's 
kind of like in some ways you feel like every place could be home but no place is 
home', lines 32-33). At the same time, however, that very possibility of attaining a 
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transcendent vantage point itself depends upon the assumption that one's outlook is 
culturally contingency in order to make sense. Contingency and transcendence, though 
in tension, are themselves mutually co-constitutive. The two sets of conflicting 
assumptions provide for the sense of their alternatives, the one depending upon its 
opposite in order to derive its sense in this context of use (Ashmore et al., 1989). 
A further way in which his tension between transcendence and contingency 
(as mutually co-constitutive) is managed in the talk is with the use of certain 
qualifying statements in which the speaker attends to her accountability for the 
employment of the one as against its alternative. For example, with the emphatic 
reference to self, the speaker works to foreclose the potential for her claims to 
transcendence to be made accountable to the assumption of contingency upon which 
those very claims depend for their sense ('and so for ME= it's given me a reference 
point', line 13-15; `Now I know what it really means to be an American, at least to 
ME=', lines 18-19; `So I think of it as a very enriching experience', lines 37-38). 
At the same time, speaker AP also works to foreclose the potential for the notion of 
situatedness that she provides for to be construed as undermining her claims to 
transcendence with her reference to self as independent of context ('I'm not that kind 
of person ANYway so I think that maybe that's why I'm here to begin with', lines 
42-43). Her claims to transcendence are warranted here to the extent that they attend 
to the epistemological warrant/category entitlement, but they are also attenuated to 
the extent that they might be made accountable to the assumptions upon which they 
depend for their sense - that is, situated contingency. In other words, the speaker 
warrants claims to transcendence to the extent that doing so manages (or makes 
available) the construal of her presence in terms of cultural sensitivity - to the 
degree that it demonstrates her awareness of cultural difference. At the same time, 
she works against that objective to the extent that it might be made accountable to the 
notion of contingency on which she draws to render her claims meaningful. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with exploring the way that speakers manage the 
conflict between competing demands for accountability in their talk through the 
creation of a disjunction between themselves as the object of some descriptive account 
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and as the individual author engaged in the activity of formulating that account. Thus, 
we saw how in the creation of a narrative account of one's experience, a speaker is 
able to depict him- or herself as having undergone a transformation whereby his or 
her initial unfamiliarity with the alien beliefs, habits, and/or customs of Arab culture 
are said to have created a problematic set of circumstances of which the speaker's 
then current knowledgeability is taken to provide a solution. In this way, the speaker 
is able to show him- or herself to be aware of and/or sensitive to cultural difference 
while at the same time attending to the potential for those efforts themselves to be 
construed as prejudicial. Again, the effectiveness of this sort of talk lies in the 
implicitly available distinction between one's narrative character in contrast to one's 
activity in relating the account of that character itself. In other words, it is the activity 
of making the claim about some past experience which is different from the 
experience of making the claim in the then present context that makes the narrative 
account effective. Among other things, it is this emphasis on the action orientation 
of a story's telling that distinguishes a discursive psychological take on the recounting 
of past events from other approaches to narrative. 
In exploring the role of narrative in the management of conflicting 
assumptions that speakers make relevant in their talk, we also touched on the way that 
narrative accounts are treated in work concerned with the rhetoric of ethnographic 
description, noting how that work (perhaps inadvertently) elides the effectiveness of 
temporal disjunction with the experiential authority potentially made available in 
implicit claims to `acceptance and empathy' (Atkinson, 1990: 27, quoted above). 
Thus, in our examination of the arrival narratives, among other things, we pointed 
up this elision by showing an example of talk where the speaker attends to the 
conflicting demands for accountability (between awareness of cultural difference and 
prejudice) while explicitly expressing dislike for those whom she describes in her 
account (Extract 4.5). In this way, we saw how the effectiveness of the activity of 
recounting a narrative arises not from the claims to transformation in the teller's 
outlook that may or may not be made in that account, but from the display of such 
transformation as afforded by the activity of the narrative's telling itself. 
Finally, we turned to consider the situated activity involved in making claims 
about a transformation in one's own outlook with our discussion of the constructive 
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analysis whereby speakers formulate the theoretical significance of their experience 
of living abroad. Our concern there was to consider the work that such analyses do 
for participants in circumstances where they are undertaken. Again, we saw that there 
is an important analytic distinction to be made between the claims broached with and 
in that talk - as the topic of that talk - and the activity of realising those claims' 
substantiality as manifested in and through the display accomplished with the activity 
itself of making such claims. It is this distinction which is essential to any analysis 
that takes up the reflexive implications of talk's activity in and for that talk itself. 
Notes 
1. This is the practical analytic heuristic referred to by Garfinkel (1967: 89-94) with the term 
documentary method. The analytic distinction between category and instance as employed in the 
analysis of narrative is referred to under various rubrics, depending upon the tradition of research. In 
the Russian Formalism of which Bakhtin was so critical (see Emerson and Morson, 1990: 21-23,77- 
83), the distinction is glossed with the terms sjuzet and fabula (Bruner, 1986). Other terms include 
historie and recite (Genette, 1988) as well as taleworld and storyrealm (Young, 1987), all of which 
assume a realist model of language as representation. For further discussion, see Edwards 1997: Ch. 
10. 
2. Billig et al. (1988) refer to this feature of talk with the term ideological dilemma. While this gloss 
very nicely refers to the sort of tasks that speakers pursue in their talk; it is nevertheless something of 
a misnomer because, as we have seen, speakers hardly appear to find themselves at an impasse when 
taking up the competing demands for accountability that they attend to in their talk. On the contrary, 
it would appear that they are able to handle the task of showing themselves accountable to conflicting 
assumptions in a rather elegant and deft fashion. Quite apart from this point, however, to gloss the 
conflict involved as a dilemma is to imply that managing the tension between the various assumptions 
at issue in the talk is somehow beside the point of the interaction -a sort of inconvenient distraction 
from the main business-at-hand of the talk. It is, among other things, the point of this thesis, however, 
to argue that pursuing conflicting demands is the activity that principally constitutes the business of the 
speakers in their talk. 
3. In Bakhtin's work, these categories relate to the philosophical concern he pursues with regard to the 
issue of individual authenticity that we touched on in Chapter 1 above (see also related discussion in 
Clark and Holquist, 1984: Ch. 3). For our purposes here, we need not pursue the same issues that 
Bakhtin is concerned to take up in order to examine how the difference to which he draws attention 
with these terms features as a resource for speakers. 
4. Our analytic concern here is not with the accuracy of the speaker's claim that she encountered the 
situation she describes with a lack of expectations except insofar as that is a concern for the 
participants - as, for example, would be the case if they were reflexively to attend to the talk itself 
as a motivated way of obscuring her true motives. The point for us here is not to reintroduce realist 
assumptions in order to establish what really happened, but to examine the situated rhetorical work that 
an account such as this works to accomplish. 
5. There are a range of interesting reflexive issues that a critique of such anthropological work itself 
raises for its own practice as well - issues having to do with the constitutive nature of anthropological 
practice as comprised of the tension wherein the unfamiliarity or alterity of the investigative object 
(i. e., the cultural Other) sustains the impetus to discover, but wherein the discovery undoes the 
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impetus. One does anthropological investigation to the extent that one makes the unfamiliar become 
familiar - to the extent that one sees things differently or from another perspective. To the degree that 
one is successful in such an endeavour, though, one is then not doing anthropology since the unfamiliar 
one works to make familiar - the perspective of the Other that one works to make his or her own - is 
no longer different. Doing anthropology successfully therefore means not doing anthropology at all (by 
definition, if anthropology depends upon the unfamiliarity of the investigative object). The contrastive 
assumptions are constitutive of the discursive practice which is anthropology/ethnography, and it is the 
management of the tension between these conflicting demands that the business of anthropology is all 
about. A good ethnography (meaning, a successful one) is one that manages the tension between these 
two gestures such that they can both be sustained. 
6. It is rather attractive - though certainly beyond what is warranted by the data here - to read this 
as a sort of comparative allusion to a teleology that culminates in secularization. For example, just as 
Lofgen (1985; cited in Shapiro, 1992: Ch. 1, n. 6-10) reads the treatment of animals and their adoption 
as pets to express a bourgeois contempt for the agrarian peasantry whose contrastive use of livestock 
it metonymically represents, so too here the reference to God might be taken to represent an earlier, 
pre-secularized and therefore unsophisticated persona from which the speakers work to distance 
themselves with the invocation. The inference would be that the speakers' narrative of personal 
experience somehow mirrors or otherwise corresponds with an assumed developmental teleology which 
is itself being made relevant to give purchase to the overall work of the narrative in elaborating the 
temporal disjunction that attends to the conflicting demands for accountability. Thus, just as Western 
society has developed from the pre-secularized, religious state alluded to with the invocation of the 
deity, so too the speakers have analogously changed from who it is that they were at the time of their 
initial arrival to Kuwait. Notice, the claim here would not be that such a teleology is manifested in the 
talk; but rather that a comparative analogy is inferentially made available to effect the display of change 
that the narrative accomplishes and which that work of managing conflicting demands for accountability 
depends upon. 
7. `For the scientist, this device [the TWOD] is important not because it reconciles potential 
contradictions between versions, but because it re-establishes the importance of the empiricist 
repertoire' (Potter and Wetherell, ibid. ). 
8. See, for example, some of the autobiographical descriptions of the ethnographer's accounts of their 
first encounters with the Yanoama people of the central Brazil as reviewed by Smole (1976: Ch. 1-2). 
9. Edwards distinguishes between three different levels of analysis where narrative is regarded as 
providing: (1) a picture of the events to which the narrative account refers, (2) a picture of the 
understanding that a narrator or narrators have of an event, and (3) a resource by which speakers 
pursue the business of their talk. In drawing these distinctions, Edwards seeks to subsume the first and 
second types of analysis into an analytic framework in which representation is approached in terms of 
its action orientation. Thus, `[w]hereas we might assume, common-sensically, that events come first, 
followed by (distorted) understandings of them, followed by (distorted) verbal expressions of those 
understandings, type 3 inverts that, and treats both understandings and events themselves as 
participants' concerns - the stuff that talk works up and deals with' (Edwards, 1997: 272). 
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Chapter 6 
RESPECTING THE WISHES OF OTHERS 
Providing for the Relevance of Cultural 
Sensitivity in Arguing for the Legitimacy 
of Western Involvement Abroad 
The previous three chapters have seen us exploring a range of different discursive 
devices that speakers deploy as a way of attending to conflicting demands for 
accountability. Specifically, we have examined a range of different ways in which 
speakers work to attend to demands for accountability to assumptions regarding 
cultural sensitivity, on the one hand, and prejudice on the other. One of the crucial 
points we considered throughout the preceding chapters, is that it is in and through 
the very activity of orienting to these assumptions that speakers constitute their 
situated undertaking as one for which these very demands are relevant. That is, it is 
in the very activity of orienting to the task of their talk as one which involves these 
very concerns, and in the activity of attending to the significance of their 
contributions for the implications they might potentially be construed as making 
available, that speakers display and thereby constitute their talk as being about such 
concerns. We also saw how in managing the conflict between the various demands 
to which they attend, speakers also work to maintain the availability of both sets of 
assumptions as relevant to accounting for their own participation in the circumstances 
by which their talk is occasioned. That is, they show themselves to be oriented to a 
range of different - and what might otherwise be regarded as conflicting - demands 
in their talk, thereby working to achieve in their interaction an activity which attends 
to such demands for accountability as constitutive of the form of talk in which they 
participate. 
Now, in this chapter our concern is to explore how this range of assumptions 
is made relevant in very specific argumentative contexts as a way of attending to the 
rhetorical work of legitimating Western involvement in the Middle East. In particular, 
the issue here is not simply one of how speakers attend to the demands for 
accountability which they do, but also one of how they deploy these same assumptions 
while discussing the legitimacy of Western involvement in other parts of the world. 
How, the question might be posed, are speakers able to justify their own participation 
with such involvement in a discursive context where they display an orientation to 
issues of racism, prejudice and the sensitivity to cultural difference as complainable 
matters? That is, how do speakers orient with their contributions to the potential 
construal of their own participation in circumstances to which they refer as 
accountable (and potentially complainable), while at the same time legitimating that 
participation? As we shall see, doing so involves some rather complicated rhetorical 
work. This is the case because not only do speakers act to foreclose the potential for 
their participation to be construed along these lines (as we have already seen in the 
preceding chapters); but they also spend time reconstructing assumptions that 
elsewhere imply the illegitimacy of Western involvement to stress legitimacy. That 
is, the nature and relevance of these assumptions is worked up in a way that is 
suitable to the particular occasion of use (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). For example, we will see the way sensitivity to cultural difference 
can be reworked so that it is not exclusively available as a way of undermining the 
legitimacy of Western involvement abroad. 
This chapter thus is concerned to explore some of a range of different 
argumentative contexts in which sensitivity to cultural difference is made relevant as 
a way of sanctioning Western involvement abroad. What is particularly significant 
about this is that in talk where speakers attend to a distinction between Western and 
non-Western identities, those speakers orient to the problematic relevance of these 
identities while doing so in such a way that nevertheless legitimates sustaining the 
distinction itself. They are thus able to attend to the demands for cultural 
sensitivity - that one be aware of, sensitive to, and in general tolerant of alternative 
perspectives (glossed in terms of cultural values and expectations) - while at the 
same time working to undermine the basis in alterity upon which that very distinction 
is itself rendered meaningful. This is an issue that we remarked upon in the preceding 
chapter with reference to the constitutive work of an anthropological discursive 
practice. Here, the relevance of these assumptions will be explored for the potential 
they have to legitimate Western involvement abroad. 
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Having a Clue: Making Sense of Military Conflict in the Persian Gulf 
One of the most frequent and ardently discussed instances of Western foreign 
involvement throughout the entire corpus of analytic material upon which this thesis 
draws is that of the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91. This particular episode of 
military confrontation is one for which there are a great number of alternative 
interpretations and whose significance is a matter of some controversy. This was 
particularly evident at the time the interview material was collected. ' In this section, 
we will explore how the status of the activities surrounding this event (for how they 
relate to accountability for the conflict, the legitimacy of activities conducted during 
hostilities, etc. ) are argumentatively informed by assumptions regarding the nature of 
cultural difference. The following material is taken from the same interview as that 
from which Extract 5.1 and Extract 5.5 in Chapter 5 above are taken. In the 
particular sequence discussed here, the speakers are concerned with the significance 
of events leading up to the initiation of armed confrontation between the United States 
and Iraq, addressing their remarks to the controversial nature (initially glossed as 
`criticism', line 1) of competing accounts of u. s. actions. That is, their concern here 
is not so much one of which party is responsible for the conflict per se (though this 
is a related matter to which their talk is addressed) as much as it is to address this 
issue relative to competing accounts. Thus, the issue is not exclusively one of 
developing an adequate account, but rather also of how speakers work to establish a 
procedure by which to decide upon the ratifying of a specific account. Speakers are 
concerned to make sense of the variation in accounts and to manage that variation in 
the sanctioning of the particular account they seek to promote. 
(6.1) Interview, 29 - corporate sales representative 
1 KM : 
2 
3 
4 
5 AP: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
there's quite a lot of critifs- criticism that's flying around uh- you 
know, that the United States uh- it wasn't necessary x to pursue the- 
the military objective, 
No =I think anyone who says that doesn't- has never really lived in 
the Middle East. I think people in Middle East, if there's one thing 
they understand it's power, a=nd you- it- it's from a very young 
age kids are taught how to be bullies and that's really encouraged, 
you know, "You want something, you take it", okay, so people 
operate here from a position of power, alright, there's no such thing 
as- let me give you an example, <PI don't know if this makes 
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12 sense to you but P>, I had my son in a Montessori school in (NAME 
13 OF U. S. CITY), 
14 KM: Mm [hm. ] 
15 AP: [where] everything was like "You're playing with the to=y and 
16 if the child wants the to =y so you come up and you say < cH 
17 `Hello, I would like to play with the toy also, can I have it from 
18 you, or would you like to share with me, okay"', in the- CH > in 
19 the Middle East you go into a nursery school the kid's playing with 
20 a toy, the other kid wants it he goes over and punches the kid in the 
21 face and takes it and no one will say anything about it, okay? That's 
22 the way it is. And that's the way they are encou=raged from the 
23 time they're very young. It's a very dog-eat-dog world, a=nd 
24 nothing is understood but power. And that's the way things get 
25 do=ne, alliances- it's- it's n- it's- that's it. And that's the way the 
26 countries interact with each other, it's a=ll- you know, it's power. 
27 A=nd coming in here and saying- slapping Saddam Hussein on the 
28 hand and saying "Shame on you, you shouldn't be doing this", it's 
29 bullshit, it doesn't work over here, people do not think the way that 
30 people in the WEST think, it's a completely different way of 
31 thinking, you know? 
32 
33 KM: Mm. 
34 AP: It's- that's the way it is. [It's a com-] completely different outlook, 
35 KM: [Mm=. ] 
36 AP: political, why do you think they have problems in the Middle East, 
37 you know, I mean why are we- why- WE had so many problems 
38 dealing with the Middle East, because we don't understand that. 
One of the first things to notice about this sequence in the way in which speaker AP 
works to make a range of assumptions regarding socialisation and developmental 
processes of socialisation available as explanatory resources with which to account for 
u. s. activities (as necessarily responsive to Iraqi actions). ' Here, the comparative 
metaphor of nursery school interaction is worked up as a means of accounting for the 
events leading up to and culminating in armed hostilities between the United States 
and Iraq. More specifically, this comparison works to make available a particular 
range of assumptions concerning the nature of socialisation - viz. that individual 
behaviour can be accounted for as determined by a set of norms and expectations 
constitutive of one's social environment, and further that such norms are acquired 
through a process that begins in early childhood. ' 
Another aspect of this comparative anecdote is that in relating the personal 
nature of speaker AP's circumstances (involving, as it does, her own individual 
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experience with child-care), there is involved an implicit assertion of experiential 
authority in making the related claim to knowledge. In this way, speaker AP attends 
to her credibility as a contributor to the encounter. Moreover, this analogy allows for 
the development of a comparison along a particular trajectory. Specifically, the 
reference to personal relations that is made relevant here to inform issues of u. s. 
diplomatic policy is productively ambiguous (Billig, 1991: 147-149; Edwards, 1997: 
96-100) for how the individual person of Saddam Hussein is regarded as both 
metonymically representative of Irag4 as well as exemplifying of a characteristic 
mode of political relations glossed as `dog-eat-dog' (line 23). This ambiguity thus 
makes it possible to account for U. S. actions in the conflict without, however, 
imputing responsibility directly to either the Iraqi president or the Iraqi governmental 
policy. Where the question might arise of whether the incursion into Kuwait merited 
sanction, then the argument could be made that Saddam Hussein, as a result of his 
socialisation, acted in an illegitimately violent fashion. Further, where the question 
of whether U. S. response to his actions was excessive (in that its effect extended to 
other Iraqi parties), then that response could be legitimated as appropriate since 
Saddam Hussein represents the intentions of all Iraqis (seeing that they are all, by 
definition, the outcome of the same processes of socialisation). In this way, the 
ambiguous nature of the implicit assumptions concerning socialisation are made 
available to foreclose a potential range of related but competing demands for 
accountability. Where Iraqi policy might be regarded in terms of what is or is not 
diplomatically justified, the personality of Saddam Hussein is implicitly available to 
account for U. S. actions as legitimately responsive. At the same time, where the issue 
of an individual's actions are regarded for whether the extent of responsibility lies 
solely with that individual, then his status as metonymic works to legitimate policy 
actions. Blurring the distinction between Saddam Hussein-as-individual and Saddam 
Hussein-as-representative thus works to foreclose demands that U. S. actions in the 
conflict are accountable as either misdirected or excessive. 
In terms of the details of how this is brought off, the account speaker AP 
develops here works rather elegantly in managing the relevance of the assumptions 
involved. Specifically, a diplomatic (rather than military) response to the Iraqi 
incursion into Kuwait is implicitly regarded as not only ineffective, but inappropriate 
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given the assumptions that a comparison with nursery school interaction makes 
available (`A=nd coming in here and saying- slapping Saddam Hussein on the hand 
and saying "Shame on you, you shouldn't be doing this", it's bullshit, it doesn't work 
over here', lines 28-30). Thus, providing for the relevance of such assumptions in this 
way effectively works to manage the potential for the pertinent u. s. activities to be 
made accountable as more appropriately having required diplomatic initiative or some 
other non-military response (such as the exclusive imposition of economic and/or 
diplomatic sanctions) as implicitly made available with the interviewer question 
('there's quite a lot of critifs- criticism that's flying around uh- you know, that the 
United States uh- it wasn't necessary x to pursue the- the military objective', lines 1- 
3). In other words, speaker AP's contribution works to address the criticism of u. s. 
activities by providing for a range of alternative assumptions implicitly made available 
in the interviewer question. 
This work is particularly relevant to our concern with the argumentative 
implications of assumptions regarding cultural sensitivity in that the mode of 
interaction which the comparative anecdote makes available is contrasted with what 
is taken as the Western mode of interaction ('people do not think the way that people 
in the WEST think, it's a completely different way of thinking, you know? ', lines 30- 
32). This, in turn, makes it possible to account for alternative, non-metaphoric ways 
of explaining the events surrounding the initiation of armed hostilities - whose 
credibility speaker AP works here to undermine - as arising from a lack of 
awareness of socio-cultural difference (`No= I think anyone who says that doesn't- 
has never really lived in the Middle East', lines 5-6). Further, in that she implicates 
both herself and the interviewer through the self-deprecatory remarks which this 
involves ('we don't understand that', line 39), speaker AP also acts to inoculate the 
rhetorical design of her talk on this point from further interrogation (Potter, 1997: 
150-158) since to disagree with the assessment that she offers would entail conceding 
the very assumptions which are at issue. 
In other words, to contest the assumptions made available with her inclusive 
reference would be to claim that people in the West do indeed understand the Middle 
East; and this, in turn, would undermine the very demands for accountability to which 
her comments are addressed. By implicating the participants themselves as included 
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among the group of those holding Western values, speaker AP can implicate both 
herself and the interviewer in the u. s. activities in question. In this way, her 
contribution very nicely exploits the implicational potential of a self-deprecatory 
remark in that responding with a preferred second turn pair-part (i. e., disagreement) 
would necessarily entail disagreement with the assertion in the first part (Levinson, 
1983; Nofsinger, 1991). Attending to the critical implications of speaker AP's 
remarks here in the talk would entail a great deal of additional interactional work on 
the part of her interlocutor to establish the distinction as relevant to the talk. 
On the whole, then, speaker AP's use of this anecdote as a way of making 
sense of the events surrounding the u. s. use of military force against Iraq is attending 
to a great range of interactionally relevant business in this talk. Not only does it work 
to control or selectively provide for the relevance of a range of assumptions, but it 
also accomplishes the work of attending to the epistemological warrant (and therefore 
the credibility) of the account she seeks to sanction in her talk. At the same time, she 
also attends with this very same account to the significance of her contribution as 
constitutive of the talk as well. So, just as we have seen with regard to the use of 
narrative in the previous chapter, so too with the deployment of the anecdote here, 
she works to foreclose the possibility that her account might be construed as 
prejudicially motivated. That is, speaker AP attends to the potential for the socialising 
account which she seeks to sanction to be taken as reductionist with and in the 
relating of the anecdote itself. Thus, where initially she offers a legitimating account 
of u. s. activity with a straightforward assertion of characteristic features ('if there's 
one thing they understand it's power', lines 7-8), she attends to the potential for her 
activity of doing so itself to be construed as prejudicial through the comparative 
analogy which she then goes on to develop ('a=nd you- it- it's from a very young 
age kids are taught how to be bullies and that's really encouraged', lines 8-9). In this 
way, her use of this anecdote rather elegantly accomplishes a range of different 
business. 
Again, this is particularly interesting for how it relates to our concern with 
the argumentative deployment of assumptions about cultural sensitivity in that this 
range of work is accomplished in working to legitimate Western involvement with 
reference to cultural sensitivity. That is, the u. s. pursuit of military confrontation 
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with Iraq is legitimated as an instance of cultural sensitivity since to have acted 
otherwise would implicitly be regarded as displaying an unawareness of and 
insensitivity to the socio-cultural norms and expectations of the region. Thus, in such 
an argumentative context, for the United States to have refrained from pursuing 
violent confrontation with Iraq in the Gulf crisis is potentially accountable as the lack 
of sensitivity. In this way, the use of force and the failure to appeal to diplomatic or 
alternative avenues for resolving conflict are advocated with reference to cultural 
sensitivity and tolerance of alternative perspectives. With this implicit appeal to 
cultural sensitivity, the speaker is thus able to take up a position which, in other 
rhetorical circumstances, could conceivably be employed to oppose the use of military 
force in order to argue instead for the legitimacy of military intervention. This 
involves a rhetorical turning-of-the-tables, as it were, in that what might otherwise 
be regarded as tough aggression is implicitly worked up as an instance of cultural 
sensitivity. Specifically, the implication would seem to be that when the United States 
acts in this way, it is displaying the ability to adapt to the culture of the other. 
Working Against Time: Difference and the Perils of Acculturation 
So far we have explored one sequence of talk where speakers attend to the work of 
legitimating U. S. involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis as a controversial matter. That 
is, we have seen how speakers work to situate the particular account which they seek 
to endorse within a rhetorical context of alternative and competing accounts, and how 
this involves undermining the alternatives through the implicit providing for of 
assumptions regarding the merits of tolerance for and sensitivity to differences in 
socio-cultural norms and values. Yet another competing account of Western 
involvement to which speakers attend in their talk about the Gulf crisis is one 
involving duplicity on the part of the United States in its relations with Iraq in the 
period leading up to the conflict itself. Such an account makes sense of U. S. activities 
during that time as designed to encourage an Iraqi attack on Kuwait so as to provide 
a pretext for Western military intervention in the region, presumably as a means of 
insuring continued Western-based corporate access to the region's oil resources 
(Benin, 1991; Emery, 1991; Hulet, 1991; Kellner, 1992; Norris, 1992; Stockwell, 
1991). Such an account of U. S. involvement -a `green light theory' of U. S. 
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diplomatic activity - is one to which a great number of speakers contrast the version 
of events they seek to promote, just as the speaker recorded in Extract 6.1 above 
attends to the controversiality of her account. In other words, part of the work of 
legitimating the u. s. use of military force involves the undermining of an explanation 
which would otherwise render that activity culpable. 
Consider the following extract which is the record of an exchange in which 
the speakers attend to such concerns. Again, just as we have seen in the previous 
material, a particularly interesting aspect of this sequence is how assumptions 
concerning cultural sensitivity are made available as a way of undermining the 
plausibility of some alternative account. This material is taken from the same 
interview as that which we encountered in our analyses of Extract 3.4 and Extract 3.5 
in Chapter 3 above. 
(6.2) Interview, 37 - business manager 
1 KM: I mean why- why do you think the United States u=h- pursued the 
2 Gulf War, um- 
3 
4 VE: Well, cynics say that the United States will pursue a policy uh- that 
5 is right only when it is also beneficial to us. I mean, when it's 
6 morally right and beneficial. When it's morally right but financially 
7 "it's going to cost us a bomb we're not going to do it", u=h- and if 
8 it makes money-sense but it's morally wrong we may steer away 
9 from it for fear of criticism but in the case of Kuwait it- it satisfied 
10 both criterias that- you know, it was morally right and also was 
11 u=h- something that we would benefit from in the long run, my uh- 
12 ... 
13 KM: I mean, some critics would go further than that and [say that] 
14 VE: [Mm hm. ] 
15 KM: (CLEARS THROAT) the United States for example um- (Hx)@ in 
16 essence uh- lead Iraq into a war, um- drew Iraq in the war as a 
17 pretext to attack for the uh- benefit that it- Western corporate 
18 interests would derive in this region. 
19 
20 VE: U=m- I don't know. Uh- I had a discussion just like that the other 
21 day and it- it is quite interesting that the uh- American ambassador 
22 to Baghdad said to uh- the government of Iraq <P just like, xI 
23 think, two weeks before the invasion P> that the United States 
24 u=h- would not involve itself in the affairs of Baghdad vis-a-vis 
25 Kuwait, something like that, and uh- it was uh- understood to be 
26 that if- if uh- Iraq decided to take the Rumaila oilfields that, you 
27 know, the United States would not uh- take action. (Hx) U=m- 
28 certainly the United States knew of the military build-up on the 
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29 border, I don't think anybody's ever argued about THAT, what is 
30 also true is that without decent xx we have uh- no way of knowing 
31 their inTENtions, they may have been just trying to scare the- the 
32 Kuwaitis at the bargaining table, say "Okay, you either sign here 
33 or", you know, "I've got a hundred-thousand troops sitting on the 
34 border and we're going to storm the place if you don't agree", 
35 u=m- I don't know, I- I- I- f- first of all I think that our h- our 
36 human intelligence effort is- is extremely bad, <P extremely bad, I 
37 don't think we have a clue as to what's going on in the Middle East 
38 P>, (Hx) uh- first of all because the people- (Hx) well, uh- one of 
39 the problems that you face, international companies often hesitate to 
40 keep somebody in a place for more than three years because they 
41 become too local. They start thinking well- "Well accepting bribes 
42 is normal- uh- you know, as a way of life, I give bribes, they give 
43 me bribes and it's okay", uh- or as one story went, you know the 
44 first year they sent him a bottle of scotch, the second year he told 
45 them "I don't drink scotch, I drink gin", the third year he said "I 
46 drink only Beefeaters", and so it gradually goes from a gift to being 
47 a solicited bribe you see. So time works against you u=h- and 
48 though you do want to have some knowledge of- of the culture in a 
49 situation, you want to preserve the uh- culture- the identity uh- that 
50 you're representing so that if I ran this hotel- <P well this is not a 
51 good example because we're in a very odd situation here P>, but 
52 let's say if you sent me to a developing country in Africa, you 
53 would not want to come back after three years and find that 
54 everything was the same standard as in the country. We were 
55 serving nothing but local food at the table and uh- you know, we 
56 were all eating with spears and- and I don't know WHAT you 
57 know, that would not be their intention in sending me there, they 
58 won't- sent ME there as a foreigner to bring foreign standards to 
59 that hotel, <P foreign standards of cleanliness, foreign standards of 
60 service, foreign standards of food P>, and so forth, so uh- if you 
61 spend too long in a time there's the- the danger that you may 
62 become too much uh- a part of uh- the society that you're working 
63 in, (Hx) so uh- the- this- the uh- American agencies, <P I guess the 
64 CIA is the one that sends the- the- the "spies" P> , uh- they probably 
65 have a- a little bit of a problem because if they send a guy into a 
66 country, he doesn't have a clue about the culture, not really, 
67 because he's not, you know, living it every DAY, he comes in 
68 every day, he works- well they- most of them work for an 
69 embassies I think, huh? 
70 
71 KM: Mm mm. 
72 VE: <PI think that's a typical standard anyway P>, that- and so that- 
73 they're getting all of their stuff from the Px ((POST EXCHANGE)), 
74 you know, they get their uh- Hunt's catsup and uh- you know, their 
75 uh- the- everything American, right? Their Oscar Meyer uh- 
76 weiners with uh- hamburger and uh- that has pork and I don't know 
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77 what and what, oblivious to where they are, and they're supposed to 
78 go out there and f- have a feel for what's happening, when we had 
79 the situation in Iran here, the CIA never saw the thing coming 
80 because their guys were all drinking cocktails with the elite and they 
81 didn't have a CLUE what was going down on the street, they 
82 weren't shopping in the markets where there were shortages, they 
83 weren't- you know- and it goes on and on, so uh- you- you get into 
84 a situation where, you know, how- how close to the culture do you 
85 want to be, (Hx) for the CIA to be very close to the people- to the 
86 culture was- would have been necessary I think to = understand 
87 what was going to happen and I don't think that they were really 
88 there, I don't think they had enough contacts at the lower levels to 
89 really do it, at the higher levels everybody was walking around 
90 smiling, talking about Arab brotherly love and so forth uh- while 
91 the tanks were all on flatcars heading for the border. 
This is a particularly lengthy extract of material involving a rather wide range of 
complex and intricate interactional and implicationally related argumentative work. 
We might begin exploring this talk by noting how speaker VE attends from the very 
outset to the issue of u. s. accountability in a quite astute and dextrous fashion. 
His opening remarks (lines 4-11) attend to a range of possible criticisms about 
the motivation for U. S. activity abroad while at the same time working to obviate the 
demand for the activities to be made accountable in this particular case. In other 
words, with his remarks to question the relevance of the distinction in the case under 
discussion, he works to establish the exceptionality of the episode in question ('but 
in the case of Kuwait it- it satisfied both criteria that- you know, it was morally right 
and also was a=h- something that we would benefit from in the long run', lines 9- 
11). In addition, with his gloss on the account in question as cynical ('Well, cynics 
say', line 4), and with his remark attending to the potential for u. s. actions to be 
construed as reactionary ('we may steer away from it for fear of criticism', lines 8-9), 
he is able to adopt a kind of situated neutrality in keeping with the suspension of 
demands for accountability that he works to achieve here. In this way, he is able to 
be responsive to the potential criticism as a complainable matter without, however, 
providing for its relevance in this particular case. Thus, he can attend to the interview 
situation as an encounter which has these demands for accountability as it concern, 
while at the same time working to manage the relevance of assumptions which those 
demands make available. ' 
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The uptake with which speaker VE's contribution is met in speaker KM's 
response (lines 13-18) is quite interesting for how he resists this work of suspending 
demands for accountability in speaker VE's prior turn-at-talk (thereby displaying that 
he regards that contribution to be undertaking just such work). In his own 
contribution, speaker KM aligns himself with the assumptions to which his 
interlocutor attends while resisting the argumentative significance they might 
otherwise make available ('I mean, some critics would go further than that and say', 
line 13). In this way, both speakers attend to the reflexive significance of their talk 
as constitutive of the interaction to which it is a contribution. They are able to sustain 
the interactional proceedings as an encounter which has as its constitutive concern the 
range of conflicting assumptions regarding the nature of culture on the one hand and 
prejudice on the other while simultaneously attending to the work of negotiating the 
significance of the argumentative positions relative to those very demands. Thus, in 
addressing speaker VE's contribution in the way that he does, speaker KM is able to 
attend to his interlocutor's contribution as relevant even while deploying that very 
relevance as a means with which to contest the situated work that it would otherwise 
accomplish here. 
In terms of our interest with how the argumentative implications of 
assumptions related to cultural sensitivity are developed to legitimate Western 
involvement abroad, the initial part of speaker VE's first extended contribution (lines 
20-38) is of particular concern. Specifically, the account of activities preceding the 
Iraqi incursion into Kuwait that he develops (lines 20-27) attends to the potential for 
u. s. diplomatic activities to be regarded as raising a range of argumentatively 
significant implications for u. s. culpability. At the same time, however, it 
simultaneously works to reject the relevance of those very implications. This is 
further effected through the development of a comparative account of Iraqi actions as 
strategically designed ('they may have been just trying to scare the- the Kuwaitis at 
the bargaining table, say "Okay, you either sign here or", you know, "I've got a 
hundred-thousand troops sitting on the border and we're going to storm the place if 
you don't agree"', lines 31-34). In other words, speaker VE's consideration of an 
alternative account of Iraqi actions (as intended to frighten) displays a range of 
possible explanations with which to account for Iraqi intentions. The massing of 
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troops on the border might thus have been seen as either a prelude to invasion or as 
a mere scare-tactic -a kind of sabre-rattling. 
The point for an analysis of the talk here is that this range of accounts is 
itself assembled as a way of working to undermine an explanation of u. s. culpability 
since it implies the possibility of misjudgment on the part of the United States. How, 
the question might be asked, could the U. S. be held accountable for the response of 
Iraq given that there is a range of equally plausible explanations for why Iraqi troops 
were massed on the border with which to contend? In this way, speaker VE can 
rather elegantly manage the relevance of the assumptions implying u. s. culpability, 
working not to exclude them from consideration as such but rather to suspend them 
from interrogation for purposes of the discussion at hand. In other words, he 
effectively works to realise the talk as an encounter which has as its concern issues 
of (how, in this case, to determine) accountability per se rather than one that has as 
its concern which of the principal parties to the Gulf War is responsible for the 
activities leading up to that event. 
All of this situated interactional work further provides an occasion for speaker 
VE to problematise the issue of u. s. knowledgability concerning the nature of the 
region's activities ('I think that our h- our human intelligence effort is- is extremely 
bad, <P extremely bad, I don't think we have a clue as to what's going on in the 
Middle East P>', lines 35-38). That is, he is able to raise the issue of u. s. 
knowledgability about what he takes to be interactional features characteristically 
endemic of the region, implicitly offering a critique to the effect that awareness of 
and sensitivity to such features is itself to be regarded as an accountable matter. In 
doing so, he is able to develop a range of argumentative inferences which he 
subsequently elaborates upon at some length in a comparative analogy with work (a 
matter to which we turn in greater detail below). The immediate implication is that 
to the extent that the United States is to be held accountable for understanding the 
Middle East, it is obviated from the demand for accountability for the events leading 
up to the Gulf War. In other words, the implicit criticism works to suspend the 
relevance of assumptions by which U. S. responsibility is given purchase since the 
United States could not possibly have planned (and therefore be held accountable for) 
events about which its agents did not have sufficient understanding. In this way, 
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implications which might otherwise be made available to establish U. S. culpability 
(relative to the assumptions they make available - that is, whether the United States 
is or is not culturally sensitive) are provided for as a way of managing their relevance 
in the specific instance under consideration (on managing the argumentative 
entailments of general and specific inferences, see Potter, 1997: Ch. 6). 
Another particularly interesting feature of this talk is that involving the 
comparative analogy which is made available in speaker VE's discussion of work and 
service encounters abroad. That is, in his discussion of corporate policy, speaker VE 
works to corroborate the argumentative implications he has developed in his 
immediately prior talk as an account for Western unfamiliarity with the region's 
cultural norms ('international companies often hesitate to keep somebody in a place 
for more than three years because they become too local', lines 39-41). In this way, 
he attends to the inferential work made available with his critique of Western 
knowledgability as potentially contentious. That is, the work he does here has 
implications for culpability in the specific argumentative context in which they occur. 
Further, his doing this involves the relating of anecdotal accounts (concerning the 
solicitation of a bribe, lines 43-47; and the description of u. s. diplomatic relations in 
pre-revolutionary Iran, lines 71-81) whose narrative details further work to buttress 
the inferences made available, rendering it with the credibility appropriate to the 
category entitlement of someone with a considerable degree of relevant experience. 
The argumentative implications for culpability are thus substantiated with specific 
detail. 
Note here also the variable contingency of the assumptions regarding 
tolerance for difference as made available in such anecdotes. Awareness of and 
sensitivity to cultural difference is informed by criteria which are independent of the 
values so glossed. Thus, where a tolerance for difference is said to involve the threat 
of adopting modes of interaction regarded as unacceptable - `going native', so to 
speak (as with the case of soliciting a bribe) - an opposite failure to exhibit such 
sensitivity is made available to manage the accountability of u. s. actions in diplomatic 
interaction (in the case of pre-revolutionary Iran). Thus, assumptions concerning 
awareness of and sensitivity to different cultural expectations varies depending upon 
the inferences for accountability made available in the context of their use. In other 
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words, awareness of and sensitivity to cultural difference is regarded as positive to 
the extent that it allows one to anticipate the activities of an Other, but not to the 
extent that one becomes tolerant of the implications for accountability that such 
activities entail. Awareness of and sensitivity to cultural difference is thus attended 
to as accountable, and yet the implications that are potentially made available in 
reference thereto can also be employed as a resource in foreclosing the very demands 
for accountability which they might otherwise entail. 
This sort of tension is particularly apparent in the account of CIA 
incomprehension of and failure to anticipate the Islamic revolution in Iran ('the CIA 
never saw the thing coming because their guys were all drinking cocktails with the 
elite and they didn't have a CLUE what was going down on the street, they weren't 
shopping in the markets where there were shortages, they weren't- you know- and it 
goes on and on, so uh- you- you get into a situation where, you know, how- how 
close to the culture do you want to be', lines 78-84). Specifically, providing for a 
distinction as between the insular concerns of a diplomatic elite and the more 
pedestrian affairs of the local population very nicely attends to the accountability for 
U. S. diplomatic activity at anticipating the activities of its interlocutor while at the 
same time attending to accountability for awareness of cultural difference. That is, 
awareness of difference is attended to as accountable, but it relevance is provided for 
only to the extent that it works to attend to U. S. culpability for the events of the 
revolution. At the same time, the related deprecation of the U. S. intelligence 
community (with which the speakers are implicitly associated by virtue of their 
citizenship status) nicely works to display disinterestedness on the part of speaker VE. 
In this way, he is able simultaneously to accomplish two different types of discursive 
work. 
A further, and perhaps more significant feature of the work that speaker VE 
attends to here with his discussion of service encounters is to provide an implicitly 
comparative analogy by which u. s. military involvement is legitimated. Specifically, 
an appeal to cultural identity as legitimating foreign (presumably Western) corporate 
involvement attends to the potential for such involvement to be construed as 
deleterious to the identity of the cultural Other ('and though you do want to have 
some knowledge of- of the culture in a situation, you want to preserve the uh- 
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culture- the identity uh- that you're representing', lines 47-50). This appeal rather 
neatly works to legitimate u. s. corporate involvement as necessary for the 
preservation of cultural identity while at the same time making it possible to appeal 
to a demand for tolerance of the wishes of the Other whose identity is to so be 
preserved. The argument here seems to be that foreign (Western) corporate 
involvement is necessary in order to sustain the cultural identity of the Other while 
at the same time attending to the wishes (for foreign standards) which a sensitivity to 
that identity requires ('you would not want to come back after three years and find 
that everything was the same standard as in the country [... ] that would not be their 
intention in sending me there, they won't- sent ME there as a foreigner to bring 
foreign standards to that hotel, <P foreign standards of cleanliness, foreign standards 
of service, foreign standards of food P> , and so 
forth', lines 52-60). For the Other 
to work at attaining the foreign standards which he or she demands would be to 
compromise his or her very identity as Other. 6 
Within the discursive context of the argument speaker VE works here to 
develop, it is the analogous interest in preserving identity which here implicitly 
legitimates u. s. military involvement as well. That is, just as the legitimacy of foreign 
corporate involvement is worked up in reference to the sanctity of cultural identity, 
so too u. s. culpability for the undertaking of violent conflict with Iraq is managed by 
appeal to the sanctity of the Other's alterity. Thus, in just the same way as Western 
corporate representatives cannot be expected to take on the perspective of the Other 
for fear of adopting negative values, so too u. s. representatives cannot be expected 
to understand the cultural Other (and therefore cannot be held accountable for 
anticipating the responsive intentions of that Other). In other words, culture and the 
notion of cultural sensitivity, while it is made accountable, is nonetheless 
argumentatively made relevant as a way of attending to the accountability of the 
United States for manipulating the circumstances that resulted in the military conflict 
with Iraq. With this comparison, speaker VE is able to manage the demands for 
accountability to assumptions of cultural sensitivity, while nevertheless 
argumentatively employing those very demands as a way of obviating the u. s. from 
responsibility for its involvement in the Gulf War. ' The double-sided nature of 
alterity is thus useful as a way of attending to accountability. On can either not be 
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accountable for an Other's reactions (since the assumption of alterity works to manage 
the responsibility for one's contribution in dialogic interaction), or else one can be 
made accountable for sustaining difference as such. To take the view of the Other is 
thus potentially held accountable as exhibiting a lack of respect for the sanctity of 
alterity. 
The Palestinian Diaspora and the Legitimacy of Policy 
In looking at the talk that we have considered in this chapter thus far, we have been 
concerned to examine how assumptions regarding the awareness of, sensitivity to, and 
tolerance for cultural difference are made available to argue for the legitimacy of 
(Western) foreign involvement in the Middle East. In particular, we have explored 
how specific aspects of the U. S. pursuit of violent military conflict with Iraq in the 
Gulf War are worked up as blameless, sanctionable, inculpable - that is, 
accountable - with reference to a range of concerns which are said to attend to 
cultural difference. As we have seen, it is in this way that Western involvement in 
relation to that of its opposite in the Middle East as informed by an assumption of the 
sanctity of alterity as such is regarded as legitimate - either as owing to the 
inevitability of difference as consequential to the relation (as we saw in our analysis 
of Extract 6.1), or else as occasioning of misunderstanding (in Extract 6.2). Thus, 
in both of the conversational sequences we have examined, assumptions regarding the 
nature of cultural alterity are made relevant in attending to various demands of 
accountability. 
Now in what follows, we will consider one final example of how providing 
for the relevance of cultural difference works to legitimate activities related to the 
Gulf War. In this case, however, rather than specifically considering u. s. activities, 
we will instead examine talk in which cultural difference is made relevant to 
legitimate Kuwaiti governmental policy toward the Palestinian community of 
approximately 400,000 residents in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War. In 
particular, in this talk speakers are concerned to address the legitimacy of 
modifications in post-Gulf War Kuwait governmental employment policy which had 
the effect of excluding virtually all but a very small fraction of what had been 
Kuwait's Palestinian diaspora community from access to the benefits they had enjoyed 
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prior to the war; and resulted, for the most part, in their repatriation to surrounding 
countries (principally Jordan). ' These issues are worked up in the context of issues 
concerning Palestinian national identity and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
The principal participant in the following extract (speaker UT) was at the 
time of this interview, working as a professional sales representative for a major agri- 
business based in the United States. She was present in Kuwait during the Iraqi 
incursion on 2 August 1990 and remained there for some months afterwards before 
relocating along with the group of other Western expatriates prior to the actual 
initiation of armed hostilities. 
(6.3) Interview, 38 - corporate sales representative 
1 UT: Well, the thing is, from the first day of the invasion there are 
2 people in certain section of town where Palestinians live, <P 
3 Hawally ((SUBURB OF KUWAIT CITY)) I'm talking about P>, who 
4 were absolutely thrilled, were HELPing the Iraqi soldiers. I had a 
5 FRIEND who was turned in by a Palestinian, u=m- there were 
6 Palestinians that were hurt by other Palestinians, u= =m- let's see 
7 what else, u=m- Sudanese, some of them were like that, u=h- 
8 u=m- but what really made me angry, those who were not for 
9 Saddam, those who were against what he was doing and were=- felt 
10 threatened as well, when they left here they didn't do anything. 
11 They were silent. When we evacuated there were a lot of u=h- 
12 Palestinians <P and maybe some Lebanese with American passports 
13 P>, and well, yes, they're entitled to come with us as well, but 
14 when they got out they said nothing. They didn't say one word in 
15 defense of Kuwait or any of us that were here. They just went on 
16 with their lives, they could have cared less. That made me very 
17 sick. U=m- when I got back to my home state, there was a=m- a 
18 very v- vocal group of Arabs in my area who were telling lies, were 
19 posing as Kuwaitis a=nd saying the most derogatory things about 
20 the country and the people, 
21 
22 KM: Like what. 
23 
24 UT: a=nd- Oh, like- I- there was one Palestinian telling people "I am a 
25 Kuwaiti", an=d uh- "these people aren't worth saving, this country 
26 isn't worth sa-" <P which is a contradictory in itself, "I'm a 
27 Kuwaiti but don't save us" P>, (H) a=m- then he said "If I ever 
28 saw the Amir"- and they focused on me because I made a personal 
29 campai=gn in defense of Kuwait, u=m- he said uh- that- they sa- 
30 uh- u=h- they said "Well xx you listen to this U, if I saw the Amir 
31 I'd piss on him". That's what they would say. And I said "Well 
32 yeah? If I saw Yassar Arafat I'd piss on him". I said you're a 
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33 Palestinian you're not a Kuwaiti. <P And people are too naive, 
34 they don't know, they can't uh- d- differentiate between these Arab 
35 nationalities. I know them by their face, by their names, by their- 
36 you know, I can tell P>, (H) a =m- (Hx) there were others- Arabs 
37 from uh- northern Africa who were in our area who were all against 
38 Kuwait and the Gulf and I have no sympathy for these people 
39 whatsoever, you know? Um- tsh they're just- well first of all, 
40 they're not really Arabs because their blood is so mixed, so they 
41 don't really hold Arab values, and secondly they're just not the kind 
42 of quality people that the Gulf people are, and that sounds very 
43 racist and- but it's- I ca- you know, after what I experienced u=m- 
44 I=- I don't- I used to be very vocal in defense of the Palestinian 
45 cause, never again. A=bsolutely not. They can go fight for their 
46 own land. I(Hx)@ could care less what happens to them. (Hx) And 
47 the Lebanese (H) many of them = uh- oh- were really with u=h- 
48 the- Saddam and they could have cared less and this is only a 
49 business opportunity here. U=m- (Hx) = 
50 
51 KM: Well but do you think that u=m- (Hx) they were necessarily 
52 pro-Saddam Hussein, I mean my understanding of the- <P for 
53 example P>, the Palestinian support for um- Iraq during the war 
54 was not so much for Iraq per se as much as a way of a=h- 
55 vocalising opposition to Western intervention. 
56 ... 
57 UT: Well, no. The thing was, I mean, they were- gloated over what 
58 happened. I mean, you- you see that because it's sort of f- how the 
59 media portrays it, but in the J- (Hx) the war- <P I'll j- give you an 
60 example P>, in a Jordanian paper there was an advertisement for a 
61 Kuwaiti maid- a Kuwaiti man for- as a driver, they don't just- it 
62 isn't just to bring- focus THEIR situation in the media, or that 
63 Westerners are coming here and they're going to occupy this area, it 
64 has nothing to do with that, it ha- it's focused on- really on the 
65 HATE that they feel towards people in this country. People do not 
66 understand- in the West they don't understand the concept of this 
67 jealousy that Arabs HAVE, it sounds very juvenile and it sounds 
68 very- uh- it doesn't sound like a re- og- uh- something that could 
69 really possibly be but it IS true, they're very jealous of this region 
70 and they think these people in this area of the world are just filthy 
71 dirty ignorant Bedouins who don't deserve any of this, and "By God 
72 if WE had that money, WHAT we could do with it", we@ll they've 
73 sucked a lot of money off of here in the FIRST place. They don't 
74 HAVE to come here. They don't have to work here, u=m- tsh they 
75 don't have to come down here and make their= uh- some of them 
76 really do quite well, and some of them or- DON'T do well, <P I 
77 mean there's a lot of very poor Palestinian that families have been 
78 living in Kuwait for years P>, but there was a lot of money sucked 
79 from this area that never gets to those people to help them, it goes 
80 in the pockets of the upper echelons of the PLO, u=m- (Hx) so 
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81 when they say that "Well we- wha- what about our situation, what 
82 about our country, why doesn't somebody liberate Palestine", well, 
83 it's a matter of how they went about it. When you go off killing 
84 people and- to liberate your country, who's going to listen to you, 
85 you know? They- they s- they set themselves up for this. If they had 
86 gone to the other side and said "What Saddam did was wrong a=nd 
87 u=h- this isn't right what happened to Kuwaiti people", even if they 
88 criticised Kuwaiti people, still- still it'd be better than what they 
89 did, 
As with previous extracts, so too here there is a great deal of argumentatively 
significant work going on in this particular episode of talk. For our present purposes, 
we can begin here by noting the sheer range of different issues with which the 
speakers are concerned. These vary anywhere from the question of patriotic loyalty, 
to the nature and details of regional party politics, to the issue of whether violence 
is a legitimate political tool, among other things. These matters are all worked up for 
how they relate to the Palestinian population and matters of accountability for the 
circumstances affecting that population. 
More specifically, the principal argumentative concern here seems to be with 
establishing the extent to which one can be held accountable for empathising with the 
conditions of that community. That is, just as with the interactional work that we have 
seen in the previous two extracts, so too here the speakers are working to manage the 
relevance of accountability as such. In short, at issue here is whether the conditions 
of the Palestinian diaspora can legitimately be considered the concern of others, 
especially as they relate to the events developing from the war. The question raised 
here is that of when and where it is legitimate to hold others accountable for the 
conditions of the Palestinian diaspora. 9 
Now, in attending to this matter, speaker UT rather delicately manages a 
range of quite complicated reflexive work. For example, in the initial work she does 
in introducing Palestinian identity as a relevant issue, she works to foreclose the 
potential construal of her providing for that relevance as itself motivated - as 
perhaps preconceived. In other words, she attends to the potential that her talk might 
be regarded as an indication of an initial predisposition to dislike Palestinians, and 
that it is for that reason that she takes the position she does. Thus, in broaching the 
issue of Palestinian identity with reference to the ghettoisation of Kuwait City, she 
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implicitly recounts the stages of an inferential process whereby she can be seen to 
have determined that (Palestinian) identity (`from the first day of the invasion there 
are people in certain section of town where Palestinians live, <P Hawally ((SUBURB 
OF KUWAIT CITY)) I'm talking about P>, who were absolutely thrilled, were 
HELPing the Iraqi soldiers', lines 1-4). Even the nature of that inferentially 
significant notice-taking is itself attended to similarly with the remark upon its timely 
aspect (`from the first day of the invasion', line 1), as well as with the comparative 
mention of other, non-Palestinian identities as a means to display a lack of exclusivity 
in attending to identity (`u= =m- let's see what else, u=m- Sudanese, some of them 
were like that', lines 6-7). 
In this way, the speaker reflexively attends to the potential for her talk and 
the work that is undertaken with that talk itself to be regarded as indicative of a 
prejudicial antipathy toward Palestinians. This particular feature characterises her talk 
throughout this sequence. Further along these lines, she works throughout to portray 
her argumentative position as a sort of outlook which she has belatedly, if reluctantly, 
adopted ('I used to be very vocal in defense of the Palestinian cause, never again. 
A=bsolutely not. They can go fight for their own land. I(Hx)@ could care less what 
happens to them', lines 44-46). This is an aspect of her talk that we also saw in the 
previous chapter when examining the way that speakers attend to cultural expectations 
as an outcome of events described in the narrating of personal experiences. Here this 
sort of work rather neatly attends to the reflexive implications of her own talk in that 
the display of incredulity it involves works to express a reluctance to take up a stance 
in opposition to the `Palestinian cause' (lines 44-45). 
In terms of our more immediate concern in this chapter with the 
argumentative deployment of assumptions regarding awareness of cultural difference, 
the relevance of Arab cultural identity is worked up to account for the animosity 
speaker UT construes as characterising inter-Arab relations. At the same time, such 
work involves attending to awareness of such characteristics as itself an accountable 
matter. That is, the implicit critique of ignorance about the details of what she 
construes to be Arab cultural norm itself displays an attention to the assumptions it 
raises as relevant to informing the talk ('People do not understand- in the West they 
don't understand the concept of this jealousy that Arabs HAVE, it sounds very 
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juvenile and it sounds very- uh- it doesn't sound like a re- og- uh- something that 
could really possibly be but it IS true', lines 65-69). The argumentative implication 
made available with this critique is that objecting to the particular state of affairs 
which speaker UT construes as characterising Arab relations would be accountable 
as an indication of naivete. That is, to reject the assumptions about Arab jealousy 
would itself constitute an accountable instance of cultural insensitivity. 
What is particularly interesting about this is how it relates to the 
argumentative context. In particular, making the awareness of cultural difference 
relevant in this way involves more than the work of merely construing what it is that 
characterises Arab interaction because within the rhetorical context in which this gets 
done, speaker UT is working to promote the particular take on the motivation of 
Palestinian activities in opposition to the alternative account of those activities 
proposed in the interviewer's prior turn-at-talk (`my understanding of the- <P for 
example P>, the Palestinian support for um- Iraq during the war was not so much 
for Iraq per se as much as a way of u=h- vocalising opposition to Western 
intervention', lines 52-55). Thus, her explanation of Palestinian activities (in support 
of the Iraqi regime) is significant here for the implications it raises for accountability 
for Kuwaiti governmental policy. Specifically, if Palestinian support for Iraq during 
the war can be accounted for as an instance of jealousy, then Kuwaiti policy can be 
said to be legitimately responsive - or, at least, it cannot be held accountable as 
insensitive to the plight of Palestinians. If, on the other hand, Palestinian activities 
during the war can be said to be motivated by opposition to Western involvement in 
the region's affairs, then there would be no basis upon which the Kuwaiti actions 
toward the Palestinian community could be made accountable. It is the first of these 
two accounts of Palestinian activity which speaker UT works to promote with an 
appeal to the assumptions of cultural sensitivity made available in her critique of 
Western awareness of cultural difference. Within this context, she also works to 
promote an account of Kuwaiti activity as against a range of potentially alternative 
accounts the implications of which are to raise a range of issues for Kuwaiti 
accountability. 
Notice too that while working to promote a particular account over an 
alternative in this way, that speaker UT also works to undermine that opposing 
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alternative through an account of its nature as worked up and, by implication, 
motivated ('I mean, you- you see that because it's sort of f- how the media portrays 
it', lines 58-59). She further elaborates upon this motivated status with the anecdote 
concerning the employment advertisement for a Kuwaiti driver. The implication here 
is that to have regarded a Kuwaiti citizen as a candidate for employment at a job of 
menial labour constitutes an insult. In other words, a range of assumptions concerning 
the relative(ly higher) status of Kuwaiti society in relation to other countries 
throughout the Arab world is made available to give purchase to a reading of the offer 
for employment as one involving insulting irony. With this particular anecdote, 
speaker UT very elegantly displays a familiarity with the details of Arab internal 
relations whose knowledgability she works to make accountable. At the same time, 
this also works to promote the version of events she seeks to bring about here as a 
way of attending to the matter of one's accountability for empathy in the particular 
case under consideration. 
This marshalling of critique is also employed reflexively to attend to the 
implications potentially made available in the work speaker UT does to undermine 
alternative takes on Palestinian opposition in her description of this animosity ('when 
I got back to my home state, there was a=m- a very v- vocal group of Arabs in my 
area who were telling lies, were posing as Kuwaitis a=nd saying the most derogatory 
things about the country and the people, ', lines 17-20). In particular, speaker UT 
addresses her remarks to the potential objection that the distinction she makes 
available (between Kuwaitis and other Arab nationalities) is itself designed for the 
situated purposes of promoting the account of Palestinian motivation she goes on to 
develop. "How did you know that those individuals were not, in fact, Kuwaitis", one 
possible objection might go. In making the matter of sensitivity to cultural difference 
available - here that sensitivity involving an awareness of differences which she 
construes as internally relevant for cultural participants - speaker UT nicely works 
to manage the potential for her situated activity (of introducing the relevance of the 
distinction between Arab identities) itself to be made accountable ('I said you're a 
Palestinian you're not a Kuwaiti. <P And people are too naive, they don't know, 
they can't uh- d- differentiate between these Arab nationalities. I know them by their 
face, by their names, by their- you know, I can tell P>', lines 32-36). Sensitivity to 
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cultural difference is thus marshalled here for the reflexive work it accomplishes. In 
addition, speaker UT works here to attend to the reflexive implications of this talk in 
displaying a lack of exclusive attention to Kuwaiti and Palestinian identity ('there 
were others- Arabs from uh- northern Africa who were in our area who were all 
against Kuwait and the Gulf', lines 36-38). Throughout, she works to manage the 
implications of her talk and the potential for the implications she develops with that 
talk itself to be construed as motivated. Thus, not only does she work to develop the 
distinction between Arab national identity as a way of bolstering the argument about 
Arab jealousy (and thereby working to obviate the demand to make the demographic 
policy effecting the Palestinian population accountable on other assumptions), but she 
also employs the very assumptions regarding the sanctity of identity as a means of 
reflexively situating her talk in responsive anticipation of the objections with which 
it might be met. 
Throughout this extract, we can see how this speaker works to manage a 
range of different concerns. On the one hand, she works to account for the 
circumstances of the Palestinian diaspora, displaying with that work attention to those 
circumstances as accountable. That is, she interactively works this up as a matter 
meriting of concern. At the same time, she also works to provide a specific take on 
those circumstances which effectively promotes a given explanation over alternatives 
rendering Western intervention accountable. Details concerning otherwise unnoticed 
distinctions which she construes as characteristic of Arab culture and the very critique 
of Western ignorance thereof is thus effectively deployed as a means of inoculating 
from interrogation her work to account for the circumstances effecting Palestinians 
as an instance of Arab jealousy. An explanation of Palestinian activity which accounts 
for support of Iraqi actions in terms other than those she works to promote (viz., as 
an instance of inter-Arab jealousy) is thus itself potentially made accountable as 
unaware). Thus, speaker UT forwards her remarks on Arab jealousy in the 
circumstances of demoting an alternative account - as a plausible alternative ('it isn't 
just to bring- focus THEIR situation in the media, or that Westerners are coming here 
and they're going to occupy this area, it has nothing to do with that, it ha- it's 
focused on- really on the HATE that they feel towards people in this country', lines 
61-65). Inter-Arab rivalry is the explanation that she promotes to make sense of the 
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Palestinian activity to which Kuwaiti actions are an understandable, though perhaps 
regrettable, response. The appeal to cultural sensitivity (made relevant with the 
critical reference) works to inoculate this very account from interrogation. 
Discussion: Repertoires (Reflexively) Revisited (R[R]R) 
We have examined in this chapter at least three different ways that assumptions 
regarding awareness of and sensitivity to cultural difference are made available as a 
way of legitimating Western involvement abroad. Thus, we saw how tolerance for 
cultural difference is deployed to legitimate: (1) the u. s. pursuit of armed conflict 
with Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, (2) post-Gulf War demographic policies effecting 
the Palestinian diaspora community throughout the region, and (3) Western foreign 
corporate involvement abroad. In each of these cases, the assumption of tolerance for 
cultural difference is made available rather creatively to argue implicitly for the 
legitimacy of very particular activities, and reflexively to address the potentially 
controversial nature of such arguments as situated within a rhetorical context of 
competing accounts. To have acted or to act differently in any of the instances under 
discussion (in the Gulf War, in response to demographic policy, in business) could 
potentially be construed as an instance of intolerance for what are taken to be non- 
Western cultural values. This very elegantly works to construe what it is that those 
values might consist of while at the same time (that is, with the very same activity) 
attending to tolerance for cultural difference as itself an accountable matter. 
One way of informing this sort of analytic work is with the notion of what 
Wetherell and Potter (1992, see also Potter and Wetherell, 1987), borrowing from 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), refer to with the term linguistic or interpretive repertoire. 
Interpretive repertoires involve the use of rather commonplace tropes, metaphors, 
images and/or descriptions. Such a definition should not be allowed to obfuscate the 
distinctive characteristic of a repertoire which is the action and situated rhetorical 
function achieved by means of these commonplace ways of talking. The emphasis 
here is on action as well as resource. 10 A repertoire is therefore not simply a 
structure or device as such, but rather is defined in terms of the work achieved by 
means of that device - that is, the conducting of a range of specific situated 
objectives through means of particular commonplace ways of talking. In the same way 
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that a physical object can potentially be employed as a device for an infinite range of 
purposes (say, a pen can be employed to do anything from writing an epistle to 
opening a soft-drink can to conducting a symphony); so too, a commonplace way of 
talking can be employed to accomplish a variety of different purposes. It is the actual 
range of purposes for which these commonplace ways of talking are employed (versus 
the otherwise potentially infinite but unrealized or unemployed purposes) which 
distinguish those commonplaces as repertoires. Addressing this point, Wetherell and 
Potter (1992: 90-91, emphasis in original) state: 
Interpretive repertoires are pre-eminently a way of understanding the content of 
discourse and how that content is organized. Although stylistic and grammatical 
elements are sometimes closely associated with this organization, our analytic focus 
is not a linguistic one; it is concerned with language use, what is achieved by that 
use and the nature of the interpretive resources that allow that achievement. 
Now, one way that this emphasis on use is relevant for the analytic work in 
this chapter is that one could say that these speakers all employ the same repertoire 
in pursuing the argumentative tacks that they do in their talk. That is, all of them 
make use of what we might regard as the same assumptions in order to arrive at very 
different argumentative outcomes. So, even while the argumentative upshot of the talk 
we have examined here is very similar in that it involves legitimating u. s. foreign 
policy abroad, it is nevertheless still possible to provide examples where sensitivity 
to cultural difference might be employed to argue against the legitimacy of that 
policy. That is, assumptions about cultural sensitivity could be deployed to condemn 
u. s. foreign policy. For example, consider the following discussion in Edward Said's 
Covering Islam (1981: 101, italics in original): 
I think it is both wrong and foolish to regard "Islam" as a block, just as I think it 
is bad political judgement to treat "America" as if it were an injured person rather 
than a complex system. Therefore I believe that we need to know more about the 
world, not less; we should consequently expect higher standards of reporting, more 
sophistication of information, more sensitive and accurate accounts of what is 
taking place than we are now getting. But this certainly means getting well beyond 
what is commonly available to newsmen and newswomen who work in a society 
(a) whose awareness of the non-Western world is essentially determined either by 
crisis or by unconditional ethnocentrism, (b) whose ability to build an elaborate 
structure of information for itself out of quickly gathered cliches and narrowly 
defined self-interest is remarkable, and (c) whose history of interaction with the 
highly diverse Islamic peoples has been shaped recently by oil and by rulers (like 
the ex-shah) whose alliance with the United States brings the limited, badly 
underexamined rewards of "modernization" and anticommunism. 
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Getting beyond all this will be difficult indeed. Consider that the 
correspondents of most of the major American newspapers and television networks 
struggle heroically to fulfil an unremitting duty to bring back a story. Yet usually 
they do not know the language of the area they cover, they have no background 
in the area, they are removed after a short tour of duty even after beginning to 
make important contributions. No matter how gifted the individual, he or she 
cannot hope to report places as complex as Iran or Turkey or Egypt without some 
training and a lengthy term of residence in the place. 
The particular observations raised here about the nature of u. s. journalistic practice 
is somewhat evocative of the talk we have seen in Extract 6.2 above. One distinction, 
however, is that the argumentative upshot is very different indeed. Where in the talk 
we examined above, the speaker argues for the legitimacy of u. s. policy (or rather, 
he works actually to obviate the need for that policy to be made accountable), here 
u. s. policy is held to account, and for very different ends. The implication made 
available in this passage is that insensitivity to differences in foreign cultural values 
results in the distorted representation of those values so as to obscure the rationale 
informing actions of those non-Westerners involved. Thus, to say `We don't 
understand Arab culture' would be a way of calling for an engagement of that culture 
in order to make available alternative explanations of its members' activities - 
explanations otherwise obscured when informed by Western cultural understandings. 
Journalists would thus be encouraged to remain in foreign locations for extensive 
periods. This is in marked contrast to the argumentative work in Extract 6.2 where 
speaker VE works to detail precisely what it is those foreign values entail ('They start 
thinking well- "Well accepting bribes is normal- uh- you know, as a way of life, I 
give bribes, they give me bribes and it's okay"', lines 41-43). This construal, in turn, 
very nicely attends to the potential for the corporate policy (of short-term 
assignments) to be construed in exactly the terms provided for in Said's account. This 
is one example of where we can see how argumentative work is situated in a 
rhetorical field of contrastive accounts: it attends to the demands for accountability 
which those explanations make relevant in the reworking of the assumptions involved. 
Now, all of this is rather interesting as a way of discussing argumentative 
work, and is informed rather nicely with the notion of repertoire. One problem 
though that this entails examining the criteria by which repertoire is to be defined. 
Simply put, to what extent can one be said to be using the same repertoire if and 
when it is employed to such different (and, as here, often diametrically opposed) 
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argumentative ends? In particular, if accounts are variable and are contingent upon 
the situation of their use; then in what way can the similarity in those accounts be 
established? By what criteria can the sameness of an account be determined seeing 
that its use will not provide a basis upon which to judge (unless, otherwise, we 
concede that all accounts are unique given that all argumentative circumstances are 
unique)? " 
A reflexive move - and this is what Potter refers to as the inherently 
reflexive aspect of doing discourse analysis in the first place (Potter, 1988) - is one 
that would draw attention to how the term repertoire in its use here does the 
rhetorical work of constituting the similarity. That is, in making the comparison 
between the different argumentative contexts implied by the term repertoire, and in 
making the claim, for example, that these different speakers employ the same 
repertoire to very different effect, this would itself be to produce the similarity as 
such. That this is the case need not, however, be regarded as a methodological 
shortcoming since any discursive product is rhetorical in this same sense. To 
problematise the notion of repertoire by explicitly taking note of how what is 
constituted as the same is employed to different argumentative effect (just as is done 
here above), is no less a rhetorical work than to establish its similarity as such. The 
dilemma involved, therefore, is worked up as a dilemma. Its dilemmaticity is no less 
constituted than is the similarity made available with the term repertoire. " 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the way in which speakers work to 
make a range of assumptions concerning the nature of cultural sensitivity available 
in their talk. Unlike previous analytic chapters where our concern was principally 
with the relevance of cultural sensitivity as a way of foreclosing the negative construal 
of speakers' talk, here we examined how accountability for an awareness of and 
sensitivity to cultural difference is employed to argue for the legitimacy of specific 
activities - activities that might otherwise be made accountable as instances of 
insensitivity. Thus, we saw how a range of different activities - including u. s. 
involvement in the Persian Gulf War as well as foreign corporate involvement in the 
Middle East - are legitimated as instances of sensitivity to cultural difference. We 
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also saw how making available the relevance of these assumptions is also employed 
rhetorically to undermine alternative accounts. In this way, speakers are able to 
employ what might otherwise serve as the basis for drawing negative inferences as 
instead providing the basis to infer sensitivity to cultural difference. Thus, it appears 
that cultural sensitivity and the critique that is involved in the assumptions it entails 
are not simply straightforward matters by which foreign involvement in the Middle 
East is criticised, but that the significance of those assumptions is worked up in the 
argumentative contexts in which its relevance is provided for. That the critique of 
cultural (in)sensitivity is worked up in this way is an indication of the flexibility with 
which speakers manage the accountability of actions. 
Notes 
1. As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, these interviews were conducted in Kuwait over a ten-month 
period in the year immediately following the cessation of armed hostilities between the United States 
and Iraq - from October 1991 to July 1992. As a matter of some controversy, speakers attended to 
the issue as one holding significant implications for the legitimacy of U. S. and other foreign 
involvement in the region. 
2. Again, as pointed out in previous chapters, drawing attention to the fact that it is speaker AP who 
undertakes this work is not to attribute the onus of responsibility to her for the sanctioning of the 
account which is accomplished with and in the exchange. As with all interaction, the work that is 
accomplished is a result of joint, interactionally managed collusion on the part of the interlocutors 
involved. 
3. These assumptions informing a Parsonian theoretical approach constitute, of course, some of the 
fundamental problematics to which an ethnomethodological sociology is addressed (Schegloff, 1991, 
Heritage, 1984; Hilbert, 1992). Of principal concern for us here, however, is the way in which the 
speakers in this encounter orient to these assumptions as unproblematically relevant for informing the 
account they jointly develop; and how in so doing, they thereby constitute the encounter as one for 
which such assumptions are available - as an encounter which is, in this sense, about these 
issues. 
4. For a discussion of the deployment of metonymy in political rhetoric, see Reicher, 1991 and Herera 
and Reicher, 1993. 
5. The subtle work of attending to an event as both complainable but not accountable similarly takes 
place in the exchange that appears in Antaki, in press. 
6. Wetherell and Potter (1992), in their discussion of culture talk (culture-as-heritage, culture-as- 
therapy, culture-as-ideology), similarly note how providing for the relevance of cultural identity attends 
to a range of contrastive argumentative positions. Citing Cowlishaw's (1988) critique of anthropological 
writing, they refer to her work in noting how "this form of discourse `freezes' culture. The emphasis 
on the archaic and on the `pure' culture of the past neatly separates culture from politics" (ibid.: 129). 
Elaborating further, they remark upon how `culture has this aura of niceness, of progressiveness and 
humanitarianism. It covers over the messy business of domination and uneven development through 
advocacy of respect and tolerance for differences. Colonial history can be reconstructed as a story of 
clashing values, the modern against the traditional, as opposed to a story of conflicting interests, power 
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relations and exploitation. There is an inevitability and acceptability in the notion of `culture contact' 
not found in the rhetoric of annexation, conquest and oppression' (1992: 137). In terms of the 
conversational interaction under consideration in the analysis of Extract 6.2 here, it is worth noting the 
way that speaker VE attends to the potential for u. s. activities to be construed as accountably initiating 
violent conflict and also of how the assumptions made relevant are employed to inform accounts of 
both military involvement and corporate involvement, which are themselves mutually supportive. 
7. This explanatory analogy involves making available a range of assumptions regarding the nature of 
corporate interests in the region which is a persistent theme throughout the corpus of analytic data on 
which this thesis is based. What is interesting about this theme for our concerns here is that the 
assumptions developed in the one case (corporate involvement) are made available to provide for the 
adequacy of assumptions in the analogous case (involvement in violent conflict). This analogy is 
elaborated upon by this same speaker at a latter point in the interview: 
1 VE: uh- uh- the- the key to being happy in the Middle East as it is and- and 
2 working in Thailand or anywhere else I think is that you have to be adaptable, 
3 <P you have to be flexible obviously P>, but you also have to have the 
4 ability to see things from a different perspective, and uh- i- if you don't, you'll 
5 be frustrated yourSELF because you don't understand why= THEY'RE not 
6 doing what you expect them to do. You have to understand that their- their uh- 
7 priorities are different. They have it- uh- a different set of priorities enTIREly, 
8 uh- generally, and that u=h- you- you have to accept that. You're in their 
9 country and- and if they figure it's more important uh- to take a three-hour 
10 siesta than to uh- process your visa applications or whatever it is, hey, that's 
11 the way it is. It's their country. Uh- you have your priorities, they have their's 
12 and you were probably brought there because your priorities ARE different, 
13 because you feel the most important thing is to provide great service to your 
14 guests or "to maintain the=- the electric" uh- "plant working twenty-four 
15 hours a day", which uh- the local people don't seem to put much importance 
16 in so they brought you in to- to see that it was operated that way, but you got 
17 to understand their perspective, it doesn't mean you have to be an expert in 
18 their culture but you have to have some notion of it and say "Okay, they see it 
19 differently and so we have to put a great emphasis on this to make sure that it- 
20 it works", 
Alterity is here the constitutive assumption which introduces not only the problematics to which 
resolution is to be sought, but also the very resources through which that resolution is provided for as 
well. It is the demand for an `ability to see things from a different perspective' (line 4) that entails the 
sustaining of that perspective as different, as Other. 
Here we might just also note about this talk how providing for the relevance of a distinction 
between flexibility and the adopting of the viewpoint of the Other is productive in foreclosing the 
potential for the sustaining of difference in perspective itself to be made accountable as motivated (' <P 
you have to be flexible obviously P>, but you also have to have the ability to see things from a 
different perspective', lines 3-4). At the same time, awareness of difference in perspective is without 
content - that is, defined negatively in terms of a lack of prejudicial expectations ('if you don't, you'll 
be frustrated yourSELF because you don't understand why= THEY'RE not doing what you expect 
them to do', lines 4-6). While reflexively attending to the situated implications of the talk itself, here 
speaker VE also continues to develop the substance of what he takes the alternative perspective to 
entail - viz., lengthy and counter-expedient bureaucratic procedures (three-hour siestas, an inadequate 
standard of service, etc. ). As elsewhere, the implication here is that to demand the adoption of 
contrastive values which are regarded as characteristic of Western cultural expectations would be 
tantamount to cultural insensitivity. Thus, the implicit argument is that not only is the sustaining of 
difference and the use of foreign (Western) expertise necessary as a means for respecting difference, 
but it is essential thereto. 
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8. In the period immediately following the Gulf War, the policy of countries throughout the region had 
a profound effect in displacing the diaspora community of Palestinians who had come to settle in the 
area since 1948 (see Brand, 1995 and related discussion in Frisch, 1997). 
9. Notice here that the question of Israeli accountability is never raised as a relevant concern in this 
talk. That is, while the matter of Palestinian national identity is made available as problematic, its 
relation to Zionist identity and the range of problematics potentially attendant thereto is not made 
relevant. 
10. In Vygotsky's research, this notion is somewhat analogous to the concept of tool-in-use (see 
Ratner, 1991). 
11. This problem is referred to by Edwards (1997) as `Whorf's dilemma' (cited in MacMillan, 1996: 
96). 
12. The notion of repertoire has variously been criticised as either belying of a `cognitive turn' (Button 
and Sharrock, 1992; cited in Edwards, 1997: 141, n. 21) or else as some form of reification (Curt, 
1994) - as `an autonomous thing-in-itself' (48), a construct of `knowledge-mongerers who are also 
critics of knowledge-mongering' (86; in reference to Potter and Wetherell, 1992 and Edwards and 
Potter, 1992). As an ethnomethodologically informed, reflexively brought-off undertaking, discourse 
analytic work would see repertoire as a useful heuristic, worked up in situ for the enterprise of 
situating its own analytic undertaking within a rhetorical context that provides for its significance. That 
discourse analytic, discursive psychological or any other discursive activity does so only works 
reflexively to display the very point it sets out to make regarding the situatedly contingent nature of 
the endeavour. 
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Chapter 7 
A-CONCLUSION 
This thesis has been concerned to explore the details of a particular problematic in 
talk where speakers account for Western involvement abroad. Specifically, this 
involves the argumentative circumstances of attending to demands for accountability 
to competing sets of assumptions about the nature of prejudice on the one hand and 
of cultural awareness on the other. Throughout the analytic chapters, the (often 
implicit) claim has been that managing the tension between these conflicting demands 
is definitive of the discursive undertaking by which speakers make sense of their own 
experience in the Middle East and, more generally, of Western experience abroad. 
Issues of identity (both Western and non-Western) as well as issues of how identity 
is constituted as such are matters which are taken up by participants in the talk as 
their own concerns (Heritage, 1995; Schegloff, 1997; Miller and Silverman, 1995). 
Thus, we saw, for example, in Chapter 4, how in their talk about race and 
nationality, participants attend to the potential for their remarks to be construed as 
prejudicially motivated; and yet that in the very act of so doing, a conversational 
context is then created wherein speakers might be construed as insensitive to and/or 
unaware of cultural difference. Attending to one set of demands for accountability, 
therefore, creates the context in which another set of demands is (at least potentially) 
made relevant. Subsequent efforts to attend to those new demands - that is , efforts 
to foreclose the construal of one's talk as made possible in the prior talk - further 
creates a context in which the motivation of one's remarks might again be construed 
as motivated by prejudice. In this way, the two assumptions are co-implicationally 
related. It is in managing the tension between these two competing sets of demands 
which is the principal activity by which talk about Western involvement abroad is 
constituted. 
Further, we also saw how this is a feature not simply of the concerns which 
speakers take as the topic of their talk, but also an aspect which is inherent to their 
very participation in the interactional circumstances where the relevance of their status 
as experts (that is, as Western expatriates) is implicitly made available as providing 
the speakers with the warrant for whatever observations that they may care to develop 
in and with that talk. The tension involved in such an encounter is that of attending 
to both category entitlement and issues of stake-and-interest. Managing this tension 
involves working so that the relevance of one's status as expatriate is made available 
to the extent that it provides the speaker with the epistemological warrant for his or 
her claims about Western experience abroad, but not to the extent that it implicates 
him or her in the demands for accountability which those claims are employed to 
raise. Doing this involves effecting some rather delicate and inferentially subtle 
discursive work. One of the tasks of this thesis has been to explore exactly how this 
is accomplished. Along the way, this has meant explicating a dialogic model of 
interaction in which conversational contributions are regarded as responsively oriented 
to their potential reception. In this way, a given discursive position is seen as 
essentially and necessarily contrastive (Billig, 1987/96; Clark and Holquist, 1984; 
Holquist, 1990). 
The analytic chapters were also linked to various related scholarship wherein 
issues of prejudice and of the representation of cultural difference are taken up as 
professional analytic concerns (as opposed to that of the participants in the talk). One 
of the principal features of that scholarship that is not unlike the mundane 
conversational interaction we examined is that descriptions of the cultural and ethnic 
Other are considered for their relationship to the circumstances of their production. 
Thus, we saw in Chapter 2 how scrutiny of descriptive practices in the literature of 
Orientalism, in anthropological writing at a more general level, and in mundane 
conversational interaction are (often implicitly) directed at relating these to the 
circumstantial contingencies which are said to account for their production. At the 
same time, the reflexive implications of such observations (about the situated 
contingency of descriptive practices) are taken up as theoretical considerations in that 
scholarship. In this way, the problematics surrounding the warranting of claims with 
reference to their status as transcendentally valid (value neutral, objective, unaffected 
by considerations of their productive circumstances) is taken up as both a topic of 
analytic concern and as a theoretical problematic. 
Not unlike in the conversation we considered in the analytic chapters, the 
tension in much of the scholarship we considered is thus that of managing the extent 
to which it is implicated in the very demands for accountability that it works to make 
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relevant. Just as in talk where speakers work to manage the extent to which they are 
implicated in the very demands for accountability that they act to make relevant 
(working to foreclose a construal of prejudice, but only to the extent that doing so 
does not implicate them as culturally insensitive and vice-versa), so too much of the 
scholarship we considered takes up the issue of situated contingency to the extent that 
the analytic claims (about contingency) are made available but not to the extent that 
the activity of making such claims is itself included within its purview. It is a case of 
reflexive policing or monitoring that Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) refer to as 
ontological gerrymandering. As they suggest, this is perhaps an inevitable feature of 
any theoretical activity which has the social as its concern since to speak (or write) 
meaningfully (or with any sense) about social reality, one must privilege their own 
analytic activity, excluding it from the scrutiny that it works to bring off, even (and 
perhaps especially) where that scrutiny takes scrutinising practices (and the activity 
of objectification) as its object. ' The suspension of reflexive implications in the 
management of the extent to which situated contingency is made accountable is 
constitutive of the activity of sociological theorisation (for a evocative essay on this 
matter, see Goffman, 1981: 124-159). 2 The selective review of the scholarship we 
considered in Chapters 1 and 2 are a demonstration of this point. 
Mundane Navel Gazing 
One area of speculative concern which has some considerable bearing on these 
analytic results is that of a body of recent theoretical work in contemporary social 
theory. This work addresses some of the theoretical implications involved with the 
observations that descriptive practices are worked up by participants as problematic. 
In particular, the concern here is with how the sorts of discursive practices that we 
have examined throughout this thesis involve talk where issues of the problematicity 
of perspectival limitation are attended to as such, and with the reflexive consequences 
this holds for a theory of the social. In these terms, then, the significance of the talk 
that we have examined does not lie in the documenting of the details of the 
perspectival limitations of participants - that is, in the contingency of their 
descriptive practices3 - but rather in how perspectival limitations and the potential 
for the transcendence thereof are worked up as participants concerns in the first place. 
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That is, speakers display, in and through their talk, a regard for the encounter as one 
in which the potential for the transcendence of perspectival limitations in pervasively 
relevant as both a topic of talk and as an effect brought about with that topicalisation. 
It is a concern with these sorts of issues that the discussion in Bruno Latour's 
We Have Never Been Modern (1993) is directed. Specifically, Latour discusses this 
under the rubrics of purification and hybridization (or translation). The details of 
Latour's discussion of these matters is often somewhat involved, but the point which 
he works to develop is rather straightforward (if not complex): that a deconstructive 
critique of a Cartesian dualism is necessarily related - inherently and 
definitionally - to the very assumptions being subjected to critique/interrogation. The 
making-an-issue-of-perspectival-limitation (that is, the problematising of the 
contingency of perspective as such) is itself an activity that is subject to the very sorts 
of implicit demands for accountability which it is employed to raise. In other words, 
the very activity whereby one works to make visible the assumption of a distinction 
between subject and object - between one's view and that of which one's view is 
said to be a representation - is an activity where the assumption of the subject-object 
dichotomy is itself suspended. At the same time, however, and with the very same 
gesture, the suspension of that assumption itself necessarily and paradoxically entails 
its availability in order to render the deconstructive reading meaningful in the first 
place. In other words, only in the context of making it visible that a distinction 
between subject and object is itself worked up is the activity of neutralising that 
dichotomy rendered meaningful. 
Similarly, only in the context where a distinction between subject and object 
is suspended is the distinction rendered meaningful. The activity of referring to either 
assumption is meaningful only as informed against the background of its opposite. 
That is, hybridization entails purification and purification likewise entails 
hybridization. There can thus be no purification (that is, action of distinguishing 
between subject and object entailed in problematising the objectification which takes 
place in discursive interaction) which can be meaningfully discussed except as against 
the background assumption of hybridization (the neutralization of suspension of that 
distinction) and vice-versa. The purity of subject and object is necessarily assumed 
in the activity of translating between the two. 
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It is in this sense that Latour claims that we have never been modern. If 
purification and hybridization necessarily entail one another, then modernity - as an 
instance of exclusive purification - has, of course, never existed as such. Latour's 
claims here are not to do with issues of the temporal but rather with the 
epistemological considerations by which a temporal distinguishing of the 
Enlightenment is given purchase, and with the how the basis for that temporality is 
itself made possible. Latour thus works reflexively to reproblematise the 
deconstructive project of the Enlightenment from within its own terms (1993: 11-12): 
So long as we consider these two practices of translation and purification 
separately, we are truly modern - that is, we willingly subscribe to the critical 
project, even though that project is developed only through the proliferation of 
hybrids down below. As soon as we direct our attention simultaneously to the work 
of purification and the work of hybridization, we immediately stop being wholly 
modern, and our future begins to change. At the same time we stop having been 
modern, because we become retrospectively aware that the two sets of practices 
have always already been at work in the historical period that is ending. Our past 
begins to change. Finally, if we have never been modern - at least in the way 
criticism tells the story - the tortuous relations that we have maintaining with 
other nature-cultures would also be transformed. Relativism, domination, 
imperialism, false consciousness, syncretism - all the problems that 
anthropologists summarize under the loose expression of `Great Divide' - would 
be explained differently, thereby modifying comparative anthropology. 
The relation this has to the analytic work of the thesis involves the way that 
purification and hybridization are dealt with in talk where speakers attend to the 
reflexive implications of their own conversational contributions as potentially 
implicating them in the very demands for accountability which they work to make 
relevant in their own talk. 
The Post-Colonial Middle Kingdom 
In the context of conceptualising the cultural and ethnic other, Hall (1992) takes up 
this concern for attending to the reflexive implications of a deconstructive reading in 
his discussion of the post-colonial. Hall's discussion has important implications for 
the talk that constitutes the interview corpus we have considered. Specifically, the 
attending to of mutually exclusive and yet co-constitutive concerns (between issues 
of cultural sensitivity/awareness and prejudice/racism) itself constitutes the discursive 
practice of the post-colonial. For example, the implicit critique of racism in the 
conversational interaction we considered in Chapter 4 does not merely inform such 
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talk, but is constitutive of such talk. It is in this way that that talk is relevant to the 
issues which Hall raises (and which Latour takes up at a more general level) because 
the talk that has the conflicting demands between cultural sensitivity and prejudice as 
its concern is definitive of the post-colonial. In citing (Hall, 1996: 245) Gramsci's 
Quaderni III (referring to his own prior citation in Hall, 1988: 138) on the notion of 
ideological weighting, Hall remarks (245-246, italics in original): 
What, in their different ways these theoretical descriptions are attempting to 
construct is a notion of a shift or a transition conceptualised as the reconfiguration 
of a field, rather than a movement of linear transcendence between two mutually 
exclusive states. Such transformations are not only not completed but they may not 
be best captured with a paradigm which assumes that all major historical shifts are 
driven by a necessitarian logic towards a teleological end. [... ] [A]II the key 
concepts in the `post-colonial', as in the general discourse of the `posts', are 
operating, as Derrida would put it, `under erasure'. They have been subjected to 
a deep and thoroughgoing critique, exposing their assumptions as a set of 
foundational effects. But this deconstruction does not abolish them, in the classic 
movement of supersession, an Aufgehebung. It leaves them as the only conceptual 
instruments and tools with which to think about the present - but only if they are 
deployed in their deconstructed form. They are, to use another, more 
Heideggerian, formulation, which Ian Chambers, for example prefers, `a presence 
that exists in abeyance' (Chambers, 1994). 
This `presence that exists in abeyance' is for the speakers in the interview material 
we have examined, the use of the very sorts of talk which occasion their own 
deconstruction. That is, speakers employ ways of talking, working to make particular 
assumptions about the nature of cultural difference available, and in so doing occasion 
the very sorts of concerns (for matters of prejudice) which a deconstruction of such 
assumptions makes available and indeed necessitates. At the same time, the 
deconstructive concern with prejudice is co-constitutive of the very assumptions 
regarding cultural difference which give rise to them. Speakers orient to the situation 
of their talk as one in which the concern for objectification is potentially relevant, and 
work to foreclose the potentially damaging inferences that these issue raise vis-a-vis 
their own talk and their contribution to the circumstances in which that talk is 
generated (the interview situation). At the same time, to even pursue the talk by 
which these inferences are occasioned in the first place, speakers must engage in the 
objectifying practices whose production they work to problematise. 
A particularly interesting feature of this talk, however, is that even while 
inhabiting this `Middle Kingdom' as Latour (1993: 89) refers to it, and in attending 
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to the matter of situatedness of viewpoint and the implicit limitations that are entailed 
thereby; participants are nevertheless selective in the way that perspective is made 
relevant. We saw, for example, in different analyses where descriptive practices 
regarding perspectival limitations are deployed either to undermine the view of the 
Other - as with the closing remarks of speaker AP recorded in Extract 5.1 ('but she 
can't help herself, I mean she's been raised that way and- and I see- my comment 
seemed very out of context, it was very very uh- you know, it was a bad thing for 
me to say', lines 94-96) - or else to foreclose the possibility of one's own remarks 
being construed as just so determined or limited - as with remarks of speaker RK 
in his working up of the characterisation of expectations about the Arab Other 
recorded in Extract 3.6 ('That means you go a lot on conjecture, you know, what 
somebody's told you, you know, like uh- like if you touch an Arab with your left 
hand, you know, they'll be just absolutely insulted if you uh- oh what are some of the 
other ones, ', lines 15-19). In such cases, the limitations of situated contingency are 
selectively deployed as a way of attending to accountability. The extent of 
perspectival limitation never includes itself. This is perhaps an inevitable feature of 
any activity whereby one accounts for their social relations (Woolgar and Pawluch, 
1985: 224): 
[One possible] reading of our critique [of selectively attending to the issue of 
perspectival limitation] is that the kind of inconsistencies we identify are an 
inevitable feature both of certain social problems arguments and, more generally, 
of the same style of sociological argument as it applies to other substantive areas. 
In this reading, the inconsistencies ... are unavoidable. 
They are not mere 
technical difficulties in social problems arguments, but pervasive features of all 
attempts to explain social phenomena. 
That is, to the extent that an account is provided, it must necessarily exclude itself - 
even in and through the very activity of attending to itself. Interestingly, in such 
accounts, the very inconsistency is paradoxically consistent with itself since the very 
point about perspectival limitation can only be made in the doing, in the 
demonstration thereof (Ashmore, 1989). 
What is also interesting here, as a comment on future investigation, is that 
attending to the selectivity of attending to perspectival limitation can itself be 
employed to attend to the potential that a reading such as the one I have developed 
here can have to undermine their position. Further, it can be employed infinitely. In 
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other words, the very point that I am making here is that speakers attend to 
perspectival limitations selectively as a way of accounting for themselves and in some 
way of justifying their presence in the Middle East. They concede limitation in 
perspective as a way of doing this in complicated and interesting ways that reflexively 
attend to matters of their own stake-and-interest, etc. Now, future research might 
want to consider how comments on that activity (such as the comments I make above) 
and the implications for accountability raised thereby are themselves attended to at a 
further step removed, as it were. This relates to infinite defeasibility as discussed not 
only in Garfinkel's work but also - to keep the theme of the thesis going - in the 
work of Bakhtin. There is no last word. This is taken up in Latour's remarks about 
the recomposition and extension of social linkage (1993: 108,109, emphasis in 
original): 
Relativists, who strive to put all cultures on an equal footing by viewing all of 
them as equally arbitrary codings of a natural world whose production is 
unexplained, do not succeed in respecting the efforts collectives make to dominate 
one another. And universalists on the other hand, are incapable of understanding 
the deep fraternity of collectives, since they are obliged to offer access to Nature 
to Westerners alone, and imprison all others in social categories from which they 
will escape only be becoming scientific, modern and Westernized. [... ] Modern 
knowledge and power are different not in that they would escape at last the tyranny 
of the social, but in that they add many more hybrids in order to recompose the 
social link and extend its scale. 
Further investigation of talk where questions of prejudice and culture are at issue 
would cease working to mediate between hybridization or purification in favour of 
one over the other. This would have to be the case if one is to pursue any 
investigation of that sort of talk since the tension between the two is constitutive of 
that talk in the first place. A far more interesting question (and, if Latour is to be 
believed, the only question that remains) is that of how that tension is sustained - 
of how deconstructive efforts survive their own effects, and indeed, work to extend 
their scope. 
(Gratuitous Set of Reflexive) Notes 
1.1 said all this already, didn't I? Yeah, well, you would have to do so though, wouldn't you, since 
to he consistent with your point about how scrutinizing practices privilege themselves, then your 
scrutinizing practice (of scrutinizing the scrutiny of scrutinizing practices) must itself be privileged. And 
the only way to do that would be to include itself in the scope of that privilege - as a way of 
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excluding itself from the reflexive implications raised thereby, and to include that practice with a 
comment such as this one. * 
* And one such as this upon that. ' 
2. As demonstrated in these remarks themselves where the situated contingency of remarks about 
situated contingency are themselves contingent upon the analytic circumstances requiring their 
problematisation or working up as an analytic concern attendant to the writing of a thesis - and in 
these remarks where that activity is objectified. ' 
3. Though, of course, this is a concern as well in that considering the efforts of speakers either to 
transcend or else selectively to implicate themselves and others in the assumptions for accountability 
made relevant in talk about perspectival limitations itself entails working that activity up as situationally 
contingent. 
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APPENDIX 
Transcription Conventions 
The interview extracts that appear above have been transcribed using a set of 
conventions which employ a number of modifications to the well-known system of 
transcription initially developed by Gail Jefferson (1985) as extended by John Du Bois 
(1991) and his colleagues (Du Bois et al. 1993). Among these modifications, several 
have been omitted in the transcription extracts above where they were not significant 
to the analysis. Other conventions which do appear include the following: 
ALL CAPS indicate added 
emphasis 
that alREADy they're feeling 
the loss of identity 
emphasis of first-person, 
singular pronoun indicated with 
boldface 
syllable lengthening indicated 
with an equals sign 
false starts indicated with a 
dash 
syllable of indistinguishable 
talk indicated with `x' 
doubtful transcription 
indicated with angular 
bracketed `x' 
third-party reported or quoted 
speech indicated with quotation 
marks 
statements accompanied with a 
speeding up of delivery and 
lowering of volume indicated with 
angular bracketed `P' 
syllable of laughter indicated 
with `@' 
So I think of it as a very 
enriching experience 
so you don't rea =11y have to 
work very hard to maintain a 
I think they like it because- I 
really think that most- the 
reason- the most important 
what is also true is that without 
decent xx we have 
I'll <x keep to x> the point 
then 
the third year he said "I drink 
only Beefeaters" 
you'll tend to see other people, 
<P or other races P>, the way 
the people around you see them 
but they loved it @@ anyhow 
syllables of talk co-articulated 
with laughter indicated with 
epenthetic `@' 
laughter across and throughout 
extended segment of talk indicated 
with angular bracketed `@' 
audible ingressive breath 
indicated with `(H)' 
audible egressive breath 
indicated with `(Hx)' 
omission of material indicated 
with ellipsis in parentheses 
deletion of material indicated 
in single parentheses 
editorial remarks indicated in 
double parentheses 
pause between speakers of less 
than one second 
pause between speakers of more 
than one second 
voiceless alveolar affricate 
indicated with `tsh' 
wait a se@co@nd no@w 
I wanted to get <@ as far away 
as I@> possibly could 
and (H) I walked out and it was 
just sort of that image that you 
families aren't here (Hx) that 
they can do whatever they want 
(... ) 
one day when I was working in 
(NAME OF U. S. STATE 
we passed these areas like 
Nugra and Hawally ((SUBURBS 
OF KUWAIT CITY)) which are 
tsh they don't have to come 
down here and make 
voiceless alveolar click 
indicated with `tsk' 
Arabic loan words indicated with 
`<AR>' 
lilting, child-like voice quality 
indicated with '<CH>' 
tsk I didn't know what to 
expect 
wearing a< AR dishdash AR > 
< CH I would like to play with 
the toy also CH > 
Lines in the transcription are numbered for ease of reference. Speaker overlap is 
indicated with squared brackets. Where ambiguity might arise, brackets are 
distinguished in form, either with doubling of squared brackets: 
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1 AP: exhilarating, in some ways, but it was also very stressful. And it 
2 was very difficult. [So the] first year was like- I felt like- I felt like 
3 KM: [Yeah. ] 
4 AP: [[after]] going through that first year, <P because I lived with my 
5 KM: [[Yeah. ]] 
6 AP: in-laws in a home where no one spoke English and it was 
7 traditional P> 
or with reference numbering: 
1 JL: Do you mean a Yemeni, an E[1 gyptian, a Leba 1] 
2 DF: [1 xx- x- 1] 
3 JL: [2 nese, a Jordanian, 2] a [3 Palestinian, 3] a Moroccan, 
4 AL: [2 No, Egyptians aren't Arabs. 2] 
5 DF: [3 Well hang on. xa Gulf. 3] 
6 JL: [4 xx. 4] 
7 DF: [4 Hang on. 4] 
8 AL: [4 No no 4] no no no. 
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